PEOPLE OF MI V LISA ANN KELLY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 278370
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 06-002107-FH
LISA ANN KELLY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her jury trial convictions of possession of metallic
knuckles, MCL 750.224(1)(d), and carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227(1), for which
the trial court sentenced defendant to pay costs, attorney fees, a victim rights assessment, and
state fees. Defendant thereafter moved the trial court for a new trial or resentencing. The court
waived the costs and attorney fees, but otherwise denied the motions. Because defendant failed
to establish instructional error or ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and has not established
any basis for appellate relief in her Standard 4 brief, we affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The prosecutor’s theory of the case was that defendant had attempted to carry, concealed
in her purse, a combination folding knife and metallic knuckles into court facilities, but that the
instrument was discovered by security personnel. At trial, defendant admitted possessing the
weapon, but explained that she carried it out of fear of stalking and other threats in her
community, even though she did not know how to expose the blade. Defendant further testified
that she had been to court many times, and knew that the weapon was not permitted, but this time
forgot to leave it elsewhere.
I. Instructional Issues
Appellate counsel argues that the trial court’s jury instructions effectively directed the jury to
conclude that the instrument in question constituted a set of metallic knuckles, and that it was in
fact a dangerous weapon. We read jury instructions in their entirety to determine if there is error
requiring reversal. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 53; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). However,
because there was no objection to the court’s instructions or comments below, our review is
confined ascertaining whether there was plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
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People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Under this standard, a reviewing
court should reverse only when the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affected
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
A. Metallic Knuckles
The trial court defined “metal knuckles” as “pieces of metal designed to be worn over the
knuckles in order to protect them in striking a blow and to make the blow more effective,” and
further instructed the jury that the crime of carrying metal knuckles required proof that “the
Defendant knowingly possessed the metal knuckles; and . . . , at the time she possessed them . . .
she knew that the metal knuckles were a weapon.”
Appellate counsel emphasizes that the defense had maintained that the instrument in
question was not a set of metallic knuckles, but rather a folding knife with mere holes in the grip
for more secure handling, through which one could not put one’s fingers when the blade was
encased, and argues that the instructions disregarded that defense and suggested that the object in
question satisfied the definition of “metallic knuckles,” thus removing that element of the crime
from the jury’s consideration. The trial court provided the correct definition for “metallic
knuckles,” then explained that the crime required the conclusion that defendant “knowingly
possessed the metal knuckles” with the understanding that they were a weapon. Implicit in those
instructions was that the jury should first determine whether the object in question satisfied the
legal definition of metallic knuckles, then, if concluding that it did, decide the possession and
knowledge elements. We agree with the trial court’s statement in denying the motion for a new
trial, that “it’s hard . . . to contemplate how you would instruct a jury any differently than what
the Court did in this case,” given the need to “determine a definition of metallic knuckles and
then to apply that definition to the object that would be in front of them.”
B. Dangerous Weapon
The trial court defined “dangerous stabbing weapon” for the jury as “any object that is
carried as a weapon for bodily assault or defense and that is likely to cause serious physical
injury or death when used as a stabbing weapon.” The court further instructed that the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon in this instance required proof that defendant “knowingly carried a
dangerous stabbing weapon,” that she “must have known that it was a weapon,” and that “[a]
dangerous stabbing weapon is any object that is carried as a weapon for bodily assault or defense
and that is likely to cause serious physical injury or death when used as a stabbing weapon.”
Then, on the subject of allowing the jury to examine the instrument in question, the court stated
as follows:
Because of the nature of the exhibit, if you wish to look at it, you should
let us know. . . .
***
The reason we are having you look at it down here—there are certain
things that I do not ever send to a jury room. I never send cash. I never send
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drugs and I never send dangerous implements or anything used in such a way. I
never send any guns or anything like that up.
Appellate counsel argues that the trial court’s statements seemed to equate the object in
question with a gun or similarly dangerous implement, thus removing that element from the
jury’s consideration. The remarks concerning the trial court’s reluctance to send certain kinds of
items into the jury room were not instructions on the substantive law, but rather concerned
courtroom management. We think it unlikely that the jury would have disregarded its duty to
determine the question whether defendant’s folding knife satisfied the legal definition of a
dangerous stabbing weapon simply because the trial court treated it, for purposes of jury
deliberations, as it would money, drugs, a gun, or other dangerous implement. Moreover, to the
extent that the trial court’s comments could have been taken to suggest that the trial court itself
regarded the object in question as a dangerous stabbing weapon, any prejudice should have been
cured by the trial court’s admonishment that the jury decide that case solely on the basis of the
evidence, with no deference to any sense of the trial court’s own opinions. “It is well established
that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 487; 581
NW2d 229 (1998).
Defendant has failed to establish instructional error on appeal.
II. Assistance of Counsel
Appellate counsel argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the
instructional issues raised and discussed above. “In reviewing a defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the reviewing court is to determine (1) whether counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable and (2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective
performance.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). In this case,
because appellate counsel has failed to show that there was any error in the instructions as given,
no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be predicated on the failure to raise objections
in the matter. “Trial counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position.” People v Snider,
239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
III. Standard 4 Brief
Defendant endeavored to supplement appellate counsel’s performance with a brief of her
own. However, defendant neither presented discrete issues, nor cited any authority—but for
listing several amendments to the United States Constitution in her table of authorities. Instead,
defendant submitted something akin to a letter to this Court, offering her reasons for carrying the
weapon at issue, and impugning the performance of defense counsel, along with motives of
Kalamazoo police and court personnel mostly in connection with matters not before this Court.
Defendant in fact, at trial and on appeal, asserted no legally cognizable privilege for
possessing an object that could function as metallic knuckles, or for carrying a concealed
weapon. That she had some fears for her safety in her part of the City of Kalamazoo is thus
irrelevant, as are the motives of any police or court personnel in connection with matters not
germane to this case.
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Pleadings offered in propria persona should be liberally construed in the interests of
justice. See Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106; 97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976). But also
coming to bear is the rule of general applicability that a party’s mere assertion that the party’s
rights were violated, unaccompanied by record citations, cogent argument, or supporting
authority, is insufficient to present an issue for consideration by this Court. See People v Jones
(On Rehearing), 201 Mich App 449, 456-457; 506 NW2d 542 (1993); MCR 7.212(C)(7). Put
another way, “A party may not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover
and rationalize the basis for the claim.” People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 604 n 4; 617
NW2d 339 (2000).
For these reasons, defendant in her Standard 4 brief brings to light no basis for appellate
relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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