IN RE ASHTYN LEWIS SNIDER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ASHTYN LEWIS SNIDER,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
August 14, 2008
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 283286
Ionia Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-000251-NA
JON HENRY GRANDY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., Zahra and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his parental rights to
the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We affirm. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that the statutory ground for termination was
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). Respondent failed to provide proper care and custody for the minor
child by failing to provide food, clothing, money, or in any manner attempting to provide for the
child during his life. Respondent’s failure to comply with the parent-agency agreement also
supplies evidence of his failure to provide proper care and custody. In re JK, 468 Mich 202,
214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). The trial court also did not clearly err by finding that there was no
reasonable likelihood that respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the
child within a reasonable time considering his age. At the time of trial, respondent was
incarcerated, with his earliest possible date of release 19 months in the future. Thus, even
assuming that respondent were paroled at the earliest possible time, expeditiously secured
housing and employment, and successfully addressed the barriers to reunification, which include
his sexual offender status as well as issues of emotional stability, it would appear that the earliest
possible time when he could provide proper care is likely in excess of two years from the time of
the termination hearing. The trial court did not clearly err by concluding that this is not a
reasonable time considering the age of the child, who was eight months old at the time of
termination.
-1-
Respondent argues on appeal that the agency improperly rushed to judgment by filing a
supplemental petition for termination of his parental rights at the time of the first dispositional
review hearing. However, the filing of a petition for termination at the time of the first
dispositional review hearing was not improper. A supplemental petition for termination may be
filed “at any time after the initial dispositional review hearing.” MCR 3.977(G)(1)(a). The
supplemental petition in this matter was filed on the same date as the first dispositional review
hearing, and, respondent suggests in his brief, after the hearing.1 Thus, the filing of the petition
at this time was not improper or erroneous, and does not warrant relief on appeal. To the extent
that error is claimed in the trial court’s authorization of the petition, that claim is also without
merit. Pursuant to MCR 3.977(G), the court must take action on a supplemental petition for
termination if the child is in foster care. Id. Since authorization of such a petition is not
required, it was merely superfluous and supplies no basis for a claim of error.2
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5). Respondent has no relationship
with the child and has never seen him. The child is placed with his maternal grandparents, who
are interested in adopting him, and who have already adopted two of his half-siblings.3 Agency
reports indicate that the minor child has a healthy bond with the maternal grandparents as well as
his half-siblings. Under these circumstances, where the child is in a stable family that wishes to
adopt him, and where respondent father will be unable to care for the child for at least 19 months
and in all likelihood upwards of two years given the uncertainty of parole as well as the need to
complete the parent-agency agreement subsequent to his release, the trial court did not clearly err
by finding that termination was not contrary to the best interests of the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
1
Respondent states that, at the December 5, 2007, hearing, the court authorized petitioner to file
a petition, and then states that petitioner did file such a petition. Even if the petition was filed in
the hours before the dispositional review hearing, we perceive no prejudice to respondent and
would find the technical violation of the court rule to be harmless error. MCR 2.613(A).
2
Respondent’s statement of the issues suggests that he claims error in the trial court’s requesting
a petition for termination. However, the body of his argument refers only to the agency and
service providers’ “rush to judgment.” Although the issue is not properly presented on appeal, it
would provide no grounds for relief even if properly stated since the filing of the petition was not
improper.
3
These are not children of respondent but of the child’s mother. Her rights were previously
terminated to the two older children. The mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to
this minor child during the proceedings in this matter.
-2-
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