PEOPLE OF MI V DOYLE EDWARD ROWLAND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 278010
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 06-034936-FH
DOYLE EDWARD ROWLAND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Doyle Rowland pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC). The trial court sentenced him to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment. He appeals by delayed
leave granted. We affirm.
1
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Initially, the prosecution charged Rowland with one count of third-degree CSC.2
Rowland, at all relevant times represented by counsel, entered into a plea agreement in April
2006. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecution agreed to dismiss at sentencing the thirddegree CSC charge in exchange for Rowland’s agreement to plead guilty to a new charge of one
count of second-degree CSC. The written plea agreement further stated that “no promise or
agreement as to any term of sentence: either party may advocate as it sees fit.” Rowland and his
attorney signed the agreement.
That same day, the trial court held a plea hearing. The trial court inquired whether the
agreement constituted the complete agreement, to which the parties responded in the affirmative.
The trial court then asked Rowland whether he understood the plea bargain as it was stated on
the record, and Rowland indicated that he did. Rowland indicated that he was aware that he was
1
MCL 750.520c(1)(b) (sexual contact with a victim who is at least 13 years of age but less than
16 when the defendant is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this authority to
coerce the victim to submit).
2
MCL 750.520d(1)(a) (sexual penetration with a victim at least 13 years old but less than 16).
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waiving his trial rights and acknowledged signing and understanding an advice of rights form
that detailed all of the rights that Rowland was waiving by pleading guilty. The trial court read
the amended information to Rowland, and Rowland stated that he understood the charge and was
pleading guilty to second-degree CSC.
Rowland explained to the trial court that in November 2005, he touched the breasts of the
complainant, his daughter’s 13-year-old half-sister, who would visit his home every other
weekend. Rowland stated that he essentially acted as the complainant’s babysitter and was in a
position of authority over her. He stated that he used his authority to touch her breasts. The trial
court once more reaffirmed that there had been no agreement regarding Rowland’s penalty. The
trial court stated in conclusion that it found Rowland’s plea to be voluntary, understanding and
knowing, and the trial court accepted the plea.
The trial court sentenced Rowland in May 2006. During the sentencing hearing, but
before the trial court imposed the sentence, Rowland objected to the scoring of multiple offense
variables, including Offense Variable (OV) 11, which is scored for criminal sexual penetration of
a victim. The trial court assessed Rowland 25 points for OV 11 for penetrating the complainant.
Rowland objected, pointing out that he never admitted to penetration, and, in fact, the crime
involving penetration as an element (third-degree CSC) was dismissed pursuant to the plea
agreement. Rowland maintained that because he pleaded guilty to second-degree CSC
(involving sexual touching, not penetration), he should be assessed points on the basis of that
crime only. The trial court responded that, if penetration could be proven, it would be
appropriate to assess points for penetration. Rowland then moved to withdraw his guilty plea on
the basis that any assessment of points for OV 11 would be impermissible given the dismissal of
the third-degree CSC charge. The trial court denied Rowland’s motion.
At the sentencing hearing, the complainant testified under oath that, on the evening in
question, she was sleeping in a bedroom downstairs when Rowland came in and took off her
clothes. She testified that Rowland touched her all over her body, including her breasts and
genital area, then penetrated her vagina with his penis. She testified that the incident was against
her will and, prior to the incident, she had been a virgin. She also indicated that the incident
caused her back to hurt for a day. She stated that she was examined at the hospital, but the
examination did not reveal anything.
The complainant further testified that Rowland sent her a handwritten letter after the
incident. In the letter, Rowland professed his love for the complainant and stated that age did not
matter. He also asked her to “not go away,” directed her to write him back and asked her to
ensure that her half-sister did not say anything about the letter. The letter was not signed, but the
complainant testified that she knew it to be in Rowland’s handwriting. In addition, Rowland’s
12-year-old daughter, the complainant’s half-sister, testified that Rowland gave her the letter to
deliver to the complainant.
Rowland testified under oath and denied engaging in penetration with the complainant.
He did admit to touching her breast, but denied writing the letter.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court found that there was more than
sufficient evidence to establish penetration. Accordingly, the trial court assessed Rowland 25
points for OV 11. Rowland once more moved to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied
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Rowland’s motion, stating that dissatisfaction concerning one’s sentence was an insufficient
ground for plea withdrawal. The trial court then sentenced Rowland to 5 to 15 years’
imprisonment, which constituted an upward departure from Rowland’s minimum sentence range
of 19 to 38 months.
II. Assessment Of Points Under Offense Variable 11
A. Standard Of Review
Rowland first argues that his plea was illusory because the trial court improperly assessed
points for offense variable (OV) 11,3 and the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw
his plea. We review a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an
abuse of discretion.4 Further, we review de novo the proper interpretation and application of
sentencing guidelines.5
B. Analysis
Rowland’s sole basis for claiming that the plea agreement was illusory is his argument
that the trial court erred in assessing him points under OV 11, which considers whether criminal
sexual penetration of the victim occurred. The prosecution initially charged Rowland with
second- and third-degree CSC. Rowland insists that because the plea agreement called for a
dismissal of the third-degree CSC charge, which charge involved the element of penetration
while the crime he pleaded guilty to did not, the trial court should not have assessed him any
points for penetration. For the reasons set forth below, Rowland’s claim is unavailing.
The complainant, 13 years old at the time of the incident, testified under oath during the
sentencing hearing that, on November 13, 2005, Rowland entered the bedroom she was in and
took off her clothes. He touched her all over her body, including her breasts and genital areas,
and penetrated her vagina with his penis. All of this was done against the complainant’s will.
Rowland admitted that he was in a position of authority over the complainant, essentially acting
as her babysitter, and that he used that authority to inappropriately touch the complainant’s
breasts. Although Rowland denied penetrating the complainant, the trial court was entitled to
believe the complainant’s testimony.6 Accordingly, the trial court acted properly in assessing
Rowland 25 points for OV 11 because a criminal sexual penetration occurred pursuant to MCL
777.41(1)(b).7
3
MCL 777.41(1)(b).
4
People v Wilhite, 240 Mich App 587, 594; 618 NW2d 386 (2000).
5
People v Morson, 471 Mich 248, 255; 685 NW2d 203 (2004).
6
MCL 750.520h (providing that victim’s testimony need not be corroborated); People v Martin,
199 Mich App 124, 125; 501 NW2d 198 (1993) (stating that the trial court is in the best position
to judge witness credibility).
7
See People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 647; 658 NW2d 504 (2003) (the sentencing court’s
scoring should be upheld if there is any support in the record for it).
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Rowland cannot sustain his claim that penetration cannot be considered in sentencing him
for second-degree CSC on the basis that penetration is an element of the dismissed third-degree
CSC charge only. Although offense variables are generally to be scored on the basis of solely
the sentencing offense, where the offense variable statute specifically provides otherwise or the
non-sentencing offense arises out of the same transaction as the sentencing offense, scoring on
the basis of a non-sentencing offense is proper.8 MCL 777.41, the statute concerning the
assessment of points under OV 11, provides, in relevant part, that a sentencing court should
“[s]core all sexual penetrations of the victim by the offender arising out of the sentencing
offense.”9
Here, the evidence suggests that the penetration arose out of the sentencing offense.
Although the act of penetration was separate from the act of breast touching (to which Rowland
admitted, and for which he was convicted), it was all part of the same criminal transaction of
CSC. There is no evidence to suggest that the two acts, which indisputably took place on the
same date and at the same location, were part of separate incidents. Indeed, both Rowland and
the complainant testified under oath at the sentencing hearing to only one sexual assault incident.
The trial court did not need to look beyond the criminal transaction supporting the conviction to
assess points for penetration. Accordingly, because the penetration “arose out of” the sentencing
offense, the trial court did not err in assessing points for penetration.10
This result is consistent with the general case law concerning the assessment of points for
facts underlying dismissed charges. A sentencing court may assess points for facts underlying
dismissed charges so long as reliable evidence supports those facts and they are part of the same
criminal transaction that gives rise to the conviction for which the defendant is being
sentenced.11
8
People v Sargent, 481 Mich 346, 349-350; 750 NW2d 161 (2008).
9
MCL 777.41(2)(a). MCL 777.41 further provides that the sentencing court should not score
points for the one penetration that forms the basis of a first- or third-degree CSC offense. MCL
777.41(2)(c). Here, the trial court’s decision to assess points for penetration was in keeping with
this directive, the purpose of which is to exclude, as an aggravating offense factor, a factor
(sexual penetration) already given weight as an element of the sentencing offense. People v
Mutchie, 251 Mich App 273, 280; 650 NW2d 733 (2002). First- and third-degree CSC require
proof of penetration, while second- and fourth-degree CSC do not. MCL 750.520b, c, d, and e.
Assessing points for penetration when the sentencing offense itself is second- or fourth-degree
CSC, like it is here, is permissible because the court is not assessing points for a factor already
given weight as an element of the sentencing offense. See Mutchie, supra at 280.
10
People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 101; 712 NW2d 703 (2006); Mutchie, supra at 276-277
(applying the common dictionary definition of “arising out of” and concluding that it was
appropriate to assess points for penetration that occurred during the nonsentencing CSC offense
because that penetration occurred at the same place, under the same set of circumstances, and
during the same course of conduct, as the sentencing CSC offense).
11
People v Gullet (On Remand), 277 Mich App 214, 217-218; 744 NW2d 200 (2007), citing
People v Chesebro, 206 Mich App 468, 471; 522 NW2d 677 (1994); People v Lawrence, 206
Mich App 378, 379; 522 NW2d 654 (1994).
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Here, the evidence of penetration was reliable. There was no evidence to suggest that the
complainant’s testimony was untruthful. Indeed, the letter Rowland wrote to the complainant
after the incident serves as additional proof that Rowland took further steps to perpetuate a
woefully inappropriate sexual relationship with the complainant. Moreover, penetration “arose
out of” the sentencing offense, as noted above, and it was part of the same criminal transaction
that gave rise to the conviction for which Rowland was being sentenced. Thus, assessment of
points for OV 11 was proper.12
Accordingly, we conclude that Rowland’s plea was not illusory and that the trial court
did not err in denying his motion to withdraw his plea.13 Likewise, because the trial court did not
err in assessing points under OV 11, Rowland’s claim that his waiver of his trial rights was
unknowing and involuntary, which is based solely upon his illusory plea argument, is
unavailing.14
III. Scoring Of OVs 3, 4, and 11
A. Standard Of Review
Rowland argues that the trial court erroneously scored OV 3, 4, and 11. We review for
an abuse of discretion a trial court’s scoring decision to determine whether the evidence
adequately supports a particular score.15 We will uphold the trial court’s scoring decision if there
is any evidence in the record to support it.16
B. OV 3
OV 3 is scored for physical injury to a victim.17 Rowland received five points for OV 3
because bodily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim.18 The technical
12
See Mutchie, supra at 277.
13
Furthermore, Rowland’s claim that the plea agreement provided that sentencing would be
based solely on the elements of second-degree CSC is contrary to the evidence. Nowhere in the
written plea agreement, nor in the plea hearing transcript, is there mention of any such
sentencing agreement. In fact, the plea agreement expressly provides that no agreement was
reached regarding sentencing.
14
For a plea to be valid, it must be tendered knowingly, voluntarily, and understandingly.
People v Haynes, 221 Mich App 551, 569; 562 NW2d 241 (1997). Here, the court complied
with MCR 6.302 concerning the taking of pleas. Rowland was expressly informed at the plea
hearing that he would be waiving his trial rights if he pleaded guilty. Rowland stated that he
understood and wished to waive his trial rights. He also signed an advice of rights form that
detailed all of the trial rights that he was waiving. Accordingly, Rowland has no basis upon
which to argue that the waiver of his trial rights was unknowing and involuntary.
15
People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
16
Spanke, supra at 647.
17
MCL 777.33.
18
MCL 777.33(1)(e).
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dictionary definition of “bodily injury” is “physical damage to a person’s body.”19 The
complainant testified that Rowland inserted his penis into her vagina and had vaginal intercourse
with her against her will. She testified that she was a virgin before the incident occurred, and she
suffered back pain for a day as a result of the incident. She even sought medical treatment after
the incident. On these facts, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that
a 13-year old virgin, who was vaginally penetrated against her will and experienced back pain as
a result of the assault, suffered bodily injury for purposes of OV 3.
C. OV 4
OV 4 is scored for psychological injury to a victim.20 Rowland received ten points for
OV 4 because serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a
victim.21 Evidence that a victim suffered from nightmares and a disrupted life following the
incident is sufficient to support an assessment of ten points for OV 4.22 The complainant
testified that Rowland took off her clothes, touched her all over her body, and had vaginal
intercourse with her—all against her will. She stated that her entire life changed as a result of
Rowland’s sexual assault. She indicated that Rowland’s actions have caused her to be very
afraid of people, to suffer from nightmares, and to feel very hurt and emotional. The record
further indicates that the complainant has been in counseling as a result of the incident. On these
facts, it is reasonable to conclude that the complainant suffered serious psychological injury
requiring professional treatment. Thus, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to assess Rowland ten points for OV 4.
D. OV 11
OV 11 is scored for criminal sexual penetration.23 Rowland received 25 points for OV 11
because a criminal sexual penetration occurred.24 “Sexual penetration” is defined as “sexual
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any
part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s
body[.]”25 The complainant testified that Rowland inserted his penis into her vagina and had
sexual intercourse with her against her will. This testimony constitutes sufficient evidence of
penetration, and there is nothing on the record to suggest that the complainant was not a credible
witness. Further, as we concluded above, it is not error for the trial court to assess points for
19
People v Cathey, 261 Mich App 506, 514; 681 NW2d 661 (2004), citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th ed) (interpreting “bodily injury” with respect to scoring OV 3 in the context of a
CSC case).
20
MCL 777.34.
21
MCL 777.34(1)(a).
22
People v Drohan, 264 Mich App 77, 90; 689 NW2d 750 (2004).
23
MCL 777.41.
24
MCL 777.41(1)(b).
25
MCL 750.520a(p).
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penetration underlying a dismissed third-degree CSC charge when the sentencing offense is
second-degree CSC. Because there was evidence of penetration, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in assessing Rowland 25 points for OV 11.
IV. Departure From The Sentencing Guidelines
A. Standard Of Review
Rowland argues that the trial court lacked substantial and compelling reasons to depart
from the guidelines. We review for clear error whether a particular sentencing factor exists is a
factual determination for the sentencing court to determine.26 We review de novo whether a
particular sentencing factor is objective and verifiable.27 We review for an abuse of discretion
whether the objective and verifiable factors constitute substantial and compelling reasons to
depart from the statutory minimum sentence.28
B. Analysis
Rowland’s minimum sentence range for his conviction of second-degree CSC was 19 to
38 months. The maximum sentence for his conviction is 15 years.29 The trial court sentenced
Rowland to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment. It indicated that it was basing its departure on the
following two reasons: (1) Rowland attempted to continue an inappropriate relationship with the
13-year-old complainant after the incident, as evidenced by his letter to the complainant, and (2)
Rowland has shown little or no remorse. “A court may depart from the appropriate sentence
range established under the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and
compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for [the] departure.”30
Further, “a substantial and compelling reason must be construed to mean an objective and
verifiable reason that keenly or irresistibly grabs [the court’s] attention; is of considerable worth
in deciding the length of a sentence; and exists only in exceptional cases.”31 Finally,
[t]he court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or offender
characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate sentence
range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record, including
the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been given
inadequate or disproportionate weight.[32]
26
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 264; 666 NW2d 231, on rem 258 Mich App 679 (2003).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 264-265.
29
MCL 750.520c(2)(a).
30
MCL 769.34(3).
31
Babcock, supra at 258, (internal quotations and citations omitted).
32
MCL 769.34(3)(b).
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Rowland provides no support for his contention that the fact he sought to maintain an
inappropriate relationship with the complainant after the incident cannot serve as the basis for an
upward departure. First, this fact is objective and verifiable. Indeed, the letter was introduced
into evidence at the sentencing hearing. There was testimony that the handwriting in the letter
was Rowland’s, and that Rowland gave the letter to the complainant’s half-sister to deliver to the
complainant. Further, not only is it disturbing that Rowland would attempt to contact his 13year-old complainant after sexually assaulting her, even more disturbing is what Rowland
expressed in the letter. Rowland told the complainant that he loved her, age did not matter, they
should be together, he found it “hard to stop” his feelings for her, and she should ensure that her
half-sister did not tell anyone of the letter. This content casts major doubt on Rowland’s desire
and potential to rehabilitate himself. There is no evidence that this factor was adequately
accounted for in the guidelines. We are persuaded that this factor was objective and verifiable,
and constituted a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the guidelines.
The trial court also stated that Rowland’s lack of remorse justified an upward departure.
At the sentencing hearing, during which the complainant and Rowland’s young daughter spoke
of their deep hurt, pain, and betrayal at Rowland’s actions, Rowland expressed no remorse.
When asked if there was anything he wanted to say, Rowland’s only statement was, “It’s a lie.”
“The sentencing court may consider evidence of a lack of remorse in determining an individual’s
potential for rehabilitation.”33 “Resentencing is required only if it is apparent that the court
erroneously considered the defendant’s failure to admit guilt, as indicated by action such as
asking the defendant to admit his guilt or offering him a lesser sentence if he did.”34 Here, the
trial court did not erroneously consider Rowland’s failure to admit his guilt by offering him a
lesser sentence if he did. Rowland’s lack of remorse was not accounted for in the guidelines, and
it is a factor that casts further doubt on his desire and potential to rehabilitate himself. We
believe that this factor was objective and verifiable, and constituted a substantial and compelling
reason to depart from the guidelines.
Moreover, if there is a substantial and compelling reason for the departure, the extent of
the departure is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.35 We find that, in light of the disturbing
offense and offender characteristics discussed herein, the extent of the trial court’s departure is
not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Rowland’s sentence does not violate the principle of
proportionality.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
33
Spanke, supra at 650.
34
Id.
35
Babcock, supra at 265.
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