IN RE JADEN TAYLOR LEE MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JADEN TAYLOR LEE, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
October 16, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283038
Mackinac Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-005132-NA
CHERYL LYNN LEE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA
INDIANS,
Intervening Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Whitbeck and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Cheryl Lee appeals by right from the order terminating her parental rights to
the minor child Jaden Lee pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), 25 USC 1912 et seq. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Cheryl Lee was 16 years old and in foster care when she gave birth to Jaden Lee in 1999.
Both Cheryl Lee and Jaden Lee are duly enrolled members of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians. Jaden Lee was first removed from Cheryl Lee’s care in 2000 when he was
one year old based on allegations of neglect. Petitioner Department of Human Services (DHS)
and tribal agencies provided Cheryl Lee with many services, but Cheryl Lee made no significant
improvement. In 2001 and 2004, she gave birth to two other children who are not subjects of
this case. Meanwhile, Jaden Lee’s case was transferred to the Sault Ste. Marie Chippewa Tribal
Court (Tribal Court), where it was closed in 2002 when Jaden Lee was placed with his paternal
grandmother, Lois Plank, under a limited guardianship.
In 2003, Cheryl Lee successfully obtained physical custody of Jaden Lee. But in 2004,
Jaden Lee and his two half-siblings were removed from Cheryl Lee’s care, again based on
-1-
allegations of neglect. The catalysts for this petition were claims that Cheryl Lee’s second child
was found unsupervised outside on a road where she had almost been hit by a car, and that the
family home was dirty and unsafe. Jaden Lee was again placed with his paternal grandmother,
and in November 2004, Jaden Lee’s father, Tony Plank, obtained full custody of Jaden Lee.
Cheryl Lee had visitation rights.
Services were provided to Cheryl Lee in an attempt to keep her united with her two other
children. However, after the two other children were observed in the middle of the street
unsupervised until 11:00 p.m. while Cheryl Lee yelled profanities at them, they were again
removed from her care in August 2005. And in 2006, the Tribal Court terminated Cheryl Lee’s
rights to those two children on the basis of neglect.
A fourth child born to Cheryl Lee in 2006 was also removed from her care, and, in
January 2007, the Tribal Court terminated Cheryl Lee’s rights to that child because of the prior
terminations.
Cheryl Lee successfully sought unsupervised visitation with Jaden Lee in May 2007. But
in July 2007, DHS filed a petition seeking termination of her rights on the basis of the prior
terminations. A supplemental termination petition filed in August 2007 alleged that Cheryl Lee
had received numerous services from a variety of agencies for over six years. Specifically, the
supplemental petition alleged:
Cultuarlly [sic] appropriate services were provided to Cheryl Lee for over six
years, including Prevention, CPS, and Wraparound Services through Mackinac
County; Protective Services, foster care services, and prevention through the SSM
Tribe; CPS services through Chippewa County[; and] DHS and CPS services
through the Children’s Aid in Canada. Cheryl has also participated in the
Families First Program three times, Wraparound and Family Continuity through
the SSM Tribe, Parenting Classes twice with SSM Tribe, once through SF/SC,
and once through the Indian Outreach Program. Although these services were
offered and somewhat complied with at times, Cheryl continued to abuse and
neglect her children, which led to her rights being terminated.
In August 2007, a hearing was held on Cheryl Lee’s motion for reinstatement of her
visitation rights. Jill Thompson, a worker with the tribe’s Binogii Placement Agency, testified
on behalf of petitioner. Thompson stated that she first worked with Cheryl Lee in 2002 in the
capacity of a Family Continuity caseworker, which required Thompson to supervise visitations
and assist Cheryl Lee in the development of her parenting skills. In 2003, Thompson stopped
being a Family Continuity caseworker and became a foster care worker. Her casework included
the foster care cases involving all four of Cheryl Lee’s children. According to Thompson,
Cheryl Lee had her good days and her bad days, and the danger in granting her visitation rights
was that, if visitation occurred on one of Cheryl Lee’s bad days, the child could be negatively
affected depending on which other adult was present. On cross-examination, Thompson
explained that, on a good day, Cheryl Lee could properly care for the children but that history
suggested she was not able to do that on a bad day. Thompson admitted that the Chippewa
Indian Tribe never received any negative reports about Cheryl Lee’s visitations at Lois Plank’s
house. Thompson also confirmed that it had been a year and a half (i.e., early 2006) since she
had last worked professionally with Cheryl Lee or been to Cheryl Lee’s home, but Thompson
-2-
opined that Cheryl Lee’s fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) diagnosis and borderline intellectual
functioning rendered her incapable of being a full-time parent.
The trial court took the matter under advisement and, a week later, it incorporated a
mediation agreement in which the parties agreed to the reinstatement of Cheryl Lee’s visitation
rights at the sole discretion of Lois Plank.
At the subsequent termination hearing, Regina Frazier testified on behalf of petitioner.
Frazier stated that her first contact with Cheryl Lee had been in 1998 when Frazier provided
Wraparound services to Cheryl Lee, who was a delinquent and a victim of abuse and neglect.
After Jaden Lee’s birth in 1999, Frazier provided Wraparound services to Cheryl Lee as a parent,
and such services continued on an on-and-off basis through 2002. Frazier stated that
Wraparound services typically lasted six months to one year, and the reason they lasted four
years in Cheryl Lee’s case was because of the changing circumstances and the desire to provide
Cheryl Lee with every opportunity for services. Frazier testified that Cheryl Lee was sometimes
compliant with the services but never officially completed the Wraparound program, which
ended in 2002 when Cheryl Lee moved to the Sault and the Sault Tribe assumed responsibility
for Cheryl Lee’s case. Frazier had since changed jobs and was now a Children’s Protective
Services (CPS) worker. She was the CPS worker who investigated a referral received in July
2007 involving Cheryl Lee. Frazier did not provide services to Cheryl Lee in July 2007 or
afterwards because an automatic termination petition was ultimately filed due to Cheryl Lee’s
prior terminations, and it was policy not to provide services or visitation under those
circumstances. Lastly, Frazier opined that it was not in the child’s best interests to be reunited
with Cheryl Lee.
Frazier further described DHS efforts to provide Cheryl Lee with services especially
geared towards behavioral issues and teen parents. In addition, different methods of teaching
Cheryl Lee were attempted in the hope that something would work. However, Cheryl Lee
refused to cooperate (for example, Cheryl Lee claimed she had no transportation to get to
counseling, and Cheryl Lee refused to do home-based therapy), and compliance with services
was never achieved, let alone any benefit gained. On questioning by the court, Frazier explained
the extensive services provided through Wraparound. In addition, assistance was provided with
parenting skills, budgeting, prevention services, and Families First; referrals were made; and
weekly meetings were held at the family home to discuss parenting issues, household chores, and
safety considerations for Jaden Lee. Despite all these efforts, Cheryl Lee never seemed to
understand the lessons. For example, Frazier recalled witnessing an incident after weeks of
working with Cheryl Lee where Cheryl Lee screamed at Jaden Lee to eat his ravioli or some
such food item when the child was too young to even ingest regular milk. In addition, the house
remained filthy, with broken glass everywhere.
Penny Clark testified that she worked for the tribe’s Anishnabek Community and Family
Services. Clark worked with Cheryl Lee from 2002 through 2004 as a Wraparound coordinator
and case manager. In 2002, Wraparound attempted to keep Cheryl Lee and her second child
united in the home by assisting with budgeting, as well as helping Cheryl Lee to sign up for
services, arrange for a payee, and apply for Social Security disability benefits, a Family
Independence program grant, and the Women, Infants, and Children program. Clark said that
Cheryl Lee received Social Security disability benefits for having borderline intelligence and an
explosive personality disorder. According to Clark, Cheryl Lee also had a history of other
-3-
mental health disorders and believed that she suffered from FAS. Clark said that she greatly
enjoyed working with Cheryl Lee, who had her ups and downs and could be moody and
impulsive. During the time Clark worked with Cheryl Lee, Cheryl Lee gave birth to her third
child. Clark said Cheryl Lee experienced even more difficulties caring for two children than she
had caring for one. After Wraparound ended in 2004, Clark worked with Cheryl Lee in the
Family Continuity program, which entailed weekly visits. In Cheryl Lee’s case, Clark spent a
great deal of time at Cheryl Lee’s house, which was frequently unsanitary and unsafe for a child.
When Clark closed the case in 2005, she did not believe Cheryl Lee had made significant
improvement or gained very much since Clark had had to keep repeating the same lessons and
Cheryl Lee had failed to follow through. Clark said that she provided all the services available
when she worked as a Wraparound worker. Clark expressed concern about Cheryl Lee’s ability
to manage her home and resources, and care for herself and the children. Clark opined that a boy
who was Jaden Lee’s age would not be able to effectively care for himself. Clark believed
Cheryl Lee’s problems were caused by a lack of ability rather than a lack of maturity. Clark
stated that she and her agency tried to “think outside the box” in tailoring services to assist
Cheryl Lee. Clark elaborated on the services received by Cheryl Lee and said they included
Families First, visits from the health department, home-based counseling, and home-based
nutritional counseling.
Jill Thompson testified, focusing on the phase in this case when the July 24, 2004 foster
care case was opened. At this time, Jaden Lee was five years old and living with Cheryl Lee, her
boyfriend, and the child’s half-siblings. Services were provided to remedy Cheryl Lee’s lack of
supervision of the children and the unsafe and unsanitary condition of the home; however, those
services were unsuccessful so the children were removed from the home. The following month,
Cheryl Lee worked diligently so that the two other children were returned to the home. Services
were provided and consisted of Families First, mental health counseling, parenting classes, and a
psychological assessment. Thompson said that Cheryl Lee had problems handling the children,
especially after she and her boyfriend broke up shortly after the children were returned to the
home. Thompson said that Cheryl Lee was never employed outside the home, had a tendency to
become involved in inappropriate romantic relationships, completed one set of parenting classes
in 2002 but did not complete the second Nurturing Parenting program, and had problems
managing her finances. Thompson’s work with Cheryl Lee stopped in August 2005 when the
two other children were placed into a guardianship with a relative. During her work with Cheryl
Lee, Thompson did not see any improvement. Thompson had not provided services to Cheryl
Lee since August 2005 and, in her opinion, it was not in Jaden Lee’s best interests to be reunited
with Cheryl Lee. Thompson further opined that she could judge Cheryl Lee’s current ability to
manage children and a house based on how things were before.
The trial court recognized Melissa VanLuven as an expert on Indian welfare. She also
was a supervisor of Penny Clark and Jill Thompson and, therefore, was familiar with the instant
case. VanLuven stated the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians expected the parents of
the tribe to provide for their children’s needs and also provide appropriate supervision,
discipline, and care for their children. In VanLuven’s opinion, Cheryl Lee’s parenting was
inconsistent with the typical parenting practice of other tribal parents, and that it was likely Jaden
Lee would suffer serious emotional or physical damage should Cheryl Lee gain custody of him.
Lastly, VanLuven stated that she was satisfied that active and reasonable efforts designed to
prevent the breakup of Cheryl Lee and Jaden Lee had been provided. VanLuven stated that she
-4-
felt qualified to deduce how Cheryl Lee would respond to current services had they been
provided, based on VanLuven’s thorough knowledge about Cheryl Lee’s prior lack of progress
with services. VanLuven further opined that Cheryl Lee was a “minimally adequate parent” on
an inconsistent basis.
In December 2007, the trial court terminated Cheryl Lee’s parental rights based on the
prior terminations. Cheryl Lee now appeals.
II. State Law Determinations
A. Prior Terminations
(1) Standard Of Review
To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that the petitioner has proven at
least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. MCL
712A.19b(3); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 632-633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). We review
for clear error a trial court’s decision terminating parental rights. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo
Minors, 462 Mich 341, 355-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); Sours, supra at 633. A finding is
clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216
(2003). Regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses who appeared before it. MCR 2.613(C); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 455
NW2d 161 (1989).
(2) Clear and Convincing Evidence
The trial court did not clearly err in its determination that clear and convincing evidence
established the statutory ground for termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). It was
undisputed that Cheryl Lee’s rights to other children had been terminated in prior proceedings
based on neglect, and the evidence was overwhelming that prior attempts to rehabilitate Cheryl
Lee had been unsuccessful. Although Cheryl Lee’s counselor testified about Cheryl Lee’s
improvements, his field of expertise was substance abuse, which only became a problem for
Cheryl Lee later in the process and had not been a focus of the prior rehabilitation efforts of DHS
and the tribal agencies.
B. Best Interests
(1) Standard Of Review
Once a petitioner has established a statutory ground for termination by clear and
convincing evidence, the trial court shall order termination of parental rights, unless the trial
court finds from evidence on the whole record that termination is clearly not in the child’s best
-5-
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5)1; Trejo, supra at 350. There is no specific burden on either party to
present evidence of the children’s best interests; rather, the trial court should weigh all evidence
available. Trejo, supra at 354. We review the trial court’s decision regarding the child’s best
interests for clear error. Id. at 356-357.
(2) Evidence Of Record
Although the entire record substantiates that Jaden Lee and Cheryl Lee loved one another
and enjoyed spending time together, it also showed Cheryl Lee’s persistent inability to provide
for her children’s care and safety. And, even though Jaden Lee had lived on and off with Cheryl
Lee when he was younger, he had not been in her physical custody since 2004, and they had seen
one another during visitations only. Jaden Lee needed permanency. Therefore, the trial court
properly found that termination was not clearly against Jaden Lee’s best interests.
III. ICWA Determinations
A. Active Efforts
Because this case involves an Indian child, both a state ground for termination of parental
rights and the ICWA standards had to be established. In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 246; 599
NW2d 772 (1999). Subsection 1912(d) of the ICWA requires that a party seeking to terminate
parental rights to an Indian child under state law must demonstrate “active efforts” to “provide
remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 25 USC § 1912(d). This Court reviews
de novo questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of the ICWA. In re Fried, 266 Mich
App 535, 538; 702 NW2d 192 (2005).
Pointing to the fact that no services have been provided to unite Cheryl Lee and Jaden
Lee since 2004 (or 2005, if the efforts aimed at uniting Cheryl Lee with the other children are
considered), Cheryl Lee argues that since DHS failed to provide current active efforts, the ICWA
was violated. We disagree.
We first note that the proper standard of proof for determinations under § 1912(d) of the
ICWA is proof by clear and convincing evidence. In re Roe, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___
(Sept. 25, 2008), slip op p 7. Therefore, the trial court erred to the extent that it assessed the
prior efforts under a beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard. However, this error was not reversible
error because evidence satisfying the higher (beyond-a-reasonable doubt) burden of proof would
clearly satisfy the lesser standard (clear and convincing evidence).
1
MCL 712A.19b(5) was amended, effective July 11, 2008. 2007 PA 199. The amended version
now requires that the trial court order termination if “the court finds that there are grounds for
termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interests.” However, in this case decided before the recent amendment, we continue to use the
language of the prior version of the statute.
-6-
Further, contrary to Cheryl Lee’s argument on appeal, this Court has recently held that
“taking into account the extent of the Department’s efforts and their cultural relevance,” id. at
slip op p 12, “formal and informal services provided prior to the current proceedings may meet
the ‘active efforts’ requirement of § 1912(d) of the ICWA, id. at slip op pp 7-8 (emphasis in
original). Therefore, “where there is clear and convincing evidence that the provision of
additional services would be futile, that finding can meet the requirements of § 1912(d).” Id. at
slip op p 8.
In its ruling to terminate Cheryl Lee’s rights, the trial court stated as follows:
[T]he Court must determine if the requirements of MCR 3.980(D) have
been met. MCR 3.980(D) provides:
“In addition to the required findings under MCR 3.977, the
parental rights of a parent of an Indian child must not be
terminated unless there is also evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that
parental rights should be terminated because continued custody of
the child by the parent of Indian custodian will likely result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”[2]
The Petitioner called Melissa [VanLuven] and the parties stipulated that
she was an expert witness in tribal culture. Ms. [VanLuven] supervised the
caseworkers who worked on Respondent’s case. Ms. [VanLuven]’s testimony
was that custody of the child with the mother would likely result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child. Respondent points out that the witness
had not personally worked with Respondent and gained her knowledge only from
review of the files and speaking with others involved with Respondent’s case.
Respondent also argues throughout that neither the tribe nor the
department have provided any services to Respondent for approximately three
years. The Petitioner relies upon the previous services from which the
Respondent did not benefit and the placement of the child with Respondent father.
Ms. Thompson testified that in hindsight it was a mistake not to proceed with
termination with regards to Jaden when the other terminations were being sought.
Thus, due to the circumstances created by the placement with the father and the
filing of a petition requesting termination at the initial disposition, neither the
tribe nor the department were in a position to provide services to Respondent.
The Petitioner argues that numerous services provided in the past failed to
improve Respondent’s parenting skills to the point where the children could be
safe if they resided with her. As an example of this, Petitioner points to the
children playing unsupervised in the street after Respondent had attended
2
The language of MCR 3.980(D) mirrors the language of ICWA subsection 1912(f).
-7-
parenting classes and one of the workers even having provided latches for the
doors to prevent the children from getting out into the street and playing
unsupervised. Respondent then counters with the argument that Respondent has
matured since those times, Jaden is older and would not require as much minute
to minute attention and the fact that she completed substance abuse counseling.
***
[T]he Court believes the testimony of the caseworkers who worked with
Respondent in the past to be compelling on the issue of Respondent’s ability to
benefit from the services provided. This testimony was supported by specific
examples of Respondent being unable to apply principles she was taught during
those services.
***
The Court is mindful of Respondent’s argument that the Respondent has
matured and that Jaden is older and does not require as much minute to minute
parenting as younger children would. However, simply growing older does not
equal an advance in maturity level. This is evidenced somewhat by Respondent’s
recent conviction for operating a motor vehicle while impaired. While
Respondent did participate and benefit from substance abuse counseling, the
counseling itself was a result or consequence of the drinking and driving related
conviction which required her participation. Further, while older children do not
have the same care needs as younger children, in many ways parenting at this
level can be even more demanding as children enter the pre-teen and teen years.
Thus, the failure to benefit from the services offered previously combined with
the recent conviction is another indicator to the Court that custody with
Respondent Mother would likely cause serious emotional or physical injury to the
child.
The trial court then summarized that its findings were based on:
1) the previous services and lack of benefit from same which raises the likelihood
of some form of serious physical injury; 2) the length of time the child has been
residing outside the Respondent’s home and the emotional damage that would
result in requiring a reunification plan; 3) the testimony presented that
Respondent’s lack of benefit was not due to Respondent’s lack of maturity, but
rather lack of ability; and 4) Respondent’s most recent conduct of operating a
motor vehicle while impaired due to alcohol.
It cannot be disputed that the trial court’s analysis quoted above does not contain the
words, “active efforts,” and, indeed, does not even mention the relevant statutory ICWA
provisions. However, based on our review of the trial court’s ruling and the record as a whole,
we conclude that the trial court clearly and carefully considered the efforts made to rehabilitate
Cheryl Lee sufficient to satisfy the § 1912(d) active efforts requirement. We note that given the
trial court’s extensive analysis, this case is distinguishable from In re Roe, supra, in which the
-8-
trial court merely “mentioned that there ‘had been a case service plan’ and that ‘efforts to
rehabilitate the [mother] were unsuccessful.’” Id. at slip op p 5.
In this case, it was clearly and convincingly established that DHS and the tribal agencies
made many varied and repeated efforts to provide services to Cheryl Lee in an attempt to keep
her united with Jaden Lee. Cheryl Lee’s argument therefore fails because the evidence
overwhelmingly established her past and persistent inability to improve her parenting skills or
make any significant progress in addressing her problems. Because of the intractable nature of
Cheryl Lee’s inability to learn appropriate parenting techniques, any additional efforts to
rehabilitate Cheryl Lee would have been largely futile.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that efforts had been made to
provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family and that those efforts had been unsuccessful.
B. Serious Emotional Or Physical Damage
Subsection 1912(f) of the ICWA requires a determination by the trial court that petitioner
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent’s continued custody of the minor child is
“likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.” 25 USC § 1912(f). In
making this finding in this case, the trial court cited Cheryl Lee’s failure to benefit from services,
the likelihood that Jaden Lee would suffer emotional harm if required to reunite with Cheryl Lee
(with whom he had spent little actual time), and recent examples where Cheryl Lee demonstrated
immature decision-making processes. Cheryl Lee disputes this determination and argues that her
behavior as a teenager did not reflect her current parenting skills and that she actually had spent
significant time with Jaden Lee due to alternating custody arrangements and consistent
visitations. However, as stated, under the well-established doctrine of anticipatory neglect, how
a parent treats one child is probative, though not determinative, of how that parent will treat
another, In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 84; 627 NW2d 33 (2001), and past behavior is a strong
indicator of future performance. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in relying upon
Cheryl Lee’s history as one (but not the sole) factor when evaluating this issue. We conclude
from our own review of Cheryl Lee’s history and the other evidence, including the tribal expert’s
testimony, that the trial court did not clearly err in its determination of this issue.
IV. Right To Jury Trial
Cheryl Lee argues that the denial of her right to a jury trial deprived her of her due
process rights. The determination whether proper procedure was followed in a child protective
proceeding presents a question of law subject to de novo review. In re CR, 250 Mich App 185,
200; 646 NW2d 506 (2001).
In this case, both Cheryl Lee and Tony Plank were named in the 2007 supplemental
termination petition; therefore, she was a named respondent before the trial court assumed
jurisdiction through the plea of Tony Plank. The trial court denied Cheryl Lee’s request for a
jury trial and held a termination hearing on Cheryl Lee’s rights where only legally admissible
evidence was considered. Such procedures were constitutionally adequate and, as such, Cheryl
Lee was afforded due process. Id. at 202-205. In addition, the denial of Cheryl Lee’s request for
a jury trial did not conflict with court rules since MCR 3.972 provides that a trial must be held
-9-
within certain time periods but does not guarantee each respondent a separate jury trial, and
MCR 3.965(B)(6) requires only that the trial court advise a respondent of the right to trial on the
allegations in the petition and does not require a court to hold a jury trial for every respondent
named in a petition.
Additionally, we note that because Cheryl Lee was named in both the July 9, 2007
petition and the August 20, 2007 supplemental petition, and Tony Plank did not enter his plea
until October 2007, the “one-parent problem” that Judge Whitbeck cautioned against in his
concurring opinion in In re Irwin, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued July 13, 2001 (Docket No. 229012), is not at issue in this case.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.