PEOPLE OF MI V MARQUIS LEE THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277256
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-006000-FC
MARQUIS LEE THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions by a jury of assault with intent to
commit murder, MCL 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by preventing him from presenting extrinsic
evidence to prove that the victim is a drug dealer, which in turn deprived him of his
constitutional right to present a defense. Defendant preserved this alleged constitutional error;
therefore, we review this issue de novo. People v Kurr, 253 Mich App 317, 327; 654 NW2d 651
(2002).
A criminal defendant has a federal and state constitutional right to present a defense. US
Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 13. However, the constitutional right to present evidence in
his defense is not absolute. United States v Scheffer, 523 US 303, 308; 118 S Ct 1261; 140 L Ed
2d 413 (1998); Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683, 690; 106 S Ct 2142; 90 L Ed 2d 636 (1986). “It
is well settled that the right to assert a defense may permissibly be limited by ‘established rules
of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of
guilt and innocence.’” People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 294; 613 NW2d 694 (2000), quoting
Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973).
It is within the trial court’s discretion to decide whether to admit evidence. People v
Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). “MRE 608(b) generally prohibits impeachment
of a witness by extrinsic evidence regarding collateral, irrelevant, or immaterial matters . . . .”
People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 644; 658 NW2d 504 (2003). Extrinsic evidence is
“[e]vidence that is calculated to impeach a witness’s credibility, adduced by means other than
cross-examination of the witness.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed). Unless the impeachment
involves a matter closely bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence, counsel is required to
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accept an answer given by a witness on cross-examination regarding a collateral matter. People
v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 590; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
Here, defendant sought to introduce witness testimony that the victim is a drug dealer.
Although defendant argues that the extrinsic evidence was necessary to his defense, to show that
other people may have been motivated to shoot the victim, the proposed evidence would not
show bias so much as reveal irrelevant bad acts by the victim, which is inadmissible character
evidence. MRE 404(b). It does not logically follow that a drug dealer may be shot simply
because of his status as a drug dealer, although that certainly could be a hazard of the activity.
Defendant did not identify another person or persons who had a conflict with the victim because
of the victim’s alleged status as a drug dealer, and thus the fact that the victim may have been
susceptible to being shot because he is a drug dealer is speculative and irrelevant, and did not
closely bear on defendant’s guilt or innocence. See LeBlanc, supra at 590; MRE 401. The trial
court properly excluded extrinsic evidence regarding defendant’s alleged drug-dealing activities.
Defendant also argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses against him when the trial court limited defendant’s cross-examination of the victim,
specifically not allowing defense counsel to inquire whether defendant lost $3,000 of cocaine
belonging to the victim. A defendant has a federal and state constitutional right to confront
witnesses against him. US Const, Am XI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. The Confrontation Clause,
however, only guarantees the defendant a reasonable opportunity to test the truth of a witness’
testimony. People v Slovinski, 166 Mich App 158, 169-170; 420 NW2d 145 (1987). “A primary
interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination.” People v
Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). The Confrontation Clause
“guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v
Fensterer, 474 US 15, 20; 106 S Ct 292; 88 L Ed 2d 15 (1985) (emphasis in original).
No violation of the Confrontation Clause occurred in this case. Defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine the victim, and was able to ask the victim whether defendant lost
his property, without bringing in irrelevant bad character evidence about $3,000 worth of cocaine
belonging to the victim. Defendant claims that the questions he wanted to ask were designed to
reveal the victim’s motive, bias, or prejudice. We conclude that it was not necessary to specify
the illegal nature of the property in order to ferret out the victim’s motive, bias, or prejudice. See
Boggs v Collins, 226 F3d 728, 740-741 (CA 6, 2000) (holding that the trial court properly
precluded cross-examination of a rape victim about an alleged prior false rape accusation
because it would not reveal the motive, bias, or prejudice of the accuser); cf. Delaware v
VanArsdall, 475 US 673, 679; 106 S Ct 1431; 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986) (holding that the trial court
impermissibly restricted defendant’s cross-examination of a witness when it prohibited all
inquiry into the witness’s potential bias). The trial court allowed defendant to inquire into
matters that could have revealed the victim’s bias against defendant. We find that the
Confrontation Clause was not violated by the restriction placed on questioning.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel when defense counsel opened the door to damaging hearsay evidence. Defendant did
not preserve his ineffective assistance claim by raising his claim in a motion for a new trial or an
evidentiary hearing. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 456; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
Consequently, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Sabin
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(On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). To establish a claim
of ineffective assistance, defendant must show that his attorney’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; that but for trial
counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the results of defendant’s trial or
sentencing would have been different; and that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair or
unreliable. Toma, supra at 302-303; People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294
(2001).
When cross-examining the detective who interviewed defendant, defense counsel asked,
“Everybody else who may have claimed that Marquis shot Jermelle only knows that because
Jermelle told them or someone who [sic] Jermelle told told them, correct?” The detective
answered, “That’s not correct, sir.” The attorneys then approached the bench for a short
conference off the record, and the trial court subsequently directed the detective to answer the
question. The detective stated that, when defendant discussed the shooting with a family
member, he told the family member that he did not know why he shot the victim. The trial court
later explained on the record that he allowed the detective to answer the question because
defense counsel “opened the door.” Defendant contends that defense counsel erred by causing
this otherwise inadmissible hearsay to be admitted.
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c). Hearsay
is generally not admissible as substantive evidence unless it is offered under one of the
exceptions to the hearsay rule contained in the Rules of Evidence. MRE 802. Here, defense
counsel elicited testimony from a detective that defendant’s aunt reported that defendant told her
that he did not know why he shot the victim. On the record before us, it is clear that this
statement was not admitted to prove that defendant had, in fact, shot the victim. Rather, the
aunt’s out-of-court statement was offered to show that at least one person knew that defendant
shot the victim because defendant admitted it, as opposed to hearing it from the victim. Because
the statement was not offered for its truth, i.e. that defendant shot the victim, the statement did
not constitute hearsay. Defendant’s claim to the contrary is meritless.
Further, even assuming that defense counsel made a tactical error by eliciting the
statement, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Defendant has failed to
show that, but for trial counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the results of
defendant’s trial or sentencing would have been different, and that the proceedings were
fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Toma, supra at 302-303; Rodgers, supra at 714. The
evidence presented overwhelmingly supported the jury’s verdict of guilt. The victim testified
that defendant shot him, numerous witnesses testified that the victim told them that defendant
shot him, and fingerprint evidence placed defendant in the car involved in the shooting. In light
of this evidence, we cannot conclude that but for the admission of the aunt’s statement, the
outcome of defendant’s trial would have differed. Moreover, defendant has failed to show, or
even argue, that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable.
Defendant finally argues that the prosecutor’s misconduct deprived him of a fair trial.
During his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated that even without the victim’s
testimony, there was enough circumstantial evidence to convict defendant. Defendant contends
that this argument misled the jury about the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to convict
defendant. This Court reviews de novo claims of preserved prosecutorial misconduct to
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determine whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Cox, 268 Mich
App 440, 450-451; 709 NW2d 152 (2005). Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a
case-by-case basis, and the reviewing court must examine the record and evaluate a prosecutor's
remarks in context. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). As a
general rule, “[p]rosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct.”
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). A prosecutor is entitled to argue the evidence and reasonable inferences arising
from the evidence. People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 178-179; 740 NW2d 534 (2007).
The prosecutor argued the strength of the circumstantial evidence presented, which in this
case was substantial. The argument was entirely proper because it was based on the evidence.
Id. We find that the jury was in no way misled about the evidence sufficient to convict
defendant. Also, any error in this regard was cured by the trial court’s instructions to the jury
that statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence, and that it was the prosecutor’s
burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See, generally, People v Callon,
256 Mich App 312, 329-330; 662 NW2d 501 (2003).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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