PEOPLE OF MI V KARRIE CALVIN MUNLIN JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 272019
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 05-001976-FC
KARRIE CALVIN MUNLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Saad, C.J., and Murphy and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Our Supreme Court reversed our decision in People v Munlin, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2008 (Docket No. 272019) and remanded for
consideration of defendant’s remaining appellate issues. People v Munlin, ___ Mich ___; 755
NW2d 658 (2008). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends that the prosecutor made improper comments during her closing
argument.1 He specifically complains that the prosecutor impermissibly shifted the burden of
proof when she commented that there was no evidence that the victim consented to defendant’s
sexual acts. We hold that this comment was not improper.
The prosecutor made the remarks during her rebuttal argument and in response to defense
counsel’s assertions that the victim’s testimony was untrustworthy and inconsistent. Defense
1
We review defendant’s unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error affecting
the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 451; 709 NW2d
152 (2005). “Issues of prosecutorial misconduct are decided case by case, with the reviewing
court examining the pertinent portion of the record and evaluating the prosecutor’s remarks in
context.” People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660, 608 NW2d 123 (1999). “Reversal is
warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v
Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003).
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counsel also stated during his opening argument that the victim consented to having sex with
defendant. In her rebuttal, the prosecutor was simply highlighting the differences between
defense counsel’s opening statement and his closing argument. While a prosecutor may not
attempt to shift the burden of proof, People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 273; 662 NW2d 836
(2003), “attacking the credibility of a theory advanced by a defendant does not shift the burden
of proof.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 635; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Here, the
prosecutor was not attempting to shift the burden of proof by pointing to any failure by defendant
to present evidence, but was, instead, attacking defendant’s theory of consent. Indeed, the
prosecutor reiterated to the jury that the burden of proof is on the prosecution. Taken in context,
plaintiff’s statements were “proper commentary on the weaknesses of defendant’s theory of
defense.” Id.
Citing the same passage, defendant claims that the prosecutor belittled defense counsel
during her closing argument. “It is true that a prosecuting attorney may not personally attack
defense counsel.” People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 646; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
While some of the prosecutor’s comments appear to have been directed at defense counsel, the
statements were mere rebuttals to defendant’s earlier comments. Though the prosecutor
attempted a few linguistic flourishes that appeared to be directed at defense counsel, in context,
they are more appropriately characterized as directed at defense counsel’s remarks. Finding that
these statements were personal attacks would, in effect, be requiring plaintiff to use “the blandest
possible terms,” and the prosecutor is not so limited. People v Williams, 265 Mich App 68, 71;
692 NW2d 722 (2005).2
II. DNA Testing
Defendant maintains that the trial court denied him mandatory discovery by failing to
require DNA testing on certain physical evidence. This issue is not preserved because defendant
did not object to the lack of testing in the trial court, and the record does not indicate that he
requested DNA testing. Accordingly, we review this issue under the plain error doctrine.
“Absent a showing of suppression of evidence, intentional misconduct, or bad faith, the
prosecutor and the police are not required to test evidence to accord a defendant due process.”
People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 21; 669 NW2d 831 (2003). Defendant had the right, under the
Michigan Court Rules, to ask the trial court to require testing of the evidence, MCR 6.201(A)(6),
but, absent such a request, the prosecutor is under no duty to do so. Coy, supra, 258 Mich App
at 21-22.
Defendant erroneously asserts that the rape shield statute requires that a victim’s
statements be supported by physical evidence. Nothing in MCL 750.520j requires that a
complainant’s testimony be supported by other evidence. Furthermore, MCL 750.520h states
that “[t]he testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to
520g [referring to first- to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct].” Accordingly, the testimony
2
Defendant also complains that the prosecutor made improper remarks during her opening
statement. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, however, a review of plaintiff’s opening statement
does not reveal that the prosecutor made any allegations that were not supported by evidence.
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of the complainant in a criminal sexual conduct trial need not be corroborated. People v Drohan,
264 Mich App 77, 89; 689 NW2d 750, 756 (2004). For these reasons, neither the trial court nor
the prosecutor were required to perform DNA tests on the evidence.
III. Assistance of Counsel
Defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective on the basis of errors he alleges
above. As discussed, the issues that defendant raised on appeal are without merit, and
“[c]ounsel is not ineffective for failing ‘to advocate a meritless position,’ ” People v Mack, 265
Mich App 122, 130; 695 NW2d 342 (2005), quoting People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425;
608 NW2d 502 (2000). Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not
bringing pre-trial motions to have a bedspread tested for DNA. As part of defendant’s burden,
he must demonstrate that trial counsel’s actions were not part of a sound trial strategy. People v
Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). In his opening statement, defense counsel argued
that the victim engaged in consensual sex with defendant. Applying that theory, defendant
would not benefit from any test of the victim’s bedspread. A positive DNA test would be
consistent with either forcible or consensual sexual activity. By not having the blanket tested,
however, defense counsel was able to effectively cross-examine the police officer on the scope
and effectiveness of her investigation. Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption that
defense counsel was engaging in effective trial strategy.3
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
3
Additionally, under MCR 6.201(A)(6), defendant would not have an automatic right to have the
evidence requested, but may have had to show “good cause” to the trial court in order to test the
evidence himself.
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