IN RE AMINAH QUEEN MUHAMMAD MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AMINAH QUEEN
MUHAMMAD, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 9, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283479
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-002789-NA
KRYSTAL DIERDORF-MUHAMMAD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
FATEEN MUHAMMAD,
Respondent.
In the Matter of AMINAH QUEEN
MUHAMMAD, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283480
Ingham Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-002789-NA
FATEEN MUHAMMAD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KRYSTAL DIERDORF-MUHAMMAD,
Respondent.
-1-
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Murphy and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the order terminating
their parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We
affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner established the statutory
grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence and that termination was not contrary
to the child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In
re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); MCL 712A.19b(5); MCR 3.977(J).
With respect to respondent-mother, the allegations in the initial and amended petitions
included her history of mental health issues, the family’s homelessness, her problematic
parenting that prompted three referrals, her lack of participation with certain services, and her
lack of employment. Over the course of the proceeding, the only service consistently attended
by respondent-mother was visitation with the child. Around the same time the supplemental
termination petition was filed in October 2007, respondent-mother contacted Community Mental
Health (“CMH”) and began engaging in treatment in November 2007. Although still homeless
and unemployed by the time of the January 2008 termination trial, respondent-mother argued she
should be granted additional time, and this request was supported by a letter from her CMH
psychiatrist and counselor, who asked that she be provided another year to comply with services.
However, the trial court properly found there was no reasonable likelihood that respondentmother would soon be able to rectify the problems that caused the child to come into care, or
would soon be able to provide proper care or custody for the child, given the child’s young age.
Respondent-mother’s behavior throughout the proceeding demonstrated her lack of commitment
to address her serious problems until she was faced with the imminent prospect of losing her
child, and her tendency to blame others demonstrated her unwillingness to change.1 The child
was 16 months old by the time of the termination trial and had been in foster care for all but three
months of her life. It was unreasonable to ask her to wait another year, and termination of
respondent-mother’s parental rights was properly based upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and
(j). The trial court also did not clearly err in its best interests determination. The bond shared by
the child and respondent-mother did not outweigh the child’s need for permanence and stability
in her young life.
With respect to respondent-father, the allegations in the initial and amended petitions
were his criminal history, lack of employment, and use of alcohol. In addition, the family’s
homelessness was a contributing, although not determining, consideration. Over the course of
the proceeding, respondent-father attempted to address his severe substance abuse problem,
1
On appeal, respondent-mother blames agency workers for failing to provide her with more
assistance with psychiatric treatment and counseling, but the evidence established that the delay
in treatment was caused by respondent-mother’s decision not to follow through on a referral for
psychiatric treatment and medication because she did “not have time” and believed medication
was unnecessary.
-2-
which also included the use of cocaine, but was unsuccessful. In June 2007, the court made his
visitations contingent upon the provision of clean drug screens, and he was subsequently never
able to exercise his visitation right. Before being incarcerated in October 2007, respondentfather was homeless.2 Although he claimed to run a window washing business, the documents
he provided were insufficient to verify his income. He remained incarcerated at the time of the
termination trial. This evidence clearly and convincingly established that respondent-father had
not successfully addressed the adjudicating conditions by the time of the termination trial. There
was also no reasonable likelihood or expectation that he would soon address these problems
within a reasonable time given the child’s age. The problems faced by respondent-father were
severe. Although he was substance-free while incarcerated and believed he would comply better
with the court orders upon his release, it remained questionable that he was committed to change.
He had been noncompliant with treatment for essentially the entire yearlong proceeding, and the
evaluating psychologist concluded that respondent-father’s inflexible expectations rendered his
prognosis for significant change as poor. Furthermore, the child was young and it was not fair to
make her wait a long period of time to see whether respondent-father finally addressed his
serious problems.
Therefore, the trial court properly based termination on MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Finally, the trial court’s best interests determination was proper
given that respondent-father had not seen the child since June 2007, and the young child needed
permanence in her life.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
2
On appeal, respondent-father argues that he was never provided with information on housing.
However, the foster care worker testified she had provided such information to him. We defer to
the trial court’s ability to judge the foster care worker’s credibility in this regard. MCR
2.613(C).
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
