IN RE BEILBY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TROY ANDREW BEILBY and
THOMAS BEILBY, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283648
Antrim Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-003821-NA
TROY BEILBY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TAMMY PEIL,
Respondent.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Wilder and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Troy Beilby appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). For the reasons
set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
This appeal arises from respondent, the biological father of the two minor children.
Tammy Peil was their mother1. Tammy Peil was married to William Peil when the children
were born, so William Peil was the children’s legal father. Tammy Peil used marijuana during
her pregnancies with both children, causing a CPS case to be opened when one of the children
was born with narcotics in his system. In May 2005, Tammy Peil placed the children under the
limited guardianship of their maternal grandmother, despite the fact that she had a history of 24
CPS referrals relating to neglect or abuse of her own children and two other children under her
1
The mother of the minors did not appeal the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental
rights in this case.
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guardianship, the most recent in April 2004. Tammy Peil and respondent resided in the
apartment above the maternal grandmother and the children, but that home burned down in
October 2005.
In March 2006, police responded to a verbal argument at the home respondent and
Tammy Peil shared and found it to be filthy, with the floor covered with trash, rotten food, and
animal feces. Respondent reported that Tammy Peil smoked marijuana regularly and became
mean when she was unable to buy it. The children returned to the maternal grandmother’s home,
but it, too, had animal feces on the floor and in the drawers where the children’s clothing was
kept and other safety hazards, causing the minors to be placed in foster care. The minors
exhibited signs of past trauma including sexual abuse.
On appeal, respondent argues that even though the children had been previously abused
and neglected by their guardians, the only allegations against respondent in the original petition
were his residence in a dirty apartment and a verbal argument with Tammy Peil. Respondent
completely rectified those conditions before the termination hearing by separating physically and
emotionally from Tammy Peil. Respondent contends that he was fully employed, had a suitable
home for the children, and had benefited from parenting classes. Thus, respondent contends, the
trial court erred in terminating his parental rights, and its order should be reversed. For the
reasons set forth in this opinion we disagree with the assertions of respondent.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and
convincing evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991). This Court
reviews the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(J); In
re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A finding is clearly erroneous if, although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Regard is given to the special ability of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. Id.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination of
respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J);
In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The conditions leading to the
children’s temporary wardship with regard to respondent were his one-time physical abuse of
another son in 2000, domestic discord with the children’s mother, and an environmentally unfit
home. Angry arguments, the unfit home environment, and to a lesser extent respondent’s prior
severe physical discipline of his then 13-year-old son all constituted respondent’s failure to
provide proper care or custody for the minor children.
The evidence showed that the minor children resided much of the time with respondent
and their mother from the time the first was born in 2002 to the time they were removed at the
ages of one and three in March 2006, even though their mother was married to another man, and
in disregard of a guardianship established in May 2005, placing the children with a guardian who
had an extensive protective services history. Respondent chose to father the minor children even
though he knew their mother was a regular marijuana user and married to someone else, which
prevented him from being the children’s legal father. Also, despite respondent’s presence in the
children’s home in years during which he claimed to have performed the majority of child care
and housekeeping, the older child was repeatedly sexually abused and the younger was severely
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traumatized, and the home became filthy and environmentally unfit. The children were seriously
harmed during the time respondent was a significant presence in their lives. The evidence also
indicated respondent had difficulty controlling his temper, his parenting skills were poor, he was
depressed, dependent, and resistant to change, he would not likely seek out services, and he had
narcolepsy. In order to become a minimally fit parent it was essential that respondent improve
his parenting skills, particularly in the areas of child development and parent-child roles, and
take significant steps to address his emotional and physical condition.
During the 11 months between initial disposition and commencement of the termination
hearing, respondent only partially addressed his anger by attending six of 26 anger management
sessions. He also completed only seven to nine parenting classes, made no progress in one-toone parenting sessions and was described as “unworkable,” and never began counseling to
address his depression and dependent personality or treated his narcolepsy. He blamed the
children’s mother for their previous neglect and the state of the home, for failing to enroll him in
services during this proceeding, and for squandering most of an income tax refund. He blamed
his employer for unjustly terminating his employment. He blamed both of those parties for
contributing to his depression and narcolepsy. Instead of admitting his parenting deficits and
making a wholehearted effort to improve, respondent blamed others for those deficits, as
indicated by his primary argument on appeal that separating from the children’s unfit mother
rendered him fit to parent the children. The trial court was not in error when it rejected these
arguments as evidence of respondent’s fitness as a parent.
The trial court correctly noted that respondent was not without some strengths, and the
trial court was required to decide whether to terminate the parental rights of a parent who had a
home and employment, had no known substance abuse issues, and was of normal intelligence,
but who had been unable to keep the children safe or properly care for them in the past and who
had not made any progress toward improving his parenting skills or addressing his depression
and dependency. However, the trial court correctly found that respondent’s condition at the
conclusion of the termination hearing in September 2007 was the same as it had been at the time
of initial disposition in June 2006, with the exception of his separation from the children’s
mother. Mere separation from her, as poor a mother as respondent’s family testified she had
been, was not sufficient to suddenly render respondent a fit parent. The harm to the children had
occurred when their mother was physically present but virtually absent as a parent and while
respondent was the one purportedly caring for the children and the home. There was not
evidence that respondent had progressed at all in his treatment to a point where the trial court had
any basis to believe that respondent would now be a fit and responsible parent.
Given the evidence as a whole, and giving deference to the trial court’s ability to judge
the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it, we cannot find that the trial court made a
mistake in finding respondent had not rectified the improper care and custody that led to the
children’s wardship and was not reasonably expected to do so within a reasonable time. In re
Miller, supra at 337. We concur with the trial court’s finding that because respondent had made
no progress, the children remained at risk of harm if placed in his care.
Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
clearly contrary to the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The evidence showed respondent loved the children and
asserted his paternity as soon as their mother’s husband relinquished parental rights. However,
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the evidence also showed respondent was not likely to become a fit parent within a reasonable
time and that, perhaps partially due to their placement in foster care at such young ages, the
children did not have a normal attachment to him. The oldest child was particularly impacted by
sexual abuse and required special services and long-term therapy, and the evidence indicated
respondent would not reliably obtain the special services the children required. The trial court
did not err in going one step further than the statute required in finding that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was not only not contrary to the children’s best interests, but in their
best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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