PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS WESLEY POE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282806
Chippewa Circuit Court
LC No. 07-008509-FH
THOMAS WESLEY POE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Sawyer and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to knowingly conduct or participate in a criminal
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity involving the delivery of cocaine, MCL
750.157a and MCL 750.159i(1), knowingly conducting or participating in a criminal enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity involving the delivery of cocaine, MCL 750.159i(1),
delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and conspiracy to deliver
less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a and MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). He was sentenced
as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 20 to 50 years each for
the racketeering and conspiracy to participate in racketeering convictions, and consecutive prison
terms of 10 to 50 years each for the delivery of cocaine and conspiracy to deliver cocaine
convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
The prosecution’s theory of the case was that between November 2005 and January 11,
2007, defendant was involved in a cocaine trafficking ring with Derek Parks, Melissa Beaudry,
Brian McDonald, Mike Causley, and Jamie Verwiebe, during which defendant and others
regularly reserved hotel rooms for Parks in Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan and assisted Parks in
selling cocaine. The evidence at trial indicated that defendant went to Toledo, Ohio to recruit his
nephew, Derek Parks, to sell cocaine in Sault Ste. Marie. A police investigation was conducted
during which several controlled purchases of cocaine were made, and the police set up
surveillance of a Comfort Inn hotel room at which defendant and Parks were arrested on January
11, 2007.
At trial, representatives of the various hotels where defendant and Parks stayed offered
testimony about who rented the rooms in question. Defendant was arrested on January 11, 2007,
inside a Comfort Inn hotel room. Before the general manager of the Comfort Inn testified, the
prosecutor advised the court that the general manager had just provided additional hotel records
reflecting defendant’s rental of that room for approximately the week preceding and up to the
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date of his arrest. At trial, defendant objected to the admission of this evidence on the ground
that it was not timely provided pursuant to a pretrial discovery order. The trial court initially
ruled that the evidence was newly discovered and could be admitted, but after hearing further
testimony, refused to admit any of the late-produced records, although the witness was allowed
to refer to the records while testifying.
On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecution’s failure to timely produce the hotel
records violated his right to due process under Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L
Ed 2d 215 (1963), and also deprived him of his right to present an alibi defense or a defense
based on mistaken identity. Specifically, defendant argues that because the evidence was not
timely produced, he was unable to properly present either of these defenses. Because these
arguments were not presented to the trial court, they are unpreserved and our review is limited to
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-767;
597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A defendant has a due process right to discovery of information in the prosecution’s
possession under Brady, supra. This right requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that
might lead a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt, regardless whether
the evidence is requested. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 666; 521 NW2d 557 (1994);
People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 281; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).
In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: (1) that
the state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that he did not possess
the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence;
(3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [Lester, supra at 281282.]
Here, there is no basis for concluding that the hotel records were either exculpatory or
favorable to defendant. Rather, the records are further evidence that defendant was the person
who rented the Comfort Inn hotel room. Defendant, who now has possession of the records,
does not explain why this evidence could be considered favorable, or how it would support either
a defense of alibi or mistaken identity, particularly considering that defendant was arrested inside
the hotel room and admitted after his arrest that he had rented the room. Defendant explained to
the police that he frequently rented hotel rooms in order to spend time with his girlfriend, who
was from Canada. Because the records were consistent with this other evidence, there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different had the evidence been
provided sooner.
Further, there is no merit to defendant’s argument that the failure to produce this
evidence sooner deprived him of his right to present a defense. Although defendant contends
that he could have presented possible defenses of alibi or mistaken identity, he fails to explain,
and it is not apparent, how the evidence could have supported either defense. On the contrary,
the hotel records were further evidence that it was defendant who rented the Comfort Inn hotel
room.
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Defendant also argues that his right to due process was violated because the trial court
prevented him from inspecting the newly produced records during trial. The record does not
support defendant’s claim. Rather, the record discloses that defense counsel asked if she could
copy the records. The court informed her that she could copy the records at the end of the day, to
which she responded, “Thank you, your Honor.” Nothing in the record suggests that counsel
was not permitted to review the records during trial. Indeed, the record discloses that defense
counsel was able to voir dire the witness regarding the records without any problems.
Accordingly, we find no merit to this issue.
Defendant lastly argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the jurors observed him
in prison garb and shackles as he was being brought into the courtroom under guard before trial
began.
A defendant’s freedom from shackling is an important part of the right to a fair trial and
shackling is permitted only under extraordinary circumstances. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App
400, 404; 552 NW2d 663 (1996).
[H]aving a defendant appear before a jury handcuffed or shackled negatively
affects the defendant’s constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence,
[People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 425 n 26; 521 NW2d 255 (1994)] (observing that
“‘[t]he presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence’” [quoting Eaddy
v People, 115 Colo 488, 492; 174 P2d 717 (1946)]). The Sixth Amendment
guarantee of the right to a fair trial means that “one accused of a crime is entitled
to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued
custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” Taylor v Kentucky,
436 US 478, 485; 98 S Ct 1930; 56 L Ed 2d 468 (1978). [People v Banks, 249
Mich App 247, 256; 642 NW2d 351 (2002).]
As this Court recently explained, however, the prohibition against shackling a defendant
does not apply to safety precautions taken by law enforcement officers when transporting a
defendant to and from the courtroom. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 37; ___ NW2d ___
(2008), lv pending. Further, when jurors inadvertently see a defendant in shackles, there must be
some showing that the defendant was prejudiced. Id.
The record here indicates that defendant was being transported into the courtroom under
guard and in restraints while the jurors were still walking into the courtroom. Contrary to what
defendant asserts, the record indicates that this occurred before a jury was selected and that the
parties were permitted to explore this issue with the jurors during voir dire to determine whether
it would affect their ability to be fair and impartial. One juror who was affected by the viewing
was dismissed for cause, but none of the other jurors indicated that they could not be fair and
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impartial. Therefore, we are unable to conclude that defendant was prejudiced and he is not
entitled to a new trial on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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