IN RE BISHOP A'KING RICHARD SMITH MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BISHOP A’KING RICHARD
SMITH, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 286249
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-001555-NA
MARY A. BONNER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Bandstra and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). We affirm. This appeal has been decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory ground for termination,
MCL 712A.19b(3)(l), was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re
Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, the evidence did not show that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5).1
The parties do not dispute the trial court’s findings that a statutory ground for termination
was established. Respondent argues that the trial court erred in its determination of the child’s
best interests.
The trial court did not err in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was not clearly contrary to the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
1
MCL 712A.19b(5) has been amended, effective July 11, 2008, to require that the trial court
make an affirmative finding that termination of a parent’s parental rights is in the best interest of
the child. 2008 PA 199. The amended statute does not affect the instant case because the
termination order was entered on June 11, 2008.
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NW2d 407 (2000). The foster care worker, therapists, and psychologist who had worked with
and evaluated respondent and Bishop testified that they had a very strong bond. In addition, the
evidence was clear that Bishop wished to return to respondent’s care. The witnesses believed
that severing contact between Bishop and respondent would have a negative impact on Bishop
because of their bond and Bishop’s strong desire to return to her care. However, clear and
convincing evidence existed that respondent was unable to meet Bishop’s needs. The counselors
and therapists agreed that respondent was unable to care for Bishop independently. Bishop had
special needs and required structure, consistent consequences, firm limits, a nurturing
environment, and considerable supervision.
Respondent’s parental rights to seven other children had already been terminated. She
and Bishop had been involved with petitioner for seven years in which they received numerous
intensive services. Bishop was almost nine years old at the time of the termination trial and had
only lived with respondent for about two years. A previous petition and court jurisdiction were
dismissed just one year earlier. Despite all of these services and the recent dismissal, these
proceedings were initiated when a police officer witnessed respondent screaming obscenities at
Bishop and hitting him. Respondent was arrested for third-degree child abuse.
Both the family therapist and the psychological evaluator testified that Bishop exhibited
aggressive behaviors. The therapist noted that Bishop had a predisposition to violence and
swearing and that, if he were exposed to those behaviors on a regular basis, he would develop a
disregard for the law and the safety of others. The psychologist found that Bishop was more than
willing to engage with someone aggressively if he were provoked and testified that, if Bishop
witnessed aggressive behavior on a regular basis, aggressive behavior would become normal for
him. After performing psychological evaluations on both respondent and Bishop and observing
respondent and Bishop interacting, the psychologist did not believe that respondent was capable
of parenting Bishop alone and recommended that someone live with respondent and Bishop to
help them. Another family counselor did not believe that respondent was capable of caring for
Bishop on her own because she was unable to handle Bishop’s behavior and maintain parental
control. While the foster care worker was not sure that termination was in the child’s best
interests, she did not believe that Bishop should be returned to respondent’s care. The foster care
worker thought that termination would move Bishop toward the permanence and stability that he
needed.
Although all of the witnesses agreed that Bishop was strongly attached to respondent and
that termination would have a negative impact on him, both the family therapist and the foster
care worker testified that Bishop was thriving in his aunt’s care. Respondent did not put any
limits or establish appropriate boundaries for Bishop. In addition, respondent failed to redirect
Bishop when he misbehaved or started swearing. Bishop’s aunt provided structure and limits,
two requirements for adequately caring for Bishop. Despite the strong bond and the child’s
expressed wishes, Bishop was able to flourish under someone else’s care.
Although respondent and Bishop shared a strong bond and Bishop expressed his wish to
return to respondent’s care, the evidence was clear and convincing that respondent was not able
to properly care for Bishop. By all accounts, Bishop was a difficult child with specific,
specialized needs and there were severe consequences if those needs were not met. More time
spent in foster care or receiving services with respondent would not provide the child with the
structure, stability, and permanence that he required, especially as he grows older. Considering
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this evidence combined with the seven years of services and care that petitioner had already
provided for respondent, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was not clearly contrary to the best interests of the child.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in not appointing separate counsel for the
child because the guardian ad litem’s determination of the child’s best interests was in conflict
with the child’s determination of his best interests. MCL 712A.17d(2) states that the trial court
“may” appoint separate counsel if such a situation arises. The use of the term “may” in MCL
712A.17d(2) and MCR 3.915(B)(2)(b) signifies a discretionary provision. Warda v Flushing
City Council, 472 Mich 326, 332; 696 NW2d 671 (2005). Therefore, this Court reviews the trial
court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Mollett v City of Taylor, 197 Mich App 328, 339;
494 NW2d 832 (1992). If the trial court’s decision results in an outcome within the range of
principled outcomes, the court has not abused its discretion. Woodward v Custer, 476 Mich 545,
557; 719 NW2d 842 (2006).
In this case, the guardian ad litem informed the trial court immediately that her
determination of the child’s best interests was in conflict with the child’s determination of his
best interests. Although the guardian ad litem clearly articulated Bishop’s opposition to the trial
court on different occasions, she did not advocate his position opposing termination.
Given the facts of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing
separate counsel for Bishop. There was ample evidence elicited at trial regarding Bishop’s
desire to live with respondent, the strong bond he shared with respondent, and that Bishop did
not want respondent’s parental rights to be terminated. However, the witnesses also were in
agreement that respondent was not capable of adequately parenting Bishop. The trial court had
to determine what weight to give Bishop’s expressed wishes in light of the child’s considerable
needs and difficulties. Given the circumstances of the case and the trial court’s extensive
knowledge and familiarity with respondent and Bishop, we find that the trial court’s decision
was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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