RICHARD STEVEN FREDERICK V FARM BUREAU INS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD STEVEN FREDERICK and
INES FREDERICK,
UNPUBLISHED
November 25, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 280629
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-614142-CZ
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right an order denying their motion for summary disposition and
granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding that
defendant had no duty to defend or indemnify plaintiffs in an underlying lawsuit. We affirm the
order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary dismissal, reverse the order granting defendant’s
motion for summary dismissal, and remand for further proceedings.
On May 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed their complaint for declaratory relief against defendant,
their homeowner insurance provider, after defendant denied representation and coverage with
regard to a lawsuit filed against them by their adjacent neighbors, Larry and Sharon Lundin, for
damage plaintiffs’ alleged negligence caused to their property. The Lundins claimed that
plaintiffs attempted to remedy a flooding problem by negligently adding fill dirt and then not
properly grading their property, which caused the Lundins to have a flooding problem and to
suffer property damage. On June 15, 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition,
arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that they had been sued by their
neighbors for an “occurrence,” as defined by defendant’s insurance policy, that was not subject
to an exclusionary provision; thus, defendant was obligated to provide a defense and liability
coverage with regard to the Lundin matter.
On June 29, 2007, defendant filed its motion for summary disposition, arguing that it was
entitled to summary dismissal because there was no “occurrence” as defined by the insurance
policy, and because coverage was excluded by the intentional act and/or criminal act exclusions
contained in the policy. Defendant argued that plaintiffs intentionally and significantly altered
the drainage patterns that existed on their property by having several truckloads of dirt dumped
on their property without consideration that their property grade height would be rendered much
higher than the grade of the Lundins’ property, which subsequently caused flooding.
-1-
On August 3, 2007, oral arguments were held on the motions. The trial court rejected
defendant’s claim that the criminal act policy exclusion applied on these facts. Next the trial
court considered whether the intentional act of dumping the dirt, even if plaintiffs did not intend
to cause harm, could constitute an “intentional act” under the policy. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued
that, for the exclusion to apply, the flooding problem had to be intentional, not the act of bringing
dirt onto the property. Defendant’s counsel argued that the “intentional act” exclusion applied if,
under an objective analysis, there was a foreseeable result from the intentional act. Here, under a
reasonable man standard, one would know that adding a significant amount of dirt to property
was going to change the water drainage patterns on the property which would cause flooding to
occur on surrounding properties. The trial court agreed with defendant and held that there was
no coverage under the policy. Thereafter, an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition was entered. This appeal followed.
Plaintiffs argue that summary dismissal was erroneous because defendant had a duty to
defend and indemnify them against the Lundins’ negligence claims which arose from an
“accident” that was not an “intentional act,” under the policy terms. After de novo review of the
trial court’s dismissal decision, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, we agree in part. See MCR 2.116(C)(10);
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003).
“Interpretation of an insurance policy ultimately requires a two-step inquiry: first, a
determination of coverage according to the general insurance agreement, and second, a decision
regarding whether an exclusion applies to negate coverage.” Auto-Owners Ins Co v Harrington,
455 Mich 377, 382; 565 NW2d 839 (1997). The duty to defend is separate from the duty to
indemnify and is triggered if the allegations in the complaint filed against the insured arguably
come within the policy coverage. Id. at 386. Although the court will look behind the allegations
to determine whether coverage is possible, there is no duty to defend against claims expressly
excluded from policy coverage. Meridian Mut Ins Co v Hunt, 168 Mich App 672, 677; 425
NW2d 111 (1988). Issues of contract interpretation, including whether an insurer is obligated to
defend an insured, are reviewed de novo as a question of law. Cohen v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 463
Mich 525, 528; 620 NW2d 840 (2001); American Bumper & Mfg Co v Nat’l Union Fire Ins Co,
261 Mich App 367, 375; 683 NW2d 161 (2004).
The homeowners insurance policy at issue provides that defendant will defend and
indemnify plaintiffs if a suit is brought against them “for property damage caused by an
occurrence to which this coverage applies.” The term “occurrence” is defined in the policy as
follows:
8.
“Occurrence” means an accident . . . which results, during the policy
period, in:
* * *
b.
property damage;
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
Plaintiffs argue that the flooding of the Lundins’ property was an “accident” and, thus,
constituted an “occurrence” within the meaning of the policy. Plaintiffs contend that, although
-2-
they intentionally added fill and graded their own property, they did not expect or intend to
damage the Lundins’ property.
The policy does not define the term “accident” but our Supreme Court has consistently
held that “an accident is an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance,
something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally
to be expected.” Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 114; 595 NW2d 832
(1999). When determining whether property damage was caused by an “accident,” the insured’s
injury-causing act or event and its consequences are evaluated from the standpoint of the insured,
not the injured party or “a reasonable person.” Allstate Ins Co v McCarn (McCarn I), 466 Mich
277, 282-283; 645 NW2d 20 (2002); Masters, supra at 114-115. An intentional act can
constitute an “accident.” “[I]f the act was intended by the insured, but the consequences were
not, the act does constitute an accident, unless the intended act created a direct risk of harm from
which the consequences should reasonably have been expected by the insured.” McCarn I,
supra; Masters, supra.
Here, the evidence indicates that before this property was purchased in April of 2001,
plaintiffs inquired with the building department of Huron Township about a standing water
problem. Plaintiffs were allegedly advised, including by its building department director, to
bring in dirt and route the water through grading so that it flowed into a ditch, that ran the length
of the property line they shared with the Lundin property, and into the Winnie Drain. Plaintiffs
were advised that, because their property was less than two acres in size, no permits were
required by ordinance. Thereafter, in the late summer of 2001, plaintiffs had a couple of
truckloads of dirt dumped and Larry Lundin even helped to spread it with his tractor.
In June of 2003, still experiencing a standing water problem, plaintiffs hired a contractor,
A-1 Excavation, to bring in more dirt and to properly grade their property so that the standing
water would run into the ditch and then the Winnie Drain. After several truckloads of dirt were
dumped, the Lundins complained about the activity to Huron Township and all work was
subsequently stopped. The standing water problem on plaintiffs’ property remains. The
complaint filed by the Lundins against plaintiffs claims that, on January 4, 2004, their property
was flooded allegedly as a consequence of plaintiffs’ negligence with regard to the addition of
the dirt and subsequent grading problems. We conclude on these facts that any flooding that
occurred to the Lundins’ property after plaintiffs intentionally added fill dirt to their property was
not intended by plaintiffs.
Further, we conclude that plaintiffs’ acts did not create a direct risk of harm from which
the flooding of the Lundin property should reasonably have been expected by them. In brief, at
the Township’s direction, plaintiffs previously added fill dirt to their property to alleviate a
standing water problem. The Lundin property did not flood. Because a standing water problem
continued, plaintiffs wanted to add significantly more dirt so they hired a contractor to perform
the job. No survey or engineering site plan was required by the Township. The contractor did
not advise them of any flooding risk. The fill dirt was supposed to be graded so that standing
water was directed to an existing ditch that would feed into the Winnie Drain. Plaintiff Richard
Frederick testified that he believed his property was lower in elevation than the Lundin property
thus flooding of the Lundin property could not occur. And, in fact, the Lundins’ property did not
flood until over six months after the fill was added.
-3-
Defendant argues on appeal that the intentional act of bringing in truckloads of dirt
“created a direct risk of harm from which the consequences should reasonably have been
expected by the insured,” McCarn I, supra, because it is obvious that such dirt would disrupt the
drainage patterns on the property. We disagree. Changing the drainage patterns on their own
property so that standing water would be diverted to a ditch that fed into the Winnie Drain did
not create a direct risk of harm from which the flooding of the Lundin property should
reasonably have been expected by plaintiffs. Under the circumstances as discussed above, we
conclude as a matter of law that the flooding of the Lundins’ property was an “accident” which
constituted an “occurrence,” within the meaning of the policy’s coverage provision.
However, the policy also contained an “intentional act” exclusion which excluded
coverage for “property damage which may be the natural, foreseeable, expected, or anticipated
result of the intentional acts of one or more Insureds or which is in fact intended by one or more
Insureds, even if the resulting . . . property damage is of a different kind, quality, or degree than
initially expected or intended . . . .” Thus we turn to the issue of whether this exclusion negates
coverage. See Harrington, supra at 382. While plaintiffs bore the burden of proving coverage,
defendant must prove that an exclusion to coverage is applicable. Heniser v Frankenmuth Mut
Ins Co, 449 Mich 155, 161 n 6; 534 NW2d 502 (1995). The trial court held that defendant
conclusively carried that burden. We disagree.
Because we have determined that the flooding of the Lundin property was not intended,
the issue here is whether the flooding of the Lundin property on January 4, 2004, was the
“natural, foreseeable, expected, or anticipated result” of the intentional act of adding fill dirt to
plaintiffs’ property in June of 2003. We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists as
to whether the exclusion applies. As defendant notes, our Supreme Court has held that the
language “natural, foreseeable, expected, or anticipated result” denotes a “reasonably expected
result.” Harrington, supra at 383-384. The inquiry, then, is whether the flooding of the Lundin
property was a reasonably expected result of the intentional act of adding fill dirt to plaintiffs’
property. The policy language used in the exclusion dictates the application of an objective
standard as indicated by its failure to reference consideration of the insured’s standpoint or
expectation. See McCarn I, supra at 283 n 4. Thus we consider “whether a reasonable person,
possessed of the totality of facts possessed by [the insured], would have expected the resulting
injury.” Allstate Ins Co v McCarn, 471 Mich 283, 290-291; 683 NW2d 656 (2004) (McCarn II).
Here, the facts possessed by plaintiffs included that they had previously added fill dirt to
their property at the Township’s direction, without the use of any site plans or surveys—which
were not required by the Township—and no flooding problems to the Lundin property resulted.
Thus, when plaintiffs continued to have standing water, they hired a contractor to add
significantly more fill dirt and to grade the property so that their standing water would be
diverted to a ditch that led to the Winnie Drain. The contractor did not advise them that there
would be any flooding problems and plaintiff Richard Frederick believed his property was of
lower elevation than the Lundin property. However, the amount of dirt that plaintiffs had
dumped was significantly more than the previous time they added fill to their property.
Defendant argues that, because of the amount of dirt, it was foreseeable that the drainage patterns
on the property would change and cause water to flow onto the Lundin property. While
changing the drainage pattern was a reasonably expected result of adding the fill dirt—and in
fact was a desired result to alleviate plaintiffs’ standing water problem—flooding the Lundin
-4-
property may not have been because the water was supposed to be directed to a ditch. But the
ditch itself was between plaintiffs and the Lundins’ property. We conclude that a genuine issue
of material fact exists as to whether a reasonable person possessed of these facts would have
expected the Lundin property to flood.
And we reject defendant’s argument on appeal that the trial court erroneously denied its
motion for summary dismissal on the ground that coverage was barred by the criminal act
exclusion. The “criminal act” exclusion barred coverage for “bodily injury or property damage
resulting from a criminal act of an insured, regardless of whether an insured person is actually
charged with, or convicted of, a crime.” The policy defines a “criminal act” as “any act or
omission or number of actions or omissions that constitute a felony or misdemeanor crime
prohibited by statute or ordinance.” Here, we agree with the trial court and conclude that
defendant has failed to prove that the flooding of the Lundin property resulted from a criminal
act committed by plaintiffs. See Heniser, supra.
In summary, the flooding on the Lundin property was an “accident,” and thus an
“occurrence” covered under the policy. There is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiffs
did not intend or reasonably expect that adding fill dirt and grading their property would cause
damage to the Lundin property. However, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
the “intentional act” exclusion negates coverage. Whether the flooding of the Lundin property
on January 4, 2004, was a “natural, foreseeable, expected, or anticipated result” of the intentional
act of adding fill dirt to plaintiffs’ property in June of 2003 must be decided by the finder of fact.
Accordingly, because the allegations against plaintiffs arguably came within the scope of the
policy coverage and any doubt must be resolved in favor of plaintiffs, defendant had a duty to
defend plaintiffs in the underlying suit. See American Bumper & Mfg Co v Hartford Fire Ins
Co, 452 Mich 440, 450-452; 550 NW2d 475 (1996). The issue whether defendant had a duty to
indemnify plaintiffs with regard to the Lundins’ negligence lawsuit is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. See Polkow v Citizens Ins Co of America, 438 Mich 174, 180-181; 476
NW2d 382 (1991). Thus, the order denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary dismissal is
affirmed, the order granting defendant’s motion for summary dismissal is reversed, and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.