PEOPLE OF MI V GABRIEL JACKSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 29, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 282141
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-013512-FH
GABRIEL JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In the prosecutor’s appeal, plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court’s order
dismissing the case over a discovery violation. We affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Facts
A. Arrest
At the preliminary examination, a Detroit Police Officer testified that while on routine
patrol on August 5, 2007, he observed a silver Grand Prix parked extremely close to the front
entrance of a gas station, impeding traffic. According to the officer, when his partner announced
the presence of the police, defendant, who was on the premises, retrieved a clear plastic bag
containing suspected cocaine from his pocket and tossed it near the front quarter panel of a Jeep
Cherokee parked near the Grand Prix. The officer continued that he approached defendant, who
then entered the Cherokee, locked the doors, and attempted to start the ignition, but the officer
informed defendant he was under arrest for suspected cocaine possession. The officer then
placed defendant in handcuffs and searched him, thereby discovering a revolver on defendant’s
person.
Defendant was charged with possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7403(2)(a)(v), second or subsequent such offense, MCL 333.7413(2), carrying a concealed
handgun, MCL 750.227(2), being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Plaintiff further
gave notice that defendant would be subject to enhanced sentencing as a second habitual
offender, MCL 769.10.
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B. Motion to Suppress/Dismiss
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in connection with the arrest on
the ground that the police had detained him without sufficient reason to suspect him of criminal
activity. See People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558; 563 NW2d 208 (1997) (evidence
obtained in the course of a violation of a suspect’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is subject to suppression at trial); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct
1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment against the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment). However, this motion became one to dismiss when the prosecution
failed to comply with a discovery order for a patrol car video recording of the confrontation
between the police and defendant.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing to decide the matter. As the hearing began on
October 12, 2007, the prosecuting attorney stated that she had no indication, until that day, that
such a video had been requested. The trial court and defense counsel observed that the existence
of the video came to light at the preliminary examination, and that an order to produce it had
been signed on that occasion. The prosecuting attorney agreed immediately to try to obtain any
such recording. The trial court stated, “It could be inculpatory or exculpatory. It may have some
effect on this motion. I don’t know. But if a video exists of the incident . . . it could have some
bearing on these proceedings.”
When proceedings resumed on November 2, 2007, the prosecuting attorney reported that
she had spoken with the officer in charge about the video on October 15 and learned that no
video existed covering the period between July 31 and August 7, 2007. The prosecuting attorney
presented a memorandum from the Technical Support Department of the Detroit Police that
indicated that no such video was available. In response, defense counsel stated as follows:
I’m asking for the Court to dismiss this case . . . . [R]eading this memo . . . , it’s
dated October 15, 2007. This incident occurred on August the 5th, 2007. The
request for the video [was] made on August the 27th, 2007, but no one attempted
to pull the video out of the computer until . . . two months later.
As any person that’s practiced criminal law is well aware . . . the video
camera that this officer is talking about holds evidence for thirty days and after
thirty days the machines, if you do not make an extra copy, they claim that they
start recording and using . . . that space over the next time. That’s why on August
the 27th, the Judge signed the order, it was served in court on the Prosecutor and
the O[fficer] I[n] C[harge] because we knew we had to get it within thirty days or
make that request.
The prosecuting attorney maintained that no video was ever made in the first instance because
the server was not engaged, but defense counsel protested that there was no evidence that the
server had not been functioning. Defense counsel argued that he had routinely asked for videos
in such situations, and not received them, and that, “we’ve had it for years where officers playing
with those machines because when they make illegal arrests or assault an individual, they want to
say the video wasn’t working or it was turned off.”
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The officer in charge for purposes of producing the requested video testified that he was
present at the preliminary examination on August 27, 2007, and there received a court order to
produce a patrol car video. Asked what steps he took to comply with that order, the officer
spoke vaguely about his workload, and putting in a request, but was not specific about when he
took any such steps. The officer did not produce a copy of the request.
Proceedings were continued several days later in order to obtain testimony from the
assistant administrator of the camera system of the Detroit Police. That witness testified that he
had received a request on October 15 for a police video dating from August 5, 2007, but was
unable to retrieve such a video. The witness indicated that his attempt turned up a “missing gap
of video stemming from July 31st at 21:41 hours, until August 7th at 18:47 hours.” Asked if that
meant that no video ever existed within that window, the witness hedged, stating both that such a
video may never have been made, or may have been made but overwritten by new computer
files. The witness stated that experience suggested to him that, “from that big of a gap, it’s
usually a hardware issue,” but admitted that he had no specific information concerning a
malfunction in this instance. The witness further testified that he could find no record of any
repair order or related complaint concerning the equipment in question.
The trial court’s findings and conclusions included the following:
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought on behalf of the Defense,
the basis being the alleged failure of the People to comply with a discovery order
issued on October 27, 2007, in the District Court . . . .
There was an order for police video in the squad car of the officers who
arrested the Defendant . . . back on . . . August 5th, of 2007.
It is the contention of the Defense that the failure to timely furnish . . .
some recording of what occurred . . . caused a severe prejudice to the Defendant
to be able to properly advance the motion to suppress physical evidence.
***
The People’s contention is that well, after October the 12th of 2007, that
the People attempted to comply with the order of discovery, that is, the August
27th, 2007 order, and have now furnished evidence that, at least, as of October
15th, 2007, no video was available. There was nothing up-loaded to a server.
There is a gap of one week of video . . . .
***
The earliest time that [the assistant administrator of the camera system]
became aware of a request for video . . . was October the 15th, 2007 . . . . He said
he attempted to pull the video and . . . discovered this missing segment of time
....
He testified that usually where there’s such a gap is probably some
malfunction in the hard dive [sic] of the car’s equipment, but he testified that he
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could not tell if there was ever video recorded . . . . But a further check . . .
indicated that that were no repair orders or requests indicating that there was any
malfunction . . . .
And the Court finds that the People were aware of the August 27th, 2007,
order at the time it was issued by the . . . District Court, but virtually no steps
were taken to comply with that order until the first date of an evidentiary hearing
in the matter on the motion to suppress, which was October the 12th of 2007.
There has been no explanation sufficient[ly] satisfactory to this Court as to
why no steps were taken by the People to locate the video prior to the October 12,
2007, hearing.
***
Then we come to a hearing of . . . November 2nd, 2007 . . . . And the
Court is then presented with an October 15, 2007, memo . . . indicating that there
was no video found to exist. This date of the 2nd of November is beyond the five
to ten days that it would have overwritten or over-recorded in the car video. And,
now we know that even if there was a video, it certainly is no longer available.
. . . [A]s I view the evidence that was adduced during the hearing [it] is not
conclusive that there was no video. The evidence tends to show that there was a
video because one of the reasons testified to . . . is that well, maybe there was a
malfunction . . . , but there’s no evidence that there was a malfunction . . . .
The evidence is to the contrary. There’s no documentation, no oral
reports, or any other kind of evidence that there was a malfunction which was
addressed with any kind of mechanical or technical correction.
. . . [I]t took three hearing for it to get to the point where we are today to
try to find out what happened. And that time-frame, given the date of the order
from the District Court of August 27th, 2007, . . . is just inexcusable. That
information should have been furnished to this Court at the time, at least of the
first hearing . . . if the police had taken the necessary steps to locate the video.
They did nothing, and that is inexcusable.
So, I would find that there has not been compliance with [the] District
Judge’s . . . order.
***
I find that the failure by the police to timely respond to the order does
prejudice the ability of the Defense to pursue the motion to suppress. . . .
. . . I find that there’s no reasonable compliance with the . . . discover
order to . . . even attempt to locate a video or make a determination if a video had
ever existed.
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For those reasons, I find that the Defense’s position with respect to
pursuing this motion . . . have been prejudiced.
***
I am compelled, I think under the circumstances to grant to Defendant’s
motion. It will be dismissed.
II. Standards of Review
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate remedy for failure to
comply with a discovery order for an abuse of discretion. People v Davie (After Remand), 225
Mich App 592, 597-598; 571 NW2d 229 (1997). A trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss
is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Adams, 232 Mich App 128, 132; 591
NW2d 44 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court chooses an outcome falling
outside a “principled range of outcomes.” People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d
231 (2003).
A trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its application of the
law to the facts is reviewed de novo. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 269; 547 NW2d 280
(1996). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Gistover, 189
Mich App 44, 46; 472 NW2d 27 (1991).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff repeatedly suggests that the video the defense sought in this case never existed in
the first instance, but stops short of asserting that the trial court clearly erred in reaching the
conclusion that a video did exist but was not preserved. Given the evidence that patrol car
videos were customarily made, the explanation that possible equipment failure accounted for the
lack of one in this instance was speculative, because there was no evidence of any equipment
failure beyond the lack of videos for a certain period. Because we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that the court erred in this regard, we affirm the trial court’s determination that
the video sought did exist at one time but that the prosecution failed to produce it.
Plaintiff argues that neither constitutional Due Process, nor the court rules, required
disclosure of the video sought in this instance. We disagree. Due Process mandates disclosure
of evidence favorable to, and requested by, a criminal accused if it is material to the issues of
guilt or punishment. Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963).
Similarly, MCR 6.201(B)(a) requires disclosure, upon request, of “any exculpatory information
or evidence known to the prosecuting attorney.” In this case, the defense wanted the video most
immediately for purposes of a pretrial suppression motion. However, had the case gone to trial,
the video could well have shed light on whether defendant in fact ever possessed the cocaine that
he allegedly tossed from his person as the police approached. And had the case proceeded to
sentencing, defendant’s behavior as reflected in that video might have affected his minimum
sentence. The lack of the video simply leaves a credibility contest between defendant and a
police witness. The trial court thus did not clearly err in finding that the defense was prejudiced
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for want of the video. Because the video sought related to questions of defendant’s guilt or
punishment, it was subject to discovery.1
Plaintiff argues that there was no evidence of bad faith. We disagree. The trial court
regarded the lack of timely activity in response to the discovery order issued by the district court
as “inexcusable,” given that the video was in danger of being overwritten if not promptly
retrieved. Those in possession of that key piece of evidence flouted the district court’s order
until it was reiterated by the circuit court several weeks later, then still more weeks went by
before there was any attempt to explain the lack of any such video. Assuming, without deciding,
that this was mere inadvertence and not a deliberate attempt to withhold evidence, we
nonetheless agree with the trial court that such egregious dalliance bespeaks something less than
a good-faith attempt to comply with the discovery order.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the remedy of dismissal was erroneously harsh. Again, we
disagree. A trial court has wide discretion in deciding how to respond to discovery violations.
See Davie, supra. This was not a case of mere delay, but one where the delay led to the
destruction of the evidence sought. In light of the prosecution’s inexcusable delay in responding
to the discovery order in question, we do not deem the remedy of dismissal to lie outside a
principled range of outcomes. See Babcock, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
Our resolution of this issue obviates any need to decide whether a video recording qualifies as a
“document, photograph, or other paper” subject to disclosure under MCR 6.201(A)(6).
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