IN RE SHAYLA DANANE LILIES MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHAYLA DANANE LILIES,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
March 5, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286797
Bay Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-009652-NA
SHELDON LILIES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ERICA NIERNBERG,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio. P.J. and K.F. Kelly and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals of right the order terminating his parental rights to the minor child
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (h), and (k)(ii). We affirm.
Termination of parental rights is appropriate where petitioner proves by clear and
convincing evidence at least one ground for termination. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once this has occurred, the trial court shall terminate the parental rights if it
finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). This Court reviews the
trial court’s findings under the clearly erroneous standard. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593
NW2d 520 (1999).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds were established by
clear and convincing evidence. The condition that led to adjudication was respondent’s sexual
abuse of the minor child’s older half-sister. Respondent pleaded no contest to third-degree
criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to eight to 15 years’ imprisonment. Because
respondent was incarcerated, petitioner was not able to provide any services to him. He also
refused to cooperate with petitioner during the proceedings and did not provide the names of any
relatives who might be suitable placements for the minor child.
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Respondent argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because the
sexual abuse did not directly involve the minor child. Because respondent failed to elaborate on
this argument or cite any authority in connection with it, this argument is considered abandoned.
In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Nonetheless, we find this
argument to be without merit. MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) specifically provides for termination if
sexual abuse involves the child “or a sibling of the child.” Moreover, MCL 712A.2(b)(2) does
not require that the conditions of adjudication be aimed directly at the minor child.
Respondent also appears to be arguing that petitioner should have provided him with a
service plan and should have investigated his family. However, respondent failed to object to the
parent agency treatment plan, which stated that there were no assessed needs for respondent. As
correctly noted by petitioner, respondent may not take a position in the trial court and then seek
redress in an appellate court on the basis of a position contrary to that taken in the trial court. In
re Gazella, supra at 679; Phinney v Verbrugge, 222 Mich App 513, 544; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
Evidence also revealed that respondent failed to cooperate with petitioner, refused to provide any
family history, and did not offer the names of any family members who might be suitable for
placement of the minor child.
The trial court found that, although respondent loved the minor child, he was unable to
provide proper care and custody for her because of his legal issues. Respondent contends that
the trial court’s findings ignore the period of time that the child lived with him and his family.
Respondent cites a letter he wrote to the judge, which was admitted as an exhibit. In this letter,
respondent stated that the child’s mother asked if the child could live with respondent and his
new wife, and he agreed. This letter further shows, at most, that the minor child lived with
respondent for one month. Such a short time frame does not demonstrate respondent’s ability to
provide proper care and custody for the minor child. Moreover, respondent has many years left
on the sentence he received as a result of his criminal conduct, and he will not be available to
provide a proper home for the child during most of her minority.
Respondent contends that trial court clearly erred in finding that termination was in the
child’s best interests. We disagree. The foster care worker opined that respondent’s parental
rights should be terminated because of respondent’s “inability to provide her with stability,
permanence -- um -- a stable home environment, able to provide for her basic needs.” In
addition, evidence revealed that respondent failed to cooperate with petitioner with regard to a
plan to care for the minor child. Respondent again cites his letter to the court, where he stated
that the child meant everything to him and he could not imagine his life without her. However,
this child needed more than respondent’s love. She needed a permanent and stable home, which
respondent was not able to provide. Termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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