PEOPLE OF MI V JERVON SAMWON WARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 24, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280672
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-000553-FH
JERVON SAMWON WARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Fort Hood and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less
than murder, MCL 750.84, and was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 83
to 180 months’ imprisonment. He appeals as of right. We affirm his conviction but remand for
resentencing. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s conviction arises from an incident in which he and a co-assailant accused the
victim of stealing property belonging to defendant. During a physical altercation between
defendant and the victim, the co-assailant shot the victim in the back. When the victim collapsed
to the floor, defendant repeatedly stomped on his head and threatened to kill him.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of
assault with the intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. We disagree.
This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence challenges in a criminal trial de novo.
People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 443; 709 NW2d 152 (2005). In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, this Court determines whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, would warrant a trier of fact in finding that all the elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 5; 715 NW2d 44
(2006). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to
prove the elements of the crime.” People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 738; 705 NW2d 728
(2005). In determining whether sufficient evidence had been presented to support a conviction,
“this Court must not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or
the credibility of witnesses.” People v Stiller, 242 Mich App 38, 42; 617 NW2d 697 (2000).
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The elements of assault with intent to do great bodily harm are: “(1) an attempt or threat
with force or violence to do corporal harm to another (an assault), and (2) an intent to do great
bodily harm less than murder.” People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703 NW2d 230
(2005), quoting People v Parcha, 227 Mich App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). Great bodily
harm is defined as “a physical injury that could seriously and permanently harm the health or
function of the body.” CJI2d 17.7(4). “Assault with intent to do great bodily harm is a specific
intent crime,” and the trier of fact may infer intent from the defendant’s conduct. Parcha, supra
at 239. “Because of the difficulty of proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to establish the element of intent.” People v McRunels, 237 Mich App
168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the
prosecution. Id. It is solely within the province of the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and
assess the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748,
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Therefore, “it is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to
determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to
be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury properly found
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder. After the co-assailant shot the victim in the back and the victim collapsed on the floor,
defendant stomped on the victim’s head numerous times, although it was apparent the victim
could not rise from the floor or shield himself from the kicks. After defendant finished stomping
on the victim, he asked the co-assailant for the gun so he could “finish off” the victim.
Defendant’s aggressive and violent actions toward the victim sufficiently establish that he
possessed the intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. Although defendant argues that
the victim only received a bruise and thus, his conviction for assault with intent to do great
bodily harm is not supported, physical injury is not required for the elements of the crime to be
established. People v Harrington, 194 Mich App 424, 430; 487 NW2d 479 (1992). Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant also argues that offense variables (OVs) 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, and 12 were misscored.
We agree in part.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to score points for an offense variable for
abuse of discretion. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). In
scoring a particular offense variable, a trial court’s determination need only be supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 142-143; 715 NW2d 778
(2006). If there is any evidence to support the trial court’s scoring decision, it will be upheld on
appeal. Hornsby, supra.
Defendant claims that OVs 1 (aggravated use of weapon), 2 (lethal potential of weapon
possessed), and 3 (physical injury to victim) were incorrectly scored on the basis of the assault
with intent to commit murder committed by the co-assailant, who shot the victim, but not by
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defendant himself. The trial court scored defendant similar to the co-assailant on the basis that,
in multiple offender cases, if one offender is assessed points under an OV, all offenders must be
assessed the same number of points. MCL 777.31(2)(b); MCL 777.32(2); MCL 777.33(2)(a).
However, according to the holding in People v Johnston, 478 Mich 903, 904; 732 NW2d 531
(2007), this is not a multiple offender case because defendant was not charged with an offense
related to the shooting and was convicted of a separate crime from that of the co-assailant.
Therefore, in accordance with Johnson, this case is not a “multiple offender case,” and defendant
should not have been scored on this basis. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for the
rescoring of OVs 1, 2, and 3, and for resentencing based on the new guidelines range.
In regard to defendant’s other scoring challenges, a trial court is to score 50 points for
OV 7 if “[a] victim was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed
to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.” MCL
777.37(1)(a). Here, as the victim lay on the ground after having been shot in the back, defendant
repeatedly stomped his head while yelling, “I’m going to kill your bitch ass for stealing from
me.” The stompings were described by the victim and witnesses as “hard” and repetitive. The
assault by defendant on the victim was clearly excessively brutal. The evidence also supports
that defendant’s behavior was designed to increase the victim’s fear and anxiety. The factual
review of the crime by the prosecutor at sentencing and in the presentence report relied upon by
the sentencing judge are consistent with the victim’s testimony in every important respect.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in scoring OV 7 at 50 points.
Defendant received ten points under OV 10, which relates to the exploitation of a
vulnerable victim and is to be scored ten points if the offender “exploited a victim’s physical
disability, mental disability, youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused
his or her authority status.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). Here, the victim had just been shot and was
lying on the floor unable to get up or defend himself when defendant repeatedly stomped on his
head. There is factual support for this score.
Defendant was scored one point for OV 12. The trial court may score points, from a
minimum of one to a maximum of 25, for OV 12 if the defendant committed felonious criminal
acts contemporaneously with the sentencing offense. MCL 777.42(1). A contemporaneous
criminal act is one that occurred within 24 hours of the sentencing offense and “has not and will
not result in a separate conviction.” MCL 777.42(2)(a)(ii).
The record reflects that defendant tried to cover up for the co-assailant after the shooting,
although the accessory after the fact charge against defendant was ultimately dismissed.
Initially, defendant stated that he was not at the scene during the incident. When questioned
further, defendant told police that he was on the scene and heard the gunshots but did not know
who fired the shots. The record supports that defendant did indeed know the co-assailant fired
the gun and that he was trying to cover up that person’s involvement in the shooting.
Accordingly, there was a sufficient contemporaneous criminal act to score OV 12 at one point.
See People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 671; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
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Finally, defendant argues that due process requires resentencing because the trial court
enhanced his sentence based on facts neither admitted by him nor proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt in violation of the rule of law set forth in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296;
124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). That claim was rejected by our Supreme Court in
Drohan, supra. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to resentencing on this ground.
Defendant’s conviction is affirmed but the matter is remanded for rescoring OVs 1, 2,
and 3 and for resentencing based upon the new guidelines range. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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