IN RE RICHARDSON/COLBERT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KAYLEN DENISE
RICHARDSON, MIKAYLA TEQWA
COLBERT, and DARNELL JEROME COLBERT,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 284355
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-414117-NA
TAELEEN M. RICHARDSON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Davis and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the three minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we affirm.
This arose in 2002 when respondent, a minor and a permanent ward of the court,
absconded with the infant Kaylen from her placement in semi-independent living and went to
live with a boyfriend who was domestically abusive. Kaylen was removed from respondent’s
care at the age of 11 months and has been in foster care for nearly six years. Mikayla was
removed from respondent’s care at birth and has been in foster care for five years. When
Mikayla was placed in the jurisdiction of the court respondent, still a minor and a court ward, she
was truant from her placement at Denby maternity center and her whereabouts were unknown.
Darnell was also removed from respondent’s care at birth and has been in foster care for nearly
four years. The petitioner has twice before sought termination of respondent’s parental rights to
these children.
During the initial custody proceedings the trial court found that several grounds for
termination were established with respect to Kaylen and Mikayla but declined to terminate
respondent’s parental rights, finding that termination would be contrary to the best interests of
the children. A short time later, another court found that grounds for termination of respondent’s
parental rights to Darnell were also not established, due to the trial court’s finding that
respondent’s failure to provide proper care and custody was attributable to her frustration with
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the judicial system. A new termination petition was filed with respect to all three children;
following a trial, the court again denied termination but advised respondent that, if great strides
in compliance with her treatment plan were not evident, termination would again be considered.
Respondent later gave birth to twins, who were allowed to remain in her care. Initially
Children’s Protective Services investigated the twins and felt that no petition was necessary.
Ultimately, a petition was filed seeking temporary custody of the twins but indicating that they
should be allowed to remain in the care of respondent. On the basis of admissions by
respondent, the trial court assumed jurisdiction of the twins. One of the twins was diagnosed
with cerebral palsy at the age of seven months. The twins remain in the care of respondent, and
termination of respondent’s parental rights has not been sought.
Despite respondent’s care of the twins, petitioner again sought termination of
respondent’s parental rights to Kaylen, Mikayla, and Darnell, and a trial on the petition was held.
Our review of the record of that trial leads us to conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by
finding that statutory grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights to Kaylen, Mikayla,
and Darnell were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433
Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Respondent failed to provide proper care and custody
for these children, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), by failing to visit them for a substantial period of time
during this case, and by missing approximately half of the visits offered in 2006 and much of
2007. With respect to Kaylen, respondent failed to provide proper care and custody by truanting
from placement with the child and then residing with a boyfriend who was physically abusive to
respondent. The trial court did not clearly err by finding that there was no reasonable likelihood
that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a
reasonable time considering their ages. Id. A significant factor in the foster care workers’
recommendation that respondent’s parental rights be terminated, and also in the trial court’s
decision, was the rather extreme special needs of the three children. Ms. Miller, a foster care
worker for the Judson Center, testified that respondent needed a great deal of assistance in order
to appropriately deal with all five children, and she would not feel comfortable leaving the
children with respondent without assistance even for the one hour of visitation.1 Ms. Miller felt
that respondent did not grasp the significant educational and behavioral needs of the children,
and she noted that respondent had failed to attend educational planning meetings for Kaylen and
Mikayla, as well as a number of medical appointments to which she had been invited. Ms.
Thompson, the most recent worker for the family, observed that respondent was overwhelmed in
visits. Ms. Thompson testified that respondent did not redirect the children when they needed to
be redirected. Ms. Thompson cited and agreed with the clinic evaluation, which indicated that
respondent would be overwhelmed with the care of just the twins who are in her care if she did
not have the assistance that she receives from the paternal grandmother of Mikayla and Darnell.
Ms. Thompson felt that respondent would require extensive services in order to be able to care
for all five children. However, respondent has a history of refusing services. While Ms.
Finnegan, the family therapist for respondent and the children, felt that respondent could reach a
stage where she would have the ability to care for all of the children, she was unable to offer any
time frame in which such progress might be anticipated. Given the unusually long duration of
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Respondent never progressed to unsupervised visits throughout this case.
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this case, we believe that a reasonable time must be a very short time. Yet, except for the
testimony of respondent’s former therapist who had never seen respondent interact with the
children and was unaware of their special needs, there was no indication that respondent would
be able to provide proper care and custody for the children in the foreseeable future. Under these
circumstances, termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) was not
clearly erroneous.
The same evidence that indicates that there is no reasonable likelihood that respondent
would be able to provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable time
considering their ages, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), equally establishes that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j),
and the trial court did not clearly err by terminating her parental rights under this statutory
subsection.2
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5). Kaylen has been in care for
nearly six years, and Mikayla and Darnell have been in care for their entire lives. Permanence
for these children is long overdue. While there was some testimony of a bond between
respondent and the children, other testimony indicated a weak bond at best. Ms. Thompson
testified that there is some attachment between respondent and the children, but it is not very
strong. Ms. Miller testified that she observed no bond between Mikayla, Darnell and respondent.
Where the evidence indicated that respondent was overwhelmed with the care of the five
children, four of whom have very significant special needs, and where there was no identifiable
point at which reunification could be foreseen after five years of court oversight, the trial court
did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly contrary to the best interests of the
children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
2
We do not rely upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) in affirming the termination of respondent’s
parental rights. While the conditions of adjudication related generally to respondent’s ability to
adequately care for the children, the specific nature of her barriers has shifted over the lengthy
duration of this case. The one specific condition of adjudication that did continue to exist,
unemployment, was noted as a basis for adjudication with respect to Darnell only.
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