IN RE NUNLEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KARRA LORRAINE NUNLEY
and KORDELL JAMAR NUNLEY, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 281893
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-423978-NA
JARELL JACOB ROBINSON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KENDRA LORRAINE NUNLEY,
Respondent.
In the Matter of KARRA LORRAINE NUNLEY
and KORDELL JAMAR NUNLEY, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 281894
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-423978-NA
KENDRA LORRAINE NUNLEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JARELL JACOB ROBINSON,
Respondent.
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Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right the order terminating their
parental rights to their son, and respondent mother’s parental rights to both children, under MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(i). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that at least one statutory ground for
termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 210; 661
NW2d 216 (2003). There was insufficient evidence to establish abandonment for at least 91
days under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) or abandonment of a young child under MCL
712A.19b(3)(k)(i). However, we affirm the trial court’s decision because there was clear and
convincing evidence of other statutory grounds. In re Huisman, 230 Mich App 372, 384-385;
584 NW2d 349 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds, In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341,
353 n 10; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Both respondents argue that the supervisor’s testimony was insufficient to establish
statutory grounds. The supervisor admitted she did not know every detail of respondents’
interactions with the foster care workers, and she gave inconsistent testimony about where
respondents were required to visit their son. However, the record indicates that respondents
stopped visiting sometime between November 2006 and April 2007, and there is no evidence
contradicting the supervisor’s testimony that respondent mother visited only three times between
June 2007 and October 2007 and respondent father did not visit. Although respondent father
showed interest in parenting immediately after the child’s birth, in the year before termination he
subsequently stopped making efforts.
Further, there was no evidence contradicting the supervisor’s testimony that respondent
father did not provide proof of employment or housing. Although the supervisor did not know
how respondent father was referred to the fatherhood program, he was offered and failed to
complete domestic violence counseling and parenting classes. Respondent mother completed
parenting classes and was apparently not responsible for the delay in re-referral. However, she
did not demonstrate any benefit by regularly attending supervised visits. She also offered proof
of employment in April 2007, but she did not offer evidence that she remained employed through
October 2007 and did not have a history of maintaining employment. She also offered no
evidence that she obtained her general equivalency degree as she promised.
Respondents argue further on appeal that petitioner did not provide sufficient services,
especially in light of respondents’ ages and respondent mother’s initial status as a court ward
herself. Petitioner generally must make reasonable efforts to rectify the problems that led to
adjudication. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005); MCL 712A.18f. To
successfully claim lack of reasonable efforts, a respondent must establish that he would have
fared better if petitioner offered other services. In re Fried, supra at 543. Neither respondent in
the present case suggests any specific services that were not provided. Although the supervisor
did not know all details of respondents’ interactions with workers, the evidence established that
respondent mother was offered a mother-baby program, parenting classes, individual counseling,
and visitation, and respondent father was offered at least domestic violence counseling, parenting
classes, and visitation.
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Petitioner provided clear and convincing evidence that respondent father did not rectify
the conditions leading to adjudication and was not reasonably likely to within a reasonable time,
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). He did not demonstrate that he had a suitable home, could
financially support his child, was willing and able to visit his child, and had resolved the
problems that led to domestic violence against the mother of his other children. Petitioner also
provided clear and convincing evidence that respondent father was not reasonably likely to
provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and the
child was likely to be harmed if returned to his care, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
Petitioner also provided clear and convincing evidence that respondent mother did not
rectify the conditions leading to adjudication, her inability to support and provide a stable home
and appropriate parenting, and was not reasonably likely to within a reasonable time, under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Her failure to visit regularly was significant evidence of her continuing
inability to parent. For the same reasons, there was also clear and convincing evidence that
respondent mother was not reasonably likely to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and the children were likely to be harmed if
returned to her care, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
A trial court is required to terminate parental rights after finding a statutory ground,
unless it determines that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 352-353. There was no evidence the children and either
respondent shared a bond at the time of termination in light of respondents’ failure to visit
regularly. There was no evidence that respondents saw the children more frequently during the
last 11 months of this case than the supervisor testified. The trial court was also permitted to
consider the children’s need for permanence when determining whether termination was in their
best interests. See In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 52; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). The trial court
did not err when it held that termination was not clearly against the children’s best interests and
terminated both respondents’ rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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