PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID LEE LINDSEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 9, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 279128
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-004705-01
v
DAVID LEE LINDSEY, a/k/a DARRYL
TAYLOR, a/k/a KENNY JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted at a bench trial of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520d(1)(b), and was sentenced to seven to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals
as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues he was denied the right to a fair trial by the trial court’s decision to
admit into evidence a poem written by complainant. Defendant claims the poem was
inadmissible hearsay. Because we conclude that the poem was not admitted to prove the truth of
the things asserted, and because defendant fails to show that he was prejudiced in the matter, we
disagree. Defendant additionally argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court
articulated insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the entire record shows
that the trial judge was aware of the issues in the case, and correctly applied the law, we again
disagree.
The minor complainant testified that, early in September 2006, while in the back sitting
room of his foster mother’s home with defendant, defendant exposed himself to complainant and
demanded that complainant perform oral sex on him. Out of fear, complainant complied.
Complainant’s English teacher testified that, in response to an assignment, complainant wrote a
poem in late September whose contents led her to speak with complainant and the school’s social
workers. Defense counsel objected to the poem’s admission; however, after determining that
complainant’s credibility and motivation were at issue, the trial court asked the teacher to read
the poem into the record.
MRE 801(d)(1)(B) provides that a statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the
statement is . . . consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
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implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” In
this case, the trial court’s expressed concern for complainant’s credibility and motivation
indicates that the poem was admitted under this exemption, and thus not for the truth of the
matters asserted. Complainant testified at trial that defendant sexually assaulted him,
complainant was subject to cross-examination regarding the poem, and the poem was consistent
with his competent testimony. For these reasons, the poem was not hearsay, as defined by the
rules of evidence, and its admission was not error.
Moreover, even though the parts of a poem indicating that a man had imposed some
distressing aggression on complainant in the month of September were potentially prejudicial,
we are confident that the trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, was able to properly consider of
that evidence. Preserved, nonconstitutional error does not require reversal “unless ‘after an
examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not
that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d
607 (1999). Because the information in the challenged poem was, at worst, cumulative to
complainant’s competent testimony, any prejudice defendant might have suffered was minimal.
Continuing to the second issue on appeal, the factual findings of a trial court will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous. See MCR 2.613(C); People v Hesch, 278 Mich App 188,
192; 749 NW2d 267 (2008). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record,
the appellate court is “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
Where a court tries an action without a jury, the court is obliged to “find the facts
specially,” and “state separately its conclusions of law.” MCR 2.517(A)(1). “Brief, definite, and
pertinent findings and conclusions on the contested matters are sufficient, without over
elaboration of detail or particularization of facts.” MCR 2.517(A)(2). Findings of fact are
sufficient if it appears from the entire record that the trial court was aware of the issues and
correctly applied the law. People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 134-35; 494 NW2d 797 (1992).
Having reviewed the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied the
facts asserted to the correct law. We note that the trial court took special care to ensure it fully
understood defense counsel’s arguments, and expressly rejected the defense theory that
complainant was seeking revenge. We further note that the court gave thorough consideration to
deciding whether to admit the challenged poem. It is clear that the trial court’s ultimate
conclusions were neither arbitrary nor based on prejudice. For these reasons, we conclude that
defendant suffered no prejudice from the trial judge’s limited statements of factual findings and
legal conclusions, and is not entitled to a new trial or a remand for further fact-finding.
We affirm.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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