ANTHONY RICHARDSON V CARLOS R CROCKETT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANTHONY RICHARDSON, Deceased Minor by
his Mother, ANDREA JONES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 9, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 279479
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-434938-NI
CARLOS R. CROCKETT,
Defendant,
and
WILLIAM T. BOSLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murray and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, William T. Bosley, appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting
plaintiff a consent judgment following the denial of his motion for summary disposition. We
affirm.
On October 19, 2003, the minor decedent, Anthony Richardson, was walking down the
street when a vehicle driven by defendant Crockett struck him.1 Plaintiff filed a complaint
alleging that defendant was the legal owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident. In his
deposition, defendant, a firefighter, acknowledged that he purchased cars from auction and sold
the vehicles to other individuals, although he did not have a license to sell vehicles. Defendant
further testified that he sold the vehicle to Crockett. However, he did not have a bill of sale,
receipt, or cancelled check to verify the sale. Rather, he testified that Crockett paid cash for the
vehicle. Although defendant testified that he gave Crockett title to the vehicle, there was no
witness to any signature on the alleged transfer of title.
1
A default judgment was entered against defendant Crockett, and that judgment is not at issue in
this appeal. Accordingly, we will refer to Bosley as “defendant.”
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In his affidavit, defendant opined that he did not own or have possession of the vehicle
driven by Crockett. Rather, “in August 2003,” defendant opined that he sold the vehicle
allegedly involved in the auto accident “to a gentleman who [he] believe[d] to be” Crockett.
However, in his deposition when asked to provide an estimate of the date of the sale, defendant
was unable to do so. When questioned regarding a season, defendant testified, “The fall. Late
summer, early fall.” However, when asked to describe what Crockett looked like, defendant
responded, “I don’t remember.”
Defendant moved for summary disposition, asserting that he was not the owner of the
vehicle at the time of the auto accident. The trial court denied the motion for summary
disposition. After entry of a consent judgment, defendant appeals as of right from the trial
court’s judgment that expressly preserved the right to appeal the summary disposition ruling.
Defendant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary disposition in light
of MCL 257.240. We disagree. A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is
reviewed de novo. McDonald v Farm Bureau Ins Co, 480 Mich 191, 196; 747 NW2d 811
(2008). “[W]here the truth of a material factual assertion of a movant’s affidavit depends on the
affiant’s credibility, there inheres a genuine issue to be decided at a trial by the trier of fact and a
motion for summary judgment cannot be granted.” Brown v Pointer, 390 Mich 356, 354; 212
NW2d 201 (1973). Summary disposition is suspect where motive and intent are at issue or
where the credibility of the witness is crucial. Vanguard Ins Co v Bolt, 204 Mich App 271, 276;
514 NW2d 525 (1994). The trial court may not make findings of fact or weigh credibility when
deciding a motion for summary disposition. In re Handelsman, 266 Mich App 433, 437; 702
NW2d 641 (2005). This Court is liberal in finding a genuine issue of material fact that requires a
trial to resolve. Id.
The goal of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the
Legislature by examining the most reliable evidence of its intent – the words of the statute. Neal
v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). If the statutory language is unambiguous,
appellate courts presume that the Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning, and further
judicial construction is neither permitted nor required. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461
Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).
At the time of the incident giving rise to this action, MCL 257.2402 provided:
The owner of a motor vehicle who has made a bona fide sale by transfer of his or
her title or interest and who has delivered possession of the vehicle and the
certificate of title thereto properly endorsed to the purchaser or transferee shall not
be liable for any damages or a violation of law thereafter resulting from the use or
ownership of the vehicle by another.
2
Effective October 1, 2005, MCL 257.240 was amended to provide that an owner was not liable
provided that the owner went to the secretary of state with the purchaser to effectuate the transfer
of title and maintained a record of the sale for a minimum of 18 months. MCL 257.240(2)(a),
(b). This statute was not in effect at the time of the alleged transfer of title at issue.
-2-
Defendant contends that his affidavit and deposition testimony establish that he is not liable for
any damages because he made a bona fide sale by the transfer of the vehicle before the accident.
Specifically, it is asserted that defendant “transferred a properly endorsed certificate of title to”
Crockett. However, the truth of the assertions raised in the affidavit and the deposition
testimony present an issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Brown, supra. Here the credibility
of defendant is crucial because it is the sole evidence of any transfer, and therefore, summary
disposition is suspect. Vanguard, supra. In the present case, the trial court could not weigh the
credibility of defendant’s deposition testimony when ruling on the motion for summary
disposition. Handelsman, supra.
In the present case, defendant immediately filed a summary disposition motion in lieu of
an answer to the complaint. With this motion, defendant Bosley submitted an affidavit
indicating that his transfer of the vehicle in question occurred “in August 2003,” with a person
“believe[d]” to be Crockett. However, in deposition, when asked to provide an estimate of the
date of the transfer, defendant could not provide a date and estimated “the fall, or late summer”
when prompted by counsel to provide a season. Moreover, when asked to describe Crockett,
defendant could provide no description. Additionally, defendant rented a lot from which he sold
vehicles that he purchased at auction for an estimated two-year period. In light of defendant’s
lack of clarity regarding the time frame of the sale, the inability to describe the purchaser, and
the fact that he sold other vehicles, the issue of whether a bona fide sale occurred before the
accident presents a credibility issue for the trier of fact. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Next, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously relied on irrelevant and
improper information provided by plaintiff to deny the dispositive motion. Review of the record
reveals that the trial court agreed with plaintiff that factual issues were presented for the trier of
fact because the affidavit was the only evidence offered in support. The trial court went on to
state that a bill of sale or other evidence, such as a filing or service of the secretary of state was
required. When defense counsel advised the trial court that there was no requirement that the
transfer of title be recorded, the trial court held that the motion was still denied. Irrespective of
whether the trial court applied the statutory provisions of MCL 257.240 that did not take effect
until October 1, 2005, (after the accident occurred), the trial court correctly held that factual
issues, specifically the credibility of defendant, precluded summary disposition. Accordingly,
defendant’s second claim of error is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-3-
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