LESIA SYROWATKA V COUNTY OF WASHTENAW
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LESIA SYROWATKA,
UNPUBLISHED
March 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 277336
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 05-000203-CK
COUNTY OF WASHTENAW,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The order dismissed plaintiff’s claims for
employment discrimination and retaliation under the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL
37.2101 et seq.1 We affirm.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. The court must consider
the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by
the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). The evidence must be viewed in favor of the party opposing the
motion. Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995). Summary
disposition should be granted if, except concerning the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for gender
discrimination. The CRA prohibits employers from discharging or otherwise discriminating
against an individual because of a person’s gender. MCL 37.2202(1)(a). A plaintiff may prove
her claim based on either direct evidence of discriminatory intent or by indirect or circumstantial
1
Plaintiff was working for defendant as a business analyst in October 2002 when she was
transferred to the position of records supervisor. In August 2003, plaintiff was informed that her
position was being eliminated and her employment terminated as part of a budget reduction plan.
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evidence. Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 132; 666 NW2d
186 (2003).
In cases involving direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff may prove
unlawful discrimination in the same manner as a plaintiff would prove any other
civil case. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001).
We have previously cited with approval the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit’s definition of “‘direct evidence’ as ‘evidence which, if believed,
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating
factor in the employer’s actions.’” Hazle, supra at 462, quoting Jacklyn v
Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp, 176 F3d 921, 926 (CA 6,
1999); Harrison [v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 610; 572 NW2d 679
(1997)].
***
In cases involving indirect or circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must
proceed by using the burden-shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Hazle, supra
at 462; DeBrow [v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After Remand), 463 Mich 534,
540; 620 NW2d 836 (2001)]. This approach allows “a plaintiff to present a
rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from which a factfinder could
infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination.” DeBrow, supra
at 538. To establish a rebuttable prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff
must present evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) her
failure to obtain the position occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination. Hazle, supra at 463; Lytle v Malady (On
Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 172-173; 579 NW2d 906 (1998) (opinion by
WEAVER, J.); see also McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802. Once a plaintiff has
presented a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. Hazle, supra at 464; Lytle, supra at 173 (opinion by
WEAVER, J.). If a defendant produces such evidence, the presumption is
rebutted, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s
reasons were not the true reasons, but a mere pretext for discrimination. Hazle,
supra at 465-466; Lytle, supra at 174 (opinion by WEAVER, J.).
Under either the direct evidence test or the McDonnell Douglas test, a
plaintiff must establish a causal link between the discriminatory animus and the
adverse employment decision. Because a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas test creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, causation is
presumed. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248, 254; 101 S
Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207 (1981). A defendant may rebut the presumption of
causation by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. Under the direct evidence test, a plaintiff must present
direct proof that the discriminatory animus was causally related to the adverse
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employment decision. . . . Harrison, supra at 612-613. [Sniecinski, supra at 132135 (footnotes omitted).]
Plaintiff argues that she presented sufficient direct evidence of discrimination to preclude
summary disposition. Plaintiff relies on various statements made by Undersheriff Herbert
Mahony to support her claim. In determining the relevancy of remarks in employment
discrimination cases, courts should take into account the following four factors: (1) whether the
remarks were made by a decisionmaker or an agent uninvolved in making the challenged
employment decision, (2) whether the disputed remarks were isolated or involved a pattern of
biased comments, (3) whether the disputed remarks were made close in time or remote from the
adverse employment action, and (4) whether the disputed comments were ambiguous or clearly
indicative of discriminatory bias. Krohn v Sedgwick James of Michigan, Inc, 244 Mich App 289,
292; 624 NW2d 212 (2001).
We agree with plaintiff that the trial court erred in determining that Mahony’s statements
were not relevant because he was not involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff ’s
employment. Although the final decision was subject to Sheriff Daniel Minzy’s approval, the
evidence showed that Mahony had a role in identifying the positions to be eliminated, including
plaintiff’s position. Nonetheless, we conclude that the nature and timing of Mahony’s statements
were inadequate to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether unlawful
discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision to eliminate plaintiff’s position. Although
the statements can be characterized as sexist, they did not provide direct proof that the
employment decision was gender-based. For example, there was no evidence that Mahony
suggested that plaintiff should be fired for being emotional.2 Additionally, there was insufficient
evidence of a close temporal proximity to the employment decision such that the comments
established a discriminatory animus that was causally related to the decision to discharge
plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff lacked sufficient direct evidence of gender discrimination to
support her claim.
Plaintiff alternatively argues that she presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of
gender discrimination. In Town v Michigan Bell Tel Co, 455 Mich 688, 695; 568 NW2d 64
(1997), the Court stated that, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on
circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must show that she was “(1) a member of a protected class,
(2) subject to an adverse employment action, and (3) qualified for the position, and that . . .
others, similarly situated and outside the protected class, were unaffected by the employer’s
adverse conduct.” Plaintiff correctly argues that because this case involves a workforce
reduction, she was not required to prove that she was replaced by a person who was not a
member of the same protected class. However, she was still obligated to show that she was
treated differently than a similarly situated male employee. Id.; Smith v Goodwill Industries of
West Michigan, Inc, 243 Mich App 438, 448; 622 NW2d 337 (2000). Because plaintiff was laid
off due to economic conditions, she must offer evidence that her gender was a determining factor
2
Plaintiff testified that Mahony referred to her as an “emotional female.”
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in the decision to discharge her. Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 684; 385 NW2d 586
(1986).
In addition to the statements by Mahony, plaintiff offered evidence that she was moved to
the records supervisor position in October 2002 and that a male employee assumed her former
position after it was changed from “business analyst” to “business manager.” Plaintiff asserts
that she was not notified of the new position and never had the opportunity to apply for it. She
claims that defendant moved her to the new position in October 2002 and then used the budget
shortfall as an excuse to discharge her in August 2003. However, plaintiff’s belief that she was
moved to the new position of records supervisor in October 2002 as a guise for the eventual
elimination of that position ten months later is merely speculative and is not supported by any
competent evidence. Further, plaintiff ’s position was not the only one eliminated. Significantly,
a male employee was also discharged as part of the budget-reduction plan. We conclude that
plaintiff failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of
gender discrimination. Therefore, the court properly granted summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10).
Because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, it is
unnecessary to address her argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning
whether defendant’s proffered reason for her discharge was a mere pretext for discrimination.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for unlawful
retaliation. The CRA not only prohibits discriminatory conduct, but also provides that a person
shall not “[r]etaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has opposed a violation
of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act.” MCL 37.2701(a). The
purpose of MCL 37.2701 is “‘to protect access to the machinery available to seek redress for
civil rights violations and to protect the operation of that machinery once it has been engaged.’”
Meyer v City of Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 571-572; 619 NW2d 182 (2000), quoting
Booker v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co, Inc, 879 F2d 1304, 1313 (CA 6, 1989). Therefore,
for a successful retaliation claim, the defendant must have specifically retaliated against the
plaintiff for conduct on her part that is protected by the CRA. Garg v Macomb Co Community
Mental Health Services, 472 Mich 263, 272; 696 NW2d 646 (2005), amended 473 Mich 1205
(2005).
A prima facie case of retaliation requires that a plaintiff show the following:
“(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was known by the
defendant; (3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.” [Garg, supra at 273, quoting DeFlaviis v
Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997).]
“To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that his participation in activity protected by the
CRA was a ‘significant factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment action, not just that there
was a causal link between the two.” Barrett v Kirtland Comm College, 245 Mich App 306, 315;
628 NW2d 63 (2001).
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As support for her retaliation claim, plaintiff relies on evidence that she complained to
Mahony about pay disparity for women in her department. Defendant asserts that it was unaware
that plaintiff’s complaint involved a claim of unlawful discrimination. To support a retaliation
claim, “[t]he employee’s charge must clearly convey to an objective employer that the employee
is raising the specter of a claim of unlawful discrimination pursuant to the CRA.” Id. at 319.
Where the evidence establishes that the plaintiff was merely asserting “generic, non-sex-based
complaints regarding working conditions,” a claim for retaliation has not been proven. Id. at
319-320.
Plaintiff testified that she met with Mahony in the fall of 2001 to ask him about parity for
the women who worked in the records office and to inquire about why she was brought in at a
lower pay step than the commanders. Plaintiff testified that Mahony responded by telling her
that women will always be paid less than men. Plaintiff admitted, however, that other women in
the records office were making more than some of the women and that there were also men who
were making more money. Plaintiff conceded that she wanted everyone to earn the same pay
and that the problem with pay disparity did not exclusively involve pay differences between men
and women, but also differences between what women in the same department earned.
Nonetheless, plaintiff believed that there was a pay disparity that was partially gender-based.
She also testified that she submitted something in writing to defendant related to the pay
disparity.
The evidence reveals that there was conflicting testimony concerning the nature of
plaintiff’s conversation with Mahony and whether it involved a complaint about pay disparity in
the department generally, or whether plaintiff was claiming that unequal pay amongst women
compared to their male counterparts amounted to unlawful discrimination. However, even
assuming that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to that issue, we agree that
summary disposition was proper because there was no causal connection between plaintiff’s pay
disparity complaint and her eventual discharge many months later.
In Aho v Dep’t of Corrections, 263 Mich App 281, 291-292; 688 NW2d 104 (2004), this
Court explained:
In addition, the fact that a long time passed between plaintiff’s
participation in the protected activity, the 1995 lawsuit, and his termination in
2000 contradicts plaintiff’s contention that the 1995 lawsuit was a significant
factor in his termination. Although the timing between the protected activity and
the adverse action may in some cases constitute circumstantial evidence pointing
to a causal nexus, Wrenn v Gould, 808 F2d 493, 501 (CA 6, 1987), in this case,
the time between the events was remote--approximately five years--thus seriously
undermining any claim by plaintiff of a causal connection. Periods much shorter
than five years have been found to be insufficient to demonstrate a causal nexus.
See, e.g., Wixson v Dowagiac Nursing Home, 866 F Supp 1047, 1057 (WD Mich,
1994) (seven months was too remote to support an inference of retaliation); and
Reeves v Digital Equip Corp, 710 F Supp 675, 677 (ND Ohio, 1989) (three
months was too remote to support an inference of retaliation). Courts have
consistently held that a lengthy period between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action precludes a nexus between the two events.
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In this case, plaintiff asserts that she talked to Mahony one time about pay disparity, in
the fall of 2001. Plaintiff was not selected for layoff until August 2003. This evidence simply
does not support an inference that the decision to eliminate plaintiff’s position in 2003 was
causally related to plaintiff’s 2001 conversation in which she complained of pay disparity.3
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s retaliation claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
3
The trial court stated that the time lapse between events was seven months, but the basis for
that conclusion is unclear. Plaintiff argued in the trial court that the lapse between events was
ten months, which would be accurate if the pay disparity complaint was made in October 2002,
when plaintiff was transferred to the records position, rather than in October 2001. Even if the
complaint was made in October 2002, we would still conclude that the evidence would not
support an inference that it was causally related to the August 2003 decision to eliminate
plaintiff’s position.
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