PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER A CLARK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 14, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278957
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-004186-01
CHRISTOPHER A. CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), armed robbery,
MCL 750.529, armed assault with intent to rob, MCL 750.89, assault with intent to do great
bodily harm, MCL 750.84, and possession of a firearm while committing a felony, MCL
750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison terms of life without parole for the
murder conviction, 15 to 40 years for the armed robbery and armed assault convictions, 2 to 10
years for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, and two years for the felonyfirearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from a robbery and the shooting of two people. Evidence
presented at trial revealed that the victims were sitting in a parked car when defendant and four
of his acquaintances approached. Defendant demanded that the man in the driver seat open the
window. Defendant then fired a shot that killed the man in the driver seat and wounded the other
man in the vehicle. Defendant and his acquaintances took the dead man’s cell phone, along with
other items. The police later located one of defendant’s accomplices, Dana Minor, through the
cell phone usage. Minor implicated defendant and the other three persons involved. When the
police interviewed these suspects, each one identified defendant as the gunman. Before trial, all
four of defendant’s accomplices entered into plea agreements in exchange for testimony. The
plea agreements required each of the accomplices to testify against defendant.
At trial, Officer Stevenson testified that each of the accomplices had identified defendant
as the gunman. Two of the acquaintances, Minor and Hicks, fulfilled their agreement to testify
and confirmed their statements to the police officer that interviewed them. Jones and Etheridge,
the other two acquaintances, refused to testify.
Defendant first argues that his constitutional confrontation right was violated when
plaintiff presented Officer Stevenson’s testimony in light of the fact that Jones and Etheridge
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later refused to testify and were therefore not subject to cross-examination. We review this
unpreserved issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). .
The United States and the Michigan Constitutions ensure that a defendant in a criminal
prosecution has the opportunity to confront witnesses. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, §20.
The confrontation clause precludes a witness from testifying about the testimonial statement of
another witness who is unavailable for trial, unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the unavailable witness. Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 53-54, 68; 124 S Ct
1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). Statements given during a police interrogation are testimonial
statements subject to the Crawford rule. See also Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822; 126 S
Ct 2266; 166 L Ed 2d 224 (2006).
Here, Officer Stevenson testified that Jones, Etheridge, Hicks, and Minor had given
statements identifying defendant as the gunman. The statements referenced in Officer
Stevenson’s testimony were plainly testimonial statements and inadmissible in light of the fact
that Jones and Etheridge did not testify and were not subject to cross-examination. However,
this is an unpreserved matter for which this Court may grant relief only for plain error that
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or that seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Carines, supra. at 763-764. The
prosecutor presented ample eyewitness testimony to identify defendant as the person that robbed
and shot the victim. See People v Shepherd, 472 Mich 343, 347; 697 NW2d 144 (2005). The
record contains sufficient evidence to uphold the jury’s conclusion without reference to the
statements of Jones and Etheridge.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by requiring Jones to take the witness
stand to confirm his refusal to testify as required by the terms of his plea bargain. We review
this constitutional issue de novo. People v Pitts, 222 Mich App 260, 263; 564 NW2d 93 (1997).
Before defendant’s trial, Jones pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for
an agreement to testify against defendant in the present case. During trial, but outside the jury’s
presence, Jones’s lawyer informed the trial court that Jones had stated that he would not testify.
The court questioned Jones about his decision, confirming Jones’s understanding that if he
refused to testify he would still be bound by his guilty plea, but that the trial court would not be
bound by the sentence recommended in the plea agreement. The trial court also confirmed that
no one had threatened Jones or otherwise coerced him not to testify.
The prosecutor then asked the court to bring Jones before the jury, stating that she wanted
to “make a record . . . and discuss that he has pled guilty, and that he made an agreement to
testify and now he’s refusing to testify.” The trial court responded that Jones had waived his
Fifth Amendment right, and that having Jones appear before the jury “gives him the opportunity
to either get the benefit of the bargain or not. And if not I don’t want [him] to come back later
and say, hey, if they had put me in front of the jury I would have.” The court further noted that
although Jones refused to testify, he had not refused to take the stand. The court concluded, “I
can’t deprive him of his option to perform. He can perform or not. That’s up to him.”
Jones then took the stand in the jury’s presence. The following colloquy occurred:
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Q. Mr. Jones, did you enter into a plea agreement to second degree
murder?
A. Yes.
Q. And in exchange for receiving a sentence of ten to twenty years plus
two years you had included that would be truthful testimony in any case that
involved [defendant], Corey Etheridge, Artis Hicks, or Dana Minor, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Are you going to testify today?
A. No.
We find no constitutional error in the decision to allow the prosecutor to call Jones to the
stand. We acknowledge that it is error for a lawyer to present a witness’s testimony if the lawyer
knows the witness will assert a Fifth Amendment privilege. People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170,
196; 577 NW2d 422 (1988), overruled on other grounds in People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 596
NW2d 607 (1999). People v Poma, 96 Mich App 726, 733; 294 NW2d 221 (1980). The error
does not amount to a constitutional violation, however, unless “the prosecution used the
witness’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege to create an inference that established a
critical element of the state’s case.” Gearns v Berghuis, 104 FED App 517, 520 (CA 6, 2004),
citing Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415, 419; 85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965). Here, Jones
did not assert a Fifth Amendment privilege in the jury’s presence, and his refusal to testify did
not address any particular element of the prosecutor’s case. The prosecutor did not question
Jones when Jones refused to testify. Accordingly, no constitutional violation occurred.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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