PEOPLE OF MI V DERRICK DARNELL FORTE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
October 2, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276091
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-027429-FC
DERRICK DARNELL FORTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321, felonious assault,
MCL 750.82, larceny of a firearm, MCL 750.357b, carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL
750.227, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent prison terms
of 5-1/2 to 15 years on the manslaughter charge, 24 months to four years on the felonious assault
charge, and 38 months to five years on the larceny of a firearm and CCW charges, all to be
served consecutively to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
On the evening of April 2, 2006, on a street corner at the intersection of Rust and Ray
streets in Saginaw, defendant shot the victim, Devon Holmes, once through the heart from a
distance of two feet or less. Three companions of the victim that evening identified defendant at
trial as the shooter. Defendant did not dispute that he had shot the victim, but testified that he
had done so because the victim produced a handgun, and the victim and his companions intended
to rob defendant. After shooting the victim, defendant discharged his handgun twice more to
frighten away the victim’s companions, and took the victim’s gun.
In addition to the several firearm-related counts mentioned above, defendant stood trial
on a count of open murder and a count of assault with intent to murder. On these most serious
counts, the jury found defendant guilty of the lesser charges of voluntary manslaughter and
felonious assault.
Defendant first contends on appeal that the trial court’s admission of irrelevant testimony
concerning a speed loader deprived him of a fair trial. This Court generally reviews a trial
court’s decision whether to admit evidence for a clear abuse of discretion. People v Bauder, 269
Mich App 174, 179; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). Because defendant failed to preserve this issue,
-1-
however, by raising a relevance objection to the challenged testimony at trial, we consider this
issue only to determine whether any plain error affected defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at
180.
The sole trial testimony concerning the existence of a speed loader consisted of a
detective’s testimony that the police discovered at 3300 Rust Street a speed loader “for a .38
handgun.” Defendant’s former girlfriend testified that she resided at 3300 Rust Street, and that
defendant and a cousin of hers also lived there around April 2006. She denied knowing whether
either her cousin or defendant owned a speed loading device. The speed loader testimony plainly
qualified as irrelevant to any material fact or issue raised at trial because absolutely no evidence
tended to show that defendant employed a speed loader at any time proximate to April 2, 2006.
MRE 401, 402.
Although the speed loader had no relevance to any material question involved in
defendant’s trial, the interjection of speed loader testimony at trial occasioned no prejudice to
defendant. Most of the relevant facts in this case were not in dispute. The evidence at trial
agreed, for example, that only defendant fired any shots at the corner of Rust and Ray streets late
on April 2, 2006; that defendant shot the victim in the chest from less than two feet away, killing
him quickly; and that defendant then fired twice more, either in the air or toward the victim’s
friends, to dissuade them from remaining near the scene. The only significant evidentiary
dispute concerned the extent to which either the victim and his friends or defendant might have
behaved aggressively immediately before the shooting. Furthermore, the affirmative testimony
about a speed loader occurred in a brief and isolated fashion during the questioning of one police
detective, and the prosecutor made no subsequent reference to the speed loader during closing
arguments. Given the very limited nature of the irrelevant speed loader testimony and the
overwhelming evidence that defendant caused the victim’s death, we conclude that the
evidentiary error caused defendant no prejudice. Bauder, supra at 180.
Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by expressing his
personal belief in defendant’s guilt during closing argument. Because defendant also failed to
preserve this issue at trial, we review his claim of misconduct for plain error affecting his
substantial rights. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 31-32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
Defendant’s complaint focuses on the following, highlighted portion of the prosecutor’s
closing argument:
. . . But it is the position, ladies and gentlemen, of the People, the
prosecution, that notwithstanding what I have characterized as the divergence of
testimony of the other people, all you really need to look at are the defendant’s
own statements and his own testimony to prove that his claim of self-defense is
not that at all. That he was not really afraid for his life or safety and/or that he—if
he claims that fear, it was not reasonable under the circumstances.
And I say this because of what he told the detectives and what he admitted
this morning under oath he told the detectives. First [defendant] says, even
though [the victim] had his pistol out almost the whole time; and, again,
remember that I am not agreeing that that was what the evidence was. I believe
the evidence is every bit as strong, if not stronger, that it was [defendant] that had
-2-
his pistol out first. But even if you look only at his testimony and not the rest, he
says that even though [the victim] had it out, he didn’t use it. [Emphasis added.]
In light of the consistent trial testimony by the victim’s three friends that defendant had initiated
verbal contact with them at the street corner, approached them, and drew a gun before the victim
retrieved his, we find that, reviewing the prosecutor’s challenged remark in context, his argument
plainly and properly summarized the evidence introduced at trial, and the reasonable inferences
arising therefrom. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (observing that
prosecutors remain free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence as
relevant to their theory of the case); People v Swartz, 171 Mich App 364, 370-371; 429 NW2d
905 (1988) (explaining that while a prosecutor cannot place the prestige of his office behind an
assertion that the defendant is guilty, he can argue that the evidence establishes the defendant’s
guilt). Consequently, no error, let alone plain error, occurred here.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.