PEOPLE OF MI V TOD KEVIN HOUTHOOFD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
TOD KEVIN HOUTHOOFD a/k/a TODD KEVIN
HOUTHOOFD,
No. 269505
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 02-021097-FH
04-024765-FH
05-025865-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Borrello and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Tod Kevin Houthoofd was convicted of obtaining property valued over $100
by false pretenses, MCL 750.218, intimidation of a witness, MCL 750.122, and solicitation to
commit murder, MCL 750.157b. He was sentenced to prison terms of five to ten years for the
false pretenses conviction, ten to 15 years for the intimidation conviction, and 40 to 60 years for
the solicitation conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions
and sentences for obtaining property by false pretenses and intimidating a witness, and vacate his
conviction and sentence for solicitation to commit murder.
I. Facts and Procedural History
This case stems from three consolidated, lower court cases involving: obtaining a tractor,
tiller, and trailer by false pretenses (LC No. 02-021097-FH); intimidating witness Detective
Sergeant Michael VanHorn (LC No. 04-024765-FH); and soliciting Michael Dotson to murder
Edward Wurtzel, Jr. (LC No. 05-025865-FH).1 The cases were consolidated by the trial court
and tried together in January and February of 2006.
In April of 1998, a man identifying himself as Colin Francis called a rental equipment
store in Saginaw County. The man indicated that he was interested in renting a tractor and tiller.
Wurtzel, a co-owner of the store, spoke to the man over the phone and made arrangements for
1
For ease of reference, we will refer to the three lower court cases as the tractor case, the
intimidation case, and the solicitation case.
-1-
the rental. Wurtzel testified that a few days later, a man appeared at the store to pick up the
tractor and tiller. In order to complete the rental agreement, the man produced a driver’s license
bearing the name “Colin Francis.” The tractor, tiller, and trailer used to haul the equipment were
not returned to Wurtzel’s store. Wurtzel then discovered that Francis was not the man who had
rented the equipment. Francis testified that at the time of the rental, he worked with defendant at
a General Motors (GM) plant in Bay City, Michigan and had recently lost his driver’s license.
Detective VanHorn testified that he discovered evidence related to the tractor case in
November of 2001. At the time, the detective was investigating a shooting at the home of Jody
Meagher. Someone had fired a round of buckshot directly at Meagher and her husband through
their window. Meagher informed the investigators, and later testified, that she was a co-worker
of defendant’s at GM in Bay City, that defendant had been placed on two periods of disciplinary
suspension, and that her department was responsible for imposing the suspensions. The shooting
occurred during defendant’s second suspension. Meagher also indicated that there was a
separate, ongoing investigation of defendant involving acts of violence against another GM
employee. Defendant had previously worked at a GM plant in Toledo, Ohio. In 1994, GM
supervisor Robert Griffith terminated defendant’s employment. Shortly thereafter, Griffith was
assaulted at his home. Defendant’s employment with GM was subsequently reinstated. In 1997,
after defendant began working in Bay City, a pipe bomb exploded at Griffith’s home.
On the night of the shooting at Meagher’s home, defendant was arrested for trespassing
on GM property. Upon searching defendant’s truck for evidence related to the shooting,
Detective VanHorn found two driver’s licenses belonging to men other than defendant. The
licenses bore the names “Colin Francis” and “Dale White.” The detective then learned of the
“cold” tractor case. While investigating the Griffith case, the Meagher case, and the tractor case,
the detective obtained a search warrant for defendant’s home and property in Arenac County.
Upon executing the warrant, investigators found Wurtzel’s tractor and tiller, two pipe bombs,
and reading materials entitled, “How to Outfox the Foxes, 297 Secrets the Law and Lawyers
Don’t Want You to Know,” “The Poisoner’s Handbook,” and “How to Be Your Own Private
Detective.” The Arenac County prosecutor subsequently charged defendant with receiving and
concealing stolen property based on his possession of Wurtzel’s equipment and two counts of
possessing illegal explosives. Defendant was incarcerated in the Arenac County jail.
In December of 2001, Detective Sergeant Wilbur Yancer of the Saginaw County
Sheriff’s Department became aware of the developments in the tractor case and arranged for an
“in-custody lineup” at the Arenac County jail. At the December 6 lineup, Wurtzel picked
defendant out as the man who took his equipment. Later that day, Wurtzel identified defendant’s
truck. On December 10, the Saginaw County prosecutor charged defendant with obtaining
Wurtzel’s property by false pretenses. The Arenac County prosecutor subsequently dropped the
charges against defendant in favor of Saginaw County proceeding with its false pretenses case.
Defendant remained in the Arenac County jail until January of 2002.
During his time in the Arenac County jail, defendant met Dotson, a fellow prisoner.
Dotson testified that two or three days after the December 6 lineup, defendant offered him
-2-
money to shoot out the windows of a Bay City house2 and to kill Wurtzel at his rental equipment
store in Saginaw County. Over the course of several conversations, defendant gave Dotson the
details of his plan and a copy of a police report listing Wurtzel’s name and business address.
Dotson initially agreed to the plan, although he testified that he never intended to carry it out,
and told defendant that a man named Chucky could assist with the Bay City shooting.
At some point in December of 2001, or early 2002, Dotson told his girlfriend Sandra
Faulman and one of Faulman’s relatives about defendant’s “murder-for-hire” scheme. In March
of 2002, Faulman’s relative conveyed the information to Trooper James Moore. Thereafter,
Trooper Moore and Detective VanHorn met with Dotson at the Arenac County jail, and Dotson
agreed to cooperate with their investigation. Upon searching Faulman’s home, the officers
recovered the police report listing Wurtzel’s name and business address. They then arranged for
Detective Sergeant William Eberhardt, posing as Chucky, to make contact with defendant.3
Investigators also arranged for Dotson to talk to defendant over the phone. During Dotson’s
recorded phone conversation with defendant, they discussed “the shit in Bay City,” money that
defendant owed Dotson, Chucky, and Wurtzel picking defendant out of a lineup in the tractor
case. When Dotson asked if they were going to do anything about Wurtzel, defendant said,
“Nah, nah, no, I, I got a real good case. . . . [M]y lawyer will pick [Wurtzel’s] fucking wings
off.” Defendant then stated that he thought the phone might be bugged.
Defendant was first tried for obtaining Wurtzel’s property by false pretenses in February
and March of 2004 in Saginaw County. During the trial, Detective VanHorn, Francis, and
Wurtzel, among several others, testified for the prosecution. Defendant testified that he
purchased the tractor and tiller in 1999 from Denny VanHaaren at Delta College where Denny
was a bricklayer. Defendant presented a receipt from the transaction, and it was undisputed that
Wurtzel’s trailer was recovered at Delta College. Defendant further testified that he found
Francis and White’s driver’s licenses in the tractor after purchasing it from Denny. The trial
ended in a hung jury, and the case was scheduled for retrial on June 29, 2004.4 Detective
VanHorn later testified that during the trial, he saw defendant in the hall and defendant said,
“Fuck off VanHorn, fuck off.”
On June 21, 2004, just eight days before the scheduled retrial, Detective VanHorn
received a page from a phone number he did not recognize. The detective testified that he called
the number and initiated a conversation, saying, “Somebody paged me from this number.” The
recipient of the call responded, “Yeah.” When the detective then identified himself, the recipient
said, “Never mind all that. I want to let you know I saw you in court last week, and I want to let
2
Detective VanHorn’s testimony suggested that the Bay City home defendant described to
Dotson was Meagher’s home.
3
At a 2007 hearing on remand from this Court, Detective Eberhardt testified that he posed as
Chucky and had a phone conversation with defendant. The detective testified that he did not
bring up the “murder-for-hire” scheme during the conversation, and that defendant made no
mention of it. They only discussed bailing Dotson out of jail.
4
At the consolidated trial, defendant did not testify. Rather, Detective Yancer recounted for the
jury relevant portions of defendant’s testimony at the first tractor trial.
-3-
you know that I know where you live, motherfucker.” According to the detective, he recognized
the recipient’s voice almost immediately and believed that it was defendant. The detective also
believed that defendant “was letting [him] know that there was no doubt that he was going to kill
[him], attempt to kill [him], or harm [his] family,” and that “it was just a matter of time.”
A phone company representative testified that the cell phone used to call Detective
VanHorn’s pager on June 21 belonged to Brandean Rinness, but Rinness testified that she lost
the phone in early June. According to the phone records, the call originated in Bay County and
terminated in Ogemaw County. The same cell phone was used to call the GM call center,
defendant’s girlfriend Roberta Haertel, a restaurant located on the same street that Haertel lived
on, and another person associated with Haertel.
On June 24, 2004, the Saginaw County prosecutor charged defendant with intimidating a
witness and obstructing justice, based on the statements made to Detective VanHorn over the
phone. Defendant then moved to adjourn the retrial of the tractor case. The prosecution
stipulated to the adjournment, indicating that it intended to use the facts of the intimidation case
and the solicitation case as evidence of consciousness of guilt in the retrial of the tractor case.
In July of 2004, Detective VanHorn received a call on his cell phone. During the call, he
heard a male voice that he did not recognize saying over and over, “I know where you live
motherfucker.” The call originated from a pay phone in Bay County and occurred while
defendant was in Saginaw County jail. Detective VanHorn testified that the caller could have
been James Franklin, a man he had previously testified against. Defendant’s first trial attorney,
Matthew Reyes, testified that he had represented Franklin in a number of cases and believed that
Franklin could have made the call to Detective VanHorn. At a motion hearing in July of 2005,
Reyes testified that he had planned, as a part of his trial strategy in this case, to create a
reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds as to the identity of the person who first threatened
Detective VanHorn by introducing Franklin as a possible perpetrator.
In September of 2004, the prosecution filed a memorandum of law regarding the
“admissibility of evidence that defendant solicited [Dotson] to kill [Wurtzel] and that defendant
threatened [Detective VanHorn] to establish defendant’s consciousness of guilt” in the tractor
case. The prosecution asserted that the evidence was admissible, independent of MRE 404(b), to
establish consciousness of guilt and that defendant’s statements to Detective VanHorn on June
21 constituted a threat to kill or injure the detective or the detective’s family, or to damage their
property under MCL 750.122. The prosecution argued that background evidence or a “timeline
of events” must be presented to the jury to demonstrate the “meaning and magnitude” of
defendant’s statements to Detective VanHorn, emphasizing that the detective was well aware of
the evidence at the time of the statements, and that defendant knew the detective was so aware.
The evidence included several prior acts defendant had committed or was suspected of
committing, but according to the prosecution, whether defendant had actually committed any of
the acts was irrelevant.
On October 20, 2004, at the hearing on the motion to admit the aforementioned evidence,
Reyes conceded that the facts of the solicitation case were admissible to establish consciousness
of guilt in the tractor case. He objected, however, to admitting the facts of the intimidation case
and the background evidence proffered by the prosecution, referring to the background evidence
as the “kitchen sink material.” The trial court found that the “kitchen sink material” was only
-4-
relevant in the intimidation case. The court stated that if the tractor and intimidation cases were
tried separately, it would allow the prosecution to present evidence that the allegedly
intimidating statements were made to establish consciousness of guilt in the tractor case, but not
any of the “kitchen sink material.” If, however, the cases were tried jointly, the prosecution
could present the “kitchen sink material” to establish that the statements constituted a threat of
violence or property damage under MCL 750.122. Reyes indicated that if the cases were tried
jointly, he would be forced to withdraw because of an “ethical conflict.” The court then ruled
that the cases would be tried separately. The next day, the court granted Reyes’ motion to
withdraw and the cases were adjourned.5
In November of 2004, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration and joinder,
requesting that the “kitchen sink material” be admitted in the tractor case and that the tractor and
intimidation cases be consolidated for trial. Defendant opposed the motion. In March of 2005,
defendant was charged in Saginaw County with solicitation to commit murder. The trial court
then ordered, in August of 2005, to consolidate the tractor case, the intimidation case, and the
solicitation case for trial, primarily as a matter of judicial economy. The court further indicated
that it would reconsider the admission of the “kitchen sink material.”
In September of 2005, defendant filed two motions in limine, arguing that the “kitchen
sink material” was inadmissible character evidence and bad-acts evidence. In a written response
and at oral arguments, the prosecution reiterated its arguments for admitting the material. On
December 13, 2005, the court entered an omnibus order allowing the admission of the “kitchen
sink material” at the consolidated trial.
On December 28, 2005, defendant filed an application for emergency leave to appeal in
this Court, along with motions for immediate consideration and stay of proceedings. Defendant
argued that the trial court erred in consolidating the three lower court cases for trial and denying
his motions to exclude the “kitchen sink material.” We granted defendant’s motion for
immediate consideration, but denied his application for leave to appeal and motion for stay.
People v Houthoofd, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 29, 2005
(Docket No. 267348).
The consolidated trial commenced on January 5, 2006, and concluded on February 13,
2006. After the prosecution rested, defendant moved for directed verdict in all three cases, and
the trial court denied the motions. The jury convicted defendant of obtaining property by false
pretenses, solicitation to commit murder, and witness intimidation involving a threat to kill,
injure, or damage property or malicious use of a telephone.
Following trial, defendant moved for dismissal, new trial, and judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. The trial court subsequently denied the motions. The court also issued a written
opinion and order placing the jurors’ information under seal. In its opinion, the court stated that
after the trial, “at least two jurors expressed concerns for their personal safety, based upon fears
5
The court then appointed attorney James Piazza to represent defendant in the tractor case and
attorney Bruce Petrick to represent him in the intimidation case.
-5-
of retribution from Defendant or a person or persons acting in his behalf. Other jurors expressed
concerns about walking from the Courthouse to their vehicles on that final day of their jury
service.” The court further stated, “[t]he evidence this court has heard . . . paints a sinister
picture of Defendant . . . as a man who lacks the capacity to either forgive or forget any
perceived wrong.” After summarizing the evidence admitted at trial, the court concluded,
“Under these circumstances – on the record – the concerns of the jurors are not fragments of
over-anxious minds. This Court views them as well-founded concerns. That is why this Court
pledged to the jurors that it would take steps to protect them from harassment or harm.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to prison terms of five to ten years for the false
pretenses conviction, and ten to 15 years for the intimidation conviction. The court exceeded the
guidelines for the solicitation to commit murder conviction, sentencing defendant to 40 to 60
years’ imprisonment.
Defendant filed a claim of appeal in this Court in April of 2006. In August of 2006,
defendant filed an untimely motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing. Defendant argued that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss for improper venue and failing to
object to numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct. He further argued that a previously
unknown witness, Detective Eberhardt, could offer potentially exculpatory testimony. We
initially denied defendant’s motion to remand, People v Houthoofd, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered September 12, 2007 (Docket No. 269505), but later granted his motion
for reconsideration and remanded “to the trial court so that defendant-appellant [could] file,
within 14 days, a motion for new trial,” People v Houthoofd, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered October 16, 2007 (Docket No. 269505).
On remand, defendant moved for dismissal and new trial. The trial court held hearings
on defendant’s motion in November of 2007 and January of 2008. On April 9, 2008, the trial
court issued a lengthy written opinion and order denying defendant’s motion for new trial. The
court found that defendant’s motion for dismissal exceeded the scope of the remand order.
II. Venue
Defendant first argues that Saginaw County was not the proper venue for prosecution of
the witness intimidation and solicitation to commit murder charges because all of the acts done
in perpetration of those offenses occurred in other counties. We find that venue was properly
established in Saginaw County as to the intimidation charge, but not the solicitation charge.
Failure to establish venue is a matter to be preserved at trial. People v Williams, 1 Mich
App 441, 443; 136 NW2d 774 (1965). See also MCL 767.45(1)(c) (stating that “[n]o verdict
shall be set aside or a new trial granted by reason of failure to prove that the offense was
committed in the county or within the jurisdiction of the court unless the accused raises the issue
before the case is submitted to the jury”). Defendant preserved this issue in a motion for
-6-
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and a motion to quash. The trial court denied defendant’s
motions, finding that venue was properly established in Saginaw County.6
We review a trial court’s determination regarding proper venue in a criminal proceeding
de novo. People v Fisher, 220 Mich App 133, 145; 559 NW2d 318 (1996). “Venue is a part of
every criminal case and must be proved by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
Under the United States Constitution, criminal trials must take place in the state and district
where the crime was committed. US Const, art III, § 2, cl 3; US Const, Am VI. Accordingly,
this Court has held that “[d]ue process requires that trial of criminal prosecutions should be by a
jury of the county or city where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by the
Legislature.” Fisher, supra at 145.
The prosecution argues that venue was properly established in Saginaw County under
MCL 762.8. MCL 762.8 provides that “[w]henever a felony consists or is the culmination of 2
or more acts done in the perpetration thereof, said felony may be prosecuted in any county in
which any one of said acts was committed.” In interpreting MCL 762.8, this Court has stated:
Where . . . venue is established by statute, this Court’s primary objective is
to effectuate legislative intent without harming the plain wording of the act. The
plain language of MCL 762.8 provides that venue is proper “in any county in
which any one of said acts [done in perpetration of a felony] was committed.”
The Legislature did not draft MCL 762.8 to provide for venue in the county where
the “effects” of the acts done in perpetration of a felony were felt. Cf. MCL
762.2(1)(e) (“A person may be prosecuted for a criminal offense he or she
commits while he or she is physically located within this state or without this state
if . . . (e) the criminal offense produces substantial and detrimental effects within
this state [emphasis added]”). If the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, this Court must assume that the Legislature intended its plain
meaning and enforce the statute as written. [People v Webbs, 263 Mich App 531,
534; 689 NW2d 163 (2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted).]
In this case, the prosecution relies on this Court’s interpretation and application of MCL
762.8 in People v Flaherty, 165 Mich App 113; 418 NW2d 695 (1987), and Fisher, supra. In
those cases, this Court interpreted MCL 762.8 broadly, ruling that when an act done in
perpetration of a felony has effects elsewhere that are essential to the offense, venue is proper in
the place where the act has its effects. Webbs, supra at 534-535; Fisher, supra at 152; Flaherty,
supra at 119. In Flaherty, the defendant was charged in St. Clair County with larceny by false
pretenses. Flaherty, supra at 116, 119. The defendant owned an insurance agency located in
Macomb County, and defrauded a general insurance agency located in St. Clair County by
accepting payment for an insurance policy that was never issued. Id. at 117, 119. The larceny
was accomplished through a series of mail and telephone communications across county lines.
6
Defendant asserts in his brief on appeal that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to
object to prosecution in Saginaw County. But he concedes in his reply brief that his attorneys
properly preserved this issue and states that we need not address his ineffective assistance claim.
-7-
Id. at 119. The Flaherty Court found that some of the defendant’s “communication ‘acts’” had
effects in St. Clair County. Id. Specifically, the defendant’s acts of placing a cover note and
invoice in the mail and sending it to St. Clair County induced the general agency to authorize an
invoice and mail payment to the defendant. Id. Noting that “detrimental reliance by the victim
on the [defendant’s] false representation” is an essential element of larceny by false pretenses,
the Flaherty Court concluded that although the defendant was physically present in Macomb
County, the “effective false representation occurred in St. Clair County.” Id. Thus, venue was
properly established in St. Clair County. Id.
In Fisher, the defendant was charged in Wayne County with inciting perjury and
attempted obstruction of justice. Fisher, supra at 135. The defendant had previously been
convicted in Wayne County of murdering his wife and, pending an appeal of that conviction, was
imprisoned in Jackson County. Id. at 135-136. While in prison, the defendant asked a prison
mate to swear to a false affidavit and claim that he, not the defendant, had committed the crime
for which the defendant had been convicted. Id. The Fisher Court noted that the defendant’s
acts were intended to affect the proceedings pending in Wayne County and that the charge of
attempted obstruction of justice required proof that defendant committed an act with the intent
“to hinder the due course of justice in the case pending in Wayne County.” Id. at 149, 152. See
People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 405; 648 NW2d 648 (2002) (stating that obstruction of
justice is generally defined as “an interference with the orderly administration of justice,”
“impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or powers
of administering justice therein,” or an “effort . . . to thwart or impede the administration of
justice”). After examining federal case law holding that in obstruction of justice cases, “venue is
proper in the district where the proceeding affected is pending,”7 other states’ decisions
regarding offenses such as tampering with a witness, and this Court’s reasoning in Flaherty, the
Fisher Court concluded that, while MCL 762.8 does not use the words “effects” or “results,” an
“act that has effects elsewhere that are essential to the offense is, in effect, committed in the
place where the act has its effects,” and therefore that venue was properly established in Wayne
County as to the attempted obstruction of justice charge. Fisher, supra at 146-150, 152. The
defendant conceded that if Wayne County was the proper venue for prosecution of the attempted
obstruction of justice charge, it was also the proper venue for the inciting perjury charge because
both charges arose out of the same transaction. Id. at 143-144 and n 1.
In Webbs, supra, the case that defendant relies on, the defendant was charged in Grand
Traverse County with larceny by false pretenses, but all of the acts done in perpetration of the
offense occurred in Wayne County. Id. at 532. The defendant falsely identified himself as
James Hardy and applied for and received a loan in Wayne County. Id. Hardy was a resident of
Grand Traverse County and claimed that the defendant’s acts affected him in his home county.
7
At the time Fisher was decided, Congress had finally ended the problem of diverging federal
court viewpoints regarding the proper situs of a charge of obstruction of justice by adding a
venue provision to 18 USC § 1512(i), which provides: “A prosecution under this section or
section 1503 may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not
pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the
conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred.”
-8-
Id. The Webbs Court criticized Flaherty and Fisher, stating that the holdings in those cases did
not comport with the plain language of MCL 762.8. Id. at 536. As previously discussed, the
Webbs Court stated that “the plain language of MCL 762.8 requires an act to be done in the
perpetration of the felony without regard to where the effects of the crime are felt.” Id. at 534.
But, the Webbs Court did not overrule Flaherty and Fisher, instead finding those cases factually
distinguishable. Id. at 534, 536. In contrast to Flaherty and Fisher in which “the defendants’
acts had effects elsewhere that were essential to the offenses charged,” the defendant’s use of
Hardy’s personal information in Wayne County was “not an act that had effects essential to the
offense of larceny by false pretenses” in Grand Traverse County. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
Thus, venue was not properly established in Grand Traverse County. Id. at 532.
Thus, according to current Michigan case law, venue is proper under MCL 762.8 in any
county where an act culminating in the charged offense occurred or, in cases where the essential
conduct elements of the charged offense are defined in terms of their effects, the effects of that
conduct are felt. While People v Jones, 159 Mich App 758, 761; 406 NW2d 843 (1987) states
that MCL 762.8 is concerned with the acts that culminate in the felony, and not with the
elements of the felony, in both Flaherty and Fisher–the only published Michigan cases that have
extended MCL 762.8 to the effects of the defendant’s acts–the essential elements of the charged
offenses were defined in terms of their effects. In Flaherty, the offense of larceny by false
pretenses required the prosecution to prove, as an essential element, detrimental reliance by the
victim on the defendant’s false representation. Flaherty, supra at 531 n 1, 536. While the
defendant in that case was physically present in Macomb County, his actions caused the victim’s
detrimental reliance in St. Clair County. Id. at 536. Likewise, in Fisher, the attempted
obstruction of justice charge required the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed an
act with the intent “to hinder the due course of justice in the case pending in Wayne County.”
Fisher, supra at 152. In obstruction of justice cases, the offense is committed when the effort is
made to hinder the judicial proceeding, regardless whether the defendant’s efforts to obstruct
justice are actually successful. See Milstead, supra at 405-406, citing People v Thomas, 438
Mich 448, 455; 475 NW2d 288 (1991) and People v Tower, 215 Mich App 318, 320; 544 NW2d
752 (1996); Fisher, supra at 149, 152.
Our reading of Michigan case law comports with the limited effects-based approach to
venue set forth in analogous federal authority. As articulated in United States v Bowens, 224 F3d
302, 311 (2000), “the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in [United States v Cabrales, 524 US 1;
118 S Ct 1772; 141 L Ed 2d 1 (1998) and United States v Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 US 275; 119 S
Ct 1239; 143 L Ed 2d 388 (1999)] require us to determine venue solely by reference to the
essential conduct elements of the crime, without regard to Congress’s purpose in forbidding the
conduct. Venue may nevertheless be proper where the effects of criminal conduct are felt, but
only when an essential conduct element is itself defined in terms of its effects.” The Court
explained that “‘the nature of the crime’ refers only to the conduct constituting the offense . . .
and that the conduct constituting the offense is limited to essential conduct elements.” Id. at 312
(citations omitted). “At the same time, we do not understand the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions to have altered the well-established rule that Congress may, consistent with the venue
clauses of Article III and the Sixth Amendment, define the essential conduct elements of a
criminal offense in terms of their effects, thus providing venue where those effects are felt.” Id.
When the essential conduct elements are defined not just in terms of the forbidden act (e.g.,
“assault” or “retaliate”), but rather in terms of their effects (e.g., intimidation of a witness or
-9-
obstruction of the administration of justice), venue is proper in the district where those
proscribed effects would be felt. Id. at 313. “This is because the criminal statutes involved in
those cases [do] not merely proscribe particular acts, but actually [define] the essential conduct
elements in terms of their particular effects, e.g., ‘affecting’ interstate commerce and
‘obstructing’ or ‘impeding’ the administration of justice.” Id.
In this case, defendant was charged in Saginaw County with intimidation of a witness and
obstruction of justice on the basis of the allegedly threatening statements made to Detective
VanHorn, the lead investigator and witness in the tractor case. According to Detective
VanHorn’s testimony, on June 21, 2004, just eight days before the retrial of the tractor case was
scheduled to commence in Saginaw County, he received a page from a phone number he did not
recognize. Phone records established that the call originated in Bay County and terminated in
Ogemaw County. When the detective called the phone number, defendant allegedly answered
the phone and threatened the detective. Although defendant was physically present in Bay
County when he threatened Detective VanHorn, like the defendant in Fisher, his actions were
intended to affect proceedings pending in Saginaw County. The charges of obstruction of justice
and intimidating a witness both required proof that defendant committed an act with the intent
“to hinder the due course of justice” in the tractor case pending in Saginaw County. Fisher,
supra at 152; MCL 750.122(3)(a). See also Milstead, supra at 405 (stating that common law
obstruction of justice was not a single offense but a category of offenses and intimidation of a
witness was an indictable common law offense associated with obstructing justice). Defendant’s
acts had effects in Saginaw County that were essential to the charged offenses. Therefore,
pursuant to this Court’s holdings in Flaherty, Fisher, and Webb, we conclude that Saginaw
County was a proper venue for prosecution of defendant’s intimidation charge.
The same cannot be said, however, for defendant’s solicitation to commit murder charge.
Defendant was charged in Saginaw County with soliciting Dotson to murder Wurtzel, the victim
and eyewitness in the tractor case. At the time of the alleged solicitation, defendant and Dotson
were incarcerated in Arenac County. Later, Dotson engaged in a recorded phone conversation
with defendant during which they alluded to plans to kill Wurtzel. The call originated in Bay
County and terminated in Arenac County. Defendant committed no acts in perpetration of the
offense in Saginaw County.
The prosecution asserts that venue was properly established in Saginaw County because
defendant’s act of solicitation had effects in Saginaw County, emphasizing that Wurtzel resided
in Saginaw County, defendant wanted Wurtzel killed at his business in Saginaw County and,
similar to the facts in Fisher, defendant intended to thwart the ongoing tractor investigation in
Saginaw County by having Wurtzel killed. But, contrary to the prosecution’s assertion, none of
defendant’s acts had effects in Saginaw County essential to the charged offense of solicitation to
commit murder. Unlike obstruction of justice cases where the essential conduct elements of the
offense are defined in terms of their effects, e.g., “obstructing,” interfering,” or “impeding,” and
the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant made an effort to hinder judicial
proceedings pending in a particular location, solicitation to commit murder is complete when
“(1) the solicitor purposely seeks to have someone killed and (2) tries to engage someone to do
the killing.” People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 616; 591 NW2d 669 (1998). Pursuant to
MCL 750.157b(1), “‘solicit’ means to offer to give, promise to give, or give any money,
services, or anything of value, or to forgive or promise to forgive a debt or obligation.” Further,
-10-
while the solicitor must intend that a killing take place, actual incitement is not necessary.
Crawford, supra at 616. Thus, any effect of the solicitation on the intended victim, and the
location of the intended victim at the time of the solicitation or otherwise, is irrelevant to the
charge. The defendant’s motive in seeking to have the person killed is also irrelevant to the
charge. While evidence of motive for soliciting a killing may be relevant to establishing the
defendant’s guilt at trial, see e.g., People v Vandelinder, 192 Mich App 447, 454; 481 NW2d 787
(1992), it is not an essential element of the offense of solicitation to commit murder and is
irrelevant to establishing venue under MCL 762.8.
In this particular case, the intended victim had ties to Saginaw County and defendant’s
apparent motive in soliciting the killing was to thwart an ongoing investigation in Saginaw
County. But, defendant was charged with solicitation to commit murder, not obstruction of
justice. The prosecution was not required to prove that defendant had any particular motive for
soliciting the killing or that the solicitation had any effect on the intended victim. Thus, it cannot
be said that defendant’s acts had effects in Saginaw County essential to the charged offense of
solicitation to commit murder. Accordingly, we must conclude that venue was not properly
established in Saginaw County for defendant’s solicitation charge.
The prosecution asserts that its correspondence with the Attorney General’s office and
this Court’s denial of defendant’s emergency application for leave to appeal suggests that venue
was properly established in Saginaw County for all of defendant’s charges. We are unpersuaded
by the prosecution’s assertion. An assistant attorney general informed the prosecution in a
January 2005 letter that, in his opinion, sufficient facts existed to establish venue in Saginaw
County for the solicitation to commit murder charge. But, the attorney’s letter was merely an
expression of his opinion regarding proper venue with no citation to authority. In fact, the letter
specifically states that the Attorney General was declining to designate Saginaw County as a
proper venue under MCL 762.3(2) because venue was not impossible to ascertain in this case.
Further, this Court’s denial of defendant’s emergency application for leave to appeal does not
constitute a ruling that venue was properly established in Saginaw County. In his emergency
application, defendant specifically argued that the trial court’s consolidation of the three lower
court cases was improper. This Court’s denial of defendant’s application was not a decision on
the merits of his venue claim.
Venue was properly established in Saginaw County as to the intimidation of a witness
charge, but not the solicitation to commit murder charge. Accordingly, we must vacate
defendant’s solicitation conviction and sentence.
III. Admission of the “Kitchen Sink Material”
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the “kitchen
sink material.” While we are inclined to agree with defendant that at least some of the “kitchen
sink material” was unfairly prejudicial, the admission of the evidence did not affect the outcome
of the case.
-11-
On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of the “kitchen sink material.” In the
facts section of his brief, he lists the particular evidence to which he is referring: his 1983
conviction for preparing to burn his uncle’s property and the expungement of that conviction; the
1994 assault on Griffith and 1997 pipe bomb explosion at Griffith’s home; the November 2001
shooting at Meagher’s home; his possession of pipe bombs and certain reading materials
discovered during the November 2001 search of his property; his 2002 acquittal of attempting to
burn his own home; his 2003 acquittal of forging GM documents; his vulgar performance
evaluation of a GM co-worker for which he received a disciplinary suspension; reports that his
estranged wife found fish hooks and other foreign substances in her pills; several peoples’
opinions of him; and, his alleged verbal confrontation with Detective VanHorn during the first
tractor trial when he told the detective to “fuck off.”8 The “kitchen sink material” was admitted
through Detective VanHorn’s testimony about the evidence he discovered during his
investigation of defendant. Additional witnesses, including Meagher, a private investigator, and
several police officers, testified to some of the same information. Defendant argues that most of
the material was inadmissible under MRE 404(b), and that all of it was irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial.
We review preserved challenges to the admission or exclusion of evidence by a trial court
for an abuse of discretion. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 179; 712 NW2d 506 (2005).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the outcome chosen by the trial court is not within the range
of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719
NW2d 809 (2006). “[D]ecisions regarding the admission of evidence frequently involve
preliminary questions of law, e.g., whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes admissibility
of the evidence. Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58,
85; 732 NW2d 546 (2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “The primary goal of
statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in enacting
the provision.” People v Althoff, 280 Mich App 524, 535; __ NW2d __ (2008). “Every word or
phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, but if the legislative intent
cannot be determined from the statute itself, dictionary definitions may be consulted.” Id.
In this case, the trial court did not admit the challenged evidence under MRE 404(b).
MRE 404(b) excludes the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove
character and show action in conformity therewith. But, not all “other-acts” evidence is subject
to MRE 404(b) analysis. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod
on other grounds 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Evidence of other acts may be admissible under MRE
401 as substantive evidence without regard to MRE 404(b) if it does not operate through an
intermediate inference of character. VanderVliet, supra at 64. In this case, the prosecution
repeatedly argued that whether defendant committed any of the prior acts at issue was irrelevant–
although defendant was at least suspected of committing all of them–and that the evidence was
8
As previously indicated, throughout the lower court proceedings, both the parties and the trial
court referred to these individual pieces of evidence, as well as others, as the “kitchen sink
material.” The trial court admitted the “kitchen sink material” as one collective body of
evidence, without reference to the individual pieces of evidence included therein. Even on
appeal, neither party has addressed the admissibility of the individual pieces of evidence.
-12-
only admitted to establish what information Detective VanHorn had collected during his
investigation of defendant, and that defendant knew the detective possessed that information.
We agree with the prosecution that the challenged evidence is not subject to MRE 404(b)
analysis and, therefore, that the appropriate analysis is whether the evidence was relevant, and if
so, whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
People v Goddard, 429 Mich 505, 518; 418 NW2d 881 (1988); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 114; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
First, defendant argues that the “kitchen sink material” was irrelevant. We disagree. The
prosecutor initially bears the burden of establishing relevance. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502,
509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). To be relevant, evidence must be material to a fact of consequence
to the action. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 439; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
The witness intimidation statute, MCL 750.122, “identif[ies] and criminalize[s] the many
ways individuals can prevent or attempt to prevent a witness from appearing and providing
truthful information in some sort of official proceeding.” People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426,
438; 661 NW2d 616 (2003). MCL 750.122 provides in relevant part:
(3) A person shall not do any of the following by threat or intimidation:
(a) Discourage or attempt to discourage any individual from attending a present or
future official proceeding as a witness, testifying at a present or future official
proceeding, or giving information at a present or future official proceeding.
***
(7) A person who violates this section is guilty of a crime as follows:
***
(c) If the violation involves committing or attempting to commit a crime or a
threat to kill or injure any person or to cause property damage, the person is guilty
of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not
more than $25,000.00, or both.
The term “threat” is not defined in MCL 750.122. Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(2005) defines a “threat” as “a declaration of an intention to inflict punishment, injury, etc., as in
retaliation for, or conditionally upon, some action or course.”
Detective VanHorn testified that on June 21, 2004, just eight days before the tractor case
was scheduled to be retried, he received a page from a phone number he did not recognize.
When the detective returned the call, a person who sounded like defendant said, “I want to let
you know I saw you in court last week, and I want to let you know that I know where you live,
motherfucker.” The trial court admitted the “kitchen sink material” to establish that defendant’s
alleged statements to Detective VanHorn constituted a threat to kill or injure the detective or his
family or to damage their property under MCL 750.122(7)(c), an issue disputed at trial. The fact
that Detective VanHorn had uncovered a plethora of information about defendant and list of
allegations against him, regardless whether defendant had actually committed any of the alleged
-13-
offenses or whether people’s opinions of him had any merit, provided the jury with the full
context of defendant’s statements. The fact that defendant knew Detective VanHorn possessed
that information at the time he made the threatening statements indicates that he knew how the
statements would be interpreted–as a “declaration of his intention” to kill or injure the detective
or his family at their home or to damage their property if the detective testified at the tractor case
retrial. Accordingly, we find that the prosecution met its initial burden of establishing relevance.
Knox, supra at 509.9
Next, defendant argues that the probative value of the “kitchen sink material” was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial
when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive
weight by the jury.” People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 306; 642 NW2d 417 (2001), citing
MRE 403. The probative value of the “kitchen sink material” was only marginal, considering
that the phrase “I know where you live, motherfucker,” coming from defendant to the detective
on the eve of the tractor case retrial, could reasonably be construed as a threat of violence or
property damage in and of itself, and the danger existed that the jury could have given undue or
preemptive weight to some of the most outrageous pieces of evidence. Thus, we are inclined to
agree with defendant that at least some of the “kitchen sink material” was unfairly prejudicial.
But, because neither party has addressed the admissibility of the individual pieces of evidence
included in the “kitchen sink material,” we decline to find that the material was unfairly
prejudicial as a whole.
Furthermore, even if we were to make a finding of unfair prejudice, reversal is not
required unless it is more probable than not that a trial court’s error in admitting evidence was
outcome determinative. See People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
We acknowledge that this is a fairly close question, particularly considering that at least some of
the jurors expressed concern for their personal safety after the trial. But, in light of all of the
other evidence presented at trial, defendant cannot establish that the admission of “kitchen sink
material” was outcome determinative.
In regard to the false pretenses charge, the prosecution presented evidence that a man
identifying himself as Colin Francis, and using Francis’s driver’s license, rented a tractor and
tiller from Wurtzel’s store, but never returned the equipment. Francis was a co-worker of
defendant’s who had recently lost his driver’s license. Years later, investigators found a tractor
and tiller on defendant’s property, and driver’s licenses bearing the names “Colin Francis” and
“Dale White” in defendant’s truck. Wurtzel subsequently identified the tractor and tiller, and
picked defendant out of a lineup as the man who had rented the equipment. Although all of this
evidence was admitted at the first tractor trial, and that trial ended in a hung jury, the prosecution
presented additional incriminating evidence at the consolidated trial. Defendant claimed to have
purchased the tractor and tiller in 1999 from Denny VanHaaren at Delta College, where Denny
9
There is evidence in the record that the trial court allowed the prosecution to present at least
some of the “kitchen sink material” for a secondary purpose–to rebut defendant’s claim during
opening statements that Detective VanHorn and GM were “out to get him” or had a vendetta
against him.
-14-
was a bricklayer, and to have found the driver’s licenses in the tractor. But, at the consolidated
trial, Donald VanHaaren testified that his son Denny had not been in Michigan since 1994, and
that the handwriting on the purchase receipt defendant presented was not Denny’s handwriting.
Guy Periard, who was familiar with all of the bricklayers who worked at Delta College in 1999,
testified that no person named Denny VanHaaren had ever worked there. White testified that he
recognized defendant from flight instruction trainings they had both attended and that at one of
those trainings, he lost his driver’s license. Additionally, evidence that defendant solicited
Dotson to murder Wurtzel before the first tractor trial, and then threatened Detective VanHorn
before the retrial, demonstrated consciousness of guilt.10 Considering all of this evidence,
defendant cannot establish that, but for the admission of the “kitchen sink material,” the jury
would not have found him guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses.
In regard to the intimidation charge, the prosecution presented evidence that eight days
before the tractor case retrial was scheduled to commence, Detective VanHorn received a page
from a phone number he did not recognize. Phone records established that the cell phone used to
call the detective’s pager belonged to Rinness, but Rinness testified that she had lost the phone.
The same cell phone was used to call several phone numbers associated with defendant and his
girlfriend. Detective VanHorn testified that when he returned the page, a person who sounded
exactly like defendant said, “I want to let you know I saw you in court last week, and I want to
let you know that I know where you live, motherfucker.” According to the detective, when he
heard defendant say those words, he believed that defendant “was letting [him] know that there
was no doubt that he was going to kill [him], attempt to kill [him], or harm [his] family,” and that
“it was just a matter of time.” The phrase, “I want to let you know that I know where you live,
motherfucker,” coming from defendant to the detective–one of the key witnesses in the tractor
case–immediately before the tractor case retrial, could reasonably be construed as a threat of
violence or property damage. Even absent the “kitchen sink material,” those words strongly
indicated defendant’s intention to find the detective or his family at the place where they lived,
and kill or injure them or damage their property, if the detective testified at the retrial. We are
not persuaded that, but for the admission of the “kitchen sink material,” the outcome of the
intimidation case would have been different.
In light of the overwhelming amount of evidence establishing defendant’s guilt in the
tractor case and the intimidation case, defendant cannot establish that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different, but for the admission of the “kitchen sink material.” See
Lukity, supra at 495-496. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s admission of the “kitchen
sink material” was harmless and, therefore, that reversal is not warranted. See id.
10
It is apparent from the record that even if the three lower court cases had not been
consolidated, the trial court would have admitted the facts of the solicitation case and the
intimidation case to establish consciousness of guilt in the tractor case.
-15-
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of obtaining
property by false pretenses because the victim in a false pretenses case must intend to convey
both possession and title under MCL 750.218. We disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). The requirements of a criminal statute are
a question of law that we review de novo. People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 5; 715 NW2d 44
(2006).
MCL 750.218 states, in pertinent part:
(1) A person who, with the intent to defraud or cheat makes or uses a false
pretense to do 1 or more of the following is guilty of a crime punishable as
provided in this section:
***
(c) Obtain from a person any money or personal property or the use of any
instrument, facility, article, or other valuable thing or service.
We have held that in order to prove false pretenses, the prosecution must show: (1) a
false representation concerning an existing fact; (2) knowledge by the defendant that the
representation is false; (3) use of the representation with an intent to deceive; and (4) detrimental
reliance on the false representation by the victim. People v Dewald, 267 Mich App 365, 371;
705 NW2d 167 (2005).
In this case, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant used another man’s
identification to obtain the tractor, tiller, and trailer from Wurtzel’s rental company with the
intent to cheat or defraud. This conduct clearly falls within the parameters of MCL
750.218(1)(c). Nonetheless, defendant asserts that because Wurtzel did not intend to convey title
to him, an essential element of the charged offense was missing. Contrary to defendant’s
assertion, however, we noted in People v Cage, 90 Mich App 497, 498; 282 NW2d 368 (1979),
rev’d on other grounds 410 Mich 401 (1981), that intent to pass title is no longer required under
MCL 750.218. See also People v Sharpe, 22 Mich App 454, 458; 178 NW2d 90 (1970) (on
which the Cage Court relied).
We acknowledge that in People v Malach, 202 Mich App 266, 271; 507 NW2d 834
(1993), a panel of this Court stated that “if the owner of the goods intends to keep title but part
with possession, the crime is larceny; if the owner intends to part with both title and possession,
albeit for the wrong reasons, the crime is false pretenses.” Malach and the cases cited therein,
People v Jones, 143 Mich App 775, 777-780; 372 NW2d 657 (1985), People v Long, 409 Mich
346, 350-351; 294 NW2d 197 (1980), and People v Martin, 116 Mich 446, 450-451; 74 NW 653
(1898), describe the historical difference between the common law crime of larceny and the
-16-
statutory offense of false pretenses. Malach, supra at 270-271. In Long, our Supreme Court
summarized the historical development of MCL 750.218, stating:
The statute has early been described as having the purpose of punishing cheats.
The Legislature amended the statute several times prior to our consideration in
[Martin, supra]. Subsequent to Martin, the statute was again amended by 1915
PA 245 so as to additionally proscribe obtaining “the use of any instrument,
facility or article or other valuable thing or service” by false pretenses. The
statute has not changed significantly since that time. The common-law concepts
of transfer of title and possession to which we referred in Martin are noteworthy
in pointing out the delineation between larceny (with its common-law origin) and
the developing statutory offense of false pretenses. While serving this function
well, these concepts do not pertain to definition of the statutory offense of false
pretenses, a matter committed to legislative prerogative. [Long, supra at 352 n 8
(citation omitted).]
While the victim’s intent to pass title is a noteworthy distinction between the common
law crime of larceny and the statutory offense of false pretenses as stated in Long, we have held
that intent to pass title is no longer a required element under MCL 750.218. See Dewald, supra;
Cage, supra; Sharpe, supra. Therefore, defendant was properly charged under MCL 750.218
and his sufficiency of the evidence argument must fail. Furthermore, while defendant argues that
failing to return rental property with intent to defraud, MCL 750.362a, would have been a more
appropriate charge, “the decision whether to bring a charge and what charge to bring lies in the
discretion of the prosecutor.” People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 100; 586 NW2d 732 (1998).
V. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues that during closing arguments, the prosecutor committed misconduct
by making several statements suggesting that defendant posed a threat to the jury and
disparaging him and his trial counsel. Defendant argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective
for failing to object to all of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements. We disagree.
To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, there must be a contemporaneous
objection and request for a curative instruction. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; ___
NW2d ___ (2008). To the extent that a preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct is a
constitutional issue, it is reviewed de novo, but a trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for
clear error. Id. “[I]n order for prosecutorial misconduct to constitute constitutional error, the
misconduct must have so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law.” People v Blackmon, ___ Mich App ___; ___
NW2d ___ (2008) (emphasis omitted), slip op p 9. Nonconstitutional error, even if preserved, is
not a ground for reversal unless, after an examination of the entire case, it affirmatively appears
that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. Id., slip op p 10;
People v Brownridge (On Remand), 237 Mich App 210, 216; 602 NW2d 584 (1999), citing
Lukity, supra at 495-496.
We review unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting the
defendant’s substantial rights. Ackerman, supra at 448. Reversal is warranted only if plain error
resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant or “‘seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
-17-
or public reputation of judicial proceedings, independent of defendant’s innocence.’” Id. at 448449, quoting People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Where a curative
instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect reversal is not warranted. Ackerman,
supra at 449; People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis. People v Thomas,
260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). The propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks
depends on all of the facts of the case. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 30; 650 NW2d 96
(2002). The remarks must be reviewed as a whole and in light of defense arguments and the
relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. Brown, supra at 135. A prosecutor is
free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to his theory
of the case, and need not state the inferences in the blandest possible terms. People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); Dobek, supra at 66.
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor made two statements suggesting that defendant
posed a threat to the jury. Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to these statements at the time
that they were made, challenging them instead in a motion for new trial. This is the first
statement:
I’d like to resume where I was, and I was speaking about Ms. Haertel as a
witness.
Remember when she looked out at you and tried to create evidence where
she had none, that Detective Sergeant VanHorn is a bad cop? Now, in her mind,
she may believe that he is a bad cop. But he’s prosecuting or investigating her
loved one. . . . .
***
Ms. Haertel said, when I asked her, since you’ve been with him since ’97,
’98, do you know about these books? The Poisoner’s Handbook. How to Outfox
the Foxes. Mad as–“no, I don’t know anything about them.[”]
***
Mr. Piazza sort of made light of it when Detective Sergeant VanHorn was
on the stand. I’d like to have that, “297 Secrets the Law and Lawyers Don’t Want
You to Know.” Perhaps Mr. Piazza should have read it, and he could have been
aware of what I had Detective Sergeant Van Horn read. And I’ll only reread one
sentence that was chilling. It is page 115. “It is never enough to argue the facts
to a jury, whether the jury is composed of 1 or 12. What you must point out to
them is that their ultimate decision, if not in your favor, will cause pain to them.”
I’ve never read anything like that before. [(Emphasis added.)]
But Ms. Haertel hadn’t seen these books.
Defendant specifically objects to the quote the prosecutor read to the jury. We find,
however, that the prosecutor’s remarks, viewed in context, were not improper. The prosecutor
-18-
cited evidence admitted during trial and made remarks consistent with the parties’ theories of the
case. During opening statements, defendant’s trial counsel asserted that Detective VanHorn and
GM were “out to get” defendant and had a vendetta against him. During trial, the prosecution
questioned Detective VanHorn about the books and pamphlets discovered at defendant’s home.
At the prosecution’s request, the detective read a lengthy passage from one of the books,
including the quote the prosecutor read during closing arguments. Defendant’s girlfriend,
Haertel, testified at trial that she tried to initiate an internal affairs investigation of Detective
VanHorn because she was aware of 14 people who had complaints about the detective. At the
conclusion of Haertel’s testimony, the trial judge questioned her, in relevant part:
Q. The people who gave you negative feedback against Detective VanHorn, had
these people been in trouble with the law and that’s how they knew Detective
VanHorn?
A. Yes, I believe–yes, yes. It wasn’t personal, you know, like outside of work
situations, no, it was through criminal proceedings or–
Q. All right. Are you aware or have you seen the books and pamphlets on
violence that [defendant] owns?
A. Have I–I’m aware of them because of the court proceedings. I’ve heard of
them before in the court proceedings, but I wasn’t aware of them before that
point. I just–
Q. All right. Can you explain your thoughts on this? I think what the jury is
saying is does that make a difference to you?
A. Well, without having–giving away trial strategy, it’s hard for me to say
because some of those books I don’t even think belong to [defendant].
It is apparent from the record that in reading the quote to the jury during closing arguments, the
prosecutor was simply reiterating that Haertel’s opinion of the relationship between defendant
and Detective VanHorn was incomplete, given that she was unaware of the books and pamphlets
defendant kept at his house. Moreover, the quote had already been read to the jury during
Detective VanHorn’s testimony.
Defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s remarks during his rebuttal argument:
Right now I’m ending partly because I’m out of voice, but also because I
have addressed the arguments raised by the defense. . . . I want to end with this
thought. Up until now, that’s been a safe spot to be. But you’re going to have to
go in the deliberation room, after you’re instructed, and make a decision.
And from the point of view of this defendant, you’re going to have to get
personal with him. You’re going to have to get intimately close to him, as close
as one can be intimate in this courtroom, from there to there. And if you vote like
the evidence show that he’s guilty and you’re going to be telling him that, you’re
not going to be able to hide behind your foreperson, whoever it is . . . . You are
-19-
going to have to individually say, when asked by the judge–because it will be
asked of you, I assure you. One side or the other will say to you, I want the jury
polled. And your foreperson will sit down and the 12 of you will say that was my
verdict. You’ll have to say that, I find you guilty as charged Mr. Houthoofd.
Based on the evidence you’ve heard, that might trouble you. Please don’t let it
trouble you. Your fear of him, if you have it, has nothing to do with deliberations
and deciding this case.
The prosecutor’s remarks suggest that the jurors might be afraid of defendant, or at least
afraid to find him guilty. But the remarks were appropriate in light of all of the evidence
presented at trial and do not appear calculated to produce fear. Defendant asserts that there is no
Michigan case law directly addressing this issue, and cites several out-of-state cases to support
his argument that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper: People v Blackman, 44 Ill App 3d
137; 358 NE2d 50 (1976), State v Jones, 266 Minn 523; 124 NW2d 727 (1963), Grant v State,
194 So 2d 612 (Fla, 1967), Johnson v State, 453 NE2d 365 (Ind App, 1983), Cleveland v
Egeland, 26 Ohio App 3d 83; 497 NE2d 1383 (1986), People v Ferguson, 594 NYS2d 860; 191
AD2d 809 (1993), and State v Hoppe, 641 NW2d 315 (Minn App, 2002). We note, however,
that in all of those cases, the prosecutor’s remarks strongly suggested that acquitting the
defendant or finding the defendant guilty of a lesser charge would expose the jurors or their
loved ones to attack. In this case, the prosecutor urged the jurors to find defendant guilty based
on the evidence presented at trial, whether they feared him or not. The prosecutor’s remarks
were proper.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor made several statements disparaging
defendant and his trial counsel. In his brief on appeal, defendant quotes 20 separate passages
from the prosecutor’s closing arguments that he claims were improper. Defendant’s trial counsel
objected to only two of those 20 statements at the time they were made.
We find that the prosecutor’s remarks, viewed in context and in light of the parties’
theories of the case, were not improper. Most of the prosecutor’s remarks related to defendant’s
trial strategy. Throughout the trial proceedings, defendant’s attorneys argued that Detective
VanHorn and GM were “out to get” defendant and had a vendetta against him, and that the
prosecution only presented the “kitchen sink material” to assassinate defendant’s character. The
prosecutor suggested during his closing arguments that defendant’s attorneys were simply
engaging in trial strategy games–one minute suggesting that the “kitchen sink material” was
improper character evidence, and the next, using the material to bolster defendant’s vendetta
theory. The prosecutor further suggested that had defendant simply stipulated to certain facts
and dropped his vendetta theory, none of the “kitchen sink material” would have been necessary.
The prosecutor also referred to Reyes’ use of Franklin in the intimidation case as a desperate trial
strategy. Reyes’ testified that he never believed Franklin made the phone calls to Detective
VanHorn, but maintained that it was just as likely that Franklin made the calls as defendant. We
find nothing improper in the prosecutor’s remarks in light of the parties’ theories of the case.
While a prosecutor may not suggest that defense counsel is intentionally trying to mislead the
jury, if a comment is directly responsive to a particular defense argument, it is not improper.
Watson, supra at 592-593.
Additionally, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting
that defendant is selfish and manipulative, calling him a “selfish coward,” and making references
-20-
to terrorism. We disagree. While a prosecutor may not argue facts that are not in evidence, he
may argue the evidence and reasonable inferences arising from it. Bahoda, supra at 282. Nor is
the prosecutor constrained to use bland terms when doing so. Id. The prosecutor did not engage
in excessive name-calling during his closing arguments and in light of all of the evidence
presented at trial, it was reasonable for him to refer to defendant as selfish, manipulative, and as
a “selfish coward” a limited number of times. The prosecutor’s references to terrorism were also
limited, and quite mild in nature. In making those references, the prosecutor emphasized for the
jury that people intent on doing evil acts cannot always be stopped and that serving on a jury is
less of a hardship than fighting a war. The prosecutor did not, as defendant suggests on appeal,
dwell on the topic of terrorism or equate defendant to the 9/11 terrorists.
Even if we were to determine that the prosecutor committed misconduct during his
closing arguments, defendant cannot establish that the prosecutor’s statements were outcomedeterminative. Blackmon, supra, slip op p 10; Ackerman, supra at 448-449. Although defendant
challenges more than 20 separate statements, the prosecutor’s closing arguments were
extraordinarily long, taking up more than 160 pages of transcript. So, the challenged statements
were, in actuality, only a small part of the prosecutor’s argument. Moreover, the trial court
instructed the jury that the lawyers’ statements and arguments were not evidence. Where a
curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudice to defendant, reversal is not warranted.
Ackerman, supra at 449; Watson, supra at 586. The evidence admitted at trial establishing
defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and he cannot establish that any of the prosecutor’s
statements affected the outcome of the case.
Alternatively, defendant argues that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to
object to all of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements during closing arguments. A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised by a motion for new trial or an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973);
Rodriguez, supra at 38. Defendant raised this issue in a motion for new trial on remand from this
Court. The trial court determined, after holding evidentiary hearings on the issue, that
defendant’s trial attorneys were not ineffective. We review a trial court’s factual findings on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for clear error, while questions of constitutional law are
reviewed de novo. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484-485; 684 NW2d 686 (2004).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that defense
counsel’s performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and denied him a fair trial. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140, 145-146; 607 NW2d 767
(1999). Furthermore, defendant must show that, but for defense counsel’s error, it is likely that
the proceeding’s outcome would have been different. Id. at 146. Effective assistance of counsel
is presumed; therefore, defendant must overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id.
Considering that the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments were proper, any
objection by defense counsel would have been futile. “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to
make a futile objection.” Thomas, supra at 457. Further, defendant’s trial attorneys testified at
the remand hearing that they chose not to repeatedly object during the prosecutor’s closing
arguments as a matter of trial strategy, and “this Court will not second-guess counsel regarding
matters of trial strategy.” People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). The trial court found that defendant “had not only adequate representation but
-21-
representation of sterling quality.” Moreover, for the reasons indicated, defendant cannot
establish that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had his trial attorneys
objected to all of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements. See Henry, supra at 146.
Therefore, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
VI. Sentencing
Defendant argues that resentencing is necessary because the trial court scored OV 9, OV
12, and OV 19 based on facts not proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a jury trial in violation of
Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). We disagree.
At sentencing, defendant objected to the scoring of OV 9 and OV 12 for his intimidation
and solicitation convictions. He did not object to the scoring of OV 19.11 We review questions
of constitutional law de novo. People v Harper, 479 Mich 599, 610; 739 NW2d 523 (2007).
But, to the extent that this issue is unpreserved, review is limited to plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 695; 739 NW2d 563 (2007).
According to Blakely, supra at 303-304, in order to preserve a defendant’s right to trial
by jury, any fact that increases a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be admitted by
the defendant or submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. But, our Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed in Harper, supra at 615, that Blakely does not apply to Michigan’s
indeterminate sentencing scheme. Moreover, as discussed in Harper, supra at 613 n 21, and
People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 162 n 13; 715 NW2d 778 (2006), Michigan’s habitual offender
statutes are not affected by Blakely or its predecessor, Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490;
120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000). Therefore, the trial court did not err in scoring the
guidelines or fashioning defendant’s maximum sentence.
VII. Conclusion
Because we must vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for solicitation to commit
murder on the basis of improper venue, we need not address the remainder of his arguments on
appeal.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences for obtaining property by false
pretenses and intimidating a witness, and vacate his conviction and sentence for solicitation to
commit murder.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
11
As previously explained, we must vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for solicitation
to commit murder. Therefore, defendant’s arguments regarding that sentence are moot.
-22-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.