ERIKA MARIE FICK V JOSEPH C FICK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ERIKA MARIE FICK,
UNPUBLISHED
August 14, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
No. 274284
Roscommon Circuit Court
LC No. 05-725257-CH
AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY,
Intervenor-Appellee,
and
JOSEPH C. FICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., Saad, C.J., and Smolenski, J.
PER CURIAM.
In this action to quiet title, defendant, Joseph Fick, appeals the trial court’s judgment for
plaintiff, Erika Fick. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to support
her fraud claim, and failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant transferred
the marital home by fraud or that, due to her mental incapacity, plaintiff did not understand the
consequences of signing the deed.1
1
When a party alleges fraud or mistake, “the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must
be stated with particularity.” MCR 2.112(B)(1); LaMothe v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 214 Mich App
577, 586; 543 NW2d 42 (1995). Defendant also claims that he should have been granted
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), release of claim, but he fails to explain how
plaintiff released her claim. We therefore deem this issue abandoned. Etefia v Credit
Technologies, Inc, 245 Mich App 466, 471; 628 NW2d 577 (2001). In any event, defendant fails
to submit any evidence that plaintiff executed a release.
-1-
Defendant’s arguments overlook that undue influence is a recognized species of fraud. In
re Jennings’ Estate, 335 Mich 241, 247; 55 NW2d 812 (1952); Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App
704, 710; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).2 In 1994, plaintiff and defendant married and, in 1996,
plaintiff sustained a closed head injury that caused physical and cognitive impairments. Plaintiff
asserted in her complaint that she suffers from severe brain trauma. Her allegations also indicate
that defendant deceived her about the nature of the transactions he induced her to enter. Plaintiff
stated that she “signed the Mortgage as a result of fraud,” or, in the alternative that “Defendant
was in a fiduciary relationship with her and exercised undue influence over her to procure her
signature on the Mortgage.” Plaintiff also alleged that defendant fraudulently induced her to
execute the quitclaim deed and mortgage, and that he was attempting to force her eviction by
claiming that she was a tenant, and not an owner, of the marital home. These allegations are
sufficiently particular to establish that defendant was plaintiff’s fiduciary, and that he used this
role as an opportunity to influence her to enter into transactions that were to his advantage and
her disadvantage.3
Defendant does not dispute that there existed a fiduciary relationship between defendant
and plaintiff after plaintiff’s accident. Indeed, defendant acknowledged his wife’s state of
dependency and testified that he decided to divorce her because she had become more like a
daughter than a wife. Defendant did not extract himself from his role as plaintiff’s fiduciary
when he divorced her. He concealed the divorce from her, and continued to live in the marital
home, controlled her finances, and collected insurance payments for providing care. Plaintiff
also presented ample evidence that defendant exploited the fiduciary relationship to enrich
himself at her expense. Plaintiff testified that she relied on defendant, as her husband, to manage
financial matters because her accident left her unable to do so. She stated that she signed
documents at his request, without knowing what they were. She denied that defendant told her
about the divorce, although she recalled that he brought her to the courthouse and had her sign
papers that he partly covered with his hand. She also denied having any memory of signing
mortgage documents or a quitclaim deed.
2
To establish undue influence, a plaintiff must show that the grantor was subjected to threats,
misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud, or physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower
volition, destroy free agency, and impel the grantor to act against the grantor’s inclination and
free will. In re Estate of Karmey, 468 Mich 68, 75; 658 NW2d 796 (2003); In re Estate of
Erickson, 202 Mich App 329, 331; 508 NW2d 181 (1993).
3
Defendant asserts that plaintiff was never subjected to a guardianship or conservatorship, and
was never found to be legally incompetent to manage her affairs. However, in Seeley v Price, 14
Mich 541 (1866), our Supreme Court recognized that persons with limited mental capacity are
entitled to protection from undue influence by those in a position of trust. Furthermore, MCL
750.174a(1) and 750.145m(u)(i) reflect a public policy to protect all dependent persons from the
encroachments of predators without limiting that protection to persons subjected to a
guardianship or conservatorship. Plaintiff showed that her injuries rendered her vulnerable, she
had reason to trust, not distrust, her husband, and that defendant unscrupulously breached the
marital trust by exploiting his wife’s vulnerability.
-2-
The objective evidence of defendant’s conduct of these transactions revealed numerous
irregularities that corroborate plaintiff’s claim of undue influence. Defendant failed to deliver
the quitclaim deed for the marital home to plaintiff as required by the divorce judgment. He
falsely represented that he and plaintiff were still married when he applied for a mortgage on the
house, and he failed to obtain plaintiff’s signature on the promissory note. Defendant also
borrowed far more money than was necessary to pay off the land contract, and he used a
significant portion of the loan proceeds for his sole benefit. The quitclaim deed that conveyed
plaintiff’s interest in the marital home to defendant contained discrepancies in the date.
Although defendant testified that he structured these transactions in order to pay off the land
contract, make home repairs, and enable plaintiff to continue living in the marital home, he failed
to plausibly explain why he failed to comply with the divorce judgment, why he falsely
represented his marital status, why he borrowed far in excess of the amount necessary to pay off
the land contract, why he spent more than $20,000 of the loan proceeds for himself, or why the
quitclaim deed listed inconsistent dates.4
All these circumstances clearly and convincingly establish undue influence. The
evidence overwhelmingly supports the inference that defendant preyed on plaintiff’s dependency
and induced her to act against her inclination and against her best interests by jeopardizing her
well-being for defendant’s benefit. The trial court did not err in finding that defendant’s
irrational and inadequate explanations were not credible.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in ordering judgment for plaintiff because
she failed to prove that she lacked mental capacity to enter into a contract. Defendant relies on
the fact that plaintiff was able to describe a mortgage as “[a] loan taken out on a house,” and she
understood that the loan must be repaid. This argument is erroneous both factually and legally.
Plaintiff’s ability to accurately describe a mortgage three years after the events that gave rise to
this lawsuit does not prove that she reasonably understood the “nature and effect” of the
mortgage transaction that defendant induced her to enter into in 2003. There is no factual basis
for finding that plaintiff understood that defendant was borrowing far more than the amount
owed on the land contract, that he was falsely representing his marital status to plaintiff and the
lender, or that he was using loan proceeds to buy himself costly items of personal property.
Moreover, there is no evidence that plaintiff understood what she was doing when she
quitclaimed her interest in the marital home to defendant. Plaintiff testified that she did not
know what a quitclaim deed is; furthermore, the irregularity with the names and dates on the
quitclaim deed establishes defendant’s fraudulent intent.
Moreover, defendant’s argument equating undue influence with lack of mental capacity is
erroneous on the merits. Undue influence and lack of mental capacity to contract are distinct
4
We also note that defendant attempted to sell the marital home to Judy Harshman, the mother
of a woman defendant dated following the divorce. Harshman then offered to let plaintiff stay in
the house only if she paid rent of $500 per month.
-3-
legal theories.5 Accordingly, plaintiff was not obligated to prove that she lacked mental capacity
to enter into a contract in order to prove her claim of undue influence. Because the evidence
overwhelmingly established that defendant violated his fiduciary obligations to plaintiff by
preying on her weakness and inducing her to jeopardize her interests for his benefit, the trial
court did not err factually or legally in entering judgment for plaintiff.6
5
Michigan case law on undue influence focuses on the fiduciary’s exercise of influence or
coercion against the grantor, not the grantor’s capacity to understand the transaction in
circumstances where there was no influence or coercion. In Erickson, supra 202 Mich App 329,
this Court separately addressed the questions of whether the grantor acted according to undue
influence, or whether he lacked capacity to contract, when he changed the beneficiaries on six
annuity contracts. Id. at 330-332.
The distinction between the two theories has been more clearly delineated in other
jurisdictions. See Liebelt v Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845; 801 P2d 52 (1990) and Dillin v Alexander,
281 Or 679, 683-684; 576 P2d 1248 (1978); See also 1 Restatement Contracts, 2d § 177(1), p
490, defining undue influence as “unfair persuasion of a party who is under the domination of
the person exercising the persuasion or who by virtue of the relation between them is justified in
assuming that the person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare.”
6
Defendant also argues that plaintiff’s failure to submit a timely response to his request for
admissions entitled him to judgment. MCR 2.313(A) permits a party to serve on another party a
written request for the admission of the truth of assertions relating to permissible areas of
discovery. A party’s failure to submit a timely objection or answer to an opposing party’s
request for admissions constitutes an admission that the assertion is true. MCR 2.313(B)(1).
However, MCR 2.312(D)(1) provides:
A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the
court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of an admission. For good
cause the court may allow a party to amend or withdrawn an admission. The
court may condition amendment or withdrawal of the admission on terms that are
just.
The trial court did not directly address this matter when defendant raised it in his trial brief and
before trial. However, by deciding this case on the merits, based on the evidence presented at
the bench trial, the trial court implicitly accepted plaintiff’s belated response as timely. This
implicit decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion where the delay was likely
attributable to plaintiff’s mental limitations, which impede her ability to comprehend legal
proceedings and act in her own best interests. See People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587; 663
NW2d 463 (2003) (trial court’s discovery decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
To the extent that the trial court erred in failing to make explicit findings and an explicit
ruling pursuant to MCR 2.312(D)(1), the error was harmless. MCR 2.613(A) provides that
“anything done or omitted by the court . . . is not ground for granting a new trial . . . or otherwise
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice.” Excusing plaintiff’s delay in responding to the request for admissions
is not inconsistent with substantial justice, especially in view of plaintiff’s cognitive
impairments.
-4-
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-5-
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