IN RE DANIELLE LEEA MARION MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DANIELLE LEEA MARION,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 285144
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-457731-NA
LATOYA RE’NEE MARION,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Borrello and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000); In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
The minor child came into care when respondent was a 16-year-old ward of the court.
The issues that led to adjudication included respondent’s struggle with caring for the minor child
while living in a mother and baby program and her hospital admission for depression.
Respondent was placed with the minor child in a foster care home and ordered to comply with
services, including participating in mental health treatment, completing parenting classes,
obtaining her high school diploma or the equivalent, obtaining and maintaining a stable home
and a legal source of income, and taking proper care of the minor child. Six months after the
minor child was taken into temporary care, respondent left the minor child in the foster care
home and went to stay with her aunt. The trial court terminated respondent’s visitation with the
minor child and requested petitioner to file a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
The trial court made clear to respondent that she needed to act like an adult to be considered for
permanent placement for the minor child, and this meant that she needed to comply with the
terms of her parent agency agreement.
Respondent had over a year to show the trial court that she had complied with the terms
of the parent agency agreement and that she would be an appropriate placement for the minor
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child. However, at the time of the termination trial, respondent had completed parenting classes
but had not otherwise complied with the terms of the agreement. She had only recently begun
therapy that was to be on a monthly basis and she had only recently started classes to obtain her
G.E.D. She was living in a shelter and did not have a legal source of income. In addition,
respondent was no longer taking the medication prescribed to her for depression. It had been 14
months since the termination petition had been filed and 20 months since the petition for
temporary custody of the minor child had been filed, and respondent had made minimal, if any,
progress to alleviate the issues that caused the minor child to come into care. The trial court
attempted to impress on respondent the importance of complying with the terms of her parent
agency agreement to show that she could care for the minor child. It was not until just before the
termination trial that respondent even began to engage in services.
With regard to respondent’s argument that the trial court erred because it should have
provided a structured plan of care to address respondent’s young age when the minor child was
removed from her care, this Court finds no error. Generally, petitioner must make reasonable
efforts to reunite a respondent and her child through a treatment plan and referrals. In re Fried,
266 Mich App 535, 542; 702 NW2d 192 (2005); MCL 712A.18f. If reasonable efforts are not
made, petitioner can be prevented from establishing statutory grounds to terminate a
respondent’s parental rights. See In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 67-68, 70: 472 NW2d 38
(1991). However, there was overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s efforts to offer services to
respondent. During the period that the minor child was in the temporary care of the court,
petitioner provided numerous referrals for services that were either underutilized or ignored. In
addition, the trial court made it clear on the record that respondent needed to be fully compliant
with the treatment plan in order to have the minor child returned to her care, and respondent was
given more than enough time in which to comply.
The trial court also did not clearly err in its determination regarding the child’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 353, 356-357. The minor child is entitled to a
stable, permanent, and safe environment, which she knows is home, and people that she can rely
on to take care of her. Allowing respondent additional time to work on her issues would cause
harm to the minor child. The court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to the
child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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