HIGGINS LAKE SHORES LAKEFRONT PROP OWNERS V LYON TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HIGGINS LAKE SHORES LAKEFRONT
PROPERTY OWNERS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 2, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278894
Roscommon Circuit Court
LC No. 05-725543-CH
LYON TOWNSHIP and ROSCOMMON
COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendants,
and
SVEIN K. BJORKLEY, MIKE JONES, MICHAEL
MAJEWSKI, CAROL MAJEWSKI, BARRY
SCHMIDT, KELLY SCHMIDT, JAMES
CONLEY, JEAN CONLEY, JEFFREY CICHON,
BETH CICHON, NANCY KRAUSE, ROBERT
YASKE, DONALD DROUILLARD, MICHAEL
FLEURY, KAREN FLEURY, DANIEL
CLAYTON, and VICKIE CLAYTON,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right the trial court’s grant of declaratory relief to plaintiff in this
real property action regarding the scope of the 1941 dedication of road ends along the shore of
Higgins Lake in the Higgins Lake Shores subdivision. Because we conclude that plaintiff had
standing to sue and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the dedication of the road
ends did not allow for the nontemporary mooring of watercraft or for recreational activities, such
as sunbathing, lounging, and picnicking, which are nonincidental uses of the water surface, we
affirm.
I
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Plaintiff, a nonprofit corporation,1 sued Roscommon County Road Commission (Road
Commission), Lyon Township, and the back lot property owners of the Higgins Lake Shores
subdivision for declaratory relief regarding the scope of the 1941 dedication of road ends along
the shore of Higgins Lake. Before trial, Lyon Township consented to the relief sought, the Road
Commission allowed a default judgment against it, and many of the back lot property owners
either defaulted or consented. The remaining defendants, now appellants, are the back lot
property owners that answered and contested the case at trial.
The road ends at issue are East Road, West Road, and Hill Street in Higgins Lake Shores.
These roads terminate at the Higgins Lake waterfront. According to the 1941 plat, “the streets as
shown on said plat are hereby dedicated, to the use of the public” by Michelson Land and Home
Company, the developer of the subdivision. East Road is 66 feet wide, but flares out to 100 feet
at the lakeshore. West Road is 44 feet wide, and the road end was flared out to a width of 100
feet during the development of the subdivision.
At trial, the evidence showed that after the dedication of the streets in Higgins Lake
Shores, H. M. Seldon, then president of Michelson Land and Home Company, exchanged several
letters with the Road Commission regarding access to the lakefront. In the earliest of these
letters, dated September 16, 1947, Seldon wished to ascertain “what the prospects are of getting
some gravel put on East Road . . . . We do not want to gravel the road from Higgins Road to the
lake as we do not want people to drive in there and park their cars. This also applies to West
Road in the subdivision.” A second letter, dated August 18, 1952, requested that the Road
Commission bring East Road to its full width in accordance with the original dedication because,
Seldon wrote, the company had received “numerous complaints” that East Road was being
“monopolized by the owners of lots 22 and 23.” In a letter dated September 13, 1952, Seldon
discussed “the streets dedicated in [Higgins Lake Shores] running to the lake providing bathing
and boating facilities for the owners who do not have front lots,” and indicated that the end of
East Road was narrower than the 100 feet that he had dedicated in the plat. He expressed
concern that some lakefront owners had built private walks on the dedicated land, and had
planted evergreen trees and cobblestone beds that extended into the dedicated street. Concerning
West Road, Seldon stated that another property owner had placed signs on the dedicated
property, that a cobblestone line had been placed at the end of the street, and that there was a tree
in the middle of the road. He also wrote that he had seen a sign blocking “the half street at the
West of our subdivision” that said “Private Property, Keep Out.” On April 30, 1953, Seldon
wrote to the Road Commission once again asking it to open East and West Roads in compliance
with the dedication “for the use of the owners in the subdivision who do not have lake frontage.”
In a June 9, 1953 letter, Seldon requested that the Road Commission show “there is 100
feet at the foot of these streets for bathing purposes, reserved for the people who do not have lake
frontage in this subdivision. The owners who purchased the corner lots were given an allowance
on the purchase of their lots for this 100 ft. bathing privilege.” Seldon, on August 10, 1955,
wrote to the Road Commission again to request that the streets be opened as, “at the foot of East
1
There was testimony that plaintiff was formed to protect the road ends of the subdivision.
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Road and West Road, 100 feet of lake frontage is reserved for bathing, boating and fishing for
the use of owners in the subdivision who do not own frontage.” This letter also states that the
“purchasers of Lots 1, 11, 12, 22 and 23 were all informed of these conditions and a reduction in
price was made because of the frontage reserved for the use by owners of lots in the subdivision
who did not have frontage.” Finally, on July 12, 1956, Seldon wrote to the Road Commission
once again urging it to ease access, citing that “at the foot of East and West Street on the lake
100’ was provided for the use of the residents in the subdivision who did not have lake frontage.”
Regarding whether lakefront owners were attempting to obstruct the use of the East Road
road end in the 1950s, Marilyn Humphrey testified that she spent entire summers beginning in
1949 at the family’s lakefront house on lot 23 at the end of East Road. Humphrey testified that
there were occasional mothers with their children who went swimming at the road end, that there
has never been a dock at the road end, that there have never been large groups of picnickers on
the shore, and that “nobody was ever prohibited from coming down the road.” However, she did
recall that evergreens were removed at the request of the Road Commission, and letters to and
from the Humphreys and the Road Commission regarding the Humphreys’ obstruction of public
access on East Road between 1950 and 1953 were admitted. Also, as previously noted, in
August 1952, Seldon brought to the attention of the Road Commission that there had been
“numerous complaints” that East Road was “being monopolized” by the Humphreys.
Kathryn Bangs and Sue Balger, members of plaintiff’s board, testified regarding the
current circumstances that led to the filing of the present action. Bangs, a yearly resident on a lot
adjacent to one of the road ends, opined that seasonal mooring decreased her property value, and
she recounted specific examples of the problems arising from the public’s use of the road end
next to her property for boat mooring, picnicking, and sunbathing. Balger recounted her
difficulties in owning property adjacent to a road end in Higgins Lake Shores. These difficulties
included picking up the trash left behind by groups picnicking on the beach and trespassers using
her dock despite no trespassing signs.
The affidavit of Nancy Krause was introduced at trial. Krause averred that she spent time
in Higgins Lake Shores beginning in 1954 and that the East and West Road road ends flared out
to 100 feet. According to Krause, at that time, there was seasonal mooring of boats, picnicking,
sunbathing, and lounging at the road ends in Higgins Lake Shores. In addition, two other
witnesses testified that the road end at Minnehaha Street had a dock and a beach area that were
used for beach activities in 1940 by owners of back lots in a different subdivision. Minnehaha
Street is located about one and a half miles from Higgins Lake Shores.
After hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the trial court decided the case
from the bench. The trial court reviewed the evidence, focusing in particular on Seldon’s
communications with the Road Commission. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Seldon’s
letters expressed an intent that the dedication for public use was the same use that was awarded
in Jacobs v Lyon Twp (After Remand), 199 Mich App 667; 502 NW2d 382 (1993). It
subsequently entered an order declaring that nontemporary moorings, erecting nontemporary
mooring structures for water craft, and recreational activities, such as sunbathing, lounging, and
picnicking, which are nonincidental to the use of the water surface, are beyond the scope of the
dedication of the at-issue road ends in Higgins Lake Shores.
II
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On appeal, defendants initially assert that plaintiff lacks standing to sue. Specifically,
defendants maintain that plaintiff does not have standing because there is no allegation or
evidence that they participated in any of the activities that plaintiff seeks to have declared
beyond the scope of the dedication. We disagree.
Whether a party has standing is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
Higgins Lake Prop Owners Ass’n v Gerrish Twp, 255 Mich App 83, 89; 662 NW2d 387 (2003).
Standing is established as follows:
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual
or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to
be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.”
Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”” [Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464
Mich 726, 739; 629 NW2d 900 (2001), quoting Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,
504 US 555, 560-561; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992) (citations
omitted).]
Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff has the right to sue to vindicate the rights of its
members. See Higgins Lake supra at 90-91. Defendants contend, however, that they were not
identified as having committed any of the acts objected to by plaintiff and, therefore, plaintiff
does not have standing to sue them. Defendants are correct as to the fact that they were not
identified at trial as having committed any of the acts complained of by plaintiff. However,
plaintiff’s witnesses were called not to testify as to certain perpetrators of acts for which the
perpetrators should be punished. Rather, the witnesses were called to testify in order to establish
that they had been injured by the types of activities that they wished to be declared beyond the
scope of the dedication. The witnesses described these activities, such as mooring of boats for
long periods of time, lounging on the beach in large parties, creating noise and litter, and
trespassing onto private property, as if they were ongoing during the summer. Their testimony
demonstrates that the injurious activities were concrete as well as imminent. “[A]lthough the
actual controversy requirement precludes a court from deciding hypothetical issues, a court is not
precluded from reaching issues before actual injuries or losses have occurred.” Associated
Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services Director, 472 Mich 117, 126;
693 NW2d 374 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). By requesting that the dedication
of the road ends be declared to include certain rights, defendants identified themselves as people
who may potentially participate in the activities that cause injury to plaintiff’s members. Thus,
although defendants have not been identified as those who have engaged in the injurious
activities in the past, the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged actions that defendants assert
a right to participate in. In addition, it is clear that a declaration in plaintiff’s favor would redress
its members’ injuries because it would prevent anyone, including defendants, from unlawfully
using the road ends. Therefore, plaintiff has met the requirements for standing.
III
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Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred by declaring that the scope of the
dedication for public use of the road ends in Higgins Lake Shores does not include the
nontemporary mooring of boats or recreational uses such as lounging, picnicking, and
sunbathing. Specifically, defendants claim that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the
evidence as a whole and, thereby, erred in concluding that the dedicator’s intent was that back lot
property owners are only permitted to use the road ends to access the water. We disagree.
Interpretation of a dedicator’s intent is a factual question, which we review for clear
error. Higgins Lake, supra at 92, 101. “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 92.
It is presumed that members of the public have the right to access a body of water from a
publicly dedicated roadway that ends at the water’s edge and to build structures to aid in gaining
access to the water. Higgins Lake, supra at 95-97, 99. The members of the public who access
the water are entitled to use the surface of the water to swim, fish, or boat. Id. at 99. The public
also has the right to anchor boats temporarily. Id. “[T]he burden rests with [the] defendants to
establish that anything other than mere access to the lake was intended.” Id. at 102. Whether the
public’s rights also include the right to sunbathe and lounge or the right to install docks and boat
hoists depends on the scope of the dedication. Id. at 99. When discerning the scope of the
dedication, if the language of the dedication is plain and unambiguous, it is to be enforced as
written and no further inquiry is permitted. See Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 700; 664 NW2d 749
(2003). However, if the text of the dedication is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be
considered by the trial court in order to determine the scope of the dedication. Id.
Here, neither party argued at trial that the language of the dedication plainly and
unambiguously established whether the dedication of the road ends allowed for the
nontemporary mooring of boats or for recreational activities, such as swimming, fishing, or
boating, which are nonincidental to the use of the water surface. Indeed, the dedication is silent
on such uses. And the language in the dedication that flares the road ends to a width of 100 feet
at the water’s edge possibly suggests that something more than mere access to the lake surface
was intended. Consequently, the trial court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine
the scope of the dedication was proper.
As summarized above, considerable extrinsic evidence was produced at trial pertaining to
activities at the road ends. This extrinsic evidence included activities at the road ends following
their dedication in 1941 to the present and the activities at another road end near the time when
the dedication of the road ends was made. But in making its factual determination, the trial court
focused on Seldon’s letters to the Road Commission. In those letters, Seldon made requests
regarding the road surface and the width of the roads leading to Higgins Lake. Seldon also made
specific references regarding the use of the lake for the back lot owners. Notably, as observed by
the trial court, these statements only identified the activities of boating, fishing, and bathing,
which the trial court concluded only required use of the water, not the beach. The trial court
concluded that nothing in the letters supports a finding that other activities, such as sunbathing,
picnicking, or lounging, were contemplated by Seldon as being within the scope of the
dedication. With respect to nontemporary moorings, the trial court held that Seldon’s request
that the Road Commission keep the road ends open and unobstructed was inconsistent with
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allowing members of the public to maintain nontemporary moorings. Consistent with these
findings, the trial court granted plaintiffs the relief it sought.
We find no clear error in the trial court’s reliance on Seldon’s letters to resolve the issues
regarding the nontemporary mooring of boats and activities such as sunbathing, picnicking, and
lounging. Seldon’s letters are, in our estimation, unusually probative of the dedicator’s intent.
Seldon, as president of the developing entity, was uniquely positioned to identify the scope of the
dedication. Indeed, his purpose in writing the letters was to obtain the Road Commission’s
cooperation in carrying out how the dedication should benefit the back lot property owners. In
the letters, he identified the activities of boating, fishing, and bathing, and addressed the desire to
keep the road ends open and unobstructed. For the trial court to construe those expressions of
the dedication intent as being consistent with Jacobs was not clearly erroneous. Further, we
recognize that the trial court did not specifically address the extrinsic evidence regarding the use
of the road ends at the time of the dedication, which was evidence properly before the trial court,
see Little, supra at 700; Dobie v Morrison, 227 Mich App 536, 540; 575 NW2d 817 (1998). The
fact that the trial court did not specifically address this evidence does not necessarily mean that
the trial court did not consider the evidence as a whole. Rather, we conclude that the trial court
merely found the letters to be the dispositive factor in determining the scope of the dedication.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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