PEOPLE OF MI V JUSTIN CHARLES WILLETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277738
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-008370 - FH
JUSTIN CHARLES WILLETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, P.J.,
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction for first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2). Because defendant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, the prosecutor
did not engage in any misconduct, and defendant was not denied the effective assistance of
counsel, we affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
At trial, defendant admitted that he stole Sarah Schutza’s purse. He claimed that he stole
the purse from the stoop outside the apartment home of Paul Buttrick and Kalen Decenzo, rather
than from inside the home. On appeal, defendant argues that his conviction should be vacated
because the prosecutor failed to produce sufficient credible evidence from which a rational trier
of fact could find that he stole Schutza’s purse from the inside of the apartment home. We
disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hardiman,
466 Mich 417, 421; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). This Court is mindful that the fact-finder had the
special opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992), and it will not interfere with the
fact-finder’s role in determining the credibility of the witnesses, People v Williams, 268 Mich
App 416, 419; 707 NW2d 624 (2005). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
arising therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime.” People v Plummer, 229
Mich App 293, 299; 581 NW2d 753 (1998). In fact, “circumstantial evidence is oftentimes
stronger and more satisfactory than direct evidence.” Wolfe, supra at 526.
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Schutza testified that she left her purse on the kitchen counter of the apartment home next
to the stove before she went to the basement to play ping-pong. Buttrick and Decenzo
remembered seeing Schutza’s purse on the counter. In addition, Courtney Schwab testified that
defendant told her and a friend that he “broke into a house” to get the purse. Viewing this
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant took Schutza’s purse from inside the apartment home.
Hardiman, supra.
We reject defendant’s argument that when one carefully looks at the various pieces of
evidence and tries to integrate them, there is far from sufficient evidence to allow a rational trier
of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he stole the purse from inside the apartment home.
Defendant points to the following: (1) there was no direct evidence, such as forensic evidence or
a video surveillance tape, establishing that he took the purse from inside the apartment home; (2)
he has always maintained, even when he initially told the police that he stole the purse, that he
took the purse from the stoop; (3) Schutza’s actions in searching the apartment home after
discovering her purse was not on the counter contradicts her testimony that she was sure she had
placed her purse on the kitchen counter; (4) Schutza was willing to lie because she had lied to the
police about having marijuana in her purse; and (5) Schwab’s testimony was ambiguous
regarding whether defendant stated he had taken the purse from inside a home. Direct evidence
is not necessary to establish the elements of a crime. Plummer, supra. Defendant’s other points
relate to the jury’s credibility determinations regarding Schutza, Schwab, and defendant. We
will not interfere with the jury’s credibility determinations. Williams, supra. Defendant’s
conviction for first-degree home invasion is supported by sufficient evidence.
II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant claims that the prosecutor’s actions denied him a fair trial and due process.
We disagree.
Because defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s statements now challenged on
appeal, we review defendant’s claims for plain error affecting his substantial rights. People v
Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453-454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). If plain error exists, reversal of
defendant’s conviction is warranted only if defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. People v
Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 448-449; 669 NW2d 818 (2003). We will not find error
requiring reversal if a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect. People v
Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). “Curative instructions are sufficient to
cure the prejudicial effect of most inappropriate prosecutorial statements, and jurors are
presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d
272 (2008) (citations omitted). We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case
basis by examining the record and evaluating the remarks in context and in light of the
defendant’s arguments. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004).
First, defendant argues the prosecutor deliberately elicited irrelevant and highly
prejudicial information by providing testimony that the reason why the police did not submit any
evidence for forensic testing was because they thought they had the right person. A prosecutor’s
good faith effort to admit evidence does not constitute misconduct. People v Dobek, 274 Mich
App 58, 70; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Here, the challenged testimony from Detective Jamie
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Chianfoni was relevant to explain to the fact-finder why no evidence had been submitted for
forensic testing. The evidence was relevant particularly in light of the fact that during opening
statements defense counsel told the jury it would not see evidence of fingerprints or handprints
on the doorknob or the counter from which the purse was allegedly stolen. Further, the police
did not just “think” defendant had stolen the purse. They knew defendant had stolen the purse
because defendant had confessed to stealing it. Consequently, Chianfoni’s testimony was not
irrelevant nor was it unduly prejudicial. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when
eliciting the challenged testimony from Chianfoni.1
Second, defendant argues that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he (1)
called on the women of the jury who own purses to use their own knowledge that they know
where their purse is at all times; (2) said that women did not leave their purses outside when they
were inside; (3) said that all witnesses recounted seeing the purse in the kitchen; and (4) stated
that no one can prove facts 100 percent in a courtroom. A prosecutor may not argue facts not in
evidence. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 588; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). However,
“[p]rosecutors are typically afforded great latitude regarding their arguments and conduct at trial.
They are generally free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as
it relates to their theory of the case.” Unger, supra at 236 (citations omitted).
A review of the record establishes that the prosecutor’s statements that women know
where they place their purses and that women do not leave their purses outside were reminders to
the jury to utilize their common sense in evaluating the evidence. A prosecutor may urge a jury
to use its common sense when evaluating the evidence and deciding issues of credibility. See
People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 355; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). See also People v Simon, 189
Mich App 565, 567; 473 NW2d 785 (1991) (“It is well known that factfinders may and should
use their common sense and everyday experience in evaluating evidence”). Accordingly, the
prosecutor’s statements regarding women and their purses were not improper.
The prosecutor’s statement that “three witness . . . say the purse was in the kitchen” was a
true statement based on the evidence presented. Schutza testified that she placed her purse on
the kitchen counter, and Buttrick and Decenzo testified that they saw the purse sitting on the
counter. It was merely for the jury to decide whether this testimony, along with the other
evidence presented, established that defendant took the purse from the kitchen counter. The
prosecutor’s statement was not improper.
Regarding defendant’s claim that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence by stating
that no one can prove facts 100 percent in a courtroom, defendant argues prejudice, claiming that
the argument degraded the prosecutor’s burden of proof. However, the “beyond a reasonable
doubt” standard does not require a prosecutor to prove facts with 100 percent certainty. People v
Bowman, 254 Mich App 142, 149-151; 656 NW2d 835 (2002), citing Victor v Nebraska, 511 US
1
In addition, in questioning Chianfoni, the prosecutor did not elicit Chianfoni’s opinion
regarding the credibility of the witnesses. As already stated, the police knew that defendant had
taken Schutza’s purse because he had admitting to taking the purse.
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1, 26-27; 114 S Ct 1239; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Thus, the
prosecutor’s statement was not improper.
Third, defendant argues the prosecutor improperly expressed a personal belief in the facts
of the case by stating during closing arguments that “[Schwab is] telling you the truth.” A
prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness by implying that she has special
knowledge of the witness’s credibility. Thomas, supra at 455. However, a prosecutor may argue
from the facts that a witness is credible. Unger, supra at 240. Considered in context, the
challenged remark was proper. The context of the remark establishes that, rather than asserting
her personal belief in Schwab’s credibility, the prosecutor was arguing that because most of
Schwab’s testimony fit with the testimony of defendant, Schwab, rather than Mark Szymczak,
was telling the truth.2
Fourth, defendant argues the prosecutor misstated the law during her opening statement
by telling the jury that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or possible doubt. The standard
jury instruction defining the reasonable doubt standard, CJI2d 3.2(3), provides that a “reasonable
doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the evidence . . . . It is not merely an imaginary or
possible doubt . . . .” This Court has previously determined that CJI2d 3.2 presents an adequate
instruction regarding the concept of reasonable doubt. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643,
656; 601 NW2d 409 (1999); People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 486-488;
552 NW2d 493 (1996). Thus, the prosecutor’s statement was correct.
Fifth, defendant argues the prosecutor, by stating that women know where their purses
are and that women do not leave their purses outside when they are inside, improperly called
upon the female members of the jury to use their personal knowledge and experience in
assessing the credibility of Schutza. Jurors may not rely on their own specialized knowledge in
determining a defendant’s guilt. See Simon, supra at 567-568. However, we disagree that the
prosecutor asked the jury to use “personal, specific knowledge and experience.” Rather, as
previously discussed, the prosecutor called on the jury to employ its common sense regarding
women’s knowledge of the location of their purses in determining the credibility of Schutza.
Such a calling by the prosecutor was proper. See Lawton, supra at 355; Simon, supra at 567-568
Accordingly, the prosecutor engaged in no misconduct.3
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically,
defendant argues that if this Court fails to rule in his favor because counsel failed to object to the
prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, then counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
challenged statements. We disagree.
2
Szymczak testified that he never saw defendant with a purse the night Schutza’s purse was
stolen.
3
Even if we were to conclude that any of the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, defendant has
failed to establish that any resulting prejudice could not have been alleviated by a curative
instruction. Callon, supra.
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Because defendant did not move for a new trial or for a Ginther4 hearing, our review of
defendant’s claim is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App
10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; that but for his counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the results
of his trial would have been different; and that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair or
unreliable. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000); People v Rodgers,
248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
As analyzed in Issue II, supra, the prosecutor’s statements were not improper. Therefore,
any objections to the statements would have been futile. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to
make futile objections. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002). In
addition, defendant has failed to prove that, had counsel made the objections, the outcome of his
trial would have been different. Toma, supra. Defendant was not denied the effective assistance
of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
4
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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