IN RE CHARLES TEDMAN ALBAND III MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KRISTENA MARIE ALBAND,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283904
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000155-NA
RUTH ALBAND,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of THOMAS KELLY ALBAND,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283905
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000156-NA
RUTH ALBAND,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of CHARLES TEDMAN ALBAND
III, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283906
Macomb Circuit Court
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RUTH ALBAND,
Family Division
LC No. 2007-000154-NA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order
terminating her parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).
We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory grounds for termination
of respondent’s parental rights had been established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
3.977(J); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624,
633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999).
The issues that led to adjudication were respondent’s lack of suitable housing for the
minor children and her mental instability. Petitioner had been providing services to respondent
for six months before the children were removed from her care, and after the removal, petitioner
provided a parent-agency agreement and referrals for services for another year. Respondent did
not attend individual counseling when it was first offered to her and attended only four or five
sessions just before the termination hearing. Respondent had been prescribed Prozac for her
depression and anxiety, but she did not take it, claiming that she had no way to get it. By the
time of the termination trial, respondent had been evicted from her home, did not have stable
income, and was living with two different friends. In addition, respondent did not fully comply
with her obligation to call in to determine when she needed to provide drug screens and did not
attend all of the scheduled screens. She did complete parenting classes, but only many months
after referrals were made. Although respondent argues otherwise on appeal, the trial court did
take into account that none of the drug screens that respondent provided were positive, that she
completed a psychological and a CARE assessment (although she did not follow through with
the recommendations of the evaluators), and that she did her best to visit with the minor children
and attend some of their medical and dental appointments.
The issues that the trial court was most concerned with were respondent’s mental health
issues and her lack of a legal source of income and a stable home. A year after the minor
children were removed from respondent’s care and custody, and 18 months after respondent
began receiving services, these issues had not been resolved. We find that the trial court did not
err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights
pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist
and there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the ages of the minor children, who were 13, 11, and 7 years old. Further,
based on the facts that respondent did not have a legal source of income, a stable home for the
children, and was mentally unstable, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that the
evidence established MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j) as well.
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With regard to respondent’s argument that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner
made reasonable efforts to prevent removal and to rectify the conditions that led to removal, this
Court finds no error. Generally, petitioner must make reasonable efforts to reunite a respondent
and her children through a treatment plan and referrals. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542;
702 NW2d 192 (2005); see also MCL 712A.18f. In this case, there was overwhelming evidence
of petitioner’s efforts to provide services to respondent. Services had been offered for six
months before the filing of the original petition to remove the minor children from the home and
throughout the termination proceedings. Petitioner provided numerous referrals for services that
were either underutilized or ignored. Petitioner made it clear to respondent that there were
options if she needed assistance with anything, and on several occasions, the trial court made it
clear to respondent that it was petitioner’s obligation to provide referrals and respondent’s
obligation to follow through with the referrals and to show the court that she was in compliance
with the parent-agency agreement. Accordingly, the trial court’s determination that petitioner
engaged in reasonable efforts was not clearly erroneous.
Respondent also argues that she has a constitutional right to the care and custody of her
children. However, the law is clear that, once a ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) is proven by
clear and convincing evidence, “the parent’s interest in the companionship, care, and custody of
the child gives way to the state’s interest in the child’s protection.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Furthermore, respondent’s argument that natural parents should
have custody of their children, if possible, ignores the record in this case. Respondent was given
an opportunity to comply with a parent-agency agreement and show the trial court that a finding
under MCL 712A.19b(3) should not be made. The trial court found that respondent did not
substantially comply with the terms of the parent-agency agreement, and the record supports this
determination.
Finally, respondent’s argument that children must be placed in the most family-like
setting that will meet the needs of the children and the state is misplaced. MCR 3.965(C)(2),
rather than MCR 5.902(B) cited by respondent, addresses the court’s obligation to place the
child, when removed from the parent’s care, in the most family-like setting. In this case, the
minor children were placed with their paternal aunt and uncle, and the trial court clearly
complied with the court rule.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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