IN RE YAHAIRA WOODALL MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of YAHAIRA WOODALL, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 21, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283185
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-725962-NA
VERNELLE BOOKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
This case came to the attention of the Department of Human Services in June 2006, when
the minor child was approximately 14 months old. Respondent had suffered two strokes after the
birth of the minor child, leaving her with impaired speech, weakness on one side of her body,
and short-term memory loss. Although the child was born in Illinois, respondent mother at the
initiation of this case was living with her adult daughter, Sheila McKenzie,1 in Pontiac,
Michigan. Ms. McKenzie was the primary caretaker of the minor child, while employed at two
part-time jobs. The difficulties that gave rise to the court’s jurisdiction were the child’s failure to
thrive, attributed to insufficient caloric intake, and the unsuitable condition of the residence, a
one-bedroom apartment inhabited by six persons, including the minor child and her teenaged
brother, Demetris. Early in these proceedings, respondent was placed under Ms. McKenzie’s
guardianship. A parent-agency agreement was provided, pursuant to which respondent was to
address her medical limitations, attend all medical appointments, and provide documentation of
completion or progress. Ms. McKenzie, as a prospective primary caretaker of the child, was
directed to participate in parenting classes, counseling, and a psychological evaluation.
1
Ms. McKenzie’s first name is variously spelled “Sheila” and “Shelia” throughout the lower
court record.
-1-
On appeal, respondent asserts that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that there is
no reasonable likelihood or expectation that she will be able to provide proper care and custody
for the child within a reasonable time considering the child’s age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We
agree. We note initially that it is clear that at present respondent is unable to care for a small
child. According to her psychological evaluation, undertaken around the time of the termination
trial, respondent suffered from moderate cognitive impairment. Except for “yes” and “no” she is
unable to communicate with language. However, apart from a vague hearsay statement, the
record is totally lacking in evidence concerning respondent’s prognosis for the future. We agree
with the psychological evaluator that it is at this time unclear to what extent recovery or
significant rehabilitation would be possible if respondent were to participate in appropriate stroke
rehabilitation services. Medical input and evidence, in the context of this case, is essential to
determine whether respondent will be able to provide proper care and custody for the child
within a reasonable time. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).2
In general, when a child is removed from the custody of the parents, the petitioner is
required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s removal by
adopting a service plan. MCL 712A.18f(1), (2), (4); In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 25-26; 610
NW2d 563 (2000). In this case, it appears that the agency utterly failed in its duty to assist
respondent in rehabilitative efforts, and furthermore that this failure is the reason for the
agency’s lack of information other than vague hearsay concerning respondent’s prognosis.
Kimberly Dehaven, the foster care worker for the family, testified that the agency did not assist
respondent in her primary assignment under the parent agency agreement: to obtain medical
treatment for her condition. Although the agency expected Ms. McKenzie to assist respondent in
this area, it also appears that the agency did not offer Ms. McKenzie any assistance in doing so.
The agency cited respondent’s absence from the state of Michigan to explain its lack of efforts,
but this is only a partial excuse. Respondent resided with Ms. McKenzie from the time of
removal in September 2006 through the January 2007 adjudication and March 2007 disposition.
From the record provided on appeal, it appears that respondent moved to Illinois to live with her
aunt and uncle on or around May 10, 2007, approximately two months after the initial
disposition, yet in that two months no services were provided. The adequacy of the agency’s
2
We note that at one time the law in Michigan was that parental rights could “not be terminated
on the basis of a parent’s physical incapacity in the absence of culpable neglect.” In re McDuel,
142 Mich App 479, 481; 369 NW2d 912 (1985). McDuel involved a mother who became
permanently disabled when she was inflicted with multiple sclerosis shortly after the birth of her
child, which confined her to a wheelchair and made it impossible for her to physically care for
her child. This Court stated that the mother’s “condition is an unfortunate and unavoidable
tragedy[, and] [w]e refuse to compound that tragedy by forever severing her bonds with her only
child, perhaps her main source of comfort.” Id. at 490. However, as stated subsequently by our
Supreme Court in In re Jacobs, 433 Mich 24, 37; 444 NW2d 789 (1989), the Legislature
amended the statute after McDuel by providing for termination for failure to provide proper care
or custody “without regard to intent,” which is the language currently employed in MCL
712A.19b(3)(g). Therefore, McDuel is no longer of any relevance. Thus, termination can occur
here, but first services must be provided, rehabilitation explored, and medical evidence on
prognosis be submitted. The fact that a guardianship exists, reflecting a current finding of
incapacity, does not necessarily mean that respondent will remain in such a state in the future.
-2-
efforts toward reunification is relevant to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a statutory
ground for the termination of parental rights. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d
192 (2005). Where respondent’s potential for stroke rehabilitation has not been explored or
examined, and no assistance has been offered in this area, we conclude that the trial court lacked
any basis for a conclusion concerning the likelihood that she could provide proper care for the
child, with or without assistance, within a reasonable time.
A significant factor in this case is the supportive family of respondent, notably her adult
daughter, who was to be provided with services as the prospective primary caretaker of Yahaira.
This also did not occur, in large part because of respondent’s relocation to Illinois during a
portion of the proceedings below. While the agency is not obligated to provide live-in support or
lifelong services for a disabled parent, In re Terry, supra at 27-28, reasonable efforts toward
reunification under these circumstances could certainly encompass assistance and support to a
relative who may be willing to do so. Thus we again agree with the psychological evaluator who
recommended a renewed psychological evaluation of Ms. McKenzie and noted that her
commitment to engaging in services could assist in determining her level of commitment to the
minor child.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
