MICHAEL T DOBBYN V PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL T. DOBBYN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 278661
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 04-001016-NF
v
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Jansen and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right a judgment in favor of plaintiff following a jury trial in this
action for no-fault work-loss benefits. See MCL 500.3101 et seq. We affirm.
On September 20, 2003, plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and suffered
back injuries that required surgical repair, including the placement of a rod and screws in his
back. Defendant denied plaintiff’s claim for work-loss benefits and this action was filed.
Subsequently, defendant moved for summary dismissal and the trial court concluded that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to decide the matter. Following a four-day trial, the jury
awarded those benefits. On appeal, defendant challenges the denial of its motion for summary
dismissal of plaintiff’s work-loss claim, the jury instructions related to the claim, and some of the
evidentiary decisions made by the trial court during the trial. We conclude that none of these
issues warrant appellate relief.
First defendant argues that it was entitled to summary dismissal of plaintiff’s work-loss
claim pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) because, at the time of the accident, plaintiff was neither
working nor “temporarily unemployed” under MCL 500.3107a. After de novo review of the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to determine whether a factual dispute existed, we disagree.
See Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Defendant argued in its motion that plaintiff had been unemployed and was not actively
seeking employment at the time of the accident. Plaintiff responded to this claim arguing that,
on the date of the accident, he was temporarily unemployed but actively looking for work. In
fact, just prior to being involved in this car accident he worked at Graham Construction. He was
a laborer earning $11.00 per hour from May 12, 2003, until he was released on July 18, 2003.
According to his deposition testimony, plaintiff then applied for a job at U.P. Special Delivery
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Inc., located in Cheboygan, Michigan, as a dock worker, but he was not hired for the position.
Plaintiff’s attached affidavit also averred that during the time between his release from Graham
and his car accident, he applied for jobs at Nicastri Construction, John Bryant Painting, PMP
Personal Services, H & H Tube Manufacturing, and Northern, without success. In response to
defendant’s argument that plaintiff could not prove that he applied for these jobs, plaintiff argued
that defendant did not seek such proof until it had been over two years since he had applied for
those jobs and most potential employers do not retain such documentation.
At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff presented his tax records to illustrate that he had
worked consistently since he was 16 years old. For example in 1998 and 2000, plaintiff earned
$7,600. In 2001, he earned $26,000. In 2002, he earned $19,464. In 2003, the year of the
accident, plaintiff had already earned $12,000. Plaintiff argued that he had only been
unemployed for 44 days before this accident, following an admirable work history. Further,
plaintiff provided a note written by someone at Nicastri Construction who remembered that
plaintiff had applied for a job in the fall of 2003. The note indicated that plaintiff had not been
hired because no position was available. The trial court agreed with plaintiff, holding that
plaintiff established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was temporarily
unemployed at the time of the accident and defendant’s motion for dismissal of the work-loss
claim was denied. On appeal, defendant claims that this decision was erroneous.
In Popma v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 446 Mich 460; 521 NW2d 831 (1994), our Supreme
Court explained the work-loss provisions of the no-fault act as follows:
The provisions governing the award of work-loss benefits are contingent
on the employment status of the claimant at the time of the accident. Section
3107(1)(b) applies when a claimant is working at the time of the accident, while §
3107a applies when a claimant is temporarily unemployed. [Id. at 466.]
Specifically, MCL 500.3107(1)(b) provides that personal protection insurance benefits are
payable for “[w]ork loss consisting of loss of income from work an injured person would have
performed during the first 3 years after the date of the accident if he or she had not been injured.”
At issue here, because plaintiff was not employed at the time of the accident, is MCL 500.3107a
which provides that “work loss for an injured person who is temporarily unemployed at the time
of the accident or during the period of disability shall be based on earned income for the last
month employed full time preceding the accident.” The phrase “temporarily unemployed” has
been interpreted by our Supreme Court to refer to “the unavailability of employment, not the
physical inability to perform work.” MacDonald v State Farm Mut Ins Co, 419 Mich 146, 153;
350 NW2d 233 (1984). Also, with regard to § 3107a, the Popma Court held that “[t]he plain
language of the statute leaves no doubt that once a person establishes unemployment, it is the
characterization of that unemployment as temporary or permanent that is dispositive and not
whether the person is receiving unemployment compensation.” Id. at 470.
In this case, plaintiff presented evidence of a significant work history, including that his
most recent gainful employment was about 44 days prior to the accident. Plaintiff testified in his
deposition and averred in his affidavit that he had been actively seeking employment when the
accident occurred. The insurance claim file included a list of the companies that plaintiff had
contacted for employment. And one of those potential employers verified that plaintiff had
sought such employment, but no positions were available.
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In deciding a motion brought under subrule (C)(10), the trial court must consider the
submitted documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A trial court may not make findings of
fact or weigh credibility in deciding the motion. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 161;
516 NW2d 475 (1994). The evidence submitted in this case, considered in a light most favorable
to plaintiff, tended to establish that plaintiff was physically able to work at the time of the
accident, that he was seeking employment but was not working because there was no work
available, and that plaintiff’s unemployed status was not permanent in nature. Thus, the trial
court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary dismissal of plaintiff’s work-loss claim
on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff was
temporarily unemployed.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury as to the law
regarding the meaning of “temporarily unemployed” because it failed to give defendant’s
supplemental instruction. We disagree.
Claims of instructional error are generally reviewed de novo. Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp
Managers, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d 356 (2002). When the standard jury instructions do not
adequately cover an issue, the trial court is obligated to give additional instructions when
requested if the supplemental instructions properly inform the jury on the applicable law and are
supported by the evidence. Bouverette v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 245 Mich App 391, 401402; 628 NW2d 86 (2001). A supplemental instruction need not be given if it would neither add
to an otherwise balanced and fair jury charge nor enhance the ability of the jury to decide the
case intelligently, fairly, and impartially. Novi v Woodson, 251 Mich App 614, 630-631; 651
NW2d 448 (2002), quoting Central Cartage Co v Fewless, 232 Mich App 517, 528; 591 NW2d
422 (1998). Whether a supplemental instruction is accurate and applicable is within the court’s
discretion. Jones v Porretta, 428 Mich 132, 146; 405 NW2d 863 (1987). The trial court’s
decision regarding supplemental instructions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Chastain v
General Motors Corp (On Remand), 254 Mich App 576, 590; 657 NW2d 804 (2002). An
instructional error warrants reversal only where failure to do so would be inconsistent with
substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A); Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17
(2000).
Defendant had requested that the trial court instruct the jury as follows: “[t]he bare
assertion of an intent to secure employment without any corroboration of such intent or actions
taken to obtain employment during the period of unemployment is insufficient to render an
injured party temporarily unemployed and thus entitled to wage loss benefits under the no-fault
insurance act.” Defendant cited the case of Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 231 Mich App 172; 585
NW2d 365 (1998) in support of its request. In Frazier, the insured plaintiff was seeking workloss benefits but was last gainfully employed four years before the accident, and had last sought
employment eight months before the accident. Id. at 177. The plaintiff indicated that he had
intended to begin a new career at the time of the accident. Id. The Frazier Court held that “a
bare assertion of intent to secure employment without any corroboration of such intent or actions
taken to obtain employment during the period of unemployment is insufficient to render an
injured party ‘temporarily unemployed.’” Id. at 176.
In denying defendant’s request for the supplemental jury instruction, the trial court held
that the circumstances in the present case were unlike those presented in the Frazier case; thus,
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the supplemental instruction would be misleading and confusing to the jury. This decision does
not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Chastain, supra. Unlike the circumstances presented
in the Frazier case, here, plaintiff had only been unemployed for about 44 days before this
accident, he had a significant and consistent work history, and he submitted evidence in support
of his claim that he had been actively seeking employment at the time of his accident. The jury
instruction actually given by the trial court included that “A person is temporarily unemployed if
he was, at the time of the accident, actively seeking employment and but for the accident would
have been actively seeking employment and there is evidence that the unemployed status would
not have been permanent if the injury had not occurred.” The jury instruction given by the trial
court properly informed the jury on the applicable law and was supported by the evidence. See
Bouverette, supra. No error warranting relief occurred.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury that, if
plaintiff was terminated from employment for just cause following the accident, the termination
was a superseding event that extinguished his right to work-loss benefits. We disagree.
In MacDonald, supra, our Supreme Court held that MCL 500.3107(1)(b) relieves an
insurer from liability for work-loss benefits if a subsequent, independent event would have
prevented the insured from working even if the motor vehicle accident had not occurred. Id. at
152, 157. The MacDonald Court held:
[W]ork-loss benefits are available to compensate only for that amount that
the injured person would have received had his automobile accident not occurred.
Stated otherwise, work-loss benefits compensate the injured person for income he
would have received but for the accident. [Id. at 152.]
In MacDonald, the subsequent, independent event that severed the “but for” chain of causation
was a heart attack. Id. The Court held that after the plaintiff’s heart attack, he would not have
earned a wage even if the accident not occurred. Id. In Luberda v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co,
163 Mich App 457; 415 NW2d 245 (1987), this Court, relying on MacDonald, similarly held
that the plaintiff’s work-loss benefits could be suspended during his incarceration because his
incarceration, and not the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, is what prevented his
gainful employment. Id. at 460.
In this case, plaintiff was physically unable to work for about six months after the
accident. On or about March 10, 2004, he became employed as a machinist at Moeller
Manufacturing Company. He had worked as a machinist in the past, but the machines were
different. Plaintiff testified that he had great difficulty performing the work because of his back
pain. The job required that he stand for about ten hours a day, twist over machines, and lift
various sizes of metal parts, some weighing 40 pounds. At the end of a shift, he felt like he had
been hit by a truck. But plaintiff continued working at Moeller until he was told, on day 89, that
he did not have the background that they needed. According to plaintiff, the plant manager gave
him the option of moving to a different department, doing machine work that he had previously
performed at another Moeller plant, but plaintiff declined. Plaintiff testified that the work would
have been more difficult and he would not have been physically able to perform the job. His
employment ended that day—June 3, 2004, because of “performance issues [and] lack of work.”
The plant manager, Paul Dery, testified that plaintiff was let go because he did not have the skills
to perform the job and work was slow anyway. Because it was a UAW facility, the decision had
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to be made before plaintiff got his 90 days in at the plant. Dery denied that he offered plaintiff
the option of moving to a different department.
Defendant claimed in the trial court, as it does here, that plaintiff’s termination from
employment at Moeller constituted a supervening, independent event that severed the “but for”
chain of causation between plaintiff’s work-loss damages and the injuries he sustained in the car
accident. Defendant’s request for a jury instruction to that effect was denied by the trial court on
the ground that the termination “doesn’t amount to the kind of termination that would be an
intervening cause.” We agree with this determination. Plaintiff’s termination from employment
for “performance issues [and] lack of work” is not similar to suffering a disabling heart attack or
incarceration.
Defendant claims that the situation presented here is similar to the factual situation
presented in McGee v City of Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued July 30, 2002 (Docket Nos. 225819 and 225824). We disagree. In that case, the plaintiff
suffered injuries that prevented him from returning to his employment as a bus driver. After the
plaintiff returned to work on a different job, he tested positive for controlled substances and was
terminated. Here, the evidence tended to establish that plaintiff was terminated because he could
not perform the assigned tasks and there was no work for him to perform, not because some
other event occurred that would have prohibited him from working even if the motor vehicle
accident had not occurred. Thus, the trial court’s refusal to give the requested supplemental
instruction did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Chastain, supra.
Defendant next argues that the jury verdict awarding plaintiff work-loss benefits based on
the argument that plaintiff was temporarily unemployed was against the great weight of the
evidence. Again, and for the reasons already discussed above, we disagree. Contrary to
defendant’s arguments, the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the verdict which
necessarily included the finding that plaintiff was temporarily unemployed at the time of his
motor vehicle accident. See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998);
Campbell v Sullins, 257 Mich App 179, 193; 667 NW2d 887 (2003).
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when defendant was
prohibited from introducing evidence that plaintiff had been incarcerated for domestic violence
against his girlfriend. Defendant claims that plaintiff introduced evidence of his good character
so it should have been allowed to introduce this evidence of his “bad” character. After review of
this discretionary decision for an abuse of discretion, we disagree. See Elezovic v Ford Motor
Co, 472 Mich 408, 419; 697 NW2d 851 (2005).
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is not. MRE 402.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence
to the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401. Here,
defendant’s theme throughout this case was that plaintiff did not work because he did not want to
work. Defendant promoted the theories that plaintiff did not work because he was lazy and,
when he did work, he was a poor worker. To rebut those claims, plaintiff elicited testimony
directly related to plaintiff’s work ethics and habits, including whether plaintiff had issues with
alcohol or drugs that might lead to him not working or being a poor worker. Defendant claims
that this line of questioning “opened the door” regarding plaintiff’s domestic abuse. It did not.
As the trial court held, the line of questioning pursued by plaintiff’s counsel simply related to
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“the issue of whether he was willing to work and nothing else.” Whether plaintiff had any
involvement in a domestic violence dispute is not relevant to whether he was entitled to workloss benefits. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it prohibited the
proffered evidence.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed plaintiff
to repeatedly present hearsay evidence. After review of these discretionary decisions for an
abuse of discretion, we disagree. See Elezovic, supra.
Generally, out-of-court statements offered for their truth are considered inadmissible
hearsay. MRE 801(c); MRE 802. Here, defendant argues that various statements were admitted
into evidence that pertained to plaintiff’s employment status before and after his accident. First,
defendant claims that hearsay testimony was admitted from plaintiff’s girlfriend. Plaintiff’s
counsel asked her if she recalled what plaintiff had told her after losing his job at Graham
Construction before the accident and what plaintiff had told her after losing his job at Moeller
Manufacturing after his accident and she testified that she did not recall what he said. Thus,
contrary to defendant’s claim, no hearsay testimony was admitted.
Second, defendant argues that hearsay testimony was elicited from plaintiff’s mother
when she was asked about plaintiff’s efforts to secure employment after the accident. Plaintiff’s
mother testified that plaintiff had been looking for a job but the only jobs advertised in the
newspaper were jobs that his doctors were telling him he was physically incapable of
performing. When defendant objected, the trial court ruled that the testimony was not hearsay
because it was not offered for the truth of whether the doctors told plaintiff that he could not
perform certain jobs. The testimony was offered to explain plaintiff’s post-accident employment
situation. Further, the court also instructed the jury that they were to consider the testimony just
as something she heard from her son, and not to decide whether the statement allegedly made by
the doctors were true. No abuse of discretion occurred.
Third, defendant argues that hearsay testimony was elicited from plaintiff regarding
statements allegedly made to him by physicians. Examples of the purported inadmissible
hearsay illustrate that the testimony pertained to the physical restrictions placed on plaintiff by
various physicians with respect to his ability to be employed in positions involving manual labor.
The testimony was elicited for the purpose of explaining why plaintiff was not employed in the
same types of positions he had held in the past, including construction and machining positions.
Plaintiff had a duty to mitigate his damages. See Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity
(After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 652; 513 NW2d 799 (1994). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting this testimony.
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of errors warrants a new trial. In
light of our conclusions on the claimed errors, this issue is without merit. See Stitt v Holland
Abundant Life Fellowship (On Remand), 243 Mich App 461, 471; 624 NW2d 427 (2000).
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. MCR 7.219.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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