PEOPLE OF MI V EDWARD WOODRUFF
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 8, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282041
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-100034
EDWARD WOODRUFF,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by delayed leave granted from a circuit court order reversing defendant’s
district court conviction of second-degree retail fraud, MCL 750.356d, and remanding for a new
trial. We reverse and remand for reinstatement of defendant’s conviction. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant and a friend, Anthony Beverly, went to a Home Depot store where Beverly
paid for three ceiling fans and then transferred the receipt to defendant, who used it as proof of
purchase for three identical ceiling fans. Defendant and Beverly offered a defense of innocent
mistake. The district court, sitting as the trier of fact, disbelieved their explanation and found
defendant guilty as charged. On appeal, the circuit court found that the district court made
erroneous factual findings and that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.
Accordingly, it vacated defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial.1
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is reviewed de novo on
appeal. People v Sherman-Huffman, 241 Mich App 264, 265; 615 NW2d 776 (2000), aff’d 466
Mich 39 (2002). The evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that each element of the crime was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 524; 640 NW2d 314
(2001). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are sufficient to
prove the elements of a crime. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
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We note that if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict, the conviction must be
reversed and double jeopardy would prevent a retrial on the same charge. People v Bruno, 115
Mich App 656, 661; 322 NW2d 176 (1982).
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The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A finding of fact is considered
“clearly erroneous if, after review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Gistover, 189 Mich App 44, 46;
472 NW2d 27 (1991). “An appellate court will defer to the trial court’s resolution of factual
issues, especially where it involves the credibility of witnesses.” People v Cartwright, 454 Mich
550, 555; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). All determinations made by the trier of fact concerning the
weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed. People v Williams, 268
Mich App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005).
A person is guilty of second-degree retail fraud if, while a store is open to the public, he
steals property of the store that is offered for sale at a price of at least $200 but less than $1,000.
MCL 750.356d(1)(b). The elements of the offense are that (1) the defendant took property
offered for sale at a store, (2) the defendant physically moved the property, although he need not
leave the store with it, (3) the defendant intended to steal the property, i.e., take it permanently
without the store’s consent, (4) the defendant’s actions took place inside a store or in the
immediate area while the store was open to the public, and (5) the value of the property was
between $200 and $1,000. MCL 750.356d(1)(b); CJI2d 23.13. The defendant’s intent may be
inferred from all the facts and circumstances of a case, In re People v Jory, 443 Mich 403, 419;
505 NW2d 228 (1993), and “minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient.” People v Fetterley,
229 Mich App 511, 518; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
The circuit court found that the district court made errors of fact. The district court did
err in stating that Beverly’s wife drove to the store from Detroit because she testified that she
drove from Redford. However, the salient point made by the district court was that Beverly’s
wife did not have time to get to the store in “the time frame that was described.” The circuit
court found error because defendant presented new evidence, not offered at trial, regarding the
time frame in question. But a trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are
not supported by the evidence presented at trial. When new evidence is at issue, the question is
whether it would warrant a new trial under the four-part test set forth in People v Cress, 468
Mich 678, 692; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). The circuit court did not find that the newly offered
evidence warranted a new trial under this test.
The district court found that “there were two transactions that took place seven minutes
apart here.” This finding is not clearly erroneous because it is supported by Beverly’s and
defendant’s time-stamped sales receipts, which are stamped 11:46 a.m. and 11:53 a.m.,
respectively. The circuit court misapprehended the district court’s finding, believing that it had
erroneously found that seven minutes had elapsed “from the time of Mr. Beverly’s phone call
until [defendant] paid for the extension rod and cleaner.” The circuit court also rejected the
district court’s finding because “there is no evidence that the time [the registers] are set to is
accurate to the minute with universal standard time or synchronized with the security video
cameras.” In this regard, the circuit court plainly substituted its judgment for that of the district
court, which apparently did not find the lack of such evidence to be a problem. An appellate
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. People v Martin, 199 Mich App
124, 125; 501 NW2d 198 (1993).
The district court stated that “[f]or reasons that have remained unexplained, the parties
split up.” The circuit court found clear error because defendant and Beverly both offered an
explanation for why they split up. It appears from the context of the district court’s statement,
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however, that it was making a factual finding that the reason offered for the split was not
satisfactory, and that the court disbelieved defendant’s and Beverly’s explanation. The circuit
court should have deferred to that finding.
The evidence showed that defendant and Beverly entered a store open to the public.
Defendant had three fans on a flatbed cart and moved them to the self-serve register area. He left
them there and went to stand by the tool corral. In the meantime, Beverly paid for three identical
fans at the other end of the store. Instead of leaving with his merchandise, however, he returned
to the sales floor. He parked his shopping cart and then walked to the area where defendant was
loitering and dropped his sales receipt into a cart. He started walking off in one direction and,
after defendant picked up the discarded sales receipt, he turned around and walked back in the
direction of his own cart. A couple of minutes later, defendant retrieved his cart and took it to a
different register, where he presented Beverly’s receipt as proof of payment for the fans, then
tried to leave with them. The value of the fans was $491. Although the prosecutor did not show
what happened with Beverly’s fans, the prosecutor was not required to negate every theory
consistent with defendant’s innocence. People v Carson, 189 Mich App 268, 269; 471 NW2d
655 (1991). It was sufficient that he prove his own theory beyond a reasonable doubt in the face
of whatever contradictory evidence defendant might present. Id.
Defendant and Beverly presented a defense of an innocent mistake, which, if believed,
would negate an intent to steal. It is clear from the district court’s findings that it simply did not
believe defendant’s defense and accepted the prosecutor’s proofs. The trial court did not clearly
err in so finding because the explanation offered by defendant and Beverly was inconsistent with
the store surveillance videos. When the evidence as a whole is considered in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, the district court reasonably could have concluded that there was no
innocent mistake and, instead, defendant intentionally picked up three extra fans, parked his cart
to wait for Beverly to drop off the receipt for the purchase of the first three fans, and took that
receipt to try to leave with the three extra fans without paying for them, which was sufficient to
establish the requisite intent to steal. The district court was not required to believe Beverly’s
testimony that he left his fans in the store. People v Cummings, 139 Mich App 286, 293-294;
362 NW2d 252 (1984) (the fact-finder “may choose to believe or disbelieve any witness or any
evidence presented in reaching a verdict”). The circuit court improperly substituted its judgment
for that of the district court. The circuit court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove
defendant’s guilt “in light of the defendant’s plausible explanations for his actions,” which
indicates only that the circuit court would have believed defendant’s testimony had it been sitting
as the trier of fact, not that the district court, which was in a superior position to evaluate
credibility, clearly erred in disbelieving defendant’s testimony and rejecting the defense offered.
The evidence was sufficient to sustain the district court’s verdict.
Defendant alternatively argues that his postjudgment motion in the district court should
have been granted as a matter of law because the prosecutor never filed an answer. We disagree.
Unless the court requires the opposing party to file a brief, the filing of a response is permissive.
See MCR 2.119(C)(2) and (E)(3). Further, the failure to file a response to a motion does not
compel the court to grant the motion. To the contrary, MCR 6.431(B) and (C) state that the court
“may” grant a postjudgment motion. The term “may” is permissive and indicative of discretion,
In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond, 276 Mich App 482, 492; 740 NW2d 734 (2007). Thus, while the
district court had discretion to grant the motion, it was not required to do so. Similarly, the
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prosecutor’s failure to timely respond to defendant’s circuit court appeal did not preclude the
prosecutor from obtaining relief on appeal. The filing of a brief by an appellee is permissive, not
mandatory. MCR 7.101(I)(1).
For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand for reinstatement of
defendant’s conviction.
Reversed and remanded in accordance with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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