PEOPLE OF MI V KASSEM MOHAMAD SALAMEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 21, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 275102
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 06-004275-01
KASSEM MOHAMAD SALAMEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Whitbeck and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.529 and MCL 750.157a. Defendant was
sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to concurrent terms of 12 to 20 years’
imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from a conspiracy to rob Tyson Janisch, a representative of
Atlas Oil Company, on Monday, March 21, 2005, outside of a Fast Track Gas Station owned by
defendant’s family. Defendant first contends that he was denied his right to due process and to
present a defense because the police failed to preserve (or purposely destroyed) potentially
exculpatory evidence. Detroit Police Investigator Maurice McClure seized the computer hard
drive from the gas station’s video surveillance system during the investigation. Investigator
McClure downloaded one minute of footage from the hard drive, depicting the actual
commission of the robbery. Investigator McClure then stored the hard drive, unplugged, in the
police station’s evidence room for two-and-a-half months. Defendant alleges that the remaining
surveillance footage was erased from the hard drive while in police custody. Defendant contends
that this footage was necessary to rebut the testimony of his codefendants, Michael Boyd, Cortez
Chenault, and Ronald Scott.
We review de novo constitutional issues, such as those related to the right to present a
defense and due process violations. People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 176; 740 NW2d
534 (2007). Defendant raised this issue in a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.
We review a trial court’s determination regarding a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003). A trial court acts within
its discretion when it selects from among “reasonable and principled” outcomes. People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
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Under principles of due process, “[a] criminal defendant has a right to present a defense.”
People v Anstey, 476 Mich 436, 460; 719 NW2d 579 (2006). As part of that right, the
prosecution is required to automatically disclose material, exculpatory evidence in its possession.
Schumacher, supra at 176, citing Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d
215 (1963). “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the trial result
would have been different, had the evidence been disclosed.” People v Fink, 456 Mich 449, 454;
574 NW2d 28 (1998) (footnote omitted). The prosecution and police are also required to
preserve “potentially exculpatory evidence” in its possession; however, the failure to do so only
violates the defendant’s right to due process when the prosecution or police act in bad faith.
Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 57-58; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988); Anstey, supra
at 460-461; People v Hunter, 201 Mich App 671, 677; 506 NW2d 611 (1993).
We hold that the trial court properly determined that defendant failed to establish that
Investigator McClure acted in bad faith. Comparing the trial and Ginther1 hearing testimony, it
appears that Investigator McClure spoke to defendant and/or his father, Mohamad Salamey, the
night of the robbery and found out that they did not know how to download the surveillance
footage. Accordingly, Investigator McClure secured a search warrant and seized the hard drive
on the day following the robbery. Such swift action was reasonable given that defendant
informed Investigator McClure that the hard drive would rewrite itself and the footage would be
lost forever. Investigator McClure would have no reason to believe that the slight variations in
the testimony of the witnesses regarding events on the day of the robbery would require
extensive examination of the lengthy surveillance footage. Further, there is absolutely no
evidence that Investigator McClure purposely erased the footage from the hard drive or
knowingly allowed the hard drive to rewrite.
Further, there is no reasonable probability that preservation of the remainder of the
surveillance footage would have changed the outcome of defendant’s trial. The jury heard the
inconsistencies among the codefendants’ testimony. Defense counsel’s strategy was to highlight
those inconsistencies. Surveillance footage, which may have disproved small points in the
codefendants’ testimony, would not likely have affected the jury’s determination.
Defendant also contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant
preserved this issue for appellate review by raising it in a motion for new trial, People v Snider,
239 Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), and the trial court conducted a Ginther hearing
to consider defendant’s claim.
Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a
mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A judge first must find the facts,
and then must decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. [People v LeBlanc, 465
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).]
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People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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We review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, MCR 2.613(C), and conclusions of
constitutional law de novo. LeBlanc, supra at 579. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed
and defendant bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76;
601 NW2d 887 (1999). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that
counsel’s deficient performance denied him the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that, but
for counsel’s errors, there is a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceedings would
have been different. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001); People v
Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
Defendant contends that defense counsel should have pursued the theory that defendant
had no motive or opportunity to rob Janisch on Monday, March 21, 2005, because Janisch
collected the cash proceeds from the station’s gasoline sales during that weekend. Therefore,
defendant would have no reason to know that Janisch would be carrying over $19,000 that day.
However, we should not presume with the benefit of hindsight that defense counsel was
ineffective just because the defense theory employed was unsuccessful. People v Pickens, 446
Mich 298, 330; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Defense counsel, Jeffrey Edison, testified at the Ginther hearing that the prosecutor’s
theory was that defendant orchestrated an “inside job” with an employee (Chenault) and some of
the employee’s friends (Scott, Boyd, and Shawn Fegan) to rob Janisch while he was carrying a
large sum of money. The prosecution theorized that the robbery occurred on Monday, March 21,
2005, because Janisch had not collected the proceeds that weekend. Accordingly, Janisch would
be collecting over $19,000 in cash – the amount actually recovered when the police apprehended
Scott and Fegan. Edison testified that there was no individual receipt documenting that Janisch
collected $19,000 on March 21, 2005. Rather, that amount was reached by totaling the receipts
dated March 19, 20, and 21, 2005.
During the trial, the prosecutor indicated that the attorneys stipulated to waive the
testimony of cashier, Senela Gant, who was an eyewitness to the robbery. Edison testified that
he did not learn that Gant had worked on Saturday, March 19, 2005, until after he had waived
her testimony at trial. At that time, the Salamey family informed Edison that Gant had initialed a
receipt acknowledging that Janisch came to the gas station and collected $8,763 in cash proceeds
on Saturday, March 19, 2005. However, defendant’s father never indicated when he told Edison
about this information. Edison admitted that he did not speak to Gant in preparing for trial and,
therefore, did not learn from Gant that she had worked that weekend. Edison indicated that the
prosecution received its copies of the collection receipts from Janisch. Edison received those
receipts as part of the discovery packet but the receipt initialed by Gant was not included. The
prosecution presented into evidence receipts dated on each day that weekend at trial. Defendant
initialed the receipt dated March 19, 2005, as provided by the prosecution.
Edison testified that the receipt dated March 19, 2005, and initialed by Gant, would have
prompted him to question Janisch’s credibility on the stand since Janisch testified that he did not
go to the gas station on the weekend preceding March 21, 2005. However, Edison did not
question Janisch about the collections allegedly made on Saturday and Sunday. He also never
questioned Janisch about the fact that he should not have $19,000 on his person on Monday,
March 21, 2005, when he was only collecting the proceeds for Sunday, March 20, 2005.
Accordingly, Edison admittedly failed to highlight that defendant would have no reason to know
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that Janisch would be carrying over $19,000 that day and, therefore, the alleged motive for the
robbery would be negated.
Edison claimed that he did not pursue the inconsistencies of the collection receipts or
attack Janisch’s credibility because “the heart of the case” was to expose the codefendants’
interest in lying to implicate defendant in order to minimize their roles in the robbery.
Furthermore, the police actually recovered the coat and money that was stolen from Janisch and
the gun used in the robbery when they arrested Scott and Fegan. Edison chose to steer the
defense to establish that Chenault was privy to the same information as defendant and
coordinated the robbery on his own.
Defendant failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective for choosing one theory
of defense over another. Investigator McClure learned of defendant’s involvement in the
conspiracy from the codefendants upon their arrests. Members of the codefendants’ families also
implicated defendant in the offense. Accordingly, it was reasonable to attack the credibility of
those individuals who implicated defendant. Furthermore, the codefendants testified that
defendant told them that Janisch would be carrying approximately $20,000 and the police
actually recovered over $19,000 when Fegan and Scott were arrested. Even if Janisch had
collected the proceeds during the weekend before the robbery and should have only been
carrying approximately $8,600, this coincidence is striking. Clearly someone (most likely
defendant) knew that Janisch would be carrying the entire weekend’s proceeds. Accordingly,
Edison’s choice of defense theories was not outcome determinative.
We further find that defense counsel was not ineffective for waiving Gant’s testimony at
trial. The failure to call or question witnesses is a matter of trial strategy that only amounts to
ineffective assistance if it deprives defendant of a substantial defense. People v Hoyt, 185 Mich
App 531, 537-538; 462 NW2d 793 (1990). “A substantial defense is one that might have made a
difference in the outcome of the trial.” People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569
(1990). However, defendant failed to rebut Edison’s testimony that neither defendant nor his
family members informed him of this defense until after he had waived Gant’s testimony at trial.
Absent information from his client, Edison would have no reason to know that Gant could
provide information other than cumulative evidence regarding her view of the robbery.
Defendant contends that Edison was ineffective for failing to present evidence that
defendant had recently upgraded the gas station’s surveillance system. Defendant asserts that
this information would have shown that he knew it would be “unwise” to rob the gas station on
the day in question. Defendant’s father testified regarding the upgrades to the system but did not
indicate whether he had shared this information with Edison. Accordingly, defendant failed to
establish that Edison even knew about this information.
Defendant contends that defense counsel should have taken some action in relation to the
missing surveillance footage. Edison testified that defendant’s father asked him to retrieve the
surveillance system hard drive from the police when they retained him as defense counsel.
Defendant’s father informed Edison that a review of the full footage would show the gas
station’s entire perimeter on the day of the robbery. Edison did, in fact, secure a copy of the
downloaded surveillance footage from the prosecution. The prosecutor informed Edison that he
had only received from the police the one-minute section depicting the commission of the
robbery. Defendant’s father testified that he did not know that the police and the prosecutor only
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had one-minute of footage until after trial. However, Edison claimed that he knew that the
footage provided by the prosecution was incomplete because defendant’s father told him that he
had viewed the footage from the entire day before Investigator McClure seized the hard drive.
We find that defense counsel’s failure to secure the full surveillance footage or challenge
the failure of the police to preserve the footage did not affect the outcome of defendant’s trial.
First, there is no record indication that the footage would have been saved had Edison secured
the hard drive sooner. Second, as noted supra, Investigator McClure did not act in bad faith by
failing to preserve this evidence. Accordingly, any objection on that ground would have been
meritless and defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it. People v Fike, 228 Mich
App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998). Third, Edison elicited testimony highlighting many of the
alleged inconsistencies between the codefendants’ testimony and the surveillance footage.
Edison elicited testimony that there was a six to eight-foot tall wall behind the gas station to
rebut Chenault’s testimony that he could see some of the robbery activity from where he
allegedly sat in defendant’s parked car on Alter Road. Defendant’s father testified that the
surveillance footage showed two men sitting on the picnic table outside of the gas station but
never showed one of the men entering the station to buy sodas. However, Edison elicited
testimony to highlight the inconsistent stories regarding whether Scott entered the gas station
before the robbery. Defendant’s father also testified that the surveillance footage did not show
any one “suspicious looking” standing across the street in front of the Family Dollar Store where
Chenault and Boyd allegedly acted as lookouts. However, defendant’s father did not testify that
no one was standing across the street. Accordingly, it is uncertain whether the surveillance
footage would have contradicted the codefendants’ testimony on this point.
Defendant contends that Edison should have called Sharod Scott, Ronald Scott’s sister, as
a witness to rebut Chenault’s testimony that defendant was involved in planning the robbery.
Sharod provided a statement to the police in which she stated that Chenault admitted to her that
he planned the robbery before he quit working at the gas station. Chenault allegedly told Sharod
that he provided all the details about the robbery, including how much money to expect and who
to rob. Edison testified that he used this information in formulating the defense. As a result, he
questioned Chenault about his role in planning the robbery in an attempt to show that Chenault
took advantage of defendant. As noted, supra, the decision not to call or question a witness only
amounts to ineffective assistance if the defendant is deprived of a substantial defense. Hoyt,
supra at 537-538. However, defendant was not denied the use of a substantial defense by the
omission of this witness. Edison did argue that Chenault knew about Janisch’s financial
activities at the gas station and planned the robbery without defendant’s involvement.
Defendant further contends that his convictions were against the great weight of the
evidence. Defendant raised this issue in his motion for new trial, but the trial court did not
decide the issue when it denied the motion on other grounds. Accordingly, the issue is not
properly preserved for appellate review. People v Stimage, 202 Mich App 28, 30; 507 NW2d
778 (1993). In any event, in support of his claim, defendant merely reiterates his previous
arguments in support of this issue. As we find that defendant failed to establish error requiring
reversal in relation to those previous arguments, we reject the current challenge to his
convictions.
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court relied on inaccurate information in
formulating his sentence and denied him the right to allocution at the sentencing hearing.
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Defendant preserved this issue for appellate review by raising it “in a proper motion for
resentencing.” MCL 769.34(10); People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310-311; 684 NW2d 669
(2004). Pursuant to MCL 769.34(10), this Court must affirm a sentence that falls within the
appropriate guidelines sentence range “absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or
inaccurate information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.” Defendant’s
sentence falls within the minimum statutory guidelines range for a second habitual offender,
MCL 769.10. The minimum sentencing guidelines range for a second habitual offender is 81 to
168 months. Accordingly, defendant’s minimum sentence of 12 years (144 months) is within the
appropriate range and we must affirm unless we determine that the trial court relied on
inaccurate information. MCL 769.34(10).
Defendant asserts that the trial court inaccurately determined that defendant “led the
perpetrators of the robbery astray” given that the codefendants all had prior criminal histories
and/or less than stellar personal backgrounds. Defendant also challenges the trial court for
treating him differently than the other parties involved based on his perceived stable and
privileged background. Defendant challenges the trial court for not allowing defendant’s family
to speak on his behalf before the imposition of his sentence and the author of his presentence
investigation report (PSIR) for failing to contact his family. We disagree.
First, regardless of the codefendants’ criminal histories, there is no reason to assume that
they would have committed this particular crime without the information provided by an “inside
man” such as defendant. Defendant correctly asserted that the codefendants had prior criminal
histories and, therefore, were not necessarily innocents being led astray. However, the trial court
did not make that assumption. Second, although defendant challenges the trial court’s bias
against him because he comes from a “stable and more privileged background,” defendant does
not contest the accuracy of that statement. It is indisputable that defendant’s parents own a
business that kept defendant employed.
Defendant challenges the trial court’s failure to consider the statements of his family and
friends in imposing the sentence. Pursuant to MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c), the trial court is required to
allow only “the defendant, the defendant’s lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim an opportunity”
to speak at the sentencing hearing. The court may, in its discretion, allow other parties to speak.
People v Lawson, 172 Mich App 498, 500-501; 432 NW2d 354 (1988). There is no indication
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s family members the opportunity
to speak at the sentencing hearing. Further, defendant has not provided testimony or affidavits
outlining his family members’ potential statements. Accordingly, it is uncertain whether these
statements would have affected the sentence imposed.
Defendant similarly contends that the author of the PSIR failed to contact his family
members and include their statements in the report. The author of the report indicated that she
attempted to contact defendant’s family once by telephone but “no contact was made.” A
defendant’s family members’ statements might be relevant to certain required considerations in a
PSIR, such as the defendant’s social history, MCR 6.425(A)(4), or the “evaluation of and
prognosis for the defendant’s adjustment in the community,” MCR 6.425(A)(10). However, the
court rule does not mandate that the author of the report include such statements when compiling
the PSIR. See generally MCR 6.425(A).
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Defendant also asserted that he was denied his right to allocution when the trial court
interrupted him at the sentencing hearing. As noted, supra, MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c) mandates the
court to allow a defendant and his counsel the opportunity to “advise the court of any
circumstances they believe the court should consider in imposing sentence.” The purpose of the
right to allocution is to allow a defendant “to speak in mitigation of the sentence,” to equalize the
sentencing process, and to allow the defendant to begin an atonement or healing process. People
v Petty, 469 Mich 108, 119, 121; 665 NW2d 443 (2003). However, we find that defendant was
not denied the right to allocution before his sentence was imposed. It is true that the court
interrupted defendant. However, there is no indication in the transcript that defendant was
denied the right to continue. Accordingly, we also affirm defendant’s sentences.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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