PEOPLE OF MI V SYEED T MONNAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276895
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2005-005003-FH
2005-005004-FH
SYEED T. MONNAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Talbot and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted, challenging the trial court’s order denying
his postjudgment motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to two counts of delivery of a controlled
substance (ecstasy), MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i), and one count of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
In LC No. 2005-005001-FH, LC No. 2005-005002-FH, and LC No. 2005-005003-FH,
defendant was charged with one count each of delivery of a controlled substance (ecstasy). In
LC No. 2005-005004-FH, defendant was charged with delivery of a controlled substance
(ecstasy), possession with intent to deliver Vicodin, possession of marijuana, possession of a
controlled substance analogue, possession of prescription forms, maintaining a drug house,
possession of a Taser, and felony-firearm. Defense counsel secured a plea agreement whereby
defendant pleaded guilty as charged in LC No. 2005-005003-FH and pleaded guilty to delivery
of a controlled substance and felony-firearm in LC No. 2005-005004-FH in exchange for the
dismissal of all other charges. The plea agreement also included a sentence agreement that
called for concurrent minimum sentences of one year for each of the controlled substance
convictions, to be served consecutively to the mandatory two-year term for felony-firearm. After
the trial court accepted the pleas and sentenced defendant accordingly, defendant moved to
withdraw his pleas. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then filed a delayed
application for leave to appeal. This Court initially denied the application,1 but, on
reconsideration, granted the application and, while retaining jurisdiction, remanded the case for a
1
People v Monnan, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 19, 2007 (Docket
No. 276895).
-1-
Ginther2 hearing.3 Following the hearing, the trial court again denied defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw
his plea in LC No. 2005-005004-FH because a factual basis for the felony-firearm charge was
not established. We disagree.
A postjudgment motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. People v Davidovich, 238 Mich App 422, 425; 606 NW2d
387 (1999), aff’d 463 Mich 446 (2000).
“In reviewing the adequacy of the factual basis for a plea, this Court examines whether
the factfinder could properly convict on the facts elicited from the defendant at the plea
proceeding.” People v Brownfield (After Remand), 216 Mich App 429, 431; 548 NW2d 248
(1996).
A factual basis to support a plea exists if an inculpatory inference can be
drawn from what the defendant has admitted. This holds true even if an
exculpatory inference could also be drawn and the defendant asserts that the latter
is the correct inference. Even if the defendant denies an element of the crime, the
court may properly accept the plea if an inculpatory inference can still be drawn
from what the defendant says. [People v Jones, 190 Mich App 509, 511-512; 476
NW2d 646 (1991) (citations omitted).]
The elements of felony-firearm are that the defendant possessed a firearm during the
commission or attempted commission of any felony other than those four enumerated in the
pertinent statute. MCL 750.227b(1); People v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 698; 575 NW2d 283
(1998). The felony-firearm charge alleged that defendant possessed a pistol at the time he
committed or attempted to commit possession with intent to deliver Vicodin. The elements of
possession with intent to deliver Vicodin are that the defendant knowingly possessed Vicodin
and intended to deliver the Vicodin to someone else. See MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(ii).
At the plea hearing, defendant stated that on August 17 and September 9, 2005, he sold
ecstasy to an undercover officer knowing that it was illegal to do so. At the time of the
September 9 sale, he also had Vicodin and a firearm at home in his bedroom. Defendant
contends that the factual basis for the felony-firearm plea was insufficient because he did not
plead guilty to the Vicodin offense, because the Vicodin had been legally prescribed, and
because he did not have the firearm in his possession at the time he delivered the ecstasy or at the
time the gun and the Vicodin were recovered.
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
3
People v Monnan, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 7, 2007 (Docket
No. 276895).
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Because the felony-firearm charge was predicated on the felony offense of possession
with intent to deliver Vicodin, not on the delivery of ecstasy, the fact that defendant was not
armed when he delivered the ecstasy is irrelevant. Likewise, the fact that defendant did not plead
guilty to possession with intent to deliver Vicodin is irrelevant because he need not be convicted
of the underlying felony to be convicted of felony-firearm. People v Jeff Davis, 196 Mich App
597, 601; 493 NW2d 467 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Miles, 454
Mich 90, 95; 559 NW2d 299 (1997). Defendant admitted that the weapon belonged to him and
was in his bedroom closet. At the time, he was in possession of Vicodin. He stated that his
mother had a prescription for the drug and that he personally had a prescription for only “[s]ome
of them[.]” Defendant’s admissions supported inculpatory inferences that he was not legally in
possession of Vicodin, because not all of it was prescribed to him, and that he had constructive
possession of a firearm at the time he possessed the Vicodin. Possession of the weapon is
determined as of the time the defendant committed the underlying felony, not at the time the
police searched his home or when the defendant was arrested. People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich
431, 438-439; 606 NW2d 645 (2000). Because inculpatory inferences sufficient to support a
conviction of felony-firearm can be drawn from defendant’s admissions, the factual basis for the
plea was adequate and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion
to withdraw his plea on this basis.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea in both cases because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Whether a
defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact.
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). The trial court’s factual findings
are reviewed for clear error, but this Court determines de novo whether the facts properly found
by the trial court establish ineffective assistance of counsel. See id.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must first show
that (1) his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
the prevailing professional norms and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
error, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” People v Horn, 279 Mich App
31, 37-38 n 2; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). A defendant must also show that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294
(2001). “Counsel is presumed to have provided effective assistance, and the defendant must
overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s assistance was sound trial strategy.” Horn, supra
at 37-38 n 2.
When considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty
plea, the court must determine whether the defendant tendered a voluntary and understanding
plea. People v Thew, 201 Mich App 78, 89; 506 NW2d 547 (1993). “The question is not
whether a court would, in retrospect, consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but whether
the advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at
89-90. “Defense counsel must explain to the defendant the range and consequences of available
choices in sufficient detail to enable the defendant to make an intelligent and informed choice.”
People v Jackson, 203 Mich App 607, 614; 513 NW2d 206 (1994). A guilty plea may be
rendered involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel fails to
explain the nature of the charges or discuss possible defenses to them. Id.
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Defendant first argues that counsel was deficient for advising him to waive the
preliminary examination, which would have enabled a record to be developed regarding “the
legality of the prescription medications found in” defendant’s house and the circumstances under
which the firearm was found, for use in a motion to quash the felony-firearm charge.
The purpose of a preliminary examination “is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it.”
People v Hunt, 442 Mich 359, 362; 501 NW2d 151 (1993). The preliminary examination, unless
waived, is a necessary prerequisite to the filing of an information charging the defendant with a
felony. MCL 767.42(1). Once a defendant is bound over for trial, he can challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence adduced at the preliminary examination in a pretrial motion to quash.
Counsel’s decision whether to file such a pretrial motion is considered a matter of trial strategy.
See, e.g., People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 463; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). “This Court will
not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess
counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77;
601 NW2d 887 (1999).
According to defendant, trial counsel told him that if he waived the preliminary
examination, half of the charges, including all the “major” charges, would be dropped.
Defendant was charged with a host of felonies and misdemeanors, most of which were actually
dismissed. Whether the offenses to which defendant pleaded guilty were “major” was a matter
of opinion. Assuming that they were and that counsel’s advice could be considered deficient,
defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to conduct a preliminary
examination for use in a subsequent motion to quash. Specifically, he failed to show that there
was any basis for concluding that there was not probable cause to believe that he committed the
offense of possession with intent to deliver Vicodin (the predicate felony for the felony-firearm
charge). That some of the drug may have been legally prescribed to his mother did not authorize
defendant to possess it. Further, that some of it may have been legally prescribed to defendant
did not authorize defendant to deliver it to others. In addition, the fact that defendant possessed
the gun at the time he possessed the Vicodin was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe
that he committed the offense of felony-firearm, regardless of the fact that he did not possess the
gun when he committed the other charged felonies, that he did not have ready access to the gun
when he was arrested, or that the gun was inoperable. Burgenmeyer, supra at 438-439; People v
Peals, 476 Mich 636, 638; 720 NW2d 196 (2006). Therefore, defendant has not shown that but
for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the felony-firearm charge would have
been dismissed before trial. In addition, defendant has not shown how counsel’s alleged
deficient advice with respect to the waiver of the preliminary examination induced him to plead
guilty, given that he knew that the felony-firearm charge was still pending and would not be
dismissed as part of the plea agreement. Finally, regardless of the fact that the felony-firearm
charge presented a “triable” issue, defendant has not shown that there is a reasonable probability
that he would have been acquitted of the offense at trial and thus cannot show that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s advice to accept the plea agreement.
Defendant next argues that counsel was deficient for advising him not to worry about the
felony-firearm charge because inoperability of the weapon precluded a conviction. Assuming
counsel made such a representation, his advice was improper because inoperability of a weapon
is not a defense to felony-firearm. People v Thompson, 189 Mich App 85, 86; 472 NW2d 11
-4-
(1991). However, defendant admitted that before he accepted the plea agreement, a motion to
quash the charge on that ground had been denied. He also admitted that counsel later told him
that the prosecutor would not dismiss the felony-firearm charge and that the plea agreement
called for him to plead guilty to that offense. Clearly, then, defendant could have rejected the
plea agreement if he did not want to plead guilty to felony-firearm. Therefore, defendant cannot
show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged erroneous advice.
Defendant also argues that counsel was deficient for failing to discuss possible trial
strategy with him, particularly the defense of entrapment.
“A defendant is entitled to have his counsel investigate, prepare and assert all substantial
defenses.” People v Hubbard, 156 Mich App 712, 714; 402 NW2d 79 (1986). “A substantial
defense is one that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Kelly,
186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). The failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v McGhee, 268 Mich
App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005).
Defendant testified that counsel never discussed a possible entrapment defense with him
or other trial strategies, such as which witnesses to call or how to gain an acquittal. However,
because defendant elected to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, there was no need to
prepare a defense for trial. In addition, defendant was only in court for a pretrial hearing. If he
wanted to proceed to trial, he did not have to enter a guilty plea; the case could have been set for
trial and he could have discussed defenses and trial strategy with counsel before the trial date.
That aside, defendant has failed to present any facts to show that he had a viable entrapment
defense and thus he has not established a factual predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999), and has not shown that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s alleged error. Likewise, defendant has not identified other possible
strategies that could have been employed at trial that might have resulted in the dismissal or
acquittal of any of charges. Although defendant’s legal expert testified that the charges could
have been tried, there was no basis for concluding that there was a reasonable probability that
defendant would have been acquitted of the charges had he proceeded to trial.
Defendant next argues that counsel was deficient for preliminarily agreeing to an illegal
sentence as part of the plea agreement, one that would have permitted the sentences for the
controlled substance convictions to run concurrently with the sentence for the felony-firearm
conviction. Defendant does not explain why counsel should be deemed deficient for trying to
obtain a more advantageous sentence. That aside, defendant has not shown that he was
prejudiced, given that the illegal sentence was not part of the plea agreement that defendant
ultimately agreed to accept and given that defendant knew that the sentence agreement called for
concurrent one-year sentences for the controlled substance convictions, to be served
consecutively to the mandatory two-year term for felony-firearm.
Defendant next argues that counsel was deficient for miscalculating the sentencing
guidelines range for the controlled substance convictions. Although someone in counsel’s office
evidently had calculated the guidelines range at 51 to 85 months, a letter attached to defendant’s
appellate brief indicates that counsel determined that the minimum sentence range could vary
from 15 to 25 months to 51 to 85 months, depending on how the variables were scored.
Defendant’s legal expert testified that the correct minimum sentence range was 24 to 40 months,
-5-
which was in fact the range calculated by the probation department at time of sentencing. Thus,
the range ultimately calculated was within the ranges provided by defense counsel. Also,
defendant never testified that counsel told him that the minimum sentence range for the
controlled substance convictions was 51 to 85 months. Rather, he testified that counsel told him
that he was facing a minimum sentence range of 84 to 120 months (seven to ten years) if
convicted as charged at trial and that it was based on that representation that he decided to accept
the plea agreement. Because defendant did not rely on the guidelines range of 51 to 85 months
in deciding to accept the plea bargain, he was not prejudiced by any error with respect to that
range. While defendant did testify that he relied on counsel’s representation that he was facing a
minimum sentence of seven to ten years if convicted as charged, counsel testified that he did not
recall making such a statement. Counsel instead stated that his advice to defendant “was you’re
going to go away for a long time unless you cooperate. . . . anywhere from two years or longer.”
Moreover, although defendant’s legal expert testified that a guidelines range of 24 to 40 months
would have been appropriate even if defendant had gone to trial and been convicted on all
charges, he admitted that guidelines can be scored differently by different people, and he stated,
“I can see where he’s got 81 months, that could be seven years on the high end of the guidelines.
But, you know, I think that’s a little bit inaccurate.” He also admitted that, after trial, the judge
could have, on the drug charges, “imposed consecutive sentencing, stacked everything, plus two
[on the felony-firearm count].” The trial court, acting as the fact-finder, heard all this testimony
and denied defendant’s claim for relief. Given the record, we find no basis on which to disturb
the court’s ruling.
Defendant lastly argues that counsel was deficient for failing to argue for a downward
departure from the sentencing guidelines range at sentencing. This alleged error related to
proceedings after defendant tendered his plea and, therefore, could not have induced defendant to
plead guilty. That aside, the plea agreement included a specific sentence recommendation, part
of which involved sentences for the controlled substance convictions that were already below the
guidelines range. Because defendant had agreed to a specific sentence as part of the plea
agreement, counsel was not required to advocate a different sentence at the sentencing hearing.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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