PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY PAUL BUSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278279
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-208894-FC
TIMOTHY PAUL BUSS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with intent to
commit murder, MCL 750.83, nine counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84, failure to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in serious injury, MCL
257.617, and malicious destruction of property, MCL 750.377. He was sentenced to concurrent
prison terms of four to six years for each assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction,
135 months to 40 years for each assault with intent to commit murder conviction, and two to five
years each for the failure to stop and malicious destruction of property convictions. He appeals
as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts
Defendant’s convictions arise from allegations that he intentionally drove through a
carnival, assaulted several people, destroyed property, and fled the scene. On the afternoon of
May 21, 2006, the Armenian Church and Cultural Center, which includes a school, held their
annual carnival on their property in Southfield. The school principal testified that he saw the
driver of a minivan attempt to make a 90-degree turn and hit the guardrail protecting the school.
An expert in accident reconstruction testified that defendant was traveling 56 miles an hour
before hitting the guardrail. The principal testified that after the rear of defendant’s van hit the
guardrail, defendant continued moving toward the school grounds instead of leaving the
premises. The principal tapped on defendant’s passenger side window, but defendant looked
straight ahead and did not respond. The principal yelled defendant’s license number and directed
nearby children to call 911.
Several witnesses testified that five to seven men surrounded defendant’s van, yelled, and
pleaded with him to stop or drive away from the carnival via a safe path. The van eventually
stopped on the grass approximately 100 feet from several inflatable rides. The children in the
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area were moved and a path was formed for defendant to safely leave the premises. Defendant
did not take the path. Instead, defendant gunned his engine, inched forward about four or five
times, veered toward the crowd, and then accelerated as he drove through the crowd. A carnival
employee jumped on the hood of defendant’s van in an attempt to stop him, but immediately
jumped down when defendant accelerated. A parent punched out the driver’s side window and
attempted to steer the vehicle or remove the keys from the ignition. Witnesses testified that
defendant was steering the wheel and had complete control of the van. As defendant drove
through the crowd, he hit at least nine people and damaged the inflatable rides. Seven of the
individuals who were injured suffered bruises and scrapes, one suffered two broken ankles, and
one suffered a crushed pelvis and broken tailbone. After driving through the carnival, defendant
fled the scene. He was later arrested at his home after the police tracked his license plate
number.
The defense denied that defendant intended to harm anyone or damage any property, and
claimed he was merely attempting to leave the premises in the midst of a loud and aggressive
crowd. The defense presented three witnesses, who all testified that defendant was a peaceful
person.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his two convictions of
assault with intent to commit murder. We disagree. When ascertaining whether sufficient
evidence was presented at trial to support a conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe,
440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). This Court will not
interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. Id. at 514. Rather, “a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences
and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
To sustain a conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, the prosecution must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed “(1) an assault, (2) with an
actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Hoffman,
225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997); see also MCL 750.83.
Defendant only challenges the intent to kill element. An intent to kill may be inferred
from facts in evidence, including the use of a dangerous weapon. See People v McRunels, 237
Mich App 168, 181; 603 NW2d 95 (1999), and People v Ray, 56 Mich App 610, 615; 224 NW2d
735 (1974). An automobile may be a dangerous weapon if used in furtherance of accomplishing
an assault and if capable of inflicting serious injury. People v Sheets, 138 Mich App 794, 799;
360 NW2d 301 (1984). Because an actor’s state of mind is difficult to prove, only minimal
circumstantial evidence is required. See McRunels, supra; Ray, supra.
Defendant’s assault with intent to commit murder convictions arise from his assault of
Sona Manzo and her three-year-old son. Evidence was presented that defendant drove a van
through a crowd of people. Five to seven men attempted to stop him, guide him away from the
crowd, and direct him off premises via a safe path. Defendant did not take the path, ignored
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pleas to stop, gunned his engine, lurched forward, and accelerated into the crowd. There was
evidence that defendant had complete control of the vehicle. Defendant hit at least eight people
and some of the inflatable rides before running over Manzo, who was holding her young son.
The wheels barely missed the toddler because of how Manzo was holding him. As a result of
defendant’s actions, Manzo suffered a crushed pelvis and broken tailbone. After hitting Manzo,
defendant did not stop, but fled the scene. This evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to infer that defendant committed the
assaults with an actual intent to kill. While the defense argued that defendant intended only to
leave the premises, the question of defendant’s intent was a matter for the trier of fact to resolve.
People v Osantowski, 274 Mich App 593, 613; 736 NW2d 289 (2007), rev’d in part on other
grounds 481 Mich 103 (2008). The evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions of
assault with intent to commit murder.
III. Jury Instructions
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the
jury on the defense of duress. The trial court’s determination whether a requested jury
instruction is applicable to the facts of a case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006).
Duress is an affirmative defense that is applicable in situtations where the defendant
commits a crime to avoid a greater harm. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 245-246; 562 NW2d
447 (1997). The defendant must present a prima facie case of the elements of the defense. Id. at
246. The defendant must show that: (1) the threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the
mind of a reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm; (2) the conduct in fact
caused such fear of death or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant; (3) the fear or
duress was operating on the mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged act; and (4) the
defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened harm. Id. at 247. The threat must have
arisen without the negligence or fault of the defendant. Id. If the defendant does not submit
sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of duress, the trial court is not required to instruct the
jury on the defense. Id. at 248.
Defendant claimed there was sufficient evidence to support a duress defense because of
the threatening behavior of the crowd, which included a group of “5 to 20 people” surrounding
his van and yelling at him, a person jumping on the hood of his van, several people pounding on
his windows, and a person breaking the driver’s side window. This evidence was insufficient to
constitute prima facie evidence of duress. There was no evidence that defendant was threatened
with any conduct that would have caused a reasonable person to fear death or serious bodily
injury. Although defendant’s window was broken, it was broken in an attempt to stop him from
driving into the crowd. The testimony was consistent that at the time that the window was
broken, defendant had already gunned his engine and was moving toward the crowd. Further, as
the trial court concluded, there was “absolutely no evidence that defendant was in fear.” Rather,
the evidence showed that the group’s actions were aimed at convincing defendant to stop his van.
Moreover, a defendant’s fear of death or serious harm must be reasonable under an objective
standard to support a duress defense. Lemmon, supra at 247. Defendant’s alleged subjective
fear of being physically assaulted by the group was clearly unreasonable because there was no
evidence that any person threatened him with death or serious bodily harm. And, of course, any
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threats would have been the result of defendant’s own fault. Lemmons, supra. Consequently,
the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury on the defense of duress.
IV. Right to Cross-Examination
Defendant’s last argument is that he was denied his right of due process when the trial
court precluded him from questioning the school principal about a prior incident in which a
vehicle entered the grounds during a carnival. We disagree. “A trial court’s limitation of crossexamination is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608,
620; 591 NW2d 669 (1998).
The prosecution moved in limine to preclude defendant from presenting evidence that
two to three years earlier a vehicle drove onto the school grounds during a carnival, was stopped
by several individuals, and drove off the premises. Defense counsel argued that the prior
incident supported his defense that he was on the premises innocently and attempted to navigate
his way out. In response to the trial court’s questions, defense counsel indicated that he did not
know if the driver of the other vehicle drove on the premises deliberately, that no one was
injured, and that the driver safely exited the premises. The trial court ruled that the evidence was
not relevant. During trial, the principal testified that the carnival had been held for 30
consecutive years and nothing like this incident had ever occurred before. Defense counsel
argued that the principal’s testimony “opened the door” to questioning regarding the prior
incident. The trial court concluded that the prior incident was not relevant because no one was
injured.
A defendant’s constitutional right to confront his accusers is secured by the right to crossexamination guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1 § 20;
People v Adamski, 198 Mich App 133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). A witness may be crossexamined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, People v Federico, 146 Mich App 776,
793; 381 NW2d 819 (1985), but neither the Confrontation Clause nor due process confers an
unlimited right to admit all relevant evidence or cross-examine on any subject. Adamski, supra.
Rather, a trial court has wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on
concerns such as prejudice, confusion of the issues, or questioning that is irrelevant or only
marginally relevant. Id.; People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 564; 496 NW2d 336 (1992).
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
MRE 401.
We agree with the trial court that the proffered evidence was not relevant. Evidence that
another vehicle drove onto the school grounds during a carnival two or three years earlier, was
stopped, and safely exited without any injury or damage did not have a tendency to make it more
or less likely that defendant was not acting intentionally when, after driving onto the premises,
he drove through the crowd, hit several people, and damaged property before fleeing. In sum,
defendant failed to demonstrate that the prior incident was relevant to his own culpability; the
inference defendant was attempting to draw between the prior incident and his actions was too
tenuous. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by foreclosing the crossexamination.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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