MATTHEW JOSEPH CREHAN V STATE OF MICHIGAN
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MATTHEW JOSEPH CREHAN, a/k/a
MATTHEW CREHAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 10, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN, MUSKEGON
COUNTY, and SIXTIETH DISTRICT COURT,
No. 282883
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 06-044966-AW
Defendants,
and
ROOSEVELT PARK POLICE DEPARTMENT
and OFFICER JARED PASSCHIER,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Donofrio, P.J. and K.F. Kelly and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Roosevelt Park Police Department (RPPD) and RPPD Officer Jared Passchier
appeal as of right from the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition
based on governmental immunity, MCR 2.116(C)(7), and failure to state a cause of action, MCR
2.116(C)(8). We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. This appeal
has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff’s suit arises out of a traffic stop conducted by Passchier, allegedly because
plaintiff was driving with a defective brake light and because Passchier “recognized the vehicle
and was aware that it had an improper plate.” Passchier discovered that plaintiff was driving
with a suspended license, had outstanding warrants, and that the plate was not registered to
plaintiff’s automobile. Plaintiff locked the door and acted as if he was going to drive away until
Passchier threatened to break the window if plaintiff did not get out of the vehicle. Passchier
cuffed and patted plaintiff down, then put him into the police cruiser and read him his rights.
Plaintiff was eventually convicted of driving with a suspended license.
-1-
Plaintiff brought suit against a variety of governmental entities and Passchier, alleging a
number of constitutional and common law claims as well as court rule violations. Defendants all
moved for dismissal based on governmental immunity and failure to state a claim, MCR
2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8).1 Eventually, the trial court dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims for failure
to state a claim except for his gross negligence claim against RPPD and Passchier, for which the
circuit court denied defendants’ motion. The other defendants were dismissed.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for
summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
(1998). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings
alone. Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp, 475 Mich 663, 672; 719 NW2d 1 (2006). All factual
allegations in support of the claim are accepted as true, as well as any reasonable inferences or
conclusions that can be drawn from the facts, and are construed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co v Commodities Export Co, 279 Mich App 662, 670;
___ NW2d ___ (2008). However, a mere statement of a pleader’s conclusions, unsupported by
allegations of fact, will not suffice to state a cause of action. Churella v Pioneer State Mut Ins
Co, 258 Mich App 260, 272; 671 NW2d 125 (2003).
The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401, et seq., provides in relevant
part at MCL 691.1407:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is
immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise
or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided in this act,
this act does not modify or restrict the immunity of the state from tort liability as
it existed before July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the
discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and
employee of a governmental agency, each volunteer acting on behalf of a
governmental agency, and each member of a board, council, commission, or
statutorily created task force of a governmental agency is immune from tort
liability for an injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer,
employee, or member while in the course of employment or service or caused by
the volunteer while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the
following are met:
(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably
believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function.
1
The State of Michigan was never served, and was dismissed from the case.
-2-
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not
amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or
damage.
(3) Subsection (2) does not alter the law of intentional torts as it existed
before July 7, 1986.
***
(7) As used in this section:
(a) “Gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a
substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.
Under the GTLA, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability unless it engaged
in an ultra vires activity or one of the statutory exceptions applies.2 Ross v Consumers Power Co
(On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 620; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). An activity of a sworn law
enforcement officer within the scope of his authority performed on private or public property as
directed or assigned by his employer for the purpose of public safety is a governmental function.
MCL 691.1401(f). Only individuals may be sued for intentional torts under MCL 691.1407(3)
or for gross negligence under MCL 691.1407(2). Odom v Wayne County, ___ Mich ___; ___
NW2d ___ (December 30, 2008), slip op at 18. Although a plaintiff must plead in avoidance of
governmental immunity when suing an agency, an individual defendant must affirmatively plead
the defense. Id. at 19. If an intentional tort is claimed, the court must determine whether the
defendant established that he is entitled to individual governmental immunity by showing the
following:
(a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and the employee
was acting, or reasonably believed that he was acting, within the scope of his
authority,
(b) the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken with malice,
and
(c) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial. [Id. at 20-21.]
If negligence is claimed, the court must follow MCL 691.1407(2) and
. . . determine if the individual caused an injury or damage while acting in the
course of employment or service or on behalf of his governmental employer and
whether:
2
There is no dispute that none of the exceptions is applicable in this case.
-3-
(a) the individual was acting or reasonably believed that he was acting within the
scope of his authority,
(b) the governmental agency was engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function, and
(c) the individual’s conduct amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate
cause of the injury or damage. [Id. at 20.]
The trial court erred in denying RPPD’s motion for summary disposition because under
the circumstances presented, RRPD cannot be sued for intentional tort or gross negligence.
MCL 691.1407(1).
The circuit court also erred in denying Passchier’s motion for summary disposition on the
gross negligence count. Nothing in the facts cited by the trial court identify “conduct so reckless
as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL
691.1407(7)(a). In fact, the sequence of events cited by the trial court describes an ordinary
traffic stop and arrest, and there are no other facts alleged anywhere in the pleadings that would
constitute reckless conduct.
We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of defendants. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
