TALISHA WINSTON V WAYNE STATE UNIV
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TALISHA WINSTON,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 283282
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-604810-CD
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition in this suit brought pursuant to the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA),
MCL 15.361 et seq. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to
MCR 7.214(E).
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for
summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201
(1998). When considering claims under the WPA, courts apply the burden-shifting analysis used
in retaliatory discharge claims under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq, and set forth in
Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456, 463-465; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). Taylor v Modern
Eng’g, 252 Mich App 655, 659; 653 NW2d 625 (2002). If the plaintiff successfully proves a
prima facie case under the WPA, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate
business reason for the adverse employment action. Id. If the defendant produces evidence
establishing the existence of a legitimate reason for the discharge, “at that point, in order to
survive a motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence in the
case, when construed in the plaintiff's favor, is ‘sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the
employer toward the plaintiff.’” Hazle, supra at 465, quoting Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing),
458 Mich 153, 176; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). As Hazle explains:
The inquiry at this final stage of the [burden-shifting] framework is
exactly the same as the ultimate factual inquiry made by the jury: whether
consideration of a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, namely,
whether it made a difference in the contested employment decision. The only
difference is that, for purposes of a motion for summary disposition or directed
verdict, a plaintiff need only create a question of material fact upon which
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reasonable minds could differ regarding whether discrimination was a motivating
factor in the employer's decision. [Id at 466, internal citation omitted.]
In this case, as in Taylor, supra, the determination that plaintiff made a prima facie case
is unnecessary in light of her failure to present sufficient evidence that defendant’s stated reasons
for firing her were pretextual. Defendant informed plaintiff her employment was terminated
“due to insubordination and unsatisfactory work performance.” Plaintiff’s insubordinate attitude
was glaringly apparent starting in December 2004 when she advised her supervisor of the details
of his “disturbing behavior.” While the record evidence shows that she could have held a
reasonable belief that wrongdoing, including embezzlement, was taking place in the school, there
is no evidence of a causal link between her alleged reports of that and her termination several
months later. Moreover, defendant showed that it had legitimate reasons for asking her to stop
investigating: the embezzlement had been reported to police and they were conducting their own
investigation. While this does not refute plaintiff’s assertion that she had a reasonable belief that
wrongdoing was occurring and being covered up, it does permit defendant to satisfy the next step
in the analysis: that it had a legitimate reason for terminating her.
Similarly, defendant refutes that plaintiff’s reporting her supervisor’s “fudging the
books” was based on her own misunderstanding of what he was doing. Again, even if plaintiff
held a reasonable belief that the supervisor was covering something up, defendant’s evidence
showing that he was not supports its claim that plaintiff was not fired for reporting wrongdoing
but for refusing to accept that nothing illegal was occurring and continuing to spread rumors and
false statements among the faculty. Plaintiff presents no evidence countering these facts.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted summary disposition in favor of defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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