PEOPLE OF MI V TORREY REMEL BRISBANE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277365
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-012990-01
TORREY REMEL BRISBANE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of receiving and concealing
a stolen motor vehicle, MCL750.535(7). He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of two
years and six months to five years for each offense to run consecutively to a parole violation
sentence. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence adduced below to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was guilty of both counts of receiving and concealing a stolen motor
vehicle. We disagree. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 340; 721 NW2d 815 (2006).
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute
satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d
78 (2000). Therefore, on review all reasonable inferences and credibility choices are made in
support of the jury verdict. Id. at 400.
Defendant was convicted for receiving and concealing two stolen motor vehicles, a
Dodge Caravan and a Dodge Ram truck, under MCL750.535(7), which provides that “[a] person
shall not buy, receive, possess, conceal, or aid in the concealment of a stolen motor vehicle
knowing, or having reason to know or reason to believe, that the motor vehicle is stolen,
embezzled, or converted.” Therefore, to prove defendant’s guilt, the prosecutor must prove (1)
that the motor vehicle was stolen, (2) that the defendant bought, received, concealed, possessed,
or aided the concealment of the vehicle, (3) that the vehicle is identified as the vehicle previously
stolen, and (4) that the defendant had knowledge of the stolen nature of the vehicle at some time
during his wrongful course of conduct. People v Allay, 171 Mich App 602, 608; 430 NW2d 794
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(1988). Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the possession and guilty
knowledge elements of the statute.
As a question of fact, the issue of possession is reserved to the fact-finder. People v Hill,
433 Mich 464, 469; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). Possession may be established through reasonable
inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. Id. at 469; People v Mumford, 60 Mich App
279, 283; 230 NW2d 395 (1975). Moreover, in Michigan, possession encompasses both actual
and constructive possession. Id. at 470. “[A] person has constructive possession if there is
proximity to the article together with indicia of control.” Id. at 470. Therefore, so long as the
defendant has constructive possession, the prosecution does not need to prove actual physical
possession. People v Terry, 124 Mich App 656; 335 NW2d 116 (1983).
Taking into consideration all the facts surrounding the use of these stolen vehicles in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could find that defendant possessed
both vehicles. In regards to the Dodge Caravan, defendant, while under police surveillance, was
observed in actual possession of the vehicle as he drove it from the field to the street. Although
defendant argues that his possession was “temporary,” there is no time requirement in the statute;
therefore, on the record, there was sufficient evidence that defendant was in actual possession of
the stolen Dodge Caravan. In regards to the Dodge Ram truck, the evidence was also sufficient
to find that defendant was in constructive possession of the vehicle. He was observed taking the
tires off of the truck, which was located in the field next to where he was staying, while its
engine was still running. The evidence indicates proximity to and control over the truck.
In addition to possession, defendant must also have had knowledge of the vehicles’ stolen
status to be convicted of the crime of receiving and concealing a stolen motor vehicle. People v
Ainsworth, 197 Mich App 321, 324-325; 495 NW2d 177 (1992). Direct evidence of guilty
knowledge is rarely available and generally must be inferred from the surrounding
circumstances. People v Salata, 79 Mich App 415, 421; 262 NW2d 844 (1977). Furthermore,
“[k]nowledge concerning the status of a stolen item encompasses not only actual knowledge, but
constructive knowledge, through notice of facts and circumstances from which guilty knowledge
may fairly be inferred.” People v Wilbert, 105 Mich App 631, 637; 307 NW2d 388 (1981).
Defendant argues the prosecution failed to establish that defendant knew the vehicles
were stolen with either direct or circumstantial evidence. However, this Court has previously
held that guilty knowledge can be inferred in similar circumstances. See People v Biondo, 89
Mich App 96, 98; 279 NW2d 330 (1979), where the defendant claimed there was insufficient
evidence to show his guilty knowledge for receiving and concealing stolen property. When the
police took possession of the vehicle from the defendant, however, they discovered that the
ignition housing was damaged. Id. at 98. This Court held that a jury could infer the guilty
knowledge element when the person is in possession of a motor vehicle with readily detectable
damage to the ignition switch. Id. at 98. As in Biondo, defendant in this case was in possession
of vehicles that had noticeable damage to their steering columns and ignition systems.
Furthermore, the Dodge Caravan had the contents of the ignition system strewn about in the
inside of the vehicle. While under police surveillance, the defendant was observed driving the
Dodge Caravan, and it was reasonable to infer that, as he was driving, he would have noticed the
damage to the steering column and the ignition parts strewn in the vehicle. In regards to the
Dodge Ram truck, the damage to the steering column and the fact that the vehicle was on blocks
in a field with the engine running while defendant removed the tires supports that defendant
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knew the vehicle was stolen. Defendant was acting in a hurry and, as soon as he removed the
tires, he and his companion quickly moved them from the field and hid them from view in the
house. The circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to meet the guilty knowledge element of receiving and
concealing a stolen motor vehicle with respect to both vehicles.
We find, considering the totality of the circumstances in this case as set forth in the
record, that there was sufficient evidence to support both counts of receiving and concealing a
stolen motor vehicle.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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