PEOPLE OF MI V ADAM BENJAMIN KIRSCH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277156
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-210880-FH
ADAM BENJAMIN KIRSCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Wilder and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a
sheriff’s deputy, MCL 750.81d(1). He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense,
MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 46 months to 15 years each, with no credit for time
served. Defendant appeals as of right, and for the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from an altercation with sheriff’s deputies in the Oakland
county jail. The prosecution’s witnesses, consisting of sheriff’s deputies who were present
during the altercation, and some inmates, testified that defendant was upset because he was being
housed in a crowded jail cell and wanted a bed. He began yelling, using vulgar language, and
threatening other officers. Officers ordered defendant to put on his shirt and exit his cell.
Witnesses testified that defendant walked up and swung at one deputy, struck another deputy,
and continued swinging his arms. Other deputies entered the cell and attempted to restrain
defendant while keeping other inmates back. Defendant continued to resist the deputies’
commands and physically resisted his removal from his cell. The deputies eventually took
control of defendant and moved him to another cell, where he continued to resist commands until
he became winded and gave up.
In contrast to the prosecution’s witnesses, defendant testified that he obeyed the order to
exit his cell, but when he did so, a deputy grabbed him by the throat and threatened to beat him.
He testified that although he tried to comply with the deputies’ orders, the deputies kicked and
punched him. He denied disobeying any direct orders from the deputies, or resisting or
obstructing the deputies from performing their duties.
On appeal, defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a
jury instruction on his right to resist excessive force by the deputies. Because defendant did not
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raise this issue in a motion in the trial court, this Court’s review is limited to mistakes apparent
from the record. People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he was so prejudiced by
counsel’s representation that he was denied the right to a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). Defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466
NW2d 315 (1991). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
People v Johnnie Johnson, Jr, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). A defendant must
also demonstrate that they were prejudiced by counsel’s performance. People v Dendel, 481
Mich 114; 748 NW2d 859, 865 (2008).
A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate, and present all substantial
defenses. Where there is a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a defense, the
defendant must show that he made a good-faith effort to avail himself of the right to present a
particular defense and that the defense of which he was deprived was substantial. A substantial
defense is one that might have made a difference in the trial’s outcome. People v Kelly, 186
Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990).
Under the common law and Michigan’s earlier resisting arrest statute, MCL 750.479, it
was necessary to prove as an element of the offense of resisting arrest that the defendant was
subject to a lawful arrest. People v Ventura, 262 Mich App 370, 374; 686 NW2d 748 (2004).
Therefore, the right to resist an unlawful arrest was a defense to a charge under MCL 750.479.
Ventura, supra.
However, MCL 750.479 was replaced by MCL 750.81d(1), which provides:
Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (4), an individual who
assaults, batters, wounds, resists, obstructs, opposes, or endangers a person who
the individual knows or has reason to know is performing his or her duties is
guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine
of not more than $2,000.00 or both.
MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(v) defines a “person” to include a sheriff or deputy sheriff. MCL
750.81d(7)(a) defines “obstruct” as including “the use or threatened use of physical interference
or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.”
In Ventura, supra at 375-377, this Court held that, unlike MCL 750.479, because MCL
750.81d does not refer to the lawfulness of an arrest or detaining act, the lawfulness of a
defendant’s detention is not an element under MCL 750.81d. Defendant argues, however, that
even if the lawfulness of a detaining act is not an element of MCL 750.81d, a defendant may still
assert as a defense to a prosecution under MCL 750.81d that he used reasonable force to resist an
officer’s unlawful use of excessive force. Assuming without deciding that such a defense is not
foreclosed, the facts of this case did not support such a defense.
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Defendant testified at trial and denied refusing to comply with the deputies’ commands or
physically resisting the deputies in the performance of their duties. He testified that he was
grabbed by the throat and that the deputies used force against him, even as he tried to cooperate.
Defendant denied being an aggressor or fighting back. Defendant’s theory was that he was
beaten without justification or cause.1 Under these circumstances, defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to request an instruction on defendant’s right to use reasonable force to
resist an officer’s unlawful use of excessive force. Such an instruction was not supported by the
evidence and would have been inconsistent with defendant’s theory that he did not attempt to
resist the officers or fail to comply with their commands. See People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636,
645; 664 NW2d 159 (2003) (counsel was not ineffective for failing to request an instruction that
was not supported by the evidence and inconsistent with the defense theory).
Next, defendant argues that because there was evidence of several acts that might have
supported conviction for the charged offenses, the trial court erred by failing to give a specific
instruction advising the jury that it had to unanimously agree on the particular act that formed the
basis for each conviction. Because defendant did not request a specific unanimity instruction at
trial, or object to the instructions given, this issue is not preserved. People v Van Dorsten, 441
Mich 540, 544-545; 494 NW2d 737 (1993). Accordingly, our review of this issue is limited to
plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Gonzalez, supra at 643.
At trial, the jury heard evidence of various different acts that could have supported the
charges. There was testimony that defendant (1) ignored an order to be quiet, (2) ignored an
order from Deputy Cardona to put on his shirt and exit the cell, (3) swung at, but did not strike,
Deputy Cardona, (4) struck Deputy Wargel, (5) ignored commands from Deputy Wargel to stop
resisting, (6) ignored commands from Deputy Vasquez to get down on the ground, and (7)
ignored commands to place his hands behind his back. Despite this evidence, defendant was
charged with only two counts of resisting or obstructing a sheriff’s deputy. One charge pertained
to Deputy Cardona and the other to Deputy Wargel.
In People v Bobby Martin, 271 Mich App 280, 338; 721 NW2d 815 (2006), this Court
explained:
A defendant has the right to a unanimous verdict and it is the duty of the
trial court to properly instruct the jury on this unanimity requirement. People v
Cooks, 446 Mich 503, 511; 521 NW2d 275 (1994). It is undisputed that the trial
court gave the jury a general unanimity instruction at defendants’ trial. Under
most circumstances, a general instruction on the unanimity requirement will be
adequate. Cooks, supra at 524. However, the trial court must give a specific
unanimity instruction where the state offers evidence of alternative acts allegedly
committed by the defendant and “1) the alternative acts are materially distinct
1
Although defendant admitted that he refused to comply with a deputy’s order to be quiet, he
explained that he disobeyed that order because he was exercising his First Amendment rights of
free speech. There was no evidence presented that defendant tried to physically defend himself
in response to the command to keep quiet.
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(where the acts themselves are conceptually distinct or where either party has
offered materially distinct proofs regarding one of the alternatives), or 2) there is
reason to believe the jurors might be confused or disagree about the factual basis
of defendant’s guilt.” Id.
Although there was evidence of several different acts that might have supported a
conviction for the charged offenses, we conclude that the failure to give a specific unanimity
instruction did not amount to a plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
In her closing argument, the prosecutor explained that the two charges were based on (1)
defendant’s failure to comply with Deputy Cardona’s command for defendant to come out of his
cell, and (2) defendant’s failure to comply with Deputy Wargel’s command for defendant to put
his hands behind his back and stop resisting. Also, for each deputy, the possible alternative acts
that may have supported separate charges were not materially distinct, but rather occurred within
the same sequence of events. Further, the defense position was that defendant never resisted or
disobeyed a command. The defense did not challenge one possible alternative act over another.
In this regard, this case is similar to Van Dorsten, supra. In that case, the defendant was
charged with a single count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but the complainant testified
that the defendant committed five separate acts of penetration. Id. at 541. The defendant denied
committing any sexual assaults. Id. at 542. The defendant did not request an instruction on a
requirement of unanimity with regard to a particular act. Id. at 544. The Supreme Court
determined that regardless of whether it would have been proper to instruct the jury that its
verdict must be unanimous with respect to a particular act or theory where there were several that
might have supported conviction of the offense, the issue was not preserved with an appropriate
objection at trial and appellate relief was not necessary to avoid manifest injustice. The Court
reasoned:
The number or specific identification of acts of sexual penetration was not
in dispute in this case. The defendant’s position was simply that there was no
sexual assault committed. It was obvious to the participants in the trial that the
verdict turned on whether the jury believed the testimony of the complainant and
Terry Doyle on the one hand, or found reasonable doubt that any sexual assault
occurred, as claimed by the defendant. Given that posture of the case, there was
no reason for the parties to focus on the specifics of individual penetrations. In
this context, the failure to give an instruction requiring unanimity on a particular
act in no way impeded the defense or denied the defendant a fair trial. [Id. at
545.]
Likewise, the focus of this case did not involve a dispute over specific acts of resistance or
failure to comply with specific commands. Rather, defendant’s position was that he complied
with all of the officers’ commands and never resisted. As in Van Dorsten, the case turned on
whether the jury believed the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the one hand, or found
reasonable doubt that any resistance or failure to comply occurred at all, as claimed by
defendant. In this context, the failure to give a specific unanimity instruction did not affect
defendant’s substantial rights.
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For these reasons, the failure to give a specific unanimity instruction does not require
reversal.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to award him sentence credit
for time served awaiting trial. The trial court determined that because defendant was on parole
when the offenses were committed, any credit for time served was required to be applied against
his prior sentence. We find no error.
Defendant was not entitled to sentence credit under MCL 769.11b. This Court has
consistently held that because MCL 768.7a(2) provides that sentences of persons convicted of
committing offenses while on parole “begin to run at the expiration of the remaining portion of
the term of imprisonment imposed for the previous offense,” any sentence credit applies to the
previous paroled offense, not a new offense. Pursuant to MCL 791.238(2), credit for time served
by a parole detainee applies only to the sentence for which parole was granted. People v Stead,
270 Mich App 550, 551-552; 716 NW2d 324 (2006); People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 638640; 696 NW2d 754 (2005); People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705-708; 686 NW2d 821
(2004).
Contrary to what defendant argues, MCL 791.238 does not violate a defendant’s right to
equal protection and due process even though it treats parolees differently than nonparolees with
respect to sentence credit. People v Stewart, 203 Mich App 432, 434; 513 NW2d 147 (1994).
Further, because defendant is entitled to credit for time served against the remaining portion of
his previous sentence, the denial of credit against his new sentence does not violate his double
jeopardy protections. North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; 89 S Ct 2072; 23 L Ed 2d 656
(1969), overruled in part on other grounds in Alabama v Smith, 490 US 794; 109 S Ct 2201; 104
L Ed 2d 865 (1989).
Defendant has not provided any support for his claim that he never received credit against
his earlier sentence. Further, our review is limited to the sentences defendant received in this
case. We lack jurisdiction to consider issues involving defendant’s previous sentence for the
paroled offense, which is not before this Court. To the extent that defendant questions the
wisdom of the Department of Corrections’s application of the statutes involved, his argument
should be addressed to the Legislature.
Defendant argues in a pro se supplemental brief that the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions, and that the jury’s verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
An appellate court’s review of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction does
not turn on whether there was any evidence to support a conviction, but whether there was
sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441
Mich 1201 (1992). The evidence must be reviewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution.
Id. at 514-515.
This case essentially involved a credibility contest between the prosecution and defense
witnesses. Testimony from the prosecution’s witnesses indicated that defendant refused to
comply with Deputy Cardona’s command to exit his cell, and that he also failed to comply with
Deputy Wargel’s command to put his hands behind his back and stop resisting. This testimony,
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if believed, was clearly sufficient to support defendant’s convictions for two counts of resisting
or obstructing a sheriff’s deputy, contrary to MCL 750.81d(1). Although contrary testimony was
presented by the defense witnesses, we are required to view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and resolve credibility disputes in favor of the jury’s verdict when
reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Wolfe, supra at 514-515. Because the
evidence, so viewed, was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions, we reject his challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant also argues that the jury’s verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
Such a claim is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Here, however, defendant failed to
preserve this issue by raising it in a motion for a new trial. People v Musser, 259 Mich App 215,
218; 673 NW2d 800 (2003). Therefore, our review of this issue is limited to plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Id.
“The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is
whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Id. at 218-219. Conflicting testimony, even when
impeached to a certain extent, is generally not a basis for granting a new trial. Id. at 219.
“[U]nless it can be said that directly contradictory testimony was so far impeached that it ‘was
deprived of all probative value or that the jury could not believe it,’ or contradicted indisputable
physical facts or defied physical realities, the trial court must defer to the jury’s determination.”
Id., quoting People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 645-646; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
Here, although defendant challenged the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses, their
testimony was not so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value that it could not be
believed. Accordingly, it was for the jury to weigh the conflicting testimony and determine
which account was accurate. Defendant has failed to establish a plain error affecting his
substantial rights.
Defendant’s pro se brief also raises several other issues that are not within the scope of
his statement of the question presented. “This Court need not consider issues that are not
properly set forth in the statement of questions presented.” People v Walker, 276 Mich App 528,
545; 741 NW2d 843 (2007), vacated in part 480 Mich 1059 (2008). Nonetheless, we have
considered defendant’s remaining issues and find no basis for relief. We additionally find no
merit in any of defendant’s remaining arguments presented in his pro se brief and accordingly,
we affirm the convictions and sentences of defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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