AMANDA LAFNER V CITY OF FLINT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
AMANDA LAFNER and AARON HEAGLE,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 282669
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 05-082535-NI
05-082800-NI
CITY OF FLINT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant claims an appeal from the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary
disposition in this governmental immunity case. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
for further proceedings. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Plaintiffs1 Amanda Lafner and Aaron Heagle sustained injuries when the vehicle in
which they were riding struck a pothole on Torrey Road in the City of Flint and left the road.
When the driver attempted to steer back onto the road, the vehicle hit the road edge drop-off
causing the driver to cross the centerline, where the vehicle was struck by an oncoming vehicle.
Plaintiffs filed separate lawsuits2 alleging that potholes in the portion of the roadway
designed for vehicular travel, as well as the road edge drop-off, rendered the road not reasonably
safe and convenient for public travel as required by MCL 691.1402, and that as a consequence of
the failure to maintain the road in a condition that was reasonably safe and convenient for public
travel, defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity.
1
Only appellee Lafner has filed a brief on appeal. That brief refers to the “appellees”; logically,
we can conclude that the arguments put forth by Lafner accurately reflect the position taken by
appellee Heagle. In this opinion “plaintiffs” refers to both Lafner and Heagle.
2
The trial court consolidated the actions for purposes of hearing and decision.
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Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10),
arguing, inter alia: that the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiffs were riding was not certain
that he hit a pothole; that defendant had no duty to maintain the shoulder of the road because the
shoulder is not included in the statutory definition of highway and is not designed for vehicular
travel; that defendant had no notice of a defect that might have caused the accident; and that no
evidence showed that any pothole that might have caused the accident was deeper than two
inches.
In response, Lafner argued that she had pled a valid claim in avoidance of governmental
immunity. Lafner noted that Richard Dunavan, the driver of the vehicle, opined that the
condition of the road caused him to lose control of his vehicle. Lafner also noted that Thomas
Bereza, an accident reconstructionist, examined the accident scene and identified a pothole that
he believed caused Dunavan to lose control of the vehicle. The pothole was in excess of four
inches deep and 12 inches in diameter; Bereza opined that the pothole had been in existence in
excess of 45 days. Bereza concluded that the road was not maintained in reasonable repair and
in a condition reasonably safe and convenient for public travel.
Lafner also argued that defendant’s argument that the claim regarding the road edge
drop-off did not avoid governmental immunity failed for three reasons. First, the holding in
Grimes v Dep’t of Transportation, 475 Mich 72, 91; 715 NW2d 276 (2006), that, “only the travel
lanes of a highway are subject to the duty of repair and maintenance” in the highway exception
applied only to the state and to county road commissions. Second, under MCL 691.1402a, a
municipality such as defendant had a duty of repair and maintenance with respect to an “other
installation” adjacent to a roadway. Third, the road edge drop-off was actually part of the
traveled portion of the roadway to which defendant’s duty applied.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The trial court found
that a question of fact existed as to whether a specific pothole in the traveled portion of the road
caused Dunavan to lose control of the vehicle, and whether the pothole had been in existence for
more than 30 days when the accident occurred. In addition, the trial court concluded that
pursuant to MCL 691.1402a(1), the shoulder of the road could be considered an “installation”
and thus come within a municipality’s duty to maintain.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Trepanier v Nat’l Amusements, Inc, 250 Mich App 578, 582-583; 649 NW2d 754 (2002).
Generally, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability for actions taken in
furtherance of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407. There are several narrowly drawn
exceptions to governmental immunity, including the highway exception. MCL 691.1402(1)
provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in section 2a, each governmental agency
having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable
repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. A person who
sustains bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of a
governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair
and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages
suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.
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MCL 691.1401(e) provides:
“Highway” means a public highway, road, or street that is open for public
travel and includes bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts on the
highway. The term highway does not include alleys, trees, and utility poles.
MCL 691.1402a sets out the scope of liability for municipal corporations, and provides in
pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a municipal corporation
has no duty to repair or maintain, and is not liable for injuries arising from, a
portion of a county highway outside of the improved portion of the highway
designed for vehicular travel, including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other
installation. This subsection does not prevent or limit a municipal corporation’s
liability if both of the following are true:
(a) At least 30 days before the occurrence of the relevant injury, death, or
damage, the municipal corporation knew or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have known of the existence of a defect in a sidewalk, trailway,
crosswalk, or other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway
designed for vehicular travel.
(b) The defect described in subdivision (a) is a proximate cause of the
injury, death, or damage.
(2) A discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a rebuttable
inference that the municipal corporation maintained the sidewalk, trailway,
crosswalk, or other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway
designed for vehicular travel in reasonable repair.
MCL 691.1403, a notice provision, states:
No governmental agency is liable for injuries or damages caused by
defective highways unless the governmental agency knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of the defect and had a
reasonable time to repair the defect before the injury took place. Knowledge of
the defect and time to repair the same shall be conclusively presumed when the
defect existed so as to be readily apparent to an ordinarily observant person for a
period of 30 days or longer before the injury took place.
The highway exception is narrowly construed. Hatch v Grand Haven Charter Twp, 461
Mich 457, 464; 606 NW2d 633 (2000). Determination of the applicability of the highway
exception is a question of law subject to de novo review. Stevenson v Detroit, 264 Mich App 37,
40-41; 689 NW2d 239 (2004).
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the ground that a
question of fact existed as to whether a specific pothole in the traveled portion of the roadway
caused Dunavan to lose control of his vehicle, whether the existence of the pothole made the
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road not reasonably safe and convenient for public travel, and whether the condition had existed
for more than 30 days. Defendant has not challenged that ruling on appeal;3 therefore, we affirm
that portion of the trial court’s decision.
The trial court also denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the ground
that the shoulder of a highway is a type of “other installation” cited in MCL 691.1402a(1) that a
municipality is responsible to repair and maintain.4 We conclude that the trial court erred in so
holding. Our Supreme Court has held that the shoulder of a highway is not designed for
vehicular travel, even if the shoulder is sometimes used for such a purpose, and thus is not
included within the scope of the highway exception. The Grimes Court held that “only the travel
lanes of a highway are subject to the duty of repair and maintenance specified in MCL
691.1402(1).” Grimes, supra at 91 (footnote omitted). The trial court declined to apply Grimes
to the circumstances of this case because Grimes concerned a highway under the jurisdiction of
the state rather than a municipality. MCL 691.1402a indicates that, absent notice and proximate
cause, a municipality “has no duty to repair or maintain, and is not liable for injuries arising
from, a portion of a county highway outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for
vehicular travel, including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation.” MCL
691.1402a(1). The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that if a statute contains general words
following an enumeration of particular subjects, the general words are presumed to including
only things of the same class, kind, character, or nature as the particular subjects enumerated.
Sands Appliance Serv, Inc v Wilson, 463 Mich 231, 242; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). In MCL
691.1402a(1), the general words “other installation” follow the particular subjects “sidewalk,
trailway, [and] crosswalk[.]” These particular subjects refer to installations designed for
pedestrian traffic and on which general, non-emergency pedestrian traffic is expected to take
place. Thus, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the general words “other installations”
would also be of that type. The shoulder of a highway might accommodate emergency
pedestrian traffic, just as it accommodates vehicular traffic under some circumstances, but
pedestrians are not expected to be walking on the shoulder of a highway as a general rule. The
trial court’s conclusion that the type of “other installation” referred to in MCL 691.1402a(1)
includes the shoulder of a roadway does not find support in the language of the statute, and
plaintiffs point to no decisions that support the ruling. We reverse that portion of the trial court’s
decision, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not
3
Defendant’s decision to not challenge this portion of the trial court’s ruling concerning the
pothole is consistent with the position defendant took below.
4
The trial court did not specifically discuss whether it concluded that a question of fact existed
as to whether defendant knew or should have known of the existence of a defect in the shoulder
of the highway at least 30 days before the accident occurred, MCL 691.1402a(1)(a).
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retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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