RANDOLPH MCDANIEL V REBECCA THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RANDOLPH MCDANIEL,
UNPUBLISHED
August 5, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
LINDA MCDANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v
No. 278396
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-517115-NF
REBECCA THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
PROGRESSIVE HALCYON INSURANCE
COMPANY and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
Before: Owens, P.J., and O’Connell and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s1 motion for summary
disposition on the grounds that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. We
affirm.
On June 10, 2002, plaintiff was involved in a car accident with defendant that resulted in
plaintiff sustaining personal injuries requiring surgical intervention. Defendant filed for
bankruptcy on June 1, 2005, but provided no notice to plaintiff. On June 9, 2005, one day before
the statute of limitations ran, plaintiff filed his complaint in Wayne Circuit Court against
defendant. Plaintiff had difficulty serving defendant and, on August 26, 2005, requested an
1
Because plaintiff only appeals as to defendant Rebecca Thomas, all references to defendant are
to her.
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extension of the summons. The trial court granted plaintiff’s request and extended the summons
until October 7, 2005. On September 15, 2005, defendant’s bankruptcy attorney contacted
plaintiff’s counsel by telephone and sent a confirming letter advising that defendant had filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings which automatically stayed all litigation involving defendant.
Defendant’s bankruptcy discharge was entered September 27, 2005. Defendant was personally
served in the present litigation on October 6, 2005.
On November 14, 2005, defendant filed an answer, a jury demand, and affirmative
defenses. One of the affirmative defenses was that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter. On March 2, 2006, defendant filed for summary judgment under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10). The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, finding that the
statute of limitations had run because plaintiff failed to refile his claim during the 30-day
window after the stay expired as provided in 11 USCS § 108.
Plaintiff first argues on appeal that the statute of limitations on his claim was not expired
at the time of service on defendant. However, service and the duration of the summons are
irrelevant to the issue at hand. Under 11 USCS § 362(a)(1), defendant’s bankruptcy petition
operated as a stay against “the commencement . . . of a judicial . . . action or proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the [bankruptcy
action].” Plaintiff was not without a remedy, however. Under 11 USCS § 108(c), “if applicable
nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court
other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor . . . and such a period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of—
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the
commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay
under section 362 . . . .” Because defendant filed for bankruptcy before the three-year statute of
limitations ran on plaintiff’s claim, MCL 600.5805(10), plaintiff’s claim fell with the protection
of the statute. Taking the longer of the two provisions, the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s
claim did not expire until 30 days after the notice of termination or expiration of the stay to refile
his claim. 11 USCS § 108(c).
Plaintiff’s fundamental misunderstanding of the issues is best reflected in his claim that
“[b]ecause of the bankruptcy code’s tolling provision, Plaintiff’s complaint and his summons
must be treated as though they were filed on the first day they could have been, September 28,
2005.”2 This statement is provided without authority and, indeed, is contrary the applicable case
law and statutes. The parties agree that plaintiff filed his claim during the automatic bankruptcy
stay. “[A]ctions taken in violation of the stay are invalid and voidable and shall be voided absent
limited equitable circumstances.” Easley v Pettibone Mich Corp, 990 F2d 905, 911 (CA 6,
1993). Accordingly, plaintiff’s filing was invalid and voidable. Id. Once the September 15,
2005, letter notified plaintiff that there was a bankruptcy proceeding and that his filing was in
violation of the automatic stay, plaintiff had several avenues available to him. Plaintiff could
have requested the bankruptcy court to modify the automatic stay to permit his action against
2
The day the stay expired based on the bankruptcy court’s September 27, 2005 discharge.
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defendant pursuant to 11 USCS § 362(d). Id. at 909-910. Alternatively, the statute of limitations
was extended 30 days after the notice of termination or expiration of the automatic stay, and
plaintiff was permitted to refile his claim with the circuit court during that time. Id. at 912; see
also Ashby v Byrnes, 251 Mich App 537, 542-544; 651 NW2d 922 (2002), overruled on other
grounds by Mayberry v Gen Orthopedics, PC, 474 Mich 1; 704 NW2d 69 (2005). Plaintiff did
neither, instead requesting extensions on the summons of his invalid petition.
Plaintiff asserted at oral argument that he received no notice of the termination of stay.
Under 11 USCS § 108(c)(2), the 30 days runs “after notice of the termination or expiration of the
stay under section 362.” Section 362(c)(2)(C) provides that the stay automatically ends upon the
grant of a discharge. A letter dated October 6, 2005, provided to counsel for plaintiff a copy of
the bankruptcy discharge and stated, “the automatic stay is lifted.” Thus, plaintiff had notice of
the expiration of the stay under section 362, and the 30 days began to run. Even assuming this
letter did not constitute proper notice, as noted by the trial court, plaintiff filed a motion in the
bankruptcy court on June 21, 2006, requesting the case be reopened. By its very nature, such a
request implies knowledge that the case was closed, and closure of the case also extinguishes the
stay. 11 USCS § 362(c)(2)(A). Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff had notice of the end of the
stay, the 30 days provided in 11 USCS § 108(c) commenced, and plaintiff failed to refile his
complaint within those 30 days.
Moreover, contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the circumstances in this case do not rise to
the level required to constitute “equitable circumstances” that would avoid the voiding of
plaintiff’s complaint. Easley, supra at 911. Where a plaintiff has notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding and has been advised that his action is in violation of the stay, the loss of a claim for
failure to refile is insufficient prejudice to constitute an equitable exception. Id. at 912. In the
present case, plaintiff was clearly advised on September 15, 2005, of the existence of the
bankruptcy proceeding and informed that his filing was in violation of the automatic stay.
Defendant also did not “lull” plaintiff into believing she would not rely on the automatic stay.
Defendant’s bankruptcy counsel notified plaintiff of the automatic stay and one of her
affirmative defenses was lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant engaged in
“evasive tactics to avoid service” are inapposite. Even if plaintiff had managed to serve
defendant on the first day the summons was issued, his claim was still filed in violation of the
automatic stay and would have needed either authorization to continue by the bankruptcy court,
11 USCS 362(d), or to be refiled within 30 days of the expiration of the stay, 11 USCS § 108(c).
Because plaintiff did neither, the circuit court had no jurisdiction over the invalid petition, the
statute of limitations expired on October 27, 2005, and plaintiff lost his claim. Easley, supra at
912. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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