IN RE LUTHER LEONARD MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of LUTHER LEONARD, Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 282909
Arenac Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-007948-NA
JAMIE LEONARD,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
found in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j) were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, the evidence did not
show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
At the time of the termination hearing, Luther had been in foster care for 18 months.
Respondent was very compliant and cooperated with all of the services that petitioner required of
him. However, there was evidence that respondent did not benefit from those services and that
respondent was not ready for Luther to be returned to his custody. Randall Mey, respondent’s
therapist, recommended that respondent receive six more months of services and then respondent
would possibly have the ability to parent his child. However, Mey’s recommendations included
many of the same services that respondent had already participated in for the previous 18
months.
Randall Christensen, the psychologist who conducted a psychological evaluation on
respondent, explained that respondent had a combination of problems that made it difficult for
him to learn and to consistently implement what he had learned. Respondent had a low IQ and
bipolar disorder, and he was a victim of neglect and poor parenting as a child. While any one of
these issues could be overcome, the combination made it difficult for respondent to function as a
stable and independent adult.
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In addition, respondent reported a long history of fighting and violence. The petition in
this case was originally filed because of physical violence between respondent and the child’s
mother while the child was present. This violent history caused great concern for his future
parenting skills. Christensen opined that respondent’s immaturity, impulsivity, and propensity
for anger made him vulnerable to erratic behavior in his interactions with his child. Moreover,
respondent’s ability to learn and apply what he had learned was very poor. Accordingly, there
was no reasonable expectation that respondent would be able to alter his angry and violent
behavior in a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
In addition, respondent voluntarily released his rights to another child during this case.
Christensen expressed concern about this because he thought that the release represented weak
parental instincts and that parental instincts were very difficult to learn. Thus, the trial court did
not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j) or in
determining that termination was not clearly contrary to the child’s best interests.
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because
petitioner made no effort to reasonably accommodate his disabilities. This Court reviews the
trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller,
supra at 337.
In In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26; 610NW2d 563 (2000), this Court held that if the
petitioner is violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., the
respondent must raise the claim in a timely manner, when a service plan is adopted, so that any
reasonable accommodations can be made. At that time, the trial court can address the
respondent’s claim and determine whether the petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family. Id.
In this case, respondent never argued that the services offered were inadequate to
accommodate his disabilities. However, even if respondent had raised this issue in a timely
manner, the evidence does not support his claim that petitioner did not reasonably accommodate
his disabilities. Matthew Engster, the caseworker, testified that respondent was provided with
extensive services and there was no evidence that he was denied any services that were available
to parents without disabilities. Engster did not believe that there were any other services that
were available because respondent had been offered every service that petitioner had to offer.
Petitioner was not required to provide respondent with full-time, live-in assistance with his
children. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that petitioner made
reasonable efforts to assist respondent in reunifying with his child and terminating respondent’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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