PEOPLE OF MI V DUSTIN DEVON MAHAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 14, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279244
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-013126-01
DUSTIN DEVON MAHAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Talbot and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89, carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.1 Defendant was
sentenced to 8 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to rob while armed
conviction, 40 months to 5 years’ imprisonment for the CCW conviction, and two years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant sets forth three reasons for his assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective.
First, defendant claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a pretrial motion to
suppress the testimony of prosecution witnesses Corey Fenderson and Bruce Tarver. Second,
defendant contends that defense counsel erroneously elicited his testimony regarding his
postarrest, post-Miranda2 silence. Third, defendant asserts that his attorney was ineffective
because he failed to object to the trial court’s omission of an element of assault with intent to rob
while armed in the jury instructions. We disagree with all three of defendant’s claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a mixed question of law and fact. People v
LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). A trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are
reviewed for clear error, and the ultimate constitutional issue arising from an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is reviewed by this Court de novo. Id. Defendant did not bring a
1
The jury acquitted defendant of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83.
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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motion for a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and failed to request a
Ginther3 hearing before the trial court. Moreover, this Court denied his motion to remand for an
evidentiary hearing with respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly,
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is unpreserved and this Court’s review is
limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d
94 (2002). A defendant has waived the issue if the record on appeal does not support his
assignments of error. People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 659; 620 NW2d
19 (2000).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is established only where a defendant is able to
demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that this was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair trial.” People v Toma, 462 Mich
281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). A defendant is required to overcome a strong presumption that
sound trial strategy motivated trial counsel’s conduct. Id. Additionally, in order to show
prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceedings would have been different but for the counsel’s errors. Id. at 302-303. Counsel’s
performance is “measured against an objective standard of reasonableness under the
circumstances and according to prevailing professional norms.” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich
App 657, 663; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). Moreover, “this Court neither substitutes its judgment for
that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor makes an assessment of counsel’s
competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687
NW2d 342 (2004).
Defendant first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
attorney failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress the allegedly coerced testimony of Fenderson
and Tarver. We disagree. Defendant correctly points out that “[b]oth our Supreme Court and
this Court have strongly condemned prosecutorial intimidation of witnesses.” People v Stacy,
193 Mich App 19, 25; 484 NW2d 675 (1992), citing People v Pena, 383 Mich 402; 175 NW2d
767 (1970). Defendant is also correct in stating that police intimidation and threats are
attributable to the prosecution. Stacy, supra at 25, citing People v Hooper, 157 Mich App 669,
675; 403 NW2d 605 (1987). Nevertheless, defendant invites this Court to leap too wide a gulf
when he urges us to conclude that defense counsel should have attempted to suppress the
testimony of Fenderson and Tarver as the alleged result of police intimidation merely because
Fenderson and Tarver were arrested during the investigation of the shooting and implicated
defendant. There is no record evidence that either the police or the prosecution intimidated or
coerced Fenderson or Tarver, and defendant cites no authority to support his proposition that
their arrests, without evidence of coercion or intimidation, rendered their testimony inadmissible.
To the contrary, according to Detroit Police Officer Steven Brown, after Tarver was arrested, he
came forward and volunteered information that implicated defendant in the shooting.
To the extent that defendant suggests that the “dragnet arrests” of Fenderson and Tarver
were illegal, he did not have standing to seek the suppression of their testimony on the basis of
alleged violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. People v Foster, 174 Mich App 505, 508;
3
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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436 NW2d 397 (1988) (concluding that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to assert
another’s Fourth Amendment rights vicariously). Furthermore, because defendant cannot
support with evidence or authority his proposition that Fenderson’s and Tarver’s testimony was
inadmissible, there is no indication that the trial court would have granted a motion to suppress
the testimony. Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608
NW2d 502 (2000). Under the circumstances, defendant cannot demonstrate that defense
counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable.
Further, defendant cannot show that defense counsel’s allegedly deficient performance
resulted in outcome-determinative prejudice. Although defendant argues that the testimony of
Fenderson and Tarver was crucial to the prosecution’s case, he fails to acknowledge the
testimony of the victim, Christopher Dreachslin, regarding the events preceding the shooting.
The jury could have believed Dreachslin’s testimony that he was positive that the person wearing
the distinctive leather jacket recovered from defendant’s residence, which defendant admitted
wearing on the night of the shooting, was the person who shot him, regardless of inconsistencies
in the accounts provided by Fenderson and Tarver. This Court will not interfere with the factfinder’s role in weighing the evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Because defendant
cannot demonstrate that counsel’s performance in failing to file a motion to suppress the
testimony of Fenderson and Tarver was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, and
cannot show that the alleged error affected the outcome of the case, his claim that he received the
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial fails.
Defendant next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because
his trial counsel elicited his testimony that he remained silent instead of providing a statement to
the police. We disagree.
Defendant testified during direct examination that after he was arrested, he was
transported to the police station, where investigators questioned him about the shooting.
Defendant testified that he did not want to make a statement to the police at that time and asked
to speak to a lawyer. Generally, after a criminal defendant has been advised of his right to
remain silent, his silence may not be used as evidence against him. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US
436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966); People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 574; 628 NW2d 502
(2001). A prosecutor may not comment on an accused’s postarrest, post-Miranda silence. Doyle
v Ohio, 426 US 610, 619-620; 96 S Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976); People v Goodin, 257 Mich
App 425, 432; 668 NW2d 392 (2003). While the deliberate use of a defendant’s post-Miranda
silence can amount to constitutional error, an isolated and inadvertent reference does not.
Dennis, supra at 579-580.
Defendant fails to rebut the strong presumption that sound trial strategy motivated
defense counsel’s decision to refer to defendant’s postarrest silence. Defense counsel’s reference
to defendant’s postarrest silence is consistent with an argument articulated in defendant’s
opening statement, where counsel averred:
Okay. My client’s just in the house, and he doesn’t even give a statement
to the police because he doesn’t even know what he’s being arrested for. Period.
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This argument suggests that defense counsel’s strategy in eliciting defendant’s testimony that he
exercised his right to remain silent was to demonstrate to the jury that defendant was both
surprised by his arrest and concerned that he had been wrongly accused. Further, defendant
cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s question regarding his postarrest
silence. Toma, supra at 302-303. The prosecution did not explore the topic of defendant’s
postarrest silence on cross-examination, and the record does not show that defendant’s decision
to remain silent was mentioned by either the prosecution or defense counsel thereafter.
Accordingly, there was no reasonable likelihood that counsel’s question regarding defendant’s
postarrest, post-Miranda silence affected the outcome of the trial. Because defendant has failed
to rebut the presumption that defense counsel’s isolated question regarding his postarrest silence
was a strategic decision, and he failed to show prejudice, his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim fails.
Defendant next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because defense
counsel failed to object to the trial court’s jury instructions that omitted an element of assault
with intent to rob while armed. We disagree.
“The elements of assault with intent to rob while armed are: (1) an assault with force and
violence; (2) an intent to rob or steal; and (3) the defendant’s being armed.” People v Akins, 259
Mich App 545, 554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). The record demonstrates that the trial court did in
fact omit an element of the jury instructions relating to the assault with intent to rob while armed
charge, which required the jury to find that defendant was, in fact, armed in order to convict him.
It was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel to maintain, contrary to the record, that the
trial court had in fact instructed the jury that defendant was required to have been armed in order
to convict him of assault with intent to rob while armed. Nevertheless, defendant’s ineffective
assistance claim lacks merit because he cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction.
Following the trial court’s instruction with regard to assault with intent to rob while
armed, the trial court instructed the jury with respect to the elements of CCW and felony-firearm,
which defendant did not contest below and does not contest on appeal. Although defendant
offers a rather strained and speculative theory regarding how the jury could have applied the
facts to the elements of assault with intent to rob as instructed, the fact that the jury concluded
that defendant was guilty of CCW and felony-firearm persuades us that the jury also believed
that defendant was armed when he assaulted Dreachslin with the intent to rob him. Supporting
this conclusion is the description of the offense, “Assault with Intent to Rob while Armed,” as it
appeared on the verdict form. Further, while instructing the jury, the trial court related the
felony-firearm charge to the assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to rob charges,
and not the CCW charge. Because defendant cannot demonstrate that a different outcome would
have resulted had his trial counsel objected to the erroneous jury instruction, his third and final
ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Toma, supra at 302-303.
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury with
respect to the elements of assault with intent to rob while armed constitutes plain error, and
because the trial court’s instructional error affected the verdict, he is entitled to a new trial. We
disagree.
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A party must object to or request a jury instruction before the jury deliberates in order to
preserve a challenge to the trial court’s direction of the jury on appeal. MCR 2.516(C); People v
Gonzales, 256 Mich App 212, 225; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). See, also, Sabin, supra at 657-658.
Defendant not only failed to object to the jury instructions given by the trial court, but expressed
satisfaction with the instructions to the extent that counsel affirmatively indicated that the jury
was properly instructed. As a general rule, a defendant waives the right to appellate review
where he expresses satisfaction with the specific actions of a trial court. People v Carter, 462
Mich 206, 219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Waiver precludes appellate review of the issue, and
extinguishes any error. Id. at 215-216. Here, because defendant expressed satisfaction with the
trial court’s instruction, to the extent that he now claims that the trial court improperly instructed
the jury with respect to the elements of assault with the intent to rob while armed, he has waived
appellate review of this issue. Id. at 215-216, 219. Accordingly, we decline to consider this
issue further.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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