IN RE AARON HUGH SOUTHARD MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ISAC SOUTHARD, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283599
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-052115-NA
RONALD DALE SOUTHARD, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BONNIE J. SOUTHARD,
Respondent.
In the Matter of AARON HUGH SOUTHARD,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283600
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-054798-NA
RONALD DALE SOUTHARD, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BONNIE J. SOUTHARD,
Respondent.
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In the Matter of ALEXANDER AMSHEY, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283601
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-052114-NA
RONALD DALE SOUTHARD, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BONNIE J. SOUTHARD,
Respondent.
In the Matter of ISAC SOUTHARD, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283602
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-052115-NA
BONNIE J. SOUTHARD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
RONALD DALE SOUTHARD, JR.,
Respondent.
In the Matter of AARON HUGH SOUTHARD,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
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Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283603
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-054798-NA
BONNIE J. SOUTHARD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROBERT DALE SOUTHARD, JR.,
Respondent.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the trial court’s order
terminating their parental rights to Isac and Aaron Southard and respondent father’s parental
rights to Alexander Amshey under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination of
respondents’ parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J);
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The conditions leading to the
children’s wardship were three bruises and a bite mark to Alexander on separate occasions,
respondents’ questionable ability to provide adequately for Alexander’s development and wellbeing as indicated by respondents’ and Alexander’s psychological evaluations, and the
consequent concern for the well-being of the other children. More than 182 days elapsed
between the August 10, 2006, and December 11, 2006, initial dispositions and the conclusion of
the termination hearing on December 5, 2007. See MCL 712A.19b(3)(c).
It was undisputed that six-year-old Alexander had special needs, and the evidence
showed he had unusually serious behavioral issues and was a difficult child to parent. Two-yearold Isac exhibited similar behavioral issues as well as severe sensory deprivation and speech
impairment. Aaron, removed from respondents at birth, was developmentally on target and too
young to undergo a behavioral assessment. Respondents did not abuse substances, had no
significant housing or employment issues, and had minor financial issues. Respondents’
personal relationship, whether or not considered as evidencing “domestic violence” by the
various parties’ definitions, was of concern as indicative of an ineffective manner of relating to
and treating the children and others.
The crux of this proceeding was the allegation that respondents could not adequately
provide for the children’s development and well-being, which goes to the very heart of what
constitutes providing proper care and custody of a child. Alexander’s unexplained physical
injuries and respondents’ failure to address his behavioral issues adequately during the three
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years he was in their custody clearly provided a preponderance of evidence warranting the trial
court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the children. MCL 712A.2(b)(1); MCR 3.972(C).
Likewise, clear and convincing evidence was presented warranting termination of
respondents’ parental rights. The evidence presented to the trial court was voluminous, and
because child protective proceedings are considered one continuous proceeding, included
evidence from the 2002 child protective proceeding during which the trial court terminated the
parental rights of Alexander’s biological mother. In addition, the trial court received evidence of
referrals and provisions of services during the three years respondents had custody of Alexander,
as well as the evidence produced from May 2006 to December 2007, during the instant
proceeding.
During the 2002 proceeding, respondent father’s September 2002 psychological
evaluation, conducted three months after Alexander was placed in respondents’ home, revealed
that he felt he was a competent parent who, when asked in what areas he might improve, stated
he did not need improvement in any area, and whose parenting philosophy was to let children do
what they wanted as long as they were good. At that time, petitioner assessed respondent
father’s parenting ability very highly, but one year after assuming Alexander’s custody,
respondents became the subject of referrals alleging their inappropriate and ineffective discipline
of Alexander. Psychological evaluations in February 2006, three months before the children’s
removal from respondents’ home, showed respondents did not recognize the seriousness of
Alexander’s behavioral issues and took no responsibility for contributing to them. Respondents
were defensive, unwilling to admit personal weakness, and showed a marked lack of insight in
believing that the children’s behaviors and poor hygiene were normal and not of concern.
The evidence showed that respondents’ attitudes did not significantly change after
removal and during the 16 months following initial disposition, despite their having completed
two general sets of parenting classes, a one-to-one Partners in Parenting program, the CHADD
program,1 domestic violence counseling through the YWCA, 20 sessions with a couples
counselor, and additional sessions with individual counselors. While they identified the cause of
the children’s wardship as their inability to parent Alexander properly, respondents consistently
denied and minimized the fact that their parenting deficits and home environment may have
contributed to Alexander’s and Isac’s special needs. Instead, they blamed Alexander and his
biological mother for his behavioral issues and did not feel Isac’s issues were of particular
concern. Testimony after 14 of 20 sessions with couples counselor Mark Olthoff showed that
respondents had made some progress in acknowledging and addressing mutual verbal abuse in
their home, but Olthoff rated their chance of reunification with the children as approximately 58
percent. After respondent mother had completed several months of counseling at the YWCA
and respondent father had completed a 26-session domestic violence program, respondents’
respective counselors noted that they had made some progress but had not yet internalized the
information. Respondent mother denied any problem in respondents’ relationship or home,
despite respondent father’s frequent displays of anger and use of intimidation toward her, the
1
This is evidently a program geared toward adults or children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder.
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children, and others. Testimony showed respondent mother had internalized the concepts
discussed in CHADD, but despite all parenting classes, respondents threatened time-outs, but did
not follow through, during visits with the children. In addition, the evidence showed that
respondents did not fully cooperate with the caseworker in providing evidence of respondent
father’s medications and income and expense information.
The trial court recognized the true issue as not whether respondents could recite
improvement in their relationship and parenting skills, but whether they had internalized the
information, were willing to correct deficits, and demonstrated new skills at visits with the
children. Given respondents’ continued blame of Alexander and his biological mother for his
issues, and respondents’ long-standing denial and minimization of their parenting deficits and the
severity of the children’s issues, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondents had
not rectified the condition of inability to provide proper care for the children and were not
reasonably likely to do so within a reasonable time. In the absence of substantial change, it
correctly found a likelihood of harm to the children if returned to respondents’ care.
Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
clearly contrary to the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
The evidence showed that Alexander and Isac were bonded to respondents, while Aaron
had been removed at birth and was likely not bonded to them. It was uncontroverted that
Alexander had very special needs and required extreme patience and superior parenting, and
Isac, whose only parenting had been by respondents before removal, suffered similar behavioral
issues, severe sensory deprivation, and other delays. The evidence showed that after removal
from respondents’ care, Alexander’s behaviors were addressed, he was taught proper hygiene
and learned skills making him socially acceptable to his peers, and no longer suffered continual
unexplained injuries. Isac received from his foster parent badly needed services to address his
sensory deprivation, behavioral issues, and speech impairment. In contrast, respondents
continued to blame Alexander for his own behavior and their involvement with protective
services and did not acknowledge the severity of Isac’s issues.
Given the evidence that respondents were not willing to admit, adequately, the parenting
deficits or problems in their home, or acknowledge that those factors had contributed to the
children’s wardship, they were not likely to change the conditions in their home and parenting
significantly, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding termination of respondents’ parental
rights in the children’s best interests.
Lastly, the trial court did not err in finding that petitioner made reasonable efforts to
reunify the family. Whether reasonable efforts were made is a question of fact this Court
reviews under the clearly erroneous standard. See MCR 3.977(J) and Miller, supra at 337.
Respondents were consistently serviced by caseworker Jennifer Crowell. The evidence showed
that she met with respondents approximately every two weeks but that respondents were often
defensive, failed to provide information regarding respondent father’s medications or their
income and expenses consistently, occasionally stormed out of meetings with her, and felt some
services she recommended were ridiculous and unnecessary. Now, on appeal, respondent father
argues that not enough services were offered, specifically, family therapy and longer visits in a
more natural environment.
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Respondents desired family therapy and extended visits to demonstrate improvement in
their parenting skills. However, respondents attended weekly visits with the children during
which they had an opportunity to demonstrate concepts learned, and Jennifer Crowell did not
feel family therapy sessions or other visits were needed for this purpose. The evidence showed
that respondents failed to follow through on implementing time-outs for the children during
supervised visits. Respondents’ counselor, Mark Olthoff, recommended family therapy, but
admitted he did not have all facts concerning why the children entered care. Alexander’s
therapist, Don Lappinga, was opposed to family therapy and felt it would be contrary to
Alexander’s well-being because Alexander spoke fearfully of respondent father’s prior physical
abuse. Thus, the trial court was presented with valid evidence regarding why family therapy was
not instituted.
While extended visits are implemented in some cases to clarifiy whether a respondent’s
interpersonal relationships and parenting skills have improved, by the one-year permanency
planning hearing respondents had not made progress sufficient to warrant them, and termination
of parental rights had become the agency goal. Respondents had failed to demonstrate improved
parenting skills during the visits allotted, and there is no evidence that allowing longer visits or
visits in a more natural setting would have altered their abilities.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
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