PEOPLE OF MI V ERNEST GORDON III
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 12, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 260592
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 04-00946-FC
COREY DEMARION MCCULLOUGH,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 261724
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 03-007771-FC
ERNEST GORDON, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Zahra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a consolidated trial, a jury convicted defendant Corey Demarion McCullough
(McCullough) of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant
McCullough to sixty to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder
conviction, to be served consecutively to 2 years’ imprisonment for his felony-firearm conviction
and the remainder of a 2 to twenty years’ imprisonment sentence for a previous conviction for
which he was on parole when he committed the instant offenses. McCullough appeals as of
right.
In regard to defendant Ernest Gordon, III, (Gordon), a jury failed to reach a verdict and
the trial court ordered a mistrial. After retrial, a jury convicted Gordon of second-degree murder.
The trial court sentenced him, as a habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11, to sixty to
ninety-nine years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the remainder of a 2 year’ term of
imprisonment and a 1 to twenty year’ term of imprisonment for previous convictions for which
he was on parole when he committed the instant offense. He also appeals as of right.
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I. Basic Facts
This case arose from the shooting death of Ean French (French), who died in his home
from twelve gunshots from two different caliber weapons sometime between the late hours of
February 3, 2003 and early hours of February 4, 2003.
French was a distributor of high-grade marijuana. He also used other drugs, particularly
heroin. On January 30, 2003, French asked Damien Johnson (Johnson) and James Schultz
(Schultz) to travel from Grand Rapids to Detroit to obtain heroin for French. Johnson and
Schultz complied with French’s request. Upon returning to Grand Rapids, Johnson then
arranged for Gordon to drive Schultz and him to French’s home where Gordon first met French.
French told Gordon that he trafficked marijuana.
On February 3, 2003, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Gordon called Johnson and asked for
French’s phone number because Gordon wanted to “‘highlight’ [French] about some business.”
Johnson gave Gordon the phone number. Later that day, around 8:00 p.m., French called
Johnson and asked and was provided Gordon’s phone number.
In the early morning hours of February 3, 2003, McCullough called Edward Johnigan
(Johnigan) from Grand Rapids and asked if he was interested in trading a half-ounce of heroin
for a half-pound of high-grade marijuana. Johnigan obtained a half-ounce of heroin in Detroit.
Johnigan left Detroit for Grand Rapids at around 2:00 p.m. on February 3, driving his sister’s
white Grand Am.
Later that day, at around 8:00 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., Christian Burke (Burke), a friend of
French, stopped by French’s house and purchased $200 of marijuana. Burke testified that French
had told him that he had recently received $70,000 worth of high-grade marijuana. He also
noticed a large stack of Viagra samples. Around 9:30 p.m., French told Burke to leave because
he had some “buddies” stopping over.
When Johnigan arrived in Grand Rapids, McCullough directed him over his cell phone to
McCullough’s girlfriend, Yvonne Thompson’s (Thompson), home. Thompson is also Gordon’s
sister. Johnigan stayed at Thompson’s home until around 8:00 p.m. or 9:00 p.m., and then drove
McCullough to a nearby Marathon station where they met Gordon. Johnigan had never before
met Gordon. McCullough got into Gordon’s white minivan, and Johnigan followed Gordon to a
Meijer’s store. Gordon and McCullough went into the store and came out together, but Johnigan
claimed he did not know if they made a purchase. Johnigan followed Gordon and McCullough
to French’s home. Gordon went into French’s house, and McCullough and Johnigan waited
together in Gordon’s van. Gordon then called McCullough, and Johnigan went inside French’s
house with the heroin. Johnigan claimed to have had two guns in his possession, a .38 caliber,
and a .40 caliber pistol that he was holding for McCullough, who owed him money.
At trial, Johnigan testified on behalf of Gordon and with no objection from McCullough.
Johnigan basically testified that Gordon and McCullough set up a drug deal between he and
French, and that after the drug deal, he alone robbed and murdered French. At the time Johnigan
testified, a jury had already convicted him of murdering French, but he had not yet been
sentenced. Also, Johnigan had previously been convicted of murder-for-hire in an unrelated
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case; See People v Johnigan, 265 Mich App 463, 696 NW2d 724 (2005) (this Court indicating
that Johnigan is a “hardened contract killer”).
Johnigan testified that, inside the house, he gave Gordon the heroin, and Gordon and
French went into the kitchen to sample and weigh it. Afterwards, French gave Johnigan a halfpound of marijuana, and French told Johnigan that he wanted more heroin. Johnigan and French
began to talk about Johnigan’s heroin connection. After McCullough honked the car horn,
Gordon went outside, leaving Johnigan and French to talk about Johnigan’s heroin connection.
Johnigan testified that he became frustrated that French would not show him a larger
quantity of marijuana. Johnigan then asked to use the bathroom and when French stood to show
him where it was, Johnigan struck him in the head with a gun. By gunpoint, Johnigan ordered
French not to move and retrieved a roll of tape from the kitchen counter, which he then used to
bind French. Johnigan stabbed French in the arm and demanded French tell him where his
marijuana was located, but French consistently told him it was not in the home. Johnigan
claimed that he searched the home but did not find a large amount of marijuana. He again tried
to force French to tell him where the marijuana was located, but French did not tell him.
Johnigan then shot French several times with a .38 caliber pistol. French was not dead, however,
and Johnigan shot him several more times with his .40 caliber pistol.
Johnigan testified that after he killed French, he went directly home to Detroit. He stated
that he did not see Gordon or McCullough after Gordon left French’s home. In Detroit, he sold
his guns to a friend, though he later borrowed back the .40 caliber pistol. Police later raided
Johnigan’s home and found the .40 caliber pistol, along with a large cache of weapons, including
two bulletproof vests, three assault rifles and a flash suppressor. Johnigan also testified that he
did not intend to rob French until he was in his home, and that he did not tell Gordon or
McCullough about his intent to rob French. He also maintained that McCullough never entered
the house.
The prosecution established that the following calls were made between defendants’ and
Johnigan’s phones around the time of the offense. Between January 24, 2003 and February 2,
2003, there were 17 phone calls between McCullough and Gordon. On February 3, 2003, there
were 17 phone calls between McCullough and Gordon. After February 3, 2003, to March 4,
2003, there were 13 phone calls between McCullough and Gordon. Between January 20, 2003
and January 29, 2003, there were eight phone calls between McCullough and Johnigan. From
January 30, 2003 to February 2, 2003, there were no phone calls between McCullough and
Johnigan, but on February 3, 2003, there were 24 phone calls between McCullough and
Johnigan. After February 3, 2003, there were 11 phone calls between McCullough and Johnigan.
These phone calls, which would bounce off nearby cellular phone towers, tended to
establish Johnigan’s and defendants’ movements. Although their movements were largely
consistent with Johnigan’s testimony, the prosecution emphasized that from February 3, 2003 at
11:58 p.m. until February 4, 2003 at 1:57 a.m., the time Johnigan indicated he was at French’s
home, defendants and Johnigan did not make or accept any calls. From this evidence, the
prosecution maintained that defendants and Johnigan searched French’s home for drugs and
money.
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The prosecution also presented evidence that Gordon was at Thompson’s house in the
evening of February 3, 2003. Thompson reluctantly testified that, later in the evening of
February 3, 2003, she saw a white car in her driveway she believed was Johnigan’s car. She
observed two or three people standing near the open trunk of the car. She testified that she wired
money to McCullough in Detroit on February 4, 2003. She testified that, on February 5, 2004,
she observed McCullough with marijuana that he previously did not have. Her description of the
marijuana matched the description of the marijuana sold by French. She testified that
McCullough had Viagra after February 3, 2003. Notably, Johnigan testified that he did not give
McCullough any marijuana that he took from French’s home and that he did not remove Viagra
from French’s home. Thompson also testified that McCullough had previously possessed the .40
caliber pistol recovered from Johnigan’s home.
In May and July 2003, felony complaints were issued against Gordon, McCullough and
Johnigan as co-defendants, generally alleging that they conspired and murdered French. The
trial court granted Johnigan’s motion for a separate trial. As mentioned, Johnigan was tried first,
and a jury convicted him of murdering French. At the initial consolidated trial, the Gordon jury
began deliberating on September 20, 2004, and the McCullough jury began deliberations the
next day. On September 23, 2004, the trial court received a note from the Gordon jury indicating
it was deadlocked and requested that the trial court “side bar” with the jury foreperson. The trial
court read a standard deadlock instruction1 to the Gordon jury and did not meet with the jury
foreperson. Also on September 23, 2004, the McCullough jury sent the trial court a note, which
provided that, “We are at an impasse. What do we do? What can be discussed when everyone is
not in the room?” The trial court stated, “[s]tarting with the second question first, ‘What can be
discussed when everyone is not in the room,’ the answer is nothing. This is a twelve-member
jury panel, and no discussions can be had without all twelve members participating. Everybody
has to participate in all discussions pertaining to this case. It is strictly forbidden to discuss it in
separate context.” In response to the first question, the trial court gave a standard deadlock jury
instruction. Following this instruction, the jury foreman, Juror 14, of the McCullough jury
stated:
Your Honor, I think we all agreed before we came in here that we have to
get everybody that’s on this jury to take their blinders off and we have to have an
open mind.
We have a situation here—and we all agreed we’re going to speak freely
here—if you go into that jury room the first day and you make a comment about
what your decision is already and it’s not going to change, no matter what we do
and no matter what logic we try to apply in the jury room, if an individual or more
than one individual has blinders on so much that they will not—and is just dead
set on, “This is how I am and nothing that you can say is going to change,” and, in
1
We note that the several deadlock jury instructions given in this case were consistent with
CJI2d 3.12, and that there was no objection to any of the deadlock instructions.
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fact, people may have made the comment, “I’ll even tell the judge that,” I think
that it’s important that anybody on this jury that’s not willing take their blinders
off needs to address that right now with you, so when we go back to the jury room
we don’t go back and deal with what we have been dealing with in the last two
days, because we’re not going to get anywhere.
The trial court then stated:
I appreciate that, and I have to say that the jurors have taken a solemn oath
and obligation to deliberate this case honestly and in good faith, which means, as I
said earlier, not only expressing views, but also explaining what facts in evidence
and what logical analysis those facts are based on so that other people can then
say, “Oh, I agree with that,” or, “No, I believe there’s an error in your thinking
with regard to this point and here’s why.” That’s how deliberations are
conducted.
If persons refuse to participate in that process and refuse to deliberate with
a view toward reaching an agreement, then they are not following their juror’s
oath, and if there’s anyone here that will not do that, then we need to know about
it, because that clearly is a violation of the oath they have taken and potentially
makes that person unsuitable as a juror.
People have to participate in the process, they have to deliberate, and
going into a room and folding one’s hands and saying, “I don’t want to be
confused by the facts, I don’t want to be confused by the law, I don’t want to be
confused by logic, this is my position and I’m not moving,” that’s not
participating in the deliberative process. That’s a violation of the juror’s oath.
That’s against the law. It’s contrary to everything we’re trying to achieve here.
You’ve got to be open-minded and you’ve got to approach the process
with a view that it’s a logical exercise and an exercise in which reasonable adults
can participate and exchange views if they become convinced they’re wrong.
There was no objection to the trial court’s instruction, and McCullough’s counsel expressed that:
I have no problem with the colloquy that took place with the individual
juror, whether he’s in fact the foreman or not, because I think that obviated the
need to have them leave and send you a note in a couple minutes.
However, my one observation is there’s a very fine line between saying,
‘You have an oath to deliberate,’ versus the instructions that are given saying, ‘If
you have a firm conviction, you ought not change that conviction if it’s based on
logic,’ et cetera. It was a close line there.
The trial court then stated:
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I agree with you completely, and I reiterated that very line I think at least
once and maybe twice in my discussion, because I agree with you, there is a fine
line. No one has to surrender their honest conviction.
On the other hand, everyone has to explain the rational basis for their
opinions, and deliberate and discuss the case with a view toward reaching an
agreement if they can without violating their own conscience, and that was the
burden of what I was trying to achieve, and if I did it badly I apologize. If anyone
thinks I need to amplify it, I certainly will.
McCullough’s counsel replied, “No, your Honor.”
The next day, September 24, 2004, in regard to the McCullough case, the trial court
indicated that there had been some “interesting developments overnight and this morning.”
First, we had a phone call on the answering machine when we came to
work here this morning at 8:00. There was a message from . . . [(Juror 13)].
[Juror 13] sounded rather weak and frail and said that she and her children were
ill. She didn’t specify what the problem was, although she did say that she didn’t
see how they could manage because they were running to the bathroom at regular
intervals, which allows us to draw certain conclusions. She said she would not be
coming in.
Gail, the jury clerk, apparently reached her by phone and found that she
was on her way to the doctor and she is apparently, I don’t know, going to secure
appropriate treatment.
The trial court also indicated that it had received a note from the McCullough jury
foreman, which stated:
As foreman for the McCullough jury I need to point out the problems we
are having. One of our jurors (Seat #13) from day one has stated and maintains
the position that we will not be able to convict Mr. McCullough because she is
going to vote not guilty on all counts. It doesn’t matter what any of the other
jurors have to say. She maintains . . . [that] nothing (I believe) any of us has to
say is going to change her mind.
Yesterday when confronted by another juror about her stand, her response
was, ‘You shut up.’ She has on at least two occasions stated, ‘You will not get a
conviction because I vote not guilty on all counts . . . .’
Her attitude in the jury room is what caused us to be brought into your
chambers yesterday.
It is my feeling that unless this issue is addressed, we will end up in a
hung jury, no matter how long we will deliberate. So unless you want us to be at
the courtroom Christmas party, you must intervene.
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The trial court contacted an alternate juror to replace Juror 13. The prosecution agreed to
the alternate, but McCullough’s counsel objected, stating:
I would object to this in any form. It’s very apparent that she is being
removed from the jury because she has a firm moral conviction that Mr.
McCullough’s not guilty. I don’t think that’s a proper reason for removing her
from the jury.
This Court, and we talked about this yesterday, has instructed the jury that
if you have a firm moral conviction, don’t give in and stick with it, and that’s
apparently what she is doing, and she’s being removed as a result of that.
Now, she’s called in sick and said that she’s sick today. There’s no reason
to believe that this won’t carry over until Monday. It may be unfortunate and
inconvenient, but there’s no reason to believe that she would not show up Monday
if told to come back Monday. And taking her off the jury because she refuses to
find Mr. McCullough guilty I don’t think is an appropriate reason.
The trial court then questioned Juror 14 in more particularity in regard to Juror 13’s
failure to deliberate. Afterwards, the trial court held that:
. . . it seems to me that we do have an extraordinary circumstance, where
we have a juror, [Juror 13], who has not deliberated but indeed announced before
deliberation commenced that she had made up her mind and was not about to
change it. She thumbs through magazines when jurors are discussing the case,
and when jurors address her in order to try and draw out the basis of her opinion,
she tells them to shut up.
To make matters worse, she has apparently suffered some kind of illness,
and indeed Michelle Vidro, my clerk, advises that she mentioned during the trial
that she had not been feeling well and was having difficulty sleeping, which is
perhaps not unusual . . . .
She has indicated this morning that by way of a call-on message that she’s
suffering what apparently is some sort of, apparently some sort of intestinal
problem, which may or may not have been exacerbated by nerves or whatever
else is involved.
It seems to me our choices are to go into limbo for several days to await
some outcome here, and then perhaps question her about this whole matter, or
simply to mercifully replace her, as she requested on the answering machine tape
this morning, and proceed with deliberations with [an alternate juror] in her place.
I am inclined, I think bearing in mind the length of the trial that we’ve
engaged in thus far, to opt for a replacement, simply because we have a very good
opportunity to proceed with a juror who is evidently untainted and even represents
the same demographic as the replaced juror, and even the same neighborhood as
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the replaced juror, and I think can fill in, even though we have to start
deliberations again.
*
*
*
But based on what we’ve heard, I’m going to direct that [Juror 13] be
removed from the jury and allowed to recuperate from her maladies and [an
alternate Juror] be substituted in her stead.
The following Monday, September 27, 2004, at around 11:35 a.m., the McCullough jury
returned a verdict finding McCullough guilty of second-degree murder. Also on September 27,
2004, at around 12:39 p.m., the trial court indicated it had received a note from the Gordon jury.
The note requested the trial court remove a juror claimed to be refusing to deliberate. The note
then specified reasons supporting its request, including the juror’s close-mindedness, inability to
explain conclusions, outbursts and use of foul language and contact with Gordon’s girlfriend and
glances toward Gordon. The trial court found no legal basis to reconstitute the jury and later
ordered a mistrial.
The evidence presented at Gordon’s second trial substantially tracked the evidence
presented in the initial consolidated trial. Following the presentation of the evidence, the trial
court instructed the jury and it began its deliberations on November 3, 2004. On November 5,
2004, the jury sent the trial court a note indicating it could not reach agreement. The trial court
without objection issued a standard deadlock instruction to the jury. The following Monday,
November 8, 2004, the jury in this case, during deliberations, wrote a note indicating a “[n]eed to
break until 1 p.m. The trial court excused the jury, and at 2:00 p.m., indicated the jury had
returned except for Juror 9. According the trial court:
Looks like juror in Seat #9 evidently took off her juror badge and turned it
in at the jury clerk’s office and more or less seceded from the jury. She called the
Court over the noon hour and left a recorded message which counsel and I have
listened to. In the message she essentially says it’s been a long, hard trial and it’s
been very stressful, that it’s ruining her health and that she’s sorry, but she just
can’t go on, that she can’t come back, that she can’t do this anymore. And I think
in three different ways she reiterated that she’s not coming back.
The trial court discussed the matter on the record with all counsel present. The prosecution
suggested that an alternate be seated, finding significant that Juror 9 had not indicated her vote.
Defense counsel objected, again requesting that the Juror 9 be brought before the trial court for
questioning. The trial court held:
Well, I guess I’m of the opinion that to bring [Juror 9] back would simply
be counterproductive. If I thought by bringing her back and holding hands with
her we could woo her back to the process, I’d say let’s do it. But if we bring her
in here by force and against her will, I just don’t see her as being a productive
deliberating participant in the process. I think she seceded from the panel,
lawfully or not, and I think we have to accept that as a fete accompli. So to the
extent that you want us to go round her up and drag her back, I’m disinclined to
do that.
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The trial court seated one of the alternates.
The jury reached a verdict the following day, November 8, 2004, at 11:00 a.m., finding
Gordon guilty of second-degree murder.
II. Docket No. 260592
A. Juror Misconduct
1. Juror’s Conversation with Mechanic
McCullough first argues that the trial court erred in not excusing Juror 14 from the jury.
Because there was no objection to the trial court’s decision, this Court reviews unpreserved
claims of appeal for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). On the third day of trial, the trial court entertained Juror
14’s concern over a discussion he had with his mechanic. The juror explained:
What happened, your Honor, is on Tuesday—I have some folks out in Ada
that are rebuilding a pick-up truck for me, and I went out to tell the guys I
wouldn’t be around for a couple of weeks because I was on a jury duty and I had a
trial. And they just asked what it was, and I said, “Well, it’s a murder trial.
Something happened in Rockford.”
Well, come to find out, the one guy that was there knew the girlfriend of
the fellow that was murdered, and he just started blurting stuff out.
So yesterday after opening statements I called V. Klavins, and Mr. Klavins
told me that I probably should talk to you this morning, and—he’s the magistrate
in the 63rd District Court up in Rockford.
Juror 14 further stated that, “There were specifics, because the deceased girlfriend [sic]
had relayed this to one of the gentlemen that were working on my truck.” McCullough’s lawyer
then asked, “[a]nd did they specify any names . . .” Juror 14 replied,
No. The only thing that was ever said about names is, if you gave me the
names of the guys, one of ‘em I guess was from Ada. I don’t know exactly what
the deal was. But I didn’t even know the names at that point, who the defendants
were, other than the fact that I was here, but I couldn’t remember Mr.
McCullough’s name at that point.
The trial court did not find prejudice arising from Juror 14’s concern, and there was no objection
to the juror continuing to serve on the jury
In People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88-89; 566 NW2d 229 (1977) our Supreme Court
stated:
A defendant tried by jury has a right to a fair and impartial jury. . . .
[J]urors may only consider the evidence that is presented to them in open court.
Where the jury considers extraneous facts not introduced in evidence, this
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deprives a defendant of his rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and
assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment.
In order to establish that the extrinsic influence constitutes error requiring
reversal, the defendant must initially prove two points. First, the defendant must
prove that the jury was exposed to extraneous influences. Second, the defendant
must establish that these extraneous influences created a real and substantial
possibility that they could have affected the jury’s verdict. [(Citations omitted).]
We conclude that McCullough failed to establish that Juror 14’s conversation with his
mechanic created a real and substantial possibility that extraneous facts not introduced in
evidence could have affected the jury’s verdict. The trial court conducted an examination by
questioning Juror 14 in regard to his conversation with his mechanic. Defense counsel’s concern
was that the mechanic mentioned names in attempting to discuss the case with Juror 14.
However, Juror 14 indicated that the mechanic did not use names to reference the offender(s),
but indicated that the mechanic stated that one of the alleged offenders was from Ada. However,
as the trial court noted, none of the defendants or Johnigan was from Ada. Significantly, Juror
14 expressed that nothing transpired that would influence his judgment or prevent him from
rendering a fair and impartial verdict. Accordingly, McCullough failed to establish plain error
affecting his substantial rights
2. Coercive Instruction
McCullough next argues that trial court erred in giving a coercive deadlock jury
instruction during the second day of deliberations. The intentional relinquishment of a known
right constitutes a waiver, which extinguishes the error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). We conclude McCullough waived this issue.
The jury sent the trial court a note, which provided that, “We are at an impasse. What do
we do? What can be discussed when everyone is not in the room?” The trial court stated,
“[s]tarting with the second question first, ‘What can be discussed when everyone is not in the
room,’ the answer is nothing. This is a twelve-member jury panel, and no discussions can be had
without all twelve members participating. Everybody body has to participate in all discussions
pertaining to this case. It is strictly forbidden to discuss it in separate context.” In response to
the first question, the trial court gave standard deadlock jury instruction.
Here, the trial court discussed the note, his charge and the colloquy it had with Juror 14
after giving the jury the deadlock instruction. The trial court expressly asked defense counsel if
more was needed and defense counsel declined. In fact, defense counsel plainly expressed
satisfaction with the instruction. “Because defense counsel approved the trial court’s response,
defendant has waived this issue on appeal.” People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d
144 (2000).
McCullough next claims that the instruction “accused the hold-out juror of violating the
law by adamantly sticking to her personal belief that McCullough was not guilty.” However, as
expressed by defense counsel, the trial court properly explained that although, “[n]o one has to
surrender their honest conviction,” . . . “everyone has to explain the rational basis for their
opinions, and deliberate and discuss the case with a view toward reaching an agreement if they
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can without violating their own conscience.” Further, contrary to McCullough’s claim on
appeal, the trial court’s instruction did not relate to a particular juror, it applied to all the jurors.
The instruction was not coercive, and there is no error.
3. Trial Court’s Communication with Juror 14
McCullough next argues that trial court erred in having direct communication with Juror
14. McCullough specifically claims that “[w]hen the Judge communicated to defense counsel
about the jury’s foreperson’s note, he indicated that the foreperson had approached him directly:
‘There’s no name on it, but it’s generically signed, ‘Foreman McCullough jury,’ And I have no
reason to doubt that’s where it came from, since it came directly from the individual to my
hand.’ While the Judge read the note from the Foreperson to all counsel on record, it will never
be known what was discussed off the record.” There was no objection to the trial court’s
decision on this issue. This Court reviews unpreserved claims of appeal for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
McCullough’s claim must be rejected because, as he admits above, there is no evidence
of a communication between Juror 14 and the trial court. The record only indicates that Juror 14
gave the trial court the note, and that the trial court read the note into the record with all counsel
present. There was no allegation of improper conduct in the lower court, and thus, the record
cannot support McCullough’s claim that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s alleged
communication with Juror 14. Accordingly, McCullough has failed to establish plain error
affecting his substantial rights.
4. Replacement of Deliberating Juror
McCullough next argues that the trial court erred in replacing Juror 13, who had been
identified as a holdout for acquittal, when Juror 13 failed to appear on the third day of
deliberations. This Court, relying on MCL 768.18, has previously addressed the replacement of
a deliberating juror with an alternate juror. People v Tate, 244 Mich App 553, 562; 624 NW2d
524 (2001); People v Dry Land Marina, Inc, 175 Mich App 322, 325; 437 NW2d 391 (1989).
MCL 768.18, provides that:
Any judge of a court of record in this state about to try a felony case which is
likely to be protracted, may order a jury impaneled of not to exceed 14 members,
who shall have the same qualifications and shall be impaneled in the same manner
as is, or may be, provided by law for impaneling juries in such courts. All of
those jurors shall sit and hear the cause. Should any condition arise during the
trial of the cause which in the opinion of the trial court justifies the excusal of any
of the jurors so impaneled from further service, he may do so and the trial shall
proceed, unless the number of jurors be reduced to less than 12. In the event that
more than 12 jurors are left on the jury after the charge of the court, the clerk of
the court in the presence of the trial judge shall place the names of all of the jurors
on slips, folded so as to conceal the names thereon, in a suitable box provided for
that purpose, and shall draw therefrom the names of a sufficient number to reduce
the jury to 12 members who shall then proceed to determine the issue presented in
the manner provided by law.
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Relying solely on MCL 768.18, Tate and Dry Land Marina addressed the replacement of
a deliberating juror with an alternate juror. Dry Land Marina noted, and Tate reiterated that,
“while a defendant has a fundamental interest in retaining the composition of the jury as
originally chosen, he has an equally fundamental right to have a fair and impartial jury made up
of persons able and willing to cooperate, a right that is protected by removing a juror unable or
unwilling to cooperate.” Tate, supra at 562. Thus, “[r]emoval of a juror under Michigan law is
therefore at the discretion of the trial court, weighing a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair
and impartial jury with his right to retain the jury originally chosen to decide his fate.” Tate,
supra at 562. Tate also distinguished the defendant’s claim that “a ‘just cause’ requirement is
mandated by a defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury originally impaneled to hear his
case,” as primarily concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
Defendant McCullough maintains that the trial court must find “just cause” to replace a
deliberating juror with an alternate. We conclude there is no merit to McCullough’s claim. We
agree with Tate that there is no “just cause” requirement. MCL 768.18 merely provides that,
“[s]hould any condition arise during the trial of the cause which in the opinion of the trial court
justifies the excusal of any of the jurors so impaneled from further service, he may do so and the
trial shall proceed, unless the number of jurors be reduced to less than 12.” A trial court has
discretion to replace a deliberating juror with an alternate juror. Tate, supra. A trial court abuses
its discretion when it fails to select from a range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006), cert den ___ US ___;
127 S Ct 1261; 167 L Ed 2d 76 (2007); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231
(2003). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this matter.
Admittedly, the present case may be distinguished from Tate and Dry Land Marina,
because the trial court here did not question Juror 13 before removing her from the jury.
Nonetheless, it is significant that Juror 13 refused to return to court to fulfill her duties as a juror.
The trial court properly concluded that she was no longer able or willing to serve on the jury, and
thus removed her from the jury.
Further, at the time Tate and Dry Land Marina were decided, MCR 6.411 provided that:
The court may impanel more than 12 jurors. If more than the number of
jurors required to decide the case are left on the jury before deliberations are to
begin, the names of the jurors must be placed in a container and names drawn
from it to reduce the number of jurors to the number required to decide the case.
The jurors eliminated by this process are to be discharged after the jury retires to
deliberate.
Effective September 1, 2001, MCR 6.411 was amended and expressly expanded the trial court’s
power to replace jurors with alternates, including deliberating jurors:
The court may impanel more than 12 jurors. If more than the number of
jurors required to decide the case are left on the jury before deliberations are to
begin, the names of the jurors must be placed in a container and names drawn
from it to reduce the number of jurors to the number required to decide the case.
The court may retain the alternate jurors during deliberations. If the court does
so, it shall instruct the alternate jurors not to discuss the case with any other
-12-
person until the jury completes its deliberations and is discharged. If an alternate
juror replaces a juror after the jury retires to consider its verdict, the court shall
instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.[2]
Thus, there is no doubt that the trial court had legal authority to replace a juror during
deliberations.
While Tate and Dry Land Marina address replacement of deliberating jurors, they did not
address jurors unwilling to serve. Juror 13, and not the trial court, requested an alternate replace
her, and thus, it cannot be said that the trial court removed a willing juror. Indeed, the trial court
here protected the parties’ right a fair and impartial jury by “ by removing a juror unable or
unwilling to cooperate.” Tate, supra at 562. Also important is that Tate and Dry Land Marina
did not rely on a court rule expressly proving for the replacement of deliberating jurors. The
court rule applicable here sanctions the replacement of deliberating jurors, and attempts to
marginalize prejudice by requiring the trial court to “instruct the jury to begin its deliberations
anew” as does MCR 6.411. Because juries are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions,
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), MCR 6.411 effectively preserves
defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict.
2
The amendments to MCR 6.411 are similar to the 1999 amendments to FR Crim P 24(c), which
provided, in pertinent part:
The court may direct that not more than 6 jurors in addition to the regular jury be
called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in
which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform
their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the
same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall
take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and
privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular
juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.
Current FR Crim P 24(c), amended on April 29, 1999 and effective December 1, 1999, provides
in pertinent part:
Retention of Alternate Jurors. When the jury retires to consider the verdict, the
court in its discretion may retain the alternate jurors during deliberations. If the
court decides to retain the alternate jurors, it shall ensure that they do not discuss
the case with any other person unless and until they replace a regular juror during
deliberations. If the alternate replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the
court shall instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew.
-13-
McCullough further maintains that the trial court should have had summoned Juror 13
and conducted a hearing in regard to her claimed illness and refusal to deliberate. In support of
this option, McCullough notes that several federal cases have indicated that, “[w]hen possible
juror misconduct is brought to the trial judge’s attention he has a duty to investigate and to
determine whether there may have been a violation of the sixth amendment.” US v Shackelford,
777 F2d 1141, 1145 (CA 6, 1985). However, the cases cited by McCullough involve extrinsic
influences on a juror, such as threatening phone calls, conversing with a defendant and reading
news articles. Id. Here, McCullough has not alleged that Juror 13 was exposed to any extrinsic
influence; rather, personal reasons underlie her inability or unwillingness to rejoin the
deliberating jury.
Nonetheless, there is some support for McCullough’s claim that the trial court was
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing. In Riggs v State, 809 NE2d 322 (Ind 2004), the
Indiana Supreme Court addressed the replacement of deliberating jurors under a Indiana court
rule similar to MCR 2.114.3 In Riggs, the jury had deliberated for four hours when the trial court
received a note from the foreman, indicating, “‘We have a juror that’s become belligerent, not
willing to discuss the issues onhand [sic] pertaining to the case. Do we have any recourse?’” Id.
at 324. The trial court then, on the record, questioned the jury foreman about the note and
essentially learned “that the [allegedly belligerent juror] has reached an opinion and refuses now
to budge from that.” Id. at 325. The trial court excused the jury foreman, discussing the matter
with counsel, and re-called the jury foreman, who indicated that, the “particular juror is not
willing to work with any of the other jurors to talk out the various different charges.” Id. “The
State then reiterated its request that the juror be replaced, and [the defendant] responded that the
record was not sufficiently clear to warrant the removal of a juror.”
The trial court then received another note from the allegedly belligerent juror requesting
he see the trial court. Riggs, supra at 326. Before the trial court the juror indicated that “[t]he
head juror accused me of trying to defend the defendant and I’m not going to take that.” Id.
Further, that “I’m trying to give a fair and impartial determination to this evidence and to this
Court.” Id. The trial court dismissed the juror, holding:
3
In St Trial P Rule 47(B), provides:
(B) Alternate Jurors. The Court may direct that no more than three (3) jurors in
addition to the regular jury be called and empanelled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury returns its verdict, become or are found to be unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same
manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same
functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate
juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury brings
in its verdict. If alternate jurors are permitted to attend deliberations, they shall be
instructed not to participate.
-14-
First of all the Court did in fact observe the demeanor of the juror and listened to
his words to the point that the Court is troubled if it sends this juror back to
deliberate . . . . I am fearful of the events that would occur back there. . . . The
Court will also . . . allow any party to examine the witnesses . . . including the
bailiff . . . [that] delivered this note and appeared to be in somewhat of a panic,
that they were screaming at each other.
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the “record is not sufficient to support
removal of a juror after deliberations have begun.” Riggs, supra at 327. The Indiana Supreme
Court specifically mentioned that, “there was no interview of [the juror] regarding the alleged
threats, and no interview of other jurors to establish fear of violence.”
There are several important differences between Riggs and the instant case. Most
important, Juror 13, and not the trial court, requested an alternate replace her, and thus, the trial
court did not remove a willing juror. Further, the applicable Indiana court rule, In St Trial P
Rule 47(B), does not require the trial court to “instruct the jury to begin its deliberations anew”
as does MCR 6.411. Thus, under the circumstances, McCullough has failed to show any basis to
conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Several options were available to the trial court to address Juror 13’s apparent inability or
unwillingness to continue serving as a juror. The trial court accepted Juror 13’s claim that she
and her children had taken ill. The trial court noted that Juror 13 sounded weak and frail, and
was later informed that Juror 13 indicated she was going to see a doctor. The trial court
considered its options and elected to replace Juror 13 with an alternate juror. We cannot
conclude that the trial court’s decision to replace Juror 13 was an abuse its discretion. MCR
6.411 expressly sanctions replacement of a deliberating juror with an alternate, and thus,
replacement of Juror 13 was not unprincipled. And while we can readily imagine instances in
which MCR 6.411 can be abused, we cannot conclude under the facts presented in this case that
the trial court abused its discretion in replacing Juror 13.
5. Improperly Instructed Alternate Juror
McCullough next claims that the trial court “abused its discretion by seating an alternate
juror who had been excused three days earlier without being properly preserved from taint.”
Defense counsel specifically objected to the alternate juror, stating:
Finally, the court rules require that alternate jurors can be replaced or the
court can replace jurors if it’s an appropriate reason. Again, as I said, I don’t
think it’s appropriate, and secondly, [MCR 6.411] says if the jurors have been
retained. These jurors have not been retained. They were released from service
last Tuesday, which was four days ago, three days ago.
The trial court excused the alternate juror and failed to instruct her not to “discuss the
case with any other person until the jury completes its deliberations and is discharged.” Rather,
the trial court indicated that she could “go about [her] business.” Thus, the trial court did not
comply with MCR 6.411.
-15-
Any error in failing to comply with MCR 6.411 is plainly harmless. Upon recalling the
alternate juror, the trial court conducted voir dire to determine if the alternate juror had discussed
the case with anyone. McCullough’s counsel was present at the hearing, and did not elicit
evidence suggesting that the alternate juror discussed the case since being excused. Accordingly,
no harm can be attributed to the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the alternate juror, and
McCullough is not entitled to relief.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
McCullough claims several instances of misconduct by the prosecutor that require
reversal. This Court reviews de novo a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. People v Abraham,
256 Mich App 265, 272; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). There being no timely objection to the claimed
misconduct, this Court’s review is limited to plain error which affected substantial rights. People
v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
1. Examination of Thompson
McCullough argues that the prosecution committed misconduct during the direct
examination of Thompson. McCullough first specifically claims that the prosecution improperly
asked Thompson leading questions. As previously mentioned, Thompson is Gordon’s sister, and
Thompson dated McCullough off and on for eight years.
Before trial, Thompson and the prosecution had entered into an agreement, which the
prosecution explained as:
That we are to dismiss the embezzlement charges against you. You are to
make restitution for the embezzlement, which I think is around four thousand
dollars. That your probation hearing, which has been set for January 2004, is
moved to December of 2004. That you are to testify truthfully in all proceedings
connected with this case. And that you were to try to help us locate Corey
McCullough, who was then at large.
When asked by the prosecution, “[i]s all that true,” Thompson replied:
It’s not as cut and dry as you say. I have been harassed all the time,
arrested, gave tickets at my house, arrested in front of my boys, picked up on –
when they came to arrest me they said is was a ten thousand dollar bond.
They got me to the Sheriff’s Department, interrogated me for a few hours,
made my bond 20,000, arrested my mom. Then when I got into trouble, came and
told me that they’d put me in front of the same judge that [McCullough] and
[Gordon] had, and that, you know, I was going to go to prison and all that.
Thompson continued this tone throughout her direct examination.
-16-
She also maintained that she could not answer certain questions posed by the prosecution.
In one instance, shortly after she began testifying, the following colloquy occurred:
Prosecution Ms. Thompson, did it become apparent to you that Mr.
McCullough was talking to Mr. Johnigan and that Mr. Johnigan was lost?
Thompson.
No, I really can’t say that because I wasn’t on the other end of the
phone, so I just can’t say that and be, you know, and be certain about it, because
I’m not sure.
Prosecution
All right. Why are you doing this?
Thompson.
Excuse me? Doing what?
Prosecution
Why are you denying the obvious? Why are you doing this?
Thompson.
I mean, I’m not going to sit up here and – just because of an
assumption and sit up here and say that’s true and it’s not. I mean, when you
guys questioned me I told you that, you know, I didn’t know for sure and, you
know, I assumed and stuff like that, but I don’t know because I wasn’t on the
phone and I didn’t answer any calls. So, I just can’t say yes because I didn’t
answer the phone.
At this point, the trial court interjected, stating that “[the prosecution] may treat the witness as a
hostile witness for purposes of perhaps focusing in with leading questions, which may get us
through this a little faster.” The prosecution then quoted the transcript of Thompson’s interview
with police, in which she stated:
When he called for directions, he was already I guess real close to Grand
Rapids. He just needed to know where to get off at. I guess, but that’s when I
found out he was coming, because Corey was like, something about. ‘He can’t
even get here,’ or something. I don’t know.
Thus, Thompson at least knew that Johnigan “needed to know where to get off at,” and was
clearly attempting to avoid directly answering the prosecution’s question.
Within an hour after Thompson took the stand, the trial court indicated “I think this is a
good point for a mercy break and suggest that Ms. Thompson go home and take some Gingko
pills or something.” Thompson replied, “[g]o see my therapist or something, I’m nervous.” The
trial court then stated,
Ms. Thompson, you’re rambling again. We need just for you to answer the
questions to the best of your ability and we can get in and out of here. We could
have been done with you by now, but we’re going to have to start this all over
again after the holiday.
Now, my hope is that you can have a restful weekend. Put on your
thinking cap, get plenty of sleep, eat properly and rest properly, and perhaps with
your memory focused on these events you can come back, answer the questions
-17-
crisply, and we’ll get through this and have you out of here in no time. But if
we’re going to continue this exercise, we’ll be at this for days
We conclude the prosecution did not improperly question Thompson. A finding of
misconduct may not be based upon a prosecutor’s good faith effort to admit evidence. People v
Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). Although Thompson agreed to testify
for the prosecution, she was argumentative and clearly attempted to evade the prosecution’s
answers. The prosecution noted that she had answered “I don’t know,” over sixty times in one
hour of testimony. When considering Thompson’s other unresponsive answers, including “I’m
not sure,” I’m not certain,” and “I don’t remember,” we conclude that the prosecution did not
commit misconduct by attempting to elicit testimony from an uncooperative witness.
2. Improper Hearsay
McCullough next argues that the prosecution improperly elicited hearsay evidence when
using a videotape of Thompson’s interview with police. However, the videotape was clearly
used to impeach Thompson’s testimony at trial, which, as explained, was argumentative and
evasive to the extent that it was misleading. “The credibility of a witness may be attacked by
any party, including the party calling the witness.” MRE 607. McCullough’s claim of improper
use of hearsay testimony to commit prosecutorial misconduct is without merit.
Last, McCullough argues that the prosecution improperly asked police officer Charles
DeWitt whether a person could say “I’m in the house, every thing is under control,” within a ten
second phone call. Although the prosecution did improperly suggest the content of the phone
call, the trial court remedied the problem, explaining that:
I think what we have here a time frame, and we can all do a little
experiment as to how many words you can get into three seconds or four seconds
of conversation. And depending on how clever we are, we can probably get part
of the Gettysburg address in. Go ahead Mr. Schieber. I think we get the point.
McCullough has not shown prejudice in this regard and reversal is not required.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
McCullough argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to object and failing to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Because a Ginther4 hearing was not held, this Court’s
review is limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record. People v Wilson, 242 Mich App
350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). “Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of
counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. . . . [A] trial court’s findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error. . . . Questions of constitutional law are reviewed . . . de novo.”
People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246, 249 (2002).
4
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-18-
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. LeBlanc, supra at 578. To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that counsel’s representation so prejudiced the defendant that he was deprived of a fair trial.
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). With respect to the prejudice
aspect of the test, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different, and that the attendant
proceedings were fundamentally unfair and unreliable. Id. at 312, 326-327; People v Rodgers,
248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). A defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was sound trial strategy. People v Carbin, 463 Mich
590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
1. Failure to Object
McCullough claims “trial counsel repeatedly failed to register appropriate objections to
inadmissible evidence offered by the prosecution.” However, in regard to this issue,
McCullough fails to identify any instances in which defense counsel failed to object. A party
may not leave it to this Court to search for the factual basis to sustain or reject his position, but
must support factual statements with specific references to the record. People v Traylor, 245
Mich App 460, 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). Moreover, we rejected McCullough’s individual
claims of prosecutorial misconduct and find no error. Thus, McCullough’s claim that counsel’s
failure to object to misconduct by the prosecutor is without merit.
2. Failure to Challenge Sufficiency of Evidence
McCullough next claims that “defense counsel failed to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence introduced at trial.” This claim is without merit. As McCullough notes, “the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence would have been properly preserved for appellate review even if the
trial court summarily denied both motions.” Because McCullough can challenge the sufficiency
of evidence on appeal, though he does not, defense counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency
of evidence at trial cannot not considered prejudicial.
3. Failure to Object to Juror 14
McCullough next claims that “defense counsel did not object to Juror [14] remaining on
the jury, even after his initial misconduct was disclosed.” Defendant “must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different, and that the attendant proceedings were fundamentally unfair and unreliable.
Pickens, supra at 312. Here, McCullough speculates that Juror 14 received misinformation from
his mechanic, but fails to identify the content of the misinformation. McCullough again has
failed to establish prejudice.
4. Evidentiary Hearing
McCullough next claims that, “in the alternative, this case should be remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.” However, considering the above claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, McCullough has not established a factual basis to further explore the ineffectiveness of
defense counsel’s performance. Thus, remand is unnecessary.
-19-
D. Evidentiary Decisions
“The decision whether to admit evidence is within a trial court’s discretion.” People v
Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). An evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a
criminal case unless, after an examination of the entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is
more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative. People v Smith, 243 Mich
App 657, 680; 625 NW2d 46 (2000).
1. Admission of the Weapon Cache
McCullough argues that the evidence of assault weapons found in Johnigan’s home was
improperly admitted because none of the assault weapons were used to kill French.
“Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of
Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.” MRE 402. “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403.
The trial court properly admitted the assault weapons found at Johnigan’s home because
it tended to establish McCullough’s involvement in the robbery and murder of French.
Testimony at trial showed that Gordon had recently met French, and that Gordon knew French
had a large quantity of marijuana. Gordon and McCullough talked more frequently after Gordon
met French. On February 3, 2003, Johnson gave Gordon French’s phone number to “highlight”
a business deal. Shortly after, McCullough called Johnigan and requested that he travel from
Grand Rapids to Detroit to acquire heroin for French, who McCullough did not know. In Grand
Rapids, Johnigan followed McCullough and Gordon to French’s house, where Johnigan
admittedly shot and killed French. One of the guns used to kill French was found in Johnigan’s
home. The trial court properly found that Johnigan’s large cache of weapons tended to show that
McCullough recruited Johnigan, a hitman, to kill French, or at least, to help him rob French
through threat of deadly force.
2. Testimony that Drug Dealers Ransacked French’s House
The trial court did not commit error requiring reversal in admitting testimony that drug
dealers searched French’s home.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the decision whether to admit evidence.
Katt, supra. An evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a criminal case unless, after an
examination of the entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that the
error was outcome determinative. Smith, supra.
McCullough claims that the trial court improperly allowed Detective Patrick Frederick to
testify as an expert in regard to how drug dealers search a house to find drugs and money.
-20-
However, at trial, there was no dispute that French’s home was ransacked and all agreed that it
was searched for drugs and money. Indeed, Johnigan testified that he searched French’s home
for drugs and money. Thus, there is little probability that any error was outcome determinative,
and reversal is not required.
3. Testimony of Brandon O’Connor
McCullough argues that the trial court committed error in admitting O’Connor’s
testimony that suggested Gordon had robbed him in a manner similar to the instant case to
establish a scheme. At trial, Gordon denied taking part in the robbery. Before both juries, the
prosecutor sought to impeach Gordon’s testimony with police reports indicating that Gordon had
previously committed robberies using duct tape to secure the victims. McCullough’s counsel
objected based on relevance as to McCullough, but the trial court overruled the objection, finding
the testimony relates to Gordon’s credibility. The prosecutor asked Gordon whether he bound
French with duct tape, and when Gordon denied it, the prosecutor asked whether he knew
O’Conner, the person Gordon allegedly bound with duct tape and robbed in 1999. Gordon
denied robbing O’Conner.
The prosecution then called O’Connor as a rebuttal witness to testify that Gordon had
asked him to buy a television, and then robbed him. O’Connor reluctantly admitted that, in
1999, he was robbed by a person named Pee-Wee (Gordon’s alias), who bound him in duct tape.
He also admitted that the person that robbed him was Marcello Sylvester’s cousin. Gordon is
Sylvester’s cousin. O’Connor also admitted that the person who robbed him had fathered a child
to Ms. Crawford, which Gordon did. However, O’Connor denied that Gordon was the person
who robbed him.
Even though O’Connor denied that Gordon had robbed him, he admitted that he
previously indicated that the person who robbed him was Marcello Sylvester’s cousin and had
fathered a child with Crawford. The prosecutor essentially impeached O’Connor’s failure to
identify Gordon as the robber by highlighting facts that make it improbable that Gordon was not
the robber. Evidence that the robber was Marcello Sylvester’s cousin and had fathered a child
with Crawford is sufficient to allow to reasonable juror to conclude that Gordon had robbed
O’Connor, despite O’Connor’s protestations that Gordon did not rob him. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to impeach Gordon’s denial of
involvement with evidence that he previously had used duct tape to commit robberies. A
decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion. People v
Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 637; 696 NW2d 754 (2005).
E. Cumulative Error
McCullough argues that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors denied
him a fair trial. “The cumulative effect of several minor errors may warrant reversal even where
individual errors in the case would not. Reversal is warranted only if the effect of the errors was
so seriously prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial.” People v Werner, 254 Mich
App 528, 544; 659 NW2d 688 (2002) (Citations omitted). McCullough has failed to establish
that he was denied a fair trial. Here, none of claimed errors alone warrant reversal because of the
lack of prejudice. Further, McCullough fails to show how the alleged errors relate to one another
to cumulatively increase prejudice. Accordingly, reversal is not required.
-21-
III. Docket No. 261724
A. Prosecution’s Peremptory Challenges
We review de novo issues regarding a trial court’s proper application of the law. People
v Bell, 473 Mich 275, 282; 702 NW2d 128 (2005). We review for clear error a trial court’s
decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent under Batson. Id.
A peremptory challenge to strike a juror may not be exercised on the basis of race. Bell,
supra citing Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 89, 96-98; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986). A
three-step process determines whether there has been an improper exercise of peremptory
challenges. Id.
First, there must be a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, the opponent of
the challenge must show that: (1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial
group; (2) peremptory challenges are being exercised to exclude members of a
certain racial group from the jury pool; and (3) the circumstances raise an
inference that the exclusion was based on race. The Batson Court directed trial
courts to consider all relevant circumstances in deciding whether a prima facie
showing has been made. Once the opponent of the challenge makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the challenging party to come forward with a neutral
explanation for the challenge. The neutral explanation must be related to the
particular case being tried and must provide more than a general assertion in order
to rebut the prima facie showing. If the challenging party fails to come forward
with a neutral explanation, the challenge will be denied. Finally, the trial court
must decide whether the nonchallenging party has carried the burden of
establishing purposeful discrimination. Since Batson, the Supreme Court has
commented that the establishment of purposeful discrimination “comes down to
whether the trial court finds the . . . race-neutral explanations to be credible.” The
Court further stated, “Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the . . .
[challenger’s] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations
are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial
strategy.” If the trial court finds that the reasons proffered were a pretext, the
peremptory challenge will be denied. [Bell, supra at 282-283.]
Gordon challenges the prosecution’s neutral explanation of his peremptory challenge.
“The neutral explanation must be related to the particular case being tried and must provide more
than a general assertion in order to rebut the prima facie showing.” Bell, supra at 283, citing
Batson, supra at 97-98.
Plaintiff challenges three of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges: Venireperson
Patterson, a male African-American; Venireperson Jones, a female African American; and
Venireperson Cardenas, a female Hispanic.
After defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s peremptory dismissal of these jurors,
the trial court required the prosecution tender neutral explanations for their removal. The
prosecutor explained that he removed Venireperson Patterson because he did not respond (by
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nodding like the other panel members) to the prosecutor’s first question on voir dire. The
prosecutor also explained:
. . . I apologize to him for this, but he doesn’t appear very smart. I was over there
asking the question about decision making and [he was] rambling and it went on
and on and I’m physically over near him and Ms. Cardenas is right in front of me
and she was rolling her eyes at some point about his answer.
In regard to Venireperson Cardenas, the prosecutor explained that:
her boyfriend got arrested and she very obviously reacted to that. Her eyes welled
up and she was obviously close to tears. At one point I asked her if she was all
right. That an arrest situation, it’s a big issue with her, it’s an issue with me and
so she’s gone.
In regard to Jones, the prosecutor explained that: “Ms. Jones because I thought of the remaining
jurors she was one most likely to be, in part because she had just too many contacts with
relatives in the criminal justice system for me to perfectly (sic) at ease with her.”
We conclude the prosecutor’s explanations of his peremptory challenges were raciallyneutral and adequate. “[T]he establishment of purposeful discrimination ‘comes down to
whether the trial court finds the . . . race-neutral explanations to be credible.’” Bell, supra at 282
(Citations omitted). “‘Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the . . .
[challenger’s] demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by
whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.’” Id. (Citations
ommited). Here, the trial court accepted each of the prosecutor’s explanations.
Also, there is evidence that Venireperson Patterson’s answer to the prosecutor’s question
was “not really responsive” and that other jurors audibly groaned at Venireperson Patterson’s
lengthy and irrelevant response. The trial court did not err in finding this explanation for a
peremptory challenge both racially-neutral and adequate. Further, that Venireperson Cardenas
became emotional with the mention of the arrest of her boyfriend is plainly a racially-neutral and
adequate explanation of potential bias against the prosecution, and permissible justification for a
peremptory challenge. Last, Venireperson Jones’ contacts with police presented potential juror
bias in this case. The prosecution’s theory was largely based on the jury accepting circumstantial
evidence presented by police. The prosecution clearly intended to prevent seating a juror that did
not accept this evidence simply based on a juror’s negative prior contacts with police. The trial
court properly held that the prosecution explanation for its peremptory challenges both raciallyneutral and adequate.
B. Testimony of Brandon O’Connor
Gordon, as did McCullough, argues that the trial court committed error in admitting
O’Connor’s testimony.5 Here, even though O’Connor denied that Gordon had robbed him, he
5
O’Conner’s testimony in this case followed his testimony in the previous trial.
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admitted that he previously indicated that the person who robbed him was Marcello Sylvester’s
cousin and had fathered a child with Crawford. The prosecutor essentially impeached
O’Connor’s failure to identify Gordon as the robber by highlighting facts that make it
improbable that Gordon was not the robber. Evidence that the robber was Marcello Sylvester’s
cousin and had fathered a child with Crawford is sufficient to allow to reasonable juror to
conclude that Gordon had robbed O’Connor using a similar method of binding the victim. In
this context, admitting O’Connor’s testimony tended to show that he used duct tape to secure his
victims, which plainly contradicts his and Johnigan’s testimony that Johnigan alone robbed and
killed French. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to impeach
Gordon’s denial of involvement with evidence that he previously used duct taped to commit
robberies. A decision on a close evidentiary question ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion.
Meshell, supra at 637. Reversal is not required.
C. Sufficiency of Evidence
The prosecution presented sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Gordon committed or aided and abetted the murder of French.
This Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. In doing so,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494 (2005).
The elements of second-degree murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by the defendant’s act,
(3) with malice, and (4) without justification. People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 534; 664 NW2d
685 (2003). To obtain a conviction on an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor must prove
that: (1) a crime was committed either by the defendant or another person, (2) the defendant
performed acts or gave encouragement which assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the
defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
commission at the time the defendant gave the aid or encouragement.
Further,
[m]alice is defined as the intent to kill or to do great bodily harm, or as the
willful and wanton disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the
defendant’s actions will be to cause death or great bodily harm. People v Kelly,
423 Mich 261, 273; 378 NW2d 365 (1985); People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 728,
299 NW2d 304 (1980). Malice may not be inferred solely from the intent to
commit another felony but it may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the commission of that felony. Kelly, supra at 273; Aaron, supra at
727-730.
A defendant may be held vicariously liable for a killing committed by
another if he had the same mens rea required to convict the principal, that is,
malice as defined above. Kelly, supra at 278; Aaron, supra at 731. However, “if
the aider and abettor participates in a crime with knowledge of his principal’s
intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, he is acting with ‘wanton and willful
disregard’ sufficient to support a finding of malice.” Kelly, supra at 278-279. An
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aider and abettor may also be held liable “on agency principles” where he acts
“intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a common plan.” Aaron, supra at 731.
[People v Spearman, 195 Mich App 434, 438-439; 491 NW2d 606 (1992), rev in
part on other grounds by People v Veling, 443 Mich 23; 504 NW2d 456 (1993).]
We conclude there is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Gordon committed second-degree murder. Further, there is substantially more
evidence from which a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gordon aided and
abetted Johnigan in the robbery of French.
The jury was not required to believe Johnigan’s testimony that he alone killed French and
searched the home. This Court should not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the
weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489
NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Indeed, Johnigan testified that he did not take
Viagra samples seen at French’s home, which McCullough and Thompson eventually possessed.
Also, Johnigan testified that after he left French’s home, he went directly to Detroit. However,
Thompson testified that she saw Johnigan’s car at her house later in the evening. She also
testified that she saw Gordon later in the evening, and that two to three persons were standing
near the open trunk of Johnigan’s car. Thus, the jury may have simply rejected Johnigan’s
testimony that he acted alone in the robbery and murder of French.
The record reflects that shortly after Gordon discovered that French was a drug trafficker
who required heroin for his personal use, he immediately began to talk with McCullough on the
phone with more frequency. Gordon obviously told McCullough about French’s money and
drugs, as McCullough eventually arranged for Johnigan to travel from Detroit to Grand Rapids,
and eventually to French’s home. Upon Johnigan’s arrival in Grand Rapids, Gordon arranged to
visit French’s home. Thus, Gordon facilitated the meeting between Johnigan and French.
Further, Gordon first entered French’s home, made a ten second phone call to McCullough, after
which Johnigan certainly entered the home. Thus, Gordon facilitated Johnigan’s, and possibly
McCullough’s, entry into French’s home.
There is no dispute that French was struck in the head, duct-taped and stabbed with a
knife in his arm before he died from being shot twelve times. The prosecution discounted
Johnigan’s testimony that he alone robbed and murdered French, and argued that at least two
persons subdued and bound French and subsequently searched French’s home. The trier of fact
determines what inferences can be fairly drawn from the evidence and determines the weight to
be accorded to the inferences. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002).
There is evidence that supports a rational jury’s conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that
Gordon directly participated in the robbery and murder of French.
Further, Gordon testified that he drove away from French’s home with McCullough soon
after Johnigan entered French’s home. However, after the brief ten second phone call at 11:58
p.m., neither Gordon, McCullough or Johnigan placed or answered any phone calls for
approximately 2 hours. And not only did Gordon not place any calls during this time, but he did
not answer calls at 12:01 a.m., 12:10 a.m., 12:16 a.m., and two calls at 11:58 p.m. and 11:59
p.m., went straight to his voicemail. A rational jury could find that Gordon was inside of
French’s home during the two-hour period after the ten-second-phone call. Given this finding, a
rational jury could readily conclude that, that during the two-hour period, Gordon at least knew
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that French was being tortured in an attempt to extract the location of his drugs and money.
Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Gordon aided and abetted
in the robbery and murder of French.
D. Replacement of Deliberating Juror
Similar to Issue I in Docket No. 260592, the jury in this case, during deliberations, wrote
a note to the trial court, apparently asking if an unidentified juror could be excused if the juror
could not reach a decision on a charge. The trial court replied that jurors could not be “voted off
the island,” and that the jury should continue to deliberate.
The jury continued to deliberate for the rest of Thursday and Friday, and was dismissed
for the weekend. The following Monday, Juror 9 left the courthouse after lunch and indicated to
court staff that she would not return. The trial court discussed the matter on the record with all
counsel present. The prosecution suggested that an alternate be seated, finding significant that
Juror 9 had not indicated her vote. Defense counsel objected, again requesting that Juror 9 be
brought before the trial court for questioning. The trial court held:
Well, I guess I’m of the opinion that to bring [Juror 9] back would simply
be counterproductive. If I thought by brining her back and holding hands with her
we could woo her back to the process, I’d say let’s do it. But if we bring her in
here by force and against her will, I just don’t see her as being a productive
deliberating participant in the process. I think she seceded from the panel,
lawfully or not, and I think we have to accept that as a fete accompli. So to the
extent that you want us to go round her up and drag her back, I’m disinclined to
do that.
The trial court excused Juror 9 because she indicated in several ways that she would no
longer serve as a juror. The trial court found from her message that “the tone of her voice
certainly sounded sincere and I think she’s having physical problems, perhaps having some
difficulty sleeping and she said it’s affecting her and she just can’t do it anymore.” The trial
court found that Juror 9 was ill and that she simply would not attend trial. The trial court
considered the possibility of arresting Juror 9, but maintained that this action would not be
productive. The trial court also indicated that requiring Juror 9 remain on the jury would be
detrimental to the entire jury’s deliberations.
As in Issue I, we note that Tate, supra and Dry Land Marina, supra, do not address jurors
unwilling to serve and do not rely on amended MCR 2.114 to replace deliberating jurors.
Although defense counsel requested an evidentiary hearing, MCR 2.114 has no such
requirement. Gordon also claims, relying on People v Gardner, 37 Mich App 520, 526; 195
NW2d 62 (1972), that once a jury is sworn, a defendant has a right to have that particular
tribunal decide the matter. However, this argument relates to the Double Jeopardy Clause and
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concerns the dismissal of an entire jury, not the replacement of one juror. Tate, supra at 562.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in replacing a deliberating juror that is no longer
willing to serve.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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