TERRY CASH V D & J SPARTAN TIRE INC
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TERRY CASH,
UNPUBLISHED
October 16, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
D & J SPARTAN TIRE INC. and DANIEL W.
CLARK,
No. 278174
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-079448-CL
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by right from the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.
Plaintiff’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that the feesplitting clause in the arbitration provision contained in defendants’ employee manual is
enforceable. We disagree.
MCR 2.116(C)(7) allows for summary disposition when the claim is barred because of an
agreement to arbitrate. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Fane v Detroit Library Comm, 465 Mich 68, 74; 631 NW2d 678
(2001). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court considers all documentary
evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless
affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict them. Id.
Plaintiff was employed with defendant D & J Spartan Tire Inc., the owner and president
of which was defendant Daniel W. Clark. The employee manual promulgated by defendants
contained an arbitration provision providing that, by accepting or continuing employment with
defendants, the employee automatically agreed that arbitration is the exclusive remedy for all
disputes arising out of or relating to the employee’s employment with Spartan Tire. The
arbitration provision also contained a clause providing that, “[t]he cost of the arbitrator and court
reporter, if any, shall be shared equally by the parties.” Plaintiff does not challenge the portion
of the arbitration provision providing that arbitration is the exclusive remedy for all work-related
disputes. Instead, plaintiff only challenges the fee-splitting clause and does so on the basis that
the fee-splitting provision will effectively prevent him and others similarly situated from
pursuing their claims because they cannot afford to pay an arbitrator’s fees. It is plaintiff’s
-1-
position that this “prohibitive cost” defense renders the fee-splitting provision unenforceable,
citing Cole v Burns Int’l Security Serv, 105 F3d 1465 (CA DC, 1997), for such a proposition.
For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive.
We first note that we find plaintiff’s reliance on Cole unavailing. Concerned that feesplitting provisions would deter financially strapped employees from pursuing their claims, the
Cole court held that “where arbitration has been imposed by the employer and occurs only at the
option of the employer – arbitrators’ fees should be borne solely by the employer.” Cole, supra
at 1485. Although Cole provides analysis on the propriety of arbitration fee-splitting provisions
in employment contracts, Rembert v Ryan’s Family Steak House, Inc, 235 Mich App 118; 596
NW2d 208 (1999), which considered Cole, is the controlling case on fee-splitting provisions in
Michigan. Cole is a federal court of appeals case from the District of Columbia Circuit, and
federal case law is not binding precedent in this Court. Sharp v City of Lansing, 464 Mich 792,
803; 629 NW2d 873 (2001). Although this Court is entitled to find Cole’s authority persuasive,
and plaintiff urges this Court to do just that, the existence of Rembert as controlling authority
obviates the need to look elsewhere for guidance.1 We thus need to look to Rembert to resolve
the issue at hand.
In Rembert, a conflict panel of this Court explained that agreements to arbitrate were
valid so long as no statutory rights or remedies were waived, and so long as the arbitration
procedure was fair. Id. at 123. Plaintiff does not argue, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that
the arbitration agreement waived any rights or remedies accorded by the statute under which
plaintiff brought his claims. Regarding fairness of the arbitration procedure, Rembert held that
“[u]nlike the court in Cole, we will not include, among the fairness requirements, a rule that the
employer must pay the fees of the arbitrator and arbitration service.” Id. at 162 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, Rembert held that an employer is not required to pay the entire
arbitration fee in order for the arbitration agreement to be upheld. Rembert’s silence on the
prohibitive cost defense implicitly establishes that an employee’s inability to pay an arbitrator’s
fees does not render the fee-splitting provision unenforceable.
Indeed, as Rembert
acknowledges, there are mechanisms in place, such as MCR 3.602 and statutory fee provisions,
which allow someone in plaintiff’s position to seek to shift the arbitration costs to the employer.
Id. This reality makes it less likely that plaintiff, or others similarly situated, would be deterred
by financial concerns from pursuing their claims.
Plaintiff contends that Rembert’s holding should not be applied to the instant case
because Rembert involved an individually negotiated employment contract, while the case at
hand involves an employee manual, the provisions of which the employee agreed to by merely
starting or continuing employment. For several reasons we reject plaintiff’s argument. First, it is
not clear that the employee in Rembert actually had the opportunity to negotiate his employment
contract. The case simply provides that he signed an arbitration agreement at the time of hire.
1
We further note that Cole involved an employee’s statutory federal civil rights, Cole, supra at
1467, and thus, appears to be applicable solely when statutory federal civil rights are at stake.
Here, none of plaintiff’s claims are federal, and only one of six is statutory. Accordingly, even if
Cole was binding authority, plaintiff cannot avail himself of Cole’s prohibitive cost defense.
-2-
Rembert, supra at 125. It is therefore mere speculation to suggest that the employee in Rembert
had more bargaining leverage than plaintiff did in the case at hand. Second, even if it were
found that plaintiff had less bargaining leverage than the plaintiff in Rembert, that in itself would
not be sufficient to render Rembert inapplicable to this case because plaintiff cannot show that
the agreement to split fees is an unenforceable agreement of adhesion. If the prospective
employee would be able to obtain work elsewhere, the contract is not one of adhesion because
the applicant has a meaningful choice in accepting the offer of employment. Id. at 157 n 28.
Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he had no meaningful choice to obtain employment
elsewhere at the time he was hired by Spartan Tire. Plaintiff further failed to present authority
for the proposition that an arbitration provision in an employee manual like the one at hand is
unenforceable per se because it was not individually negotiated and employment was
conditioned upon its acceptance. In light of Rembert’s undistinguishable holding, the trial court
did not err in ruling that the fee-splitting provision was enforceable and granting defendants’
motion for summary disposition.
Finally, plaintiff’s argument that upholding the trial court’s decision will foreclose the
arbitration process to him and others similarly situated has no factual underpinnings. Indeed, it
appears that the opposite is true in this case, i.e., that the arbitrator’s fee will only be paid at the
conclusion of the hearing. The arbitrator’s letter to the parties indicates as much, stating that the
parties will not have to pay his fees until the proceedings are concluded.2 In other words,
although plaintiff’s counsel made a forceful policy argument about the potential difficulties in
enforcing an arbitration provision that essentially precludes an available forum to adjudicate
statutory rights, we simply do not have such a case here. As the United States Supreme Court
aptly noted under similar circumstances in Green Tree Financial Corp v Randolph, 531 US 79,
90-91; 121 S Ct 513; 148 L Ed 2d 373 (2000):
It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a
litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights
in the arbitral forum. But the record does not show that Randolph will bear such
costs if she goes to arbitration. Indeed, it contains hardly any information on the
matter. As the Court of Appeals recognized, “we lack . . . information about how
claimants fare under Green Tree’s arbitration clause.” [Randolph v Green Tree
Financial Corp,] 178 F3d [1149,] 1158 [(CA 11, 1999)]. The record reveals only
the arbitration agreement’s silence on the subject, and that fact alone is plainly
insufficient to render it unenforceable. The “risk” that Randolph will be saddled
with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration
agreement. [Footnote omitted.]
Again, there is nothing in the record showing that plaintiff will be prevented from proceeding
through arbitration because of the arbitrator’s fees or costs.
2
The arbitrator’s letter provides that “[t]he fees will be split equally by the parties, unless the
parties have a contrary agreement or unless I determine a different allocation as part of the final
award.”
-3-
Additionally, the fact that the arbitration process was already under way also suggests
that the cost of arbitration would not preclude plaintiff from accessing a forum. Therefore, even
if we were to adopt plaintiff’s alternative argument, i.e, the approach applied in Green Tree
Financial Corp and Morrison v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 317 F3d 646, 663 (CA 6, 2003),3 we
would still hold that the provision at hand was enforceable because plaintiff has failed to
establish that he would be denied access to a forum.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
3
Green Tree and Morrison held that fee-splitting provisions are not unenforceable per se, but are
unenforceable only if potential litigants can show that the potential costs of arbitration would
deprive the litigant and/or similarly situated individuals of access to a forum. However, these
cases, like Cole, involved employees’ statutory federal civil rights under the United States
Arbitration Act. Green Tree, supra at 89-90; Morrison, supra at 663. Thus, like Cole, it is likely
that neither case trumps Rembert, nor is applicable to the case at bar.
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.