MICHAEL BADRAN V HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP III
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL BADRAN and ANTONITA
BADRAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 23, 2008
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 279026
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-534153-CH
HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP, III,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court’s May 23, 2007, order granting summary
disposition in defendant’s favor. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it granted
summary disposition in defendant’s favor, based on its erroneous conclusion that Mounir
Badran’s transfer of the questioned property via a quitclaim deed to his brother, Michael Badran,
was nullified because it did not comply with the terms of Equicredit’s mortgage. Plaintiffs
further argue that summary disposition should have been granted in their favor under either MCR
2.116(C)(9) because of defendant’s failure “to properly allege affirmative defenses,”1 or under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there is no genuine issue of material fact that under Michigan’s
race/notice statute plaintiffs have a priority interest in the questioned property because they
recorded their interest first. Defendant argues that we should affirm the trial court’s order
because the trial court did not err when it found that the deed was nullified or, in the alternative,
under a theory of equitable subrogation. We reverse the trial court’s order as the trial court erred
when it concluded that Mounir’s transfer of the questioned property to Michael was nullified,
1
In defendant’s answer to plaintiffs’ petition, defendant denied plaintiffs’ allegation that they
were not involved in Mounir’s fraudulent loan application, as well as plaintiffs’ claim that
defendant violated MCL 600.2932 when it attempted to sell the property. Defendant also
asserted the affirmative defenses of failure “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
and that plaintiffs’ claims should be barred based on their wrongful conduct. We cannot discern
a basis for concluding that the trial court erred when it denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9). See Nasser v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 435 Mich 33, 4748; 457 NW2d 637 (1990).
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and remand this matter to the trial court so that it can make a determination of whether defendant
is entitled to judgment based upon a theory of equitable subrogation.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 13, 1998, Mounir purchased the questioned property for approximately
$152,000 from Rhagida Saad. The purchase was funded in large part by a $129,000 loan that
Mounir obtained from Equicredit in exchange for a mortgage on the property. In relevant part,
the terms of Equicredit’s mortgage state that Mounir was not allowed to transfer or sell the
property without Equicredit’s prior written consent, which could be given if certain conditions
were met:
17. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. If all or
any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by the
Borrower . . . without Lender’s prior written consent . . . Lender may, at Lender’s
option, declare all the sums secured by this Security Instrument to be immediately
due and payable.
***
Lender may consent, at its sole election, to a sale or transfer if: (1) Borrower
causes to be submitted to Lender information required by Lender to evaluate the
transferee as if a new loan were being made to the transferee; (2) Lender
reasonably determines that Lender’s security will not be impaired and that the risk
of a breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument is
acceptable; (3) interest will be payable on the sums secured by this Security
Instrument at a rate acceptable to Lender; (4) changes in the terms of the Note and
this Security Instrument required by Lender are made, including, for example,
periodic adjustment in the interest rate, a different final payment date for the loan,
and addition of unpaid interest to principal; and (5) the transferee signs an
assumption agreement that is acceptable to Lender and that obligates the
transferee to keep all the promises and agreements made in the Note and in this
Security Instrument. . . . [(Emphasis added).]
On August 25, 2000, Mounir transferred the property to Michael via a quitclaim deed
because he allegedly could no longer afford to pay the Equicredit mortgage. Although the deed
does not recite any consideration for the transfer, nor has any evidence of a purchase agreement
ever been presented, Michael alleges that he orally agreed to pay $125,000 for the property.
Michael stated that he waived Mounir’s debt ($3,800 that Michael borrowed Mounir for his
down payment, as well as an undisclosed amount that Michael paid to cover the 1999 property
tax), gave Mounir $13,000 cash, allowed Mounir to continue collecting rent money that was
owed, and agreed to payoff the remainder of Equicredit’s mortgage, which Michael admitted was
less than the value of the property. Michael generally made mortgage payments directly to
Equicredit, but on occasion (when Michael was out of town) Michael would give cash payments
to Mounir and have him make the Equicredit payments. Although it is undisputed that
Equicredit never gave prior written consent for Mounir to transfer/sell the property to Michael,
Michael alleges that Mounir called Equicredit and informed them that he had transferred
ownership to Michael. Michael alleges that Equicredit had no problem with the transfer of
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ownership and never even discussed the possibility of Michael signing an assumption agreement,
but rather just allowed them to keep the mortgage in Mounir’s name.
Michael recorded the deed on June 26, 2001. On January 10, 2002, approximately six
months after Michael recorded his interest in the property, Mounir obtained a loan from
defendant for approximately $159,000, in exchange for a mortgage on the questioned property, a
property that Mounir had no legal interest in. The loan, in part, was used to payoff the entire
Equicredit mortgage.
Before obtaining the loan, Mounir, in relevant part, needed to establish that he was
employed and that he had an interest in the questioned property. In order to establish that
Mounir was employed by M & H Petroleum (MHP), Andrew Zych, who works for defendant
and assisted Mounir in obtaining the loan, had Mounir produce 2001 and 2002 W-2 forms, a
recent paycheck (allegedly signed by Sami Berri)2 and a completed employment verification
form (allegedly signed by Berri). Although Berri acknowledged that Mounir might have worked
for him on more than one occasion,3 Berri believed that Mounir only worked for him on one
occasion for approximately one month as the night shift cashier. Berri further stated that his
signature on the paycheck and employment verification was fraudulent, as he never signed either
document, and furthermore, he never issued paychecks or W-2’s, as he had Michael pay all
employees in cash. Berri further suggested that the paycheck, which came from an MHP
checkbook, was likely stolen from his office at the gas station, and that the W-2, which stated
that Mounir made $43,000 a year, was “nonsense.” In order to establish that he had an interest in
the property despite the fact that the title search revealed that Mounir deeded the property to
Michael, Mounir told Zych that Michael was his American name, and the purpose of the deed
was to transfer the property to himself in his American name. Zych stated that he believed
Mounir and was not suspicious because Michael’s driver’s license and W-2 forms verified that
he still lived at the property, there was still a mortgage on the property (which in practice would
have been discharged had the property been transferred to someone else), and furthermore, the
deed listed Michael as a single man, and did not contain an amount of consideration given. Zych
stated that he would not have issued the loan if he were aware of the fact that Mounir had no
legal interest in the property.
Michael alleges that he was unaware of the fact that Mounir was obtaining a mortgage
from defendant until “late” 2002 when he attempted to get another mortgage (refinance), which
he was going to use, in part, to payoff what he thought was the existing Equicredit mortgage.4
2
Sami Berri owned MHP from 1993 to 2002.
3
Michael, who managed MHP from 1994 to 2002, stated that Mounir worked at MHP on and off
for approximately eight months.
4
It should be noted that despite the fact that Michael alleges that he was unaware of defendant’s
mortgage until “late” 2002, the record establishes that Michael wrote checks to defendant on
February 25, 2002, May 28, 2002, and July 29, 2002. Although the checks appear to have been
signed by Michael, Michael alleges that Mounir, whose name was on Michael’s checking
account, wrote the checks to defendant. Mounir had access to Michael’s checking account until
“mid-2003” when Michael finally removed Mounir from his account for a lack of trust.
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Nonetheless, shortly after the time in which Michael alleges that he first learned of Mounir’s
mortgage from defendant, Michael contacted defendant to inquire whether defendant would
remove the mortgage. Months later, defendant had not taken any steps to remove the mortgage.
In May 2004, Mounir left Michigan after receiving a letter from defendant regarding his
default on the mortgage. Michael and his wife allege that they have not heard from Mounir since
he left, and thus, do not know his whereabouts. After Mounir disappeared, both he and Michael
stopped making payments to defendant. However, up until that time, Michael admitted that he
either made payments to defendant out of his account, or gave Mounir money and made sure that
Mounir made payments to defendant. On November 17, 2005, defendant sent Mounir a letter
(which Michael opened) indicating that he was not up to date on his payments, and that
defendant would pay him $1,000 to vacate the property and sign a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
Michael did not respond to the letter. On November 30, 2005, defendant foreclosed on the
property.
On November 29, 2005, plaintiffs filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment to quiet
title to the questioned property, arguing that since they properly recorded their interest in the
property on June 26, 2001, defendant, who negligently issued Mounir a loan in exchange for a
mortgage on a property that he no longer owned, violated MCL 600.2932 when it attempted to
sell the property without having absolute title. On April 18, 2007, defendant filed a motion for
summary disposition, arguing that summary disposition should be granted in its favor because
Michael did not have a valid interest in the property because his deed from Mounir was nullified
for failure to comply with the terms of Equicredit’s mortgage, and alternatively, even if it were
found that Michael received a valid interest, summary disposition should be granted in its favor
under a theory of equitable subrogation.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, finding that
Mounir’s transfer of the property via a quitclaim deed to Michael had no legal effect:
In August of 2002, [Mounir] gave [Michael] a quitclaim deed to the
property. However that transfer had no legal effect, because the mortgage that
was on the property at the time required prior written consent.
So the alleged transfer was a nullity because of the provisions in the
mortgage on the property with EquiCredit.
So then [Mounir] refinanced in 2002 giving [defendant] a mortgage on the
property. He then defaulted in 2004, they foreclosed and received a sheriff’s deed
at the sale.
So this Court finds that [defendant] has title to the property. And the
Court will grant [defendant’s] Motion for Summary Disposition.
The trial court entered an order to this effect on May 23, 2007, which in addition to granting
defendant’s motion for summary disposition, also denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary
disposition, and ruled that plaintiff had no interest in the property, while defendant had a full
vested fee title in the property. Plaintiffs’ June 6, 2007, motion for reconsideration was denied.
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II.
Analysis
We first address plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred when it granted summary
disposition in defendant’s favor, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), instead of in plaintiffs’ favor.5
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition,
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003), viewing the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342
(2004).
As previously discussed, the trial court granted summary disposition in defendant’s favor
based on its conclusion that Mounir’s transfer of the questioned property to Michael was
nullified because it was made without obtaining Equicredit’s prior written consent, and thus, did
not comply with the terms of Equicredit’s mortgage. As pointed out by defendant, Equicredit’s
mortgage, in relevant part, provides that if Mounir sold or transferred the questioned property
without Equicredit’s “prior written consent,” Equicredit had the option to “declare all the sums
secured by [the mortgage] to be immediately due and payable.” The mortgage also indicated that
Equicredit could only consent to the sale or transfer if the transferee signed an assumption
agreement that obligated the transferee to keep all the promises and agreements made by Mounir
in the parties’ security instrument.
“The primary goal in interpreting contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’
intent.” Old Kent Bank v Sobczak, 243 Mich App 57, 63; 620 NW2d 663 (2000). “To do so, this
Court reads the agreement as a whole and attempts to apply the plain language of the contract
itself.” Id. An unambiguous contract allows but one interpretation, and therefore, will be
enforced as written. Morley v Automobile Club of Michigan, 458 Mich 459, 465; 581 NW2d 237
(1998). Because plaintiffs never signed an assumption agreement, Equicredit could not have
properly given its written consent for the sale/transfer of the questioned property.
Where the trial court erred, however, was the failure to recognize that under the plain
language of the mortgage, Equicredit’s sole remedy for Mounir’s failure to obtain Equicredit’s
prior written consent before selling/transferring the property was to “declare all the sums secured
[by the mortgage agreement] to be immediately due and payable,” and not to nullify the deed.
Furthermore, according to the plain language of the mortgage, any remedies that were available
to Equicredit for a violation of the terms of the mortgage were only exercisable at Equicredit’s
option, an option that was undisputedly never exercised. Therefore, the contract contained the
remedies available to Equicredit for the unconsented to transfer, but those were never exercised.
For these reasons, the trial court erred when it nullified Mounir’s deed to Michael based on the
fact that Mounir violated the terms of Equicredit’s mortgage when it sold/transferred the
5
As an initial matter, we note that not only does plaintiffs’ brief fail to comply with MCR
7.212(C)(6) and (7), People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 260; 457 NW2d 136 (1990), but it
further fails to provide any legal authority in support of their position, Mitcham v Detroit, 355
Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). Despite these deficiencies, we will address the merits of
plaintiffs’ appeal.
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property. Morley, supra at 465; See also Short v Hollingsworth, 291 Mich 271, 274; 289 NW
158 (1939) (holding that if “it appears to have been the intention that the remedy specified in the
contract should be exclusive, the rights of the parties will be controlled thereby.”)
Because Mounir’s transfer to Michael cannot be nullified on the basis asserted by the trial
court, and because Michael properly recorded his interest in the property approximately six
months before Equicredit obtained a mortgage on the property, pursuant to Michigan’s racenotice statute plaintiffs would “generally” have a priority interest over defendant. MCL 565.29;
MCL 565.25(4); Richards v Tibaldi, 272 Mich App 522, 539; 726 NW2d 770 (2006).
However, defendant argues that plaintiffs’ priority interest could be negated under a
theory of equitable subrogation. Equitable subrogation is “a legal fiction through which a person
who pays a debt for which another is primarily responsible is substituted or subrogated to all the
rights and remedies of the other.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co v Used Car Factory, Inc,
461 Mich 210, 215; 600 NW2d 630 (1999), quoting Commercial Union Ins Co v Medical
Protective Co, 426 Mich 109, 117; 393 NW2d 479 (1986). The application of equitable
subrogation “is proper in all cases ... where injustice would follow its denial.” Stroh v O’Hearn,
176 Mich 164, 177; 142 NW2d 865 (1913). In accordance with the tenets of this doctrine, a
subrogee may not be “a mere volunteer who has no equities which appeal to the conscience of
the court,” for example, the subrogee cannot have voluntarily made payment, “but rather must
have done so in order to fulfill a legal or equitable duty owed to the subrogor.” Ameriquest
Mortgage Co v Alton, 273 Mich App 84, 94-96; 731 NW2d 99 (2006). Equitable subrogation is
a “flexible, elastic doctrine of equity,” which should be applied on a “case-by-case analysis
characteristic of equity jurisprudence.” Id. at 95.
Our Supreme Court has held that where a mortgagee advances money on a mortgage to
pay a prior mortgage on the same property based on the false assumption that the mortgagor has
valid title to the property, the mortgagee can be subrogated to the status of the prior mortgagee if
there are no intervening liens “entitled to superior equities.” Sproal v Larsen, 138 Mich 142,
143; 101 NW 213 (1904).6 However, if there are intervening liens, equitable subrogation
“cannot be used to avoid the dictates of [MCL 565.29]” to allow a new mortgage granted as part
of a generic refinancing transaction to take the priority of the original mortgage unless the new
mortgagee can establish that an intervening lien holder acted fraudulently. Alton, supra at 95,
99-100.
Given that the trial court never addressed this argument, we remand this matter to the trial
court so that it can address whether defendant should be equitably subrogated to Equicredit’s
status7 because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the loan that defendant issued Mounir
6
The holding in Sproal is consistent with the Restatement, which provides that one “who fully
performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the owner of .
. . the mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.” Restatement Property
(Mortgages), 3d, § 7.6.
7
If the trial court determines that equitable subrogation is applicable, defendant would likely be
placed in the exact position that Equicredit was in, a position where it is owed $129,645.13, not a
(continued…)
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and the fact that defendant paid off Michael’s debt with Equicredit when it issued Mounir’s
loan.8
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
(…continued)
position where it is owed the entire amount that it lent to Mounir ($147,998.85). Otherwise,
Michael would be in a worse position than he was before Mounir fraudulently obtained the
questioned loan from defendant. Wyman v Johnson, 68 Ark 369; 59 SW 250 (1900) (holding
that a party who is entitled to equitable subrogation, is subrogated to the status of the prior
mortgagee “to the extent” that the proceeds it lent were used to satisfy the prior mortgage); See
also, Restatement Property (Mortgages), 3d, § 7.6, comment e, illustration 28, pp 520-522
(stating that a “payor is subrogated only to the extent that the funds disbursed are actually
applied toward payment of the prior lien. There is no right of subrogation with respect to any
excess funds”).
8
Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, we conclude that defendant’s answer properly preserved its
ultimate defense of equitable subrogation as it adequately put plaintiffs on notice of such
defense, allowing plaintiffs to adequately prepare their case. See Stanke v State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins Co, 200 Mich App 307, 317-318; 503 NW2d 758 (1993).
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