PEOPLE OF MI V WESLEY LATHAN WILSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 12, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 276059
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-027899-FC
WESLEY LATHAN WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals of right his conviction of one count of conspiracy to commit bank
robbery, MCL 750.531 and MCL 750.157a, and two counts of bank robbery, MCL 750.531.
Defendant was sentenced as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to concurrent prison terms
of six to 18 years on each of the three counts. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that statements made by the alleged principal actor in the bank
robberies, which were admitted through the testimony of another witness, were improper hearsay
evidence of a codefendant that deprived defendant of his Sixth Amendment1 right to
confrontation. At trial, plaintiff solicited testimony from a witness concerning statements made
by the alleged principal bank robber. When defendant objected, plaintiff agreed that the
evidence was hearsay, but argued that defense counsel had opened the door to the evidence.
Michigan has adopted the rule of curative admissibility, but has recognized that the rule
is one within the discretion of the trial court: “[T]he admission of such evidence is not a matter
of absolute right, but rests in the sound discretion of the court.” Grist v Upjohn Co, 16 Mich
App 452, 483; 168 NW2d 389 (1969).
Under the rule of curative admissibility, or the “opening the door”
doctrine, the introduction of inadmissible evidence by one party allows an
opponent, in the court’s discretion, to introduce evidence on the same issue to
rebut any false impression that might have resulted from the earlier admission.
See United States v. Segall, 833 F.2d 144, 148 (9th Cir.1987); United States v.
1
US Const, Am VI.
-1-
Makhlouta, 790 F.2d 1400, 1402-03 (9th Cir.1986); I J. Wigmore, Evidence § 15
(Tillers rev. 1983). The doctrine does not permit the introduction of evidence that
is related to a different issue or is irrelevant to the evidence previously admitted.
McCormick on Evidence § 57 (3d ed. 1984). [United States v Whitworth, 856
F2d 1268, 1285 (CA 9, 1988).]
For the rule to apply, however, there must initially be an introduction of inadmissible evidence.
See Grist, supra at 482-483.
The objected-to testimony concerned what the principal actor had told the witness about
his involvement in the crimes when the principal returned home after committing the robberies.
This general line of questioning had been inquired into by both parties prior to defendant’s
objection. At the time of the objection, the trial court was within its discretion to find that the
door had been opened to the subject. However, as the prosecutor continued along this line, the
witness eventually began to testify regarding statements made by the principal actor that directly
implicated defendant. The “‘truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely
threatened when an accomplice’s confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal
defendant without the benefit of cross-examination.’” People v Watkins, 438 Mich 627, 656;
475 NW2d 727 (1991), quoting Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530, 541; 106 S Ct 2056; 90 L Ed 2d 514
(1986) (emphasis removed). The admission of an accomplice’s statement, implicating a
defendant, “does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the prosecution can establish that his
statement bore adequate indicia of reliability,” or “if the statement fell within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception.” People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 671-672; 664 NW2d 203 (2003).
Michigan courts have not held that a statement against the declarant’s penal interest, pursuant to
MRE 804(b)(3), is a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.” Id. at 672.
As a threshold matter for MRE 804 admission, the declarant must be unavailable to
testify. A witness that refuses to testify based on the Fifth Amendment2 privilege against selfincrimination, satisfies this requirement. Id. In Washington, counsel for the codefendant stated
on the record that his client would refuse to testify based on his Fifth Amendment privilege.
People v Washington, 251 Mich App 520, 526-527; 650 NW2d 708, rev’d 486 Mich 667 (2002).
Here, there is no indication on the record that the principal actor would refuse to testify. See
Washington, supra, 468 Mich at 673-674 (refusing to accept as evidence statements by defense
counsel that a witness had a history of mental illness because there was not evidence presented
on the record). However, given the other evidence tending to show that defendant drove the
principal actor to and from the robberies—including defendant’s own testimony—it cannot be
said that the error affected the outcome of the trial. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662
NW2d 376 (2003).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to take a plea
offered by defendant. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to accept or reject a plea for an
abuse of discretion. People v Grove 455 Mich 439, 460; 566 NW2d 547 (1997). A court’s
discretion to accept an offered plea is restricted by the requirement that the court ensure that the
2
US Const, Am V.
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defendant’s “plea is understanding, voluntary, and accurate.” MCR 6.302(A); see People v
Safforld, 465 Mich 268, 272; 631 NW2d 320 (2001). The court must additionally make certain
inquiries and disclosures, including an inquiry into whether there is “support for a finding that
the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which the defendant is pleading.”
MCR 6.302(D)(1). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court chooses an outcome falling
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 265;
666 NW2d 231 (2003).
As the plea agreement was being placed on the record, defendant raised some concerns
about his prior statement. These concerns were sorted out. While the court was ensuring that
defendant understood his plea, it became apparent that defendant was crying. However,
defendant insisted on continuing with the plea. When the court asked defendant if he understood
his rights and wished to give them up, defendant stated that he wished to give them up, but asked
if he would get leniency. Shortly afterward, the court stated that it would not take defendant’s
plea. “[F]or the record,” the court stated, “this gentleman is in tears. He is upset, and—and I am
not going to go home in my conscience and allow this gentleman to plead guilty under these
circumstances.” Given the confusion surrounding the plea, and deferring to the court’s superior
position to assess the dynamic of what was going on than this Court can on a dry reading of the
written transcript, it was reasonable for the court to refuse to take the plea at that time. Id.
Defendant next argues that certain questioning and statements by the prosecutor
constituted misconduct. “A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed de novo.” People v
McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 630; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). But if unpreserved, “prosecutorial
misconduct may only be reviewed for plain error.” People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 413;
740 NW2d 557 (2007). Review is “on a case-by-case basis, looking at the prosecutor’s
comments in context, and in light of the defense arguments and the relationship of the comments
to evidence admitted at trial.” Id.
Defendant argues that questions directed toward a police officer concerning a search of a
house where the principal bank robber was living constituted misconduct because the evidence
tended to improperly connect defendant with illegal drug use or possession. However, the
testimony explained how the officer came to be involved in the bank robbery investigation.
Additionally, the search warrant that was executed in the hope of finding illegal drugs resulted in
the discovery of evidence of the robbery. This testimony was at least minimally relevant to show
the course of the officer’s investigation into the robberies, and thus the prosecutor’s questioning
was simply a good-faith effort to develop relevant evidence. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58,
70; 732 NW2d 546 (2007) (“A prosecutor’s good-faith effort to admit evidence does not
constitute misconduct.”). Further, none of the testimony indicated that defendant used or
possessed any narcotics. In fact, the prosecutor attempted to ensure that that inference was not
made when he stated in the presence of the jury, “I’m not trying to accuse [defendant] of being a
drug dealer.”
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by implying that
defendant decided to fabricate testimony after hearing the overwhelming evidence presented
against him. Specifically, the prosecutor argued as follows: “He realized the evidence is
overwhelming, so he took the stand and he did something which he wasn’t required to do. The
People have to prove the intent of the case. The defendant’s required to prove nothing. That’s
the protection of the law.”
-3-
A prosecutor should not denigrate a defendant by making “intemperate and prejudicial
remarks.” People v Cox, 268 Mich App 440, 452; 709 NW2d 152 (2005). A prosecutor also
“may not vouch for the credibility of witnesses by claiming some special knowledge with respect
to their truthfulness.” McGhee, supra at 630. “A prosecutor may, however, argue from the facts
that a witness is credible or that the defendant or another witness is not worthy of belief.”
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). Here, the prosecutor was not
vouching for a witness based on “special knowledge” or using intemperate remarks to denigrate
defendant. Rather, the prosecutor was arguing that based on the testimony presented,
defendant’s story was not worthy of belief. The prosecutor did not denigrate defendant as the
defendant, but argued against his credibility as a witness. Plaintiff had the right to comment on
defendant as a witness in the same manner that plaintiff could have commented on the testimony
of any other witness. Id.3
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly made a personal attack against
defense counsel. Because defendant did not preserve this issue, it is reviewed for plain error
affecting substantial rights. Odom, supra at 413. “A prosecutor may not suggest that defense
counsel is intentionally attempting to mislead the jury.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572,
692; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). “When the prosecutor argues that the defense counsel himself is
intentionally trying to mislead the jury, [the prosecutor] is in effect stating that defense counsel
does not believe his own client.” People v Wise, 134 Mich App 82, 102; 351 NW2d 255 (1984).
The prosecutor began his rebuttal closing by responding to defense counsel’s comment
that if he “were representing [the principal actor], I guess I would have to say . . . you win.” The
prosecutor correctly pointed out that defense counsel could not actually concede the case against
the principal actor if he were acting on his behalf. However, the prosecutor then linked that
argument with a clear implication that the veracity of defense counsel’s argument on behalf of
defendant was suspect. Specifically, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel was “an advocate
for whoever he represents,” and that defense counsel’s statements were “suspect because it
shows that it’s an advocate for one side saying, I know what all the evidence says, and I know
what common sense might say, but I want you to take the position of my client who has said
this.” In other words, defense counsel does not believe in his client, does not believe in what he
is saying, and is simply trying to mislead the jury because that is his job.
3
A closer question, one not raised by defendant, is whether the prosecutor impinged upon
defendant’s right to testify. “The right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial has
sources in several provisions of the Constitution. It is one of the rights that ‘are essential to due
process of law in a fair adversary process.’” Rock v Arkansas, 483 US 44, 51; 107 S Ct 2704; 97
L Ed 2d 37 (1987), quoting Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 819 n 15; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed
2d 562 (1975). Arguing that defendant chose to testify because he knew the case against him
was overwhelming tends to tread on his right to testify to meet the charges raised against him.
Nonetheless, the jurors were instructed that it was their “job to decide what the facts of the case
are, to apply the law as [given by the court] . . . , and in that way decide the case.” They were
also instructed that “[t]he lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence.” “It is well
established that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich
476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
-4-
Assuming, arguendo, that the comments were improper, the record does not support a
finding that defendant was prejudiced by the comments or that they “‘resulted in the conviction
of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.’” Odom, supra at 413, quoting People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312,
329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). The comments were during rebuttal, after both sides had the
opportunity to argue the facts of the case, and constituted a very small part of plaintiff’s
argument. Moreover, the jurors were instructed that it was their “job to decide what the facts of
the case are, to apply the law as [given by the court] . . . , and in that way decide the case.” They
were also instructed that “[t]he lawyers’ statements and arguments are not evidence.” “It is well
established that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Graves, 458 Mich
476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). For these same reasons, we also reject defendant’s cumulative
effect argument. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 649; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
Defendant finally argues that the trial court should not have relied on two offenses the
parties agreed were not to be relied upon for scoring prior record variable (PRV) 5. Defendant’s
argument displays a basic misunderstanding about what occurred below. At sentencing,
defendant raised two separate objections to the scoring of PRV 5. First, defendant argued that
two misdemeanors listed on the presentence investigation report—harassing and alarming
conduct and causing or risking public—should not be used to calculate PRV 5 because he was
never charged with them. The trial court denied the challenge. In his subsequently filed written
objections, defendant again challenged the scoring of PRV 5. This time, defendant conceded
that harassing and alarming conduct and causing or risking public could be scored. However,
defendant argued that two other listed misdemeanors—both open intoxicant, as a passenger—
should not be scored, which would result in PRV 5 being scored at five points instead of ten.
Plaintiff agreed that PRV 5 should be reduced from ten to five and the court granted the change.
The sentencing information report indicates that PRV 5 was scored at five points. Thus, no error
occurred.
Defendant also argues that the court improperly relied on facts that were attributable to
the principal actor, and not defendant, in sentencing defendant. Because defendant did not
preserve this issue, it is reviewed for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Callon,
supra at 332. At issue is the trial court’s reference to the principal actor’s use of “disgusting
disguises.” An examination of the court’s statement in context reveals that the court was
concerned with the fact that defendant had argued that he was innocently driving the principal
actor around without knowing of the bank robberies. The trial court was using the fact that
defendant was driving a person with pubic hair glued to his face to illustrate that the court did not
believe that defendant could have innocently driven the man around from bank to bank. In doing
so, the court was properly accounting for the facts surrounding the offenses, and defendant’s
participation in the offenses. People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 98; 617 NW2d 721 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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