CHRISTOPHER J ZIRKLE V JACKIE M FRANKLIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTOPHER J. ZIRKLE,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 282826
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-701692-DC
v
JACKIE M. FRANKLIN, n/k/a JACKIE M.
VOIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Markey and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the order of the trial court denying her motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the Texas court in which she had filed a complaint for child custody had “home state
jurisdiction” under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),
codified in Michigan as MCL 722.1101 et seq. Alternatively, she argues that this Court should
vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the trial court to provide defendant a record of its
communication with the Texas court, offer the parties an opportunity to present facts and legal
arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made, and make findings of fact regarding whether
plaintiff’s removal of the parties’ child from Texas constituted “unjustifiable conduct.”
The parties have one child together, Aura Faye Zirkle, who was born in Texas on April
20, 2006. The parties were never married to one another. Both parties signed a State of Texas
Acknowledgement of Paternity the day after the child’s birth. The parties and the child lived
together in Texas until November 2006, when plaintiff moved to Michigan with the child.
Plaintiff commenced these child custody proceedings in the Wayne Circuit Court (“the trial
court” or “the court”) on January 18, 2007. In August 2007, plaintiff returned the child to Texas,
at defendant’s request, because defendant wanted the child with her to attend a funeral. When
defendant failed to bring the minor child back, plaintiff filed a motion asking the trial court to
intervene and order defendant to return the child to Michigan. After defendant failed to appear
for several hearings in the trial court and did not return the child to Michigan, the trial court
entered an order finding defendant in contempt of court. On November 13, 2007, defendant filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to make a
child custody determination. Shortly thereafter, on November 27, 2007, defendant filed an
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action in the 306th Judicial District Court of Galveston County, Texas (“the Texas court”)
seeking an award of custody. According to the trial court’s order, the trial judge spoke to Judge
Stephen Baker of the Texas court by telephone on December 4, 2007. The only record of this
communication is a letter dated January 7, 2008, authored by Judge Brennan of the Wayne
County Circuit Court, which implied the Texas court acquiesced to the Michigan court
continuing to exercise jurisdiction in this matter “[i]n light of the lengthy proceedings that have
taken place in Michigan over the past eleven months and considering the provisions of the
UCCJEA and the best interests of the minor child.” The trial court entered an order denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss on December 11, 2007.
“Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that this
Court reviews de novo.” Atchison v Atchison, 256 Mich App 531, 534; 664 NW2d 249 (2003).
“Once jurisdiction is established, a trial court’s decision concerning whether to exercise
jurisdiction in a custody proceeding is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Fisher v Belcher,
269 Mich App 247, 253; 713 NW2d 6 (2005). The jurisdictional determination in this case
involves the UCCJEA. “Issues of statutory construction present questions of law that are
reviewed de novo.” Atchison, supra at 534-535.
Defendant argues that, because Texas had “home state jurisdiction” under Michigan’s
version of the UCCJEA, the trial court lacked jurisdiction and, therefore, erred in denying her
motion to dismiss. MCL 722.1201 sets forth the basic jurisdictional requirement for making an
initial custody determination:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 204,1 a court of this state has
jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only in the following
situations:
(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within 6
months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from
this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.
(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under subdivision
(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under section 207 or
208, and the court finds both of the following:
1
MCL 722.1204 provides for temporary emergency jurisdiction in a court of this state “if the
child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” This provision is not relevant here because plaintiff
made no such allegation in his complaint.
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(i) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least 1 parent or a
person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than
mere physical presence.
(ii) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s
care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
(c) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (a) or (b) have
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that a court of this state is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under section 207 or
208.
(d) No court of another state would have jurisdiction under subdivision
(a), (b), or (c).
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a childcustody determination by a court of this state.
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child-custody determination. [Footnote
added.]
The term “home state” is defined in MCL 722.1102(g) as:
[T]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at
least 6 consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a childcustody proceeding. In the case of a child less than 6 months of age, the term
means the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting
as a parent. A period of temporary absence of a parent or person acting as a
parent is included as part of the period.
The trial court assumed jurisdiction based on its determination that neither Michigan nor
Texas qualified as the child’s “home state,” impliedly based on its interpretation of MCL
722.1102(g), finding that “in the six consecutive months immediately before the commencement
of this proceeding on January 18, 2007, Aura lived with a parent in two different states.” The
trial court then asserted jurisdiction, determining that the child and plaintiff had a “significant
connection with this state other than mere physical presence” and that “substantial evidence”
existed in Michigan pertaining to “the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationship.” MCL 722.1201(1)(b)(i) and (ii).
Although the trial court was correct in finding that Michigan was not the “home state” for
the child pursuant to MCL 722.1201(1)(a), its determination that Texas also did not qualify as a
“home state” was in error. Specifically, although the minor child did not reside in Texas during
“the six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of [the] proceeding,” MCL
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722.1102(g) (emphasis added), this did not preclude Texas from being deemed the child’s “home
state” for purposes of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. MCL 722.1201(1)(b) permits Michigan
to assume jurisdiction “only” if “A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under
subdivision (a).”2 MCL 722.1201(1)(a) provides, alternatively:
This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the
proceeding, or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a
parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state. [Emphasis
added.]
Clearly, the minor child resided in Texas with both parents from her birth until plaintiff removed
the child to Michigan in November 2006. MCL 722.1201(2) provides that “Subsection (1) is the
exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.”
Because plaintiff initiated custody proceedings on January 8, 2007, within the six-month criteria
elucidated in MCL 722.1201(1)(a), jurisdiction was proper in Texas and the trial court should not
have proceeded with a custody determination.
Approximately 11 months after the initiation of proceedings in Michigan, the Texas court
declined to exercise jurisdiction in this matter. The letter memorializing contact with the trial
court suggests that the Texas court’s agreement to decline to exercise its jurisdiction was based
on “the lengthy proceedings that have taken place in Michigan” and not on a determination that it
originally lacked jurisdiction. It is worth noting that defendant did not challenge the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction when proceedings initiated. In fact, defendant retained a Michigan
attorney and the parties, or their respective legal counsel, appeared in the trial court and even
agreed to and participated in mediation. It was not until mid-November 2007 that defendant
challenged jurisdiction in the trial court and shortly thereafter, filed her own action in Texas to
secure custody of the minor child. It was at this juncture that the Michigan and Texas courts
communicated on the issue of jurisdiction.
The subsequent decision by the Texas court to decline to assert jurisdiction, coupled with
the amount of time that had passed, serves to remedy the trial court’s initial, erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 722.1201(1)(b). As noted by the trial court, we are
confronted now by the extended period of time that has elapsed in this matter and its impact on
the “best interests of the child.” While we are concerned regarding the initial errors by the trial
court in asserting jurisdiction, to vacate and remand this matter at this stage would serve no
useful purpose and only delay further proceedings, as implicitly recognized by the Texas court
when it declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Defendant further asserts error by the trial court regarding violation of MCL 722.1110,
which provides, in relevant part:
2
See also MCL 722.1201(1)(d), which provides:
jurisdiction under subdivision (a), (b), or (c).”
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“No court of another state would have
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state
concerning a proceeding arising under this act.
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall be
given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on
jurisdiction is made.
The statute is clearly discretionary regarding the initiation of communication between the courts
and the participation by the parties in any such communication. MCL 722.1110(2) is not
applicable, because the parties are only required to have an “opportunity to present facts and
legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.” (Emphasis added.) This
communication occurred fairly belatedly in the proceedings, after the trial court had already
made a determination, albeit erroneous, regarding its authority to exercise jurisdiction. In
addition, defendant fails to assert or demonstrate that she was “not able to participate in the
communication,” MCL 722.1110(2), or that the trial court violated MCL 722.1110(4) by failing
to inform the parties of the court’s communication with Texas or grant access to the record.
Defendant had retained counsel in Michigan and filed a motion asserting lack of jurisdiction,
which did not seek, as part of the relief requested, communication with the Texas court regarding
the propriety of that forum’s jurisdiction. Arguably, the filing and hearing on defendant’s
motion asserting lack of jurisdiction provided “the opportunity to present facts and legal
arguments” before the trial court reasserted its determination regarding jurisdiction. Further,
defendant fails to demonstrate, even if the statutory provision had been violated, any remedy
required by the statute for this Court to impose.
Defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to decline jurisdiction based on her
assertion that plaintiff engaged in “unjustifiable conduct” by removing the minor child to
Michigan from Texas. MCL 722.1208(1). Defendant misconstrues the statutory language.
MCL 722.1208 provides, in pertinent part:
(1) [I]f a court of this state has jurisdiction under this act because a person
invoking the court’s jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court
shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless the court finds 1 or more of the
following:
(a) The parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the
exercise of jurisdiction.
(b) A court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under sections 201 to
203 determines that this state is a more appropriate forum under section 207.
(c) No court of another state would have jurisdiction under sections 201 to
203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction under
subsection (1), the court may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety
of the child and prevent a repetition of the unjustifiable conduct, including staying
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the proceeding until a child-custody proceeding is commenced in a court having
jurisdiction under sections 201 to 203. [Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.]
Clearly, MCL 722.1208(1) does not strictly mandate the trial court to decline jurisdiction based
on the alleged “unjustifiable conduct” of the plaintiff. Rather, the exception contained in MCL
722.1208(1)(c), premised on the Texas court’s decision to decline jurisdiction, permits the trial
court to continue with proceedings in this matter. We do not, by this Order, intend to justify the
errors, which resulted in the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction. However, given the protracted
nature of this litigation, to “start over” would merely create further delays in obtaining a
resolution, which we determine not to be in the child’s, or parties’, best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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