PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC MAURICE HAMMOND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278220
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-010856-01
ERIC MAURICE HAMMOND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.
Defendant was sentenced to six months to five years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of
a firearm conviction, and five years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals as of right. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
This case arises from an arrest that occurred on September 6, 2006, in Detroit, Michigan
Around 2:40 a.m., on that date, Detroit police sergeant Kurt Worboys was patrolling the area of
Brentwood and Charleston in an undercover vehicle. He observed two vehicles parked in the
middle of Brentwood with two individuals standing in the street talking to someone in one of the
vehicles. Sergeant Worboys testified that the first individual was a black male dressed in darkly
colored clothing, and he was leaning into the window of a vehicle. The second individual was
also a black male and was dressed in dark clothing, but he was several inches shorter than the
first and had a lighter complexion. Worboys observed that the second individual was standing
behind the first individual and holding a “blue steel” semi-automatic handgun down to his left
side. Worboys immediately radioed for additional officers and Officer Mitchell and Officer
Owen responded that they were on their way.
The two vehicles in the street started to drive away. Worboys began to follow them, but
was only a block away when he heard on his radio that the other officers were arriving on the
scene, and he headed back to assist them. As he approached the original location, he observed
the officers exit their vehicles and begin chasing two individuals. Worboys saw at least one
individual run up onto the porch at 412 Brentwood. Approximately five minutes later, Sergeant
Worboys gained entry to the residence. At trial, he identified defendant as the individual he saw
when he entered the house. He testified that defendant had attempted to barricade the door with
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a couch and people in the house were shouting. The other officers secured the individuals on the
ground floor, while Sergeant Worboys went upstairs to conduct a protective sweep of the house.
Sergeant Worboys testified that when he entered an upstairs bedroom he saw a black
male dressed in dark clothing trying to get underneath a bed. He further testified that the
individual he saw in the bedroom was not present in the courtroom on the day of trial. Sergeant
Worboys placed that individual under arrest. He then looked into the bedroom closet and saw a
loaded rifle in plain view.
Officer John Mitchell testified that when he first approached the scene in his fully marked
police vehicle, he saw an individual squatting on the sidewalk in front of 412 Brentwood. At
trial, he identified that individual as defendant. While in pursuit of defendant, Officer Mitchell
observed defendant reach into his front waistband and pull out a blue steel semiautomatic
handgun. Defendant dropped the gun to the ground near the porch steps.
Defendant disappeared into the house, and Officer Mitchell ran to the backyard to make
sure defendant would not flee from a back door. After other officers forced entry into the house,
Officer Mitchell came back around to the front porch where he recovered a loaded .40 caliber
Glock blue steel automatic handgun from where defendant had dropped it near the porch.
Sergeant John Falk questioned defendant at the station house. The parties stipulated that
defendant was sufficiently advised of his rights and his statement was voluntarily given.
Defendant indicated in his statement that he was not outside 412 Brentwood the previous night
with a gun and denied that he had run onto the porch and dropped something to the ground, and
stated instead, that he was using the bathroom when police started kicking in the front door.
Finally, when asked whether he ever handled or touched a Glock firearm, defendant responded,
“No. But I was – but I had a shotgun in the house.”
First, defendant argues that evidence of a rifle should have been suppressed as the fruit of
an unlawful search and seizure. It is undisputed that police did not have a warrant to arrest
defendant or search the house he was arrested in. Generally, a search and seizure that occurs
without a warrant is unreasonable, unless probable cause and circumstances establishing an
exception to the warrant requirement exist. People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 704; 703
NW2d 204 (2005). Probable cause exists when the totality of the circumstances would lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime was or is being committed and that the
evidence sought will be found in a particular place. People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744,
749; 630 NW2d 921 (2001).
The existence of “exigent circumstances” is a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. People v Blasius, 435 Mich 573, 582; 459 NW2d 906 (1990). If police have
probable cause to believe a crime was recently committed and that the premises contains
evidence or perpetrators of that crime, they may enter a residence without a warrant if immediate
action is necessary. In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261, 271; 505 NW2d 201 (1993).
That immediate action must be necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, protect the
police or others, or prevent the perpetrator’s escape. Id.
Based on the evidence presented in this case, it is reasonable to conclude that officers
believed they were chasing someone who had clearly been carrying a concealed weapon.
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Officers did not know how many other individuals were inside the home and whether there were
drugs or weapons inside. The totality of the circumstances presented a situation where the
officers could reasonably conclude that they were in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing felon, that there
was a risk of evidence being destroyed, or that the officers or additional persons could be in
danger. See People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 558-559; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). We conclude
that the officers were justified in deciding that there was a need for immediate action and,
therefore, the warrantless entry was not unlawful.
Police may lawfully conduct a protective search of a home after an arrest is made within
it if they “reasonably believe that the area in question harbors an individual who poses danger to
them or others.” Beuschlein, supra at 757. The sergeant testified that after defendant had been
arrested, another individual in the house mentioned that someone may be upstairs. The sergeant
went upstairs alone and witnessed a man attempting to hide. It would be reasonable for him to
quickly look into an open closet in order to ensure his safety.
This Court recognizes that the “plain view doctrine” allows an officer to seize items,
without a warrant to do so, when those items are in plain view and the officer is lawfully present
in the location where the item is seized. People v Fletcher, 260 Mich App 531, 546; 679 NW2d
127 (2004). The incriminating character of the item must be immediately apparent. Id. Here,
the sergeant was lawfully conducting a protective sweep of the second floor after defendant had
been arrested. There is no evidence showing that any of the officers conducted additional
searches beyond this protective sweep. Therefore, the rifle that was observed in plain view was
not unlawfully seized.
Next, defendant argues that the statement he made to police officers should have been
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure as well. Defendant did not move to
suppress his statement and, therefore, that claim has been forfeited and will be reviewed for plain
error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Reversal is only warranted under the plain error standard if the alleged error resulted in an
innocent defendant being convicted or it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the proceedings. Id.
Because the officers were justified in arresting defendant inside the house, we cannot
conclude that admission of the statement resulted in an innocent person being convicted.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that defendant was sufficiently apprised of his rights and the
statement at issue was made voluntarily. When considering the additional evidence against
defendant and the voluntariness of his admission, defendant has not sustained his burden of
establishing that the fairness, integrity, or the public reputation of the proceedings was affected
either.
Additionally, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel failed to move for the suppression of defendant’s statement. Defendant has
not properly presented this argument on appeal, as it was not included in the questions presented
in defendant’s brief. See People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000);
MCR 7.212(C)(5). Nevertheless, absent an evidentiary hearing on the issue of counsel’s
effectiveness, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Jordan,
275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007).
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Effective assistance of counsel is presumed and, therefore, defendant carries a high
burden of successfully proving otherwise. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683
NW2d 761 (2004). Generally, to overcome this presumption, a defendant must establish: (1)
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness pursuant to the
prevailing norms of the profession; (2) that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s
deficiency, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different; and (3) that the resulting
outcome was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740
NW2d 557 (2007). This Court has held that counsel’s failure to raise “futile” objections does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 455; 669
NW2d 818 (2003).
The exclusionary rule restricts evidence of materials and observations gathered from an
unlawful search or seizure, as well as any additional products of that search or seizure. People v
Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 634; 597 NW2d 53 (1999). If the record shows that defendant was
unlawfully detained or the house was unlawfully searched, then counsel may have been deficient
in failing to move for exclusion of defendant’s statement as the fruit of that unlawful act.
We have already concluded that the officers were justified in finding exigent
circumstances to enter the house, conducting the protective sweep, and seizing the rifle. The
facts presented, along with the additional evidence, make it difficult for defendant to establish
that the outcome of his case would have been different had counsel moved to suppress the
statement. Although the statement was significant evidence against defendant at trial, the judge
had already denied defendant’s motion to suppress the rifle, ruling that exigent circumstances
and the plan view doctrine applied. Therefore, it is highly likely that a motion to suppress his
voluntary statement would have been denied as well. The alleged deficiencies of counsel did not
prejudice defendant’s case, and defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s
assistance was effective.
Finally, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felon in
possession of a firearm and felony-firearm because the prosecution did not establish that
defendant was in “possession” of the rifle.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecutor and determines whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
The elements of a crime may be established by drawing reasonable inferences from
circumstantial evidence. People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 622; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). It is
for the trier of fact to determine what particular inferences can fairly be drawn from the evidence
presented. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Furthermore, this
Court should not interfere with the trier of fact’s determination of the weight of the evidence or
the credibility of the witnesses. People v Passage, 277 Mich App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746
(2007).
To establish the crime of felon in possession of a firearm, the prosecutor must show the
following elements: (1) defendant possessed a firearm; (2) defendant had been convicted of a
prior felony; and (3) less than five years had elapsed since defendant had been discharged from
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probation. People v Perkins, 262 Mich App 267, 270; 686 NW2d 237 (2004), aff’d 473 Mich
626 (2005); MCL 750.224f. The word “possession” includes both actual and constructive
possession, and it can be established by circumstantial evidence. People v Burgenmeyer, 461
Mich 431, 437; 606 NW2d 645 (2000). In Burgenmeyer, our Supreme Court held that “ . . . a
defendant has constructive possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it
is reasonably accessible to the defendant. Physical possession is not necessary as long as the
defendant has constructive possession.” Id. at 438.
As the husband and father of the individuals living in the house, defendant would visit
periodically to “check on his wife and son.” Defendant testified that he was trying to reconcile
with his wife, and on the night in question, he was at her house at 2:00 a.m. Although defendant
claims he did not live at the house, it is undisputed that he was there in the middle of the night.
In addition, he referred to that house as his residence several times while talking to officers.
Defendant also testified that he was in an upstairs bathroom when he heard banging on the front
door. It is presumable that defendant was free to move about the house as he chose, and that he
had the ability to put his belongings upstairs.
Aside from the evidence of defendant’s presumable control and access in the house,
defendant voluntarily told police that he kept a shotgun there. Defendant used the word
“shotgun” in his statement, while police referred to the weapon recovered from the upstairs
closet as a “rifle” or “long gun.” Both parties agree that because defendant admitted to owning a
weapon that was on the premises, but denied being the person seen outside in the street, the jury
acquitted defendant of possessing the Glock handgun found outside, but convicted him of
possessing the rifle found inside. The only evidence defendant produced to refute his statement
was his own testimony that he did not say this. Defendant now argues on appeal that because of
his military experience, he would not call a rifle a “shotgun,” thus implying that he was referring
to some weapon other than the rifle he claims belonged to his wife. If defendant’s wife owned
the rifle, it is reasonable to assume that he would know about it and would have told police about
it when he was questioned. Instead, he provided nothing to this effect in his statement and
actually admitted that he had a “shotgun” in the house.
The prosecutor does not bear the burden of negating every reasonable theory of
innocence. People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). Therefore, the
prosecutor need not rebut defendant’s theories that he was referring to a “shotgun” in his
statement and not a “rifle,” or that someone else may have been the owner of the rifle that was
found. The jury, as the fact finder, was free to determine the credibility of the testimony. This
Court should not interfere with the jury’s determination that defendant admitted to owning a
shotgun. Based on that determination, the jury applied the judge’s instructions regarding
constructive possession.
The elements of felony-firearm are: (1) defendant possessed a firearm, (2) during the
commission or attempted commission of a felony. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 554; 675
NW2d 863 (2003); MCL 750.227b. We have already concluded that it was reasonable for the
jury to infer that defendant had access to, and control over, various areas of the home. In
addition, defendant voluntarily gave a signed statement, admitting that he kept a shotgun in that
home. Therefore, defendant had constructive possession of the rifle.
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It was not irrational for the jury to find defendant knew of the location of the rifle, and
the rifle was reasonably accessible by him. When viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, it is reasonable to infer that defendant knowingly possessed the rifle
that was found in the closet, without being lawfully entitled to do so, and the elements of both
crimes he was convicted of were met.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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