PEOPLE OF MI V GERALD LEE BEELBY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 26, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276998
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-206274-FH
GERALD LEE BEELBY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., Zahra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of arson, MCL 750.72, for which he was sentenced to
14 to 20 years in prison. He appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s conviction arises from an incident that occurred on June 18, 2005, at a house
owned by Robert Redmond at 301 Oakland Street in Holly. Delores Hernandez rented the
upstairs unit of the house and defendant later moved in with her. Defendant owned a yellow
“golf ball looking thing” with a green fuse that he described as “a quarter stick of dynamite.”
Neighbors often heard defendant and Hernandez argue.
On the night of June 17, 2005, defendant and Hernandez went to a bar with Hernandez’s
brother and his ex-wife. Defendant and Hernandez argued and defendant left, saying that he was
going to walk home. Hernandez later left the bar and spent the night at a friend’s house.
Sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m., defendant showed up at the home of Joseph
Fultz. He was upset and explained that he had had an argument with Hernandez. Half an hour
later, Fultz walked defendant home. Defendant, who was still upset, said “he was going to go
home, throw shit out the window and burn his house.” Fultz tried to dissuade him. Once at the
house, Fultz stayed to talk with defendant, “trying to calm him down and tell him it’s probably
best to just leave things alone.” After 20 minutes, Fultz left. Defendant, who had run out of
cigarettes, accompanied Fultz home and got some from him. Defendant then left.
Joseph and Sarah Miller lived next door to Hernandez and defendant. Sometime between
5:30 and 6:00 a.m., they heard loud noises from next door and Sarah Miller saw defendant
hurling boxes out the upstairs front door; other items were already on the ground, including a
toilet, a television, a fan, a cabinet, and a bench. At approximately 7:00 a.m., defendant came to
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the Millers’ door, said his house was on fire, and suggested that they might want to evacuate.
Sarah Miller went outside and saw that defendant’s house “was completely engulfed in flames.”
Steven Sipes, who lived across the street, was awakened by an explosion and looked out to also
see flames shooting out the upstairs window. He also noticed items lying about the yard.
A responding police officer noticed various items in the front yard, including a bicycle,
boxes, clothing, and “household items.” Defendant emerged from his grandfather’s house across
the street and approached his house. When the officer went to speak with defendant, he dropped
to the ground, curled up in the fetal position, removed his socks, and “was crying about his house
being on fire and saving his son’s bike.”
One firefighter noted that the fire seemed to be unusually intense. Investigators were
called in to determine the cause and origin of the fire. An electrical engineer ruled out the
electrical and natural gas systems as causes. He found no defects in any appliances that could
account for the fire. James Lehtola, an arson investigator, determined from burn patterns on the
floor of the bedroom that a flammable liquid had been poured on the bedroom floor and ignited
with an open flame. An arson investigator hired by Redmond’s insurer, Robert Puddy, also
noticed distinctive burn patterns on the floor and determined that the fire was caused by the
ignition of vapors from an accelerant poured primarily on the bedroom floor and, to a lesser
extent, on the kitchen floor. He collected two samples from the upstairs unit and sent them to a
laboratory for testing. They tested positive for gasoline.
Hernandez spoke to defendant about a week after the fire. They got into an argument,
during which defendant said, “I burnt your shit down.” Hernandez admitted that she did not
know if defendant was serious and added that “then he like took it back, you know.” Sipes also
spoke to defendant. On the morning of the fire, defendant said that the fire started after he fell
asleep with a lit cigarette in his hand, yet remarked that “it sounded like a bomb going off.”
Later, he said that he had used a bomb to start the fire. Later still, he said the fire had been
started with gasoline.
Defendant testified that after he walked back home from the bar, he went to visit Fultz
and discussed his problems with Hernandez. He admitted that Fultz walked him home but
denied saying anything to him about starting a fire. Once home for the night, he began packing
his things to move out. He got tired of going up and down the stairs, so he started dropping his
belongings off the balcony. Coincidentally, the toilet malfunctioned and broke away from the
floor, so defendant discarded that too. Sometime while defendant was in the house, he noticed
that there was a fire in the bedroom and ran out. Defendant denied setting the fire deliberately
and claimed that it was caused by his “carelessness.” Defendant admitted that he told Sipes that
he had fallen asleep with a lit cigarette. He denied telling him anything different. However, he
told Lehtola “that couldn’t have happened” and suggested that the fire was caused by the
electrical system or the furnace. He told Puddy that he was not at home when the fire started.
I. Appellate Counsel’s Brief
Defendant, through appellate counsel, raises two related arguments on appeal. He argues
that the prosecutor’s misconduct denied him a fair trial and that defense counsel was ineffective
for failing to object. The issue of prosecutorial misconduct has not been preserved because
defendant did not object at trial. Therefore, review is precluded unless defendant establishes a
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plain error that affected the outcome of the trial. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453-454;
678 NW2d 631 (2004), lv den 471 Mich 868 (2004); People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434,
448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003), lv den 469 Mich 1012 (2004). The issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel has not been preserved because defendant did not move for a new trial or evidentiary
hearing below. Therefore, review is limited to the existing record. People v Snider, 239 Mich
App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), lv den 463 Mich 855 (2000); People v Hedelsky, 162
Mich App 382, 387; 412 NW2d 746 (1987).
“The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial (i.e., whether prejudice resulted).” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272;
662 NW2d 836 (2003), lv den 471 Mich 916 (2004). The reviewing court must examine the
prosecutor’s remarks in context on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 272-273. The propriety of a
prosecutor’s remarks depends on all the facts of the case. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10,
30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002), lv den 468 Mich 880 (2003). The prosecutor’s remarks are not to be
taken out of context; his closing argument should be considered in its entirety and evaluated in
light of defense arguments and the relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.
Hedelsky, supra at 386; People v Jansson, 116 Mich App 674, 693; 323 NW2d 508 (1982).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “defendant must first show that
(1) his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the
prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Counsel is presumed to have
provided effective assistance, and the defendant must overcome a strong presumption that
counsel’s assistance was sound trial strategy.” People v Horn, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d
___ (Docket No. 274130, issued May 15, 2008), slip op at 4 n 2 (citations omitted), lv pending.
The prosecutor summarized the events that began on the night of July 17. He noted that
the two couples went to the bar and that defendant eventually got into a fight with Hernandez.
The prosecutor continued, “And what does the defendant do – it tells you a little bit about his
nature – he throws beer on her chest, on her upper torso in an open, public bar. And he’s
obviously fighting with her.” Defendant argues that this comment constituted an improper
character argument. While the implied reference to defendant’s character for having a short
temper may have been inappropriate because defendant’s character was not at issue, People v
Quinn, 194 Mich App 250, 253; 486 NW2d 139 (1992), lv den 440 Mich 909 (1992), this one
isolated remark did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. The crux of the prosecutor’s argument
was that defendant became mad at Hernandez at the bar, which defendant admitted, and that this
was his motive for setting the fire. Further, the trial court’s instructions that the jury is to decide
the case based only on the evidence and that the attorneys’ arguments are not evidence
effectively dispelled any prejudice. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 281; 531 NW2d 659
(1995), reh den 448 Mich 1225 (1995). Consequently, defendant was not prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to object. Horn, supra.
In commenting on the expert witnesses’ testimony, the prosecutor stated:
Ask yourselves this too. Physical evidence has no bias. It has no friends.
These scientists aren’t here to testify against the defendant because they have any
personal bias against him either. These are expert witnesses. People that are
specialists in their field and I submit to you, you can look across the whole state
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of Michigan and you wouldn’t find better experts than what you heard in this trial.
These are some of the most experienced people. Some of the best of the best.
Defendant argues that in making these remarks, the prosecutor improperly vouched for
the witnesses’ credibility. We disagree. The prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of a
witness or suggest that he has some special knowledge concerning a witness’s truthfulness.
Bahoda, supra at 276. The prosecutor may, however, comment on the credibility of his own
witness during closing argument and argue from the facts that the witness has no reason to lie.
Thomas, supra at 455. He may also argue that a witness should be believed. People v Wise, 134
Mich App 82, 104; 351 NW2d 255 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 852 (1985). The prosecutor did not
claim that he knew the witnesses had testified truthfully or that he had special knowledge
regarding the witnesses’ credibility. He commented only on their qualifications for rendering
expert testimony as evidenced by their foundational testimony. We find no error. Because there
was no error, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. People v Goodin, 257
Mich App 425, 433; 668 NW2d 392 (2003), lv den 469 Mich 972 (2003).
There was evidence that defendant had been drinking and defendant admitted that he was
still drunk at 6:00 a.m. Defense counsel argued that defendant was intoxicated and that
intoxicated persons have difficulty formulating an intent. In response, the prosecutor noted that
defendant had been drinking “over a 14 hour period so it works out to one drink an hour. Your
body eliminates about one drink an hour as it goes along.” This statement was improper because
it was not supported by the evidence presented at trial. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 686;
521 NW2d 557 (1994), cert den sub nom Michigan v Caruso, 513 US 1121; 115 S Ct 923; 130 L
Ed 2d 803 (1995). However, improper remarks are subject to harmless error analysis, People v
Armentero, 148 Mich App 120, 134; 384 NW2d 98 (1986), lv den 425 Mich 883 (1986), and
because intoxication was not offered as a defense, we cannot conclude that defendant was
prejudiced by the remark, especially where, as here, it was made in response to defense counsel’s
argument. People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996), lv den 456
Mich 886 (1997).
Defendant lastly takes issue with the prosecutor’s implication that he deliberately evaded
the police. Lehtola testified that he completed his investigation within several weeks but it took
many months to arrest defendant because “part of the problem was I didn’t know Mr. Beelby’s
whereabouts.” In commenting on this testimony, the prosecutor stated, “Why was the defendant
trying to stay out of the way of the police after the first conversations with them? Because he
knew what he had done.” We find no error. The prosecutor’s comment was a reasonable
inference based on the testimony, Bahoda, supra at 282, and evidence that defendant evaded the
police permits an inference of consciousness of guilt. People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4;
532 NW2d 885 (1995). Because there was no error, defense counsel was not ineffective for
failing to object. Goodin, supra at 433.
II. Defendant’s Standard 4 Brief
Defendant raises several additional issues in a pro se Standard 4 brief. He first argues
that the failure to preserve Redmond’s house, which was torn down after the fire, deprived him
of an opportunity to have his own expert conduct a cause and origin examination. Because
defendant did not raise this issue below, it has not been preserved for appeal. People v Bauder,
269 Mich App 174, 177; 712 NW2d 506 (2005), lv den 476 Mich 863 (2006). Therefore, review
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is limited to plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), reh den 461 Mich 1205 (1999).
It is generally preferable that the police “keep all evidence until the criminal prosecution
is concluded without concern for its value at trial.” People v Tate, 134 Mich App 682, 692; 352
NW2d 297 (1984). A defendant is constitutionally entitled to have access to evidence, and the
state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant violates due process. Arizona v
Youngblood, 488 US 51, 55, 57; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988), reh den 488 US 1051;
109 S Ct 885; 102 L Ed 2d 1007 (1989). But when the state fails to preserve potentially
exculpatory evidence, due process is violated only if the police act in bad faith. Id. at 58.
Reversal is required only where the defendant can show “that the missing evidence was
exculpatory or that law enforcement personnel acted in bad faith.” People v Hanks, 276 Mich
App 91, 95; 740 NW2d 530 (2007), lv den 480 Mich 1008 (2007).
The record shows that the samples collected by Puddy were retained by the testing
laboratory and were not consumed by the testing process and thus presumably could have been
tested by an independent expert had one been retained. Although the house was razed after the
fire, defendant has not shown that the burned remains contained exculpatory or even potentially
exculpatory evidence or that the sheriff’s department or the prosecutor acted in bad faith in
failing to maintain the house. Defendant has thus failed to establish plain error.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a cause and
origin expert to assist him in cross-examining the prosecutor’s experts, to testify that the fire was
accidental, and to rebut the testimony of the prosecutor’s experts.
The decision whether to call an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy. Ackerman,
supra at 455; People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 658; 601 NW2d 409 (1999), lv den 461
Mich 997 (2000). Decisions regarding how to cross-examine and impeach witnesses are also
matters of trial strategy. In re Ayres, 239 Mich App 8, 23; 608 NW2d 132 (1999); People v
McFadden, 159 Mich App 796, 800; 407 NW2d 78 (1987), lv den 429 Mich 853 (1987). “This
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor
will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich
App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). “Ineffective assistance of counsel may be established by
the failure to call witnesses only if the failure deprives defendant of a substantial defense.”
People v Julian, 171 Mich App 153, 159; 429 NW2d 615 (1988). “A substantial defense is one
that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App
524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
There is nothing in the record to suggest, and defendant has not offered any evidence to
show, that another cause and origin expert would have determined that the fire was accidental.
Further, the fact remains that gasoline was detected in samples taken from the house. Therefore,
even if counsel had been able to get the prosecutor’s experts to agree that there was a basis for
disputing certain theories regarding the behavior of fire and the interpretation of the charred
remains, or had he located an expert who could refute some of the testimony offered by the
prosecutor’s experts on those points, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability
that but for counsel’s failure to retain such an expert, the outcome of the trial would have been
different. Ackerman, supra at 455-456.
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Lastly, defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in a variety of misconduct. He first
argues that the prosecutor improperly presented false evidence to obtain a conviction.
A prosecutor may not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a conviction, and a
prosecutor has an obligation to correct false evidence and advise the defendant and the trial court
if a government witness lies under oath. People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 276-277; 591
NW2d 267 (1998), lv den 461 Mich 861 (1999). The crux of defendant’s argument is that the
prosecutor’s experts lied about the cause of the fire. Part of this contention depends on facts
outside the record, which cannot be considered on appeal. MCR 7.210(A)(1); People v Powell,
235 Mich App 557, 561 n 4; 599 NW2d 499 (1999); Isagholian v Transamerica Ins Corp, 208
Mich App 9, 18; 527 NW2d 13 (1994). Regardless, both Lehtola and Puddy were qualified as
experts in cause and origin and offered their opinions on the cause of the fire. An opinion is by
definition “a belief or judgment based on ground insufficient to produce complete certainty,”
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997), and thus cannot be true or false. With
regard to Lehtola’s testimony that defendant denied having fallen asleep while smoking a
cigarette, defendant admitted saying that to Lehtola, although he claimed that he had lied. For
these reasons, defendant has not shown a plain error.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that defendant
had lied. A prosecutor may argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom as it
relates to his theory of the case. Bahoda, supra at 282. The prosecutor may also “argue from the
facts that a witness is credible or that the defendant or another witness is not worthy of belief” or
is lying. People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997), lv den 459 Mich 884
(1998); People v Gilbert, 183 Mich App 741, 745-746; 455 NW2d 731 (1990), lv den 437 Mich
927 (1991). Because defendant admitted that he lied to Lehtola, it was reasonable to infer that he
may not have been truthful about the rest of his testimony. Defendant has not shown a plain
error.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor wrongfully suppressed evidence regarding
defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of the fire. Specifically, he claims that when the
prosecutor argued that defendant was not as drunk as defense counsel had implied, he failed to
disclose that defendant had registered a .110 blood alcohol content on a preliminary breath test
given several hours after the fire. Neither the police report nor any other evidence regarding
defendant’s blood alcohol level was in evidence and, as noted, the prosecutor cannot argue facts
not in evidence. Stanaway, supra at 686. Further, whether defendant was drunk or not was
irrelevant because voluntary intoxication was not a valid defense. MCL 768.37(1); People v
Maynor, 470 Mich 289, 296-297; 683 NW2d 565 (2004). Defendant has not shown a plain error.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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