PEOPLE OF MI V EARNEST LAMONT WARREN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 18, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276816
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 06-053122-FC
EARNEST LAMONT WARREN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions following a bench trial of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC 1), MCL 750.520b(1)(c), and assault with assault with intent to do
great bodily harm, MCL 750.84. Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth
offense, MCL 769.12, to 30 to 75 years’ imprisonment for his CSC 1 conviction and to 20 to 75
years’ imprisonment for his assault conviction. We affirm.
On March 31, 2006, the victim, Desiree Rose, received her monthly social security check,
and she obtained a fifth of rum, $35 worth of marijuana, and $100 worth of crack cocaine for a
weekend of partying. The victim and a friend smoked all of the crack cocaine at a crack house in
Muskegon, Michigan. The victim then walked to her sister’s nearby residence, where she
smoked some marijuana and shared her rum with her sister. Next, the victim went a short
distance to another friend’s residence, where she was introduced to defendant. At some point in
the late evening, the owner of that residence asked the victim and defendant to leave. The victim
now needed somewhere to spend the night, and defendant invited her to a nearby abandoned
house, where they could continue to party into the early morning hours. At trial, defendant
testified that they made a sex-for-drugs agreement.
At the abandoned house, defendant led the victim to a second-floor bedroom without
furniture, but with some bedding strewn across the floor. They shared a small quantity of crack
cocaine and marijuana. Defendant then departed to obtain more intoxicants, while the victim fell
asleep. Defendant returned with alcohol, which they both consumed. Defendant departed again,
and he next returned with a quantity of crack cocaine. However, at this point, the victim
indicated that she no longer wanted to have sexual relations with defendant, but she still wanted
the crack cocaine. The victim, nevertheless, completely undressed in front of defendant,
although she covered herself with a sheet. The relationship deteriorated after the victim smoked
some of the crack cocaine without defendant’s permission. A melee ensued in the bedroom,
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where defendant beat the victim severely, hitting her six or seven times in her face. The victim
fought back, trying to push defendant out of a window, but she was ultimately rendered
unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she was lying on her back, and defendant had
his shirt off, his pants down, and his legs straddling one of her legs. While defendant’s exposed
penis was not inside of her body, the victim believed that a sexual penetration occurred because
of the sensation she felt inside her vagina.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial for his CSC 1
conviction, arguing that the prosecution did not prove the element of “penetration” beyond a
reasonable doubt. We disagree.
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction,
this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). The
prosecution may offer circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences as proof of the elements
of a crime. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
To convict a defendant under MCL 750.520b(1)(c), “the prosecution must prove two
elements: (1) a sexual penetration (2) that occurs during the commission of another felony.”
People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 728, 737; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). MCL 750.520a(r) defines
“sexual penetration” as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.”
In the instant case, the victim was rendered unconscious as she attempted to defend
herself from defendant’s blows during their altercation. When she regained consciousness,
defendant’s penis was not inside of her body, but on her leg. However, the victim believed that
defendant sexually penetrated her, because she felt a sensation in her vagina and it felt as if she
had had sexual intercourse. After the attack, the victim was treated at the emergency room at
Hackley Hospital in Muskegon. Her pelvic examination revealed three areas of bruising to her
posterior fourchette. The emergency room physician testified that this type of bruising does not
occur in typical sexual intercourse and that such bruising was indicia of sexual assault. While a
forensic scientist later failed to find any of defendant’s pubic hair, semen, or other DNA in the
samples contained in the victim’s CSC kit, a sheet collected at the crime scene contained blood
matching the victim’s DNA and semen matching defendant’s DNA.
To the extent that the trial court found it necessary to infer sexual penetration, as we
noted earlier, “[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence
can constitute sufficient proof of the elements of the crime.” People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545,
554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003). Significantly, “[i]t is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to
determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to
be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
On the record before us, a reasonable inference could be drawn that a sexual penetration
occurred based on the testimony of the victim, the emergency room physician, and the forensic
scientist. See People v Legg, 197 Mich App 131, 132; 494 NW2d 797 (1992) (a trier of fact may
make reasonable inferences from the facts, if supported by direct or circumstantial evidence).
While defendant ultimately argues on appeal that the trial court should have afforded more
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weight to his trial testimony, this argument entirely lacks merit. In a bench trial, “[s]pecial
regard will be given to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses and
its decision will be affirmed where there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s findings.”
People v Cyr, 113 Mich App 213, 222; 317 NW2d 857 (1982). The trial court specifically found
that defendant lacked credibility.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to enable the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant sexually
penetrated the victim. Jaffray, supra at 296; Wilkens, supra at 737.
Next, defendant asserts that the trial court used a legally incorrect definition of “great
bodily harm” when deciding the case, enabling the prosecution to use a lower standard to prove
assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Defendant argues not only that the trial court applied
an incorrect definition of great bodily harm, but also that, if the correct definition had been used,
the prosecution failed to satisfy that element to sustain defendant’s conviction of assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. We disagree.
Initially, we note that, in arguing that the trial court used an incorrect standard, defendant
relies on the former version of CJI2d 17.7(4), which provided that “[g]reat bodily harm means a
physical injury that could seriously and permanently harm the health or function of the body.”
CJI2d 17.7(4) no longer reflects the standard argued by defendant; it was changed, after the date
of defendant’s trial, to eliminate the word “permanently.” Moreover, “[t]he Criminal Jury
Instructions are not officially sanctioned by the Supreme Court.” People v Stephan, 241 Mich
App 482, 495; 616 NW2d 188 (2000). “Where a Criminal Jury Instruction does not accurately
state the law, it will be disavowed by the courts.” Id. Thus, we do not look to the cited standard
instruction to decide the issue in this case.
The offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is a specific
intent crime, consisting of the following elements: (1) an attempt or threat with force or violence
to do corporal harm to another, i.e., an assault, and (2) an intent to do great bodily harm. People
v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 147; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). “This Court has defined the intent to
do great bodily harm as ‘an intent to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.’” Id., quoting
People v Mitchell, 149 Mich App 36, 39; 385 NW2d 717 (1986).
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that defendant committed the offense of
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, inferring defendant’s intent from the
nature of the victim’s injuries. At trial, the victim testified that defendant hit her in the face six
or seven times. Defendant also admitted to hitting the victim a number of times at trial and in a
jailhouse audiorecording. In that audiorecording, he also admitted that she was severely injured,
believing that her jaw had to be “rewired.” A responding police officer found the victim lying on
a couch with blood all over her face, hands, and clothing. The medical witnesses testified that
the victim sustained the following injuries: her left eye was completely swollen shut, and she
had moderate swelling of her right eye, two lacerations on her forehead, bruises on her face and
arms, pain and tenderness in her upper chest, and multiple bruises on both knees. The victim
was beaten so severely that she sustained bilateral orbital floor fractures in both eyes.
On the record, there is no indication that the trial court did not follow the correct
statement of the law concerning the offense of assault with intent to do great bodily harm. Also,
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we presume that the trial court, sitting as trier of fact in this bench trial, knew the law and
considered only the evidence properly before it. Dep’t of Human Services v Nierescher, 277
Mich App 71, 84; 744 NW2d 1 (2007). Further, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of
fact with respect to this element were not clearly erroneous. The aforementioned testimony and
evidence were sufficient to give rise to an inference of the necessary intent; indeed, “[a]n intent
to harm the victim can be inferred from [a] defendant’s conduct.” People v Parcha, 227 Mich
App 236, 239; 575 NW2d 316 (1997). The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant intended to do great bodily harm, where defendant repeatedly hit the victim in her
face, causing swelling and bilateral orbital floor fractures in both eyes, as well as other injuries; it
is a reasonable inference that defendant intended to do serious injury of an aggravated nature.
Brown, supra at 147.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting irrelevant,
improper, and unduly prejudicial rebuttal evidence. “Admission of rebuttal evidence is within
the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of
discretion.” People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 398; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). Because defendant
did not object at trial to the testimony, this Court’s review is limited to whether the alleged,
unpreserved error affected his substantial rights. People v Rice, 235 Mich App 429, 442; 597
NW2d 843 (1999).
Generally, rebuttal evidence is properly admitted to explain, contradict, or otherwise
refute an opponent’s evidence. Figgures, supra at 399. A party may not introduce evidence
during rebuttal unless it properly responds to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the
opponent. Id. Rebuttal testimony on collateral issues is generally improper. People v
Richardson, 139 Mich App 622, 628; 362 NW2d 853 (1984). However, “a party may introduce
rebuttal evidence to contradict the answers elicited from a witness on cross-examination
regarding matters germane to the issue if the rebuttal evidence is narrowly focused on refuting
the witness’ statements.” People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 644-645; 658 NW2d 504 (2003);
see also People v Vasher, 449 Mich 494; 537 NW2d 168 (1995).
In the instant case, defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted rebuttal
testimony from a police detective, which amounted to an attack on defendant’s credibility. The
rebuttal evidence, however, followed defendant’s case-in-chief, during which defendant testified.
Throughout the cross-examination of defendant, the prosecution attacked defendant’s credibility,
focusing on defendant’s statements to the police during an interview following the incident. At
trial, defendant testified during cross-examination that he initially denied to the police that he
knew anything about the incident in question. Defendant then testified that he later changed his
story while talking to the police, and admitted that he was present at the residence of the victim’s
friend and that he left that residence with the victim. Defendant then told the police that another
African-American male joined them as they left that residence, and the victim and that male went
on their way without defendant. Defendant finally testified that he eventually told the police
everything, including that he and the victim went to the abandoned house.
The prosecution subsequently recalled a police detective, who interviewed defendant, as
a rebuttal witness. Importantly, the detective contradicted defendant’s trial testimony that he
ultimately told the police that he took the victim to the abandoned house.
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A witness’s credibility is always significant. People v Layher, 238 Mich App 573, 580;
607 NW2d 91 (1999). Again, the prosecution “may introduce rebuttal evidence to contradict the
answers elicited from a witness on cross-examination regarding matters germane to the issue if
the rebuttal evidence is narrowly focused on refuting the witness’ statements.” Spanke, supra at
644-645. In the instant case, that is exactly what the prosecution did by recalling the detective as
a rebuttal witness, and that rebuttal testimony was limited to defendant’s statement and to
specifically refuting defendant's testimony that he told the police everything, i.e., that he went to
the abandoned house with the victim and that she was injured from running into the walls. The
issue was germane to the question of guilt or innocence because it related to defendant’s being
forthcoming or not forthcoming about having taken the victim to the abandoned house. See
People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 274-275; 591 NW2d 267 (1998) (discussing Vasher, supra).
We, therefore, cannot conclude that the admission of the testimony constituted plain error.
Defendant next argues that the sentencing court erroneously scored offense variable (OV)
7 at 50 points, and OV 11 at 25 points. Significantly, a trial court’s scoring decision will be
upheld if there is any evidence in the record to support it. People v Kegler, 268 Mich App 187,
190; 706 NW2d 744 (2005).
First, defendant challenges the trial court’s OV 7 scoring of 50 points, reflecting that “[a]
victim was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed to
substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense.” MCL
777.37(1)(a). At trial, the victim testified that defendant hit her in the face six or seven times.
At trial, and in a jailhouse audiorecording played at trial, defendant admitted to hitting the victim
a number of times, and he also admitted that the victim was severely injured, believing that her
jaw had to be “rewired.” In the jailhouse recording, defendant also expressed a lamentation that
he should not have beat the victim to “that” extent and that he had never done anything like that
in the past. The record revealed how the police found the victim, and the extent of her injuries.
As noted previously, the victim was beaten so severely that she sustained bilateral orbital floor
fractures in both eyes. Also, the emergency room physician testified that “[i]t takes a lot of
trauma” to cause such bilateral orbital floor fractures.
“Brutality” is not defined in the statute, but Random House Webster’s College Dictionary
(1997) defines it as “the quality of being brutal,” and it defines “brutal” as “savage; cruel;
inhuman” or “harsh; severe.” Defendant’s severe beating of the victim, which caused bilateral
orbital floor fractures in both of her eyes, falls within any reasonable understanding of
excessively brutal conduct. Thus, the record supports a score of 50 points for OV 7, Kegler,
supra at 190.
Next, defendant challenges the trial court’s OV 11 scoring of 25 points, reflecting that
“[o]ne criminal sexual penetration occurred.” MCL 777.41(1)(b). Under MCL 777.41(2)(c),
“[p]oints should not be scored, however, for the one penetration underlying a CSC 1 conviction.”
People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 61; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). Sexual penetration is defined
as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however
slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another
person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 750.520a(r). Additionally, MCL
777.41(2)(a) requires the non-offense penetration to arise out of the sentencing offense. “Arise
out of” has been described as “at the same place, under the same set of circumstances, and during
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the same course of conduct . . . .” People v Mutchie, 251 Mich App 273, 277; 650 NW2d 733
(2002).
As noted earlier, there was sufficient evidence that at least one penile/vaginal penetration
occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we further find that the whole record supports at
least one additional penetration that could be scored under MCL 777.41.
The emergency room physician testified that there was significant trauma to the victim’s
vaginal area, and he found that there were three distinct areas of bruising. The victim also
testified that her “butt” or “bottom” was injured during the incident, but it was unclear whether
that injury was a result of the physical altercation or the sexual assault. However, the PSIR
provides more context and some record support that another penetration occurred:
[The victim] stated the suspect fondled her and forced her to have
intercourse with him while she was standing. Her comments to the nurse were
that most of it happened while she was standing. The nurse asked the victim if
she thought the suspect had done anything to her anally. She advised she thought
he did.
On this record, we conclude that there is a reasonable inference that more than one sexual
penetration occurred. The emergency room physician testified that there was significant trauma
to the genital area. Additionally, the victim testified that her “butt” or “bottom” was injured
during the incident, and, according to the PSIR, the victim told a nurse that she believed that an
anal penetration occurred. While the emergency room physician agreed that her rectal area
appeared normal, the sexual penetration need be only “however slight.” MCL 750.520a(r).
There is evidence in the record to support the OV 11 score. Kegler, supra at 190. Again, a trial
court’s scoring decision will be upheld if there is any evidence in the record to support it.
Kegler, supra at 190.
Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that he must be resentenced for his assault
conviction because no sentencing guidelines were prepared for that conviction and because his
sentence for that conviction therefore amounts to an unlawful departure. Defendant was
convicted of multiple offenses; thus, the trial court was required to score each offense, “subject
to [MCL 771.14] . . . .” MCL 777.21(2). Because defendant received concurrent sentences, the
trial court was not required to provide a recommended minimum sentence range for each
conviction for which a consecutive sentence (not applicable here) was authorized, MCL
771.14(2)(e)(i), but instead was only required to prepare the recommended minimum sentence
range for the crime having the highest crime class. MCL 771.14(2)(e)(ii). CSC 1 is a class A
felony, MCL 777.16y, while assault with intent to do great bodily harm is a class D felony, MCL
777.16d. Thus, for sentencing on defendant’s multiple convictions with concurrent sentences,
the guidelines were properly prepared. People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 128; 695 NW2d 342
(2005).
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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